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I 
"Good managers, Mr. Drucker said, were the last century's heroes." 
Barnaby J. Feder. The New York Times Obituaries. November 12, 2005:A 13 
It has been a century of unprecedented disaster and cataclysms: two 
world wars, a Stalin, a Hitler, a Mao, and scores of lesser but no less 
murderous villains. Indeed we packed into every decade as much 
"history" as one usually finds in a century; and little of it was benign. Yet 
most of this world, and especially the developed world, somehow 
managed not only to recover from the catastrophes again and again but to 
regain direction and momentum - economic, social, even political. The 
main reason was that ordinalY people, people running the everyday 
concerns of everyday businesses and institutions, took responsibility and 
kept on building for tomorrow while all around them the world came 
crashing down (the italics are mine). Thus tomorrow is being shaped 
today. 
Peter F. Drucker. The Frontiers of Management. 1986:x. 
II 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis studies the development and transfer of core competencies in multinational 
corporations. It aims to advance the general body of knowledge relating to core 
competencies, to have practical applicability for management practitioners and 
academics, to explain how three companies from South Africa became global leaders 
in their fields and to examine the lessons they learned about international business. 
Three South African originated multinationals and a US multinational company were 
studied. The basic methodology is a case study. The methods of research were 
personal interviews, telephone interviews, written questionnaires, documents, archival 
records and direct observations. Value chains were used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of methods of development and transfer and the success of transfer of core 
competencies. 
It is concluded that different and multiple methods are needed to develop and transfer 
core competencies. The effectiveness of methods varies by company and value chain 
location. There is a significant high degree of correlation between the ratings of 
success in transferring core competencies and the effectiveness of the methods used 
to transfer them. This gives substantial credibility to the information provided by the 
companies and highlights the importance of selecting appropriate methods. 
There are some variances between the research results and established literature on 
the development and transfer of core competencies. There are notable differences 
between the companies from South Africa and the US multinational on the 
effectiveness of methods used to develop and transfer core competencies. There are 
also areas where all the companies are in accord. 
"Roadmaps" covering the effectiveness of methods for developing and transferring 
core competencies in different locations in a value chain are presented. Practical 
examples of the companies' actions relating to acquisitions and post-acquisition 
integration, their experiences in different countries, challenges they face, the methods 
used to assess transfer, avoid pitfalls and improve transfer, and other issues are also 
provided. 
III 
The success of the multinationals from South Africa is explained by a combination of 
history, competitive factor conditions, management practices, attributes and 
leadership. The conclusions of the thesis are followed by recommendations on how 
to improve the management, development and transfer of core competencies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Development of Idea and Motivation for Study 
The idea for this thesis originated when I started teaching Strategic Management to 
honours students (post-graduate) at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa 
in 2001. The textbook for the course was Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson's (2001) 
Strategic Management: Competitiveness and Globalization. One of the 13 chapters is 
"The Internal Environment: Resources, Capabilities and Core Competencies". 
New to the academic profession from the business sector, I formed the impression that 
certain of the literature on strategy (and core competencies) often concentrates on 
what should be done while failing to adequately describe why it should be done and 
how it should, has been or can be done. Following from this is the issue of which 
methods are more likely to be effective under different circumstances. 
Around this time I became very interested in the success of some of South Africa's 
larger companies as they were transformed from regional companies into 
multinational corporations. I used a number of these companies as case examples in 
class assignments in 2002 and 2003. When I decided to study for a doctorate, the 
concept of core competencies and the practical application of the how and why of the 
success of these South African multinational companies became the foundation on 
which to develop ideas for the dissertation. 
The preliminary reading of the literature led me to redefine and focus my initial ideas 
on the methods used to develop and transfer core competencies. I found very little in 
the literature that deals with the practical specifics of how to develop and transfer core 
competencies in multinational corporations and the circumstances in which they are 
likely to be effective. For example, what does, or should, a South African firm do to 
follow Porter' s (1990) observation that a global firm employs advantage from its 
home base to penetrate foreign markets and is also able to seek locational advantages 
to reinforce the home advantage and offset home disadvantage in other countries? 
For 'advantage' read core competencies. 
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This is, to the best of my knowledge, the first doctoral thesis that covers South 
African multinational corporations (Nexus 2006). Information about theses relating to 
South African multinational companies is available in Appendix 1.1. 
1.2 Aims and Scope 
The thesis examines the development and transfer of core competencies by three 
South African multinational corporations, each a global leader in its field. A leading 
multinational in the United States of America is included in the research for 
comparison and contrast, especially with regard to core competencies, their 
development, transfer and related issues. 
The thesis has four overall aims or objectives: 
1. To advance the general body of knowledge relating to the development and 
transfer of core competencies 
2. To have practical applicability for both management practitioners and 
academics 
3. To explain how three corporations, originating in South Africa, with limited 
international experience, became global leaders in their fields within a decade 
4. To examine the lessons learned by the corporations and glean advice from 
these for other corporations contemplating or implementing international 
expansIOn. 
The fourth aim was added when it became apparent that this would not only 
contribute to the other three aims but also provide valuable insight and practical 
experiences on its own. Certain of the lessons and advice do, in any event, relate to 
core competencies 
The key literature review, case studies and other research are directed toward 
achieving the above aims. Some answers to questions will meet all four of them, 
others two or three, while some will relate to only one aim. The questions were 
refined after the literature review and define the scope and field of reference for the 
thesis. To be of practical applicability, the thesis deals with the basic issues of how 
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core competencies are developed and transferred and the effectiveness of the various 
methods used for doing so. 
How core competencies are chosen or evolve and the success rates of the transfer of 
different core competencies in different fields are important. The competitiveness of 
multinational companies depends largely on their ability to develop and transfer core 
competencies. The companies will improve their ability to manage these processes if 
they understand how core competencies are selected and evolved. Knowing the 
success rates of transfer of core competencies in different fields will assist the 
companies in deciding which core competencies can be transferred effectively. 
The problems and issues confronted during transfer, how success of transfer can be 
assessed and measured, and how pitfalls can be avoided and transfer improved are all 
considered. The practical problems encountered in both the development and transfer 
of core competencies and how these are resolved are also examined. Culture and its 
influence on the development and transfer of core competencies is also of great 
significance. The lessons learned in going global and the advice for others emanating 
from these is essential to achieve the fourth aim to glean advice for other 
corporations. 
The knowledge generated by the thesis must enable practitioners to manage more 
effectively, and academics to improve their teaching or research, if the thesis is to 
have practical applicability. Advancing the general body of knowledge relating to 
core competencies (transfer and development) requires practical or theoretical 
information not previously available. This comes from the case studies and 
questionnaires sections of the thesis. 
Explaining the success of the compames reqUIres a revIew of strategies and 
backgrounds of the corporations, specifically country of origin and how this 
influences competitiveness. Strategy, mergers and acquisitions and post-merger and 
acquisition integration are added to the field of reference. The lessons learned from 
going global are based, predominantly, on interviews with either the CEOs or senior 
executives of the companies together with practical examples obtained from other 
sources. 
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Core competencies are in any event not an end in themselves. They are an inherent 
part of the strategies that companies use to achieve their objectives. Strategies do not 
always exist around core competencies. Kaplan and Norton (2004) point out that 
strategies can exist around many doctrines, for example, shareholder or stockholder 
value, process management and innovation. All successful companies have core 
competencies, but the ways in which they are articulated and utilized strategically 
vary widely. 
The scope or field of reference focuses on the development and transfer of core 
competencies. It extends to the related areas of strategies, international business 
culture, learning and knowledge management, mergers and acquisitions and post-
merger and acquisition integration. The focus is reflected in the emphasis given to the 
different areas in the literature review and research. 
1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
The paradigm adopted is post-positivism. I endeavour to bring to the thesis the 
perspective of a CEO combined with that of a teacher. The basic methodology of the 
thesis is that of a case study. Surveys, the study of documents and statistical analysis 
support and complement the basic methodology. The case study as a research 
strategy constitutes an all-encompassing method, covering the logic of design, data 
collection techniques and specific approaches to data analyses (Yin 2003). 
The literature review covers nine areas. These are strategy, international business, 
learning and knowledge management, culture, core competencies, mergers and 
acquisitions, post-merger and acquisition integration, the development of core 
competencies and the transfer of core competencies. A framework for the thesis and 
the questions to be asked in the research are derived from this review. 
The overall concept is to cover the development and transfer of core competencies by 
multinational corporations by focusing on the methods of development and transfer. 
Core competencies are assigned to value chain locations or activities to which they 
are related so that they can be assessed, compared and analysed. 
5 
The key concepts and topics in the research and analysis are core competencies, value 
chain activities, methods of developing core competencies and methods of 
transferring core competencies. The rates of success of transferring core 
competencies and the effectiveness of the methods are also covered. The units of 
measurement are corporations (or companies), the rating of success in transferring 
core competencies, the effectiveness of methods used to develop core competencies 
and the effectiveness of methods used to transfer core competencies. 
The methods of gathering data comprised personal interviews, telephone interviews, 
written questionnaires, documents, archival records and direct observations. The 
returned qualitative questionnaires were analysed in terms of consistency with 
quantitative aspects and compared with other companies. The qualitative 
questionnaires were used to expand on the quantitative data and provide richer data. 
The analysis of both sets of data led to further questions and responses. Descriptive 
and statistical procedures were applied to the quantitative data where appropriate. 
The findings show the degrees or ratings of success in transferring core competencies, 
the effectiveness of various methods used to develop and transfer different core 
competencies and the relationship between the effectiveness of methods used and the 
degrees of success in transferring core competencies. Value chain activities related to 
the core competencies are used to analyse and evaluate the findings. 
The personal interviews covered background information, South Africa as a "home" 
or originating base, perceived reasons for success, the practical issues confronted in 
developing and transferring core competencies, how these were resolved and lessons 
learned in "going global". Interviews were also used for clarification or follow-up 
questions. 
1.4 Presentation and Style 
The research for the thesis was largely undertaken between October 2002 and July 
2004 with further related research in 2005. My general cut-off guideline for 
information was 31 December 2005. For example, the annual accounts of two of the 
companies for their financial years ending December 2005 and March 2006 were not 
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available at that time. These accounts are therefore shown in the Appendices together 
with other current information on aspects such as the leading companies in 2006. 
Appendix ILl summarises pertinent post-31 December 2005 information. If 
however, I learned of information in 2006 which had been available before 31 
December 2005, then I have generally included it in the thesis. 
While I did not actively pursue research (except for follow-up and clarification) after 
31 December 2005, I did take advantage of any relevant information that became 
known to me. Certain information such as company financial results and new editions 
of the books reviewed has been updated since 2004. Other information has been left 
as it was at the time of research or collection so that readers will be aware of the 
information used at the time of the initial research. 
Sub chapters (example: 1.2) in the thesis are referred to as sections, with the next level 
down (example 1.2.1) referred to as subsections. Tables and figures names use the 
number of the chapter in which they are contained as a prefix. For example, the 
fourth table in Chapter 2 is Table 2.4. 
The thesis aIms to find a balance between the use of active and passive voices 
(Mouton 2001). The literature review section is predominantly in the third person or 
passive voice unless I give my personal opinion. The guidelines followed regarding 
tense are that one should normally use the present tense when referring to previously 
published work, and both present and past tense when referring to present results (Day 
1995, cited by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2000). 
Mouton' s (2001) How to Succeed in Your Master 's & Doctoral Studies and The 
Chicago Manual of Style (2003) were consulted. The Harvard Method ofreferencing 
is followed as a guideline. Under this method personal communications are not 
included in the List of References. Days and months as well as years are therefore 
included when citing the dates of interviews and personal communications in text 
citations of interviews and other personal communications. Full details are given 
when an interview or personal communication is cited for the first time in a chapter. 
For example, the initial citation of "(A.J. Phillips, personal interview, Sandton, 22 
October 2002)" is subsequently cited as "(A.1. Phillips, 22 October 2002)". Titles of 
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persons are not provided in the text references, as they are available in Subsection 
4.6.1 and Appendix 4.2 Data Collection and Field Work Record. When more than 
two authors for a publication are quoted for the fust time in a chapter, All the names 
are stated "(Hitt, Ireland and Hoskinson 2005)" when a publication with more than 
two authors is quoted for the first time in a chapter. Abbreviations "(Hitt et al. 
2005)" are used sUbsequently. 
One of the South African companies, SABMiller, is technically and legally a United 
Kingdom company. I refer to it as a South African company to avoid having to 
continually use the phrase "South African-originated". The legal distinction should 
however be kept in mind. 
The terms company, corporation and firm are regarded as interchangeable, as are the 
terms competence and competency. Wolverine World Wide, Wolverine and WWW 
(only used in tables or figures) are also interchangeable, as are United States of 
America, the United States, America, US and the USA. SA Breweries, SAB and The 
South African Breweries are used to designate the same company. SA Breweries 
became SABMiller in 2002 when the former company acquired Miller Brewing in the 
United States. The full names of the companies include Limited, pic or Inc, but these 
terms are not generally used in the text. London refers to London, England, and the 
Grand Rapids and Rockford cited are in Michigan. 
The annual reports of SABMiller, Sappi and Wolverine World Wide are in US 
dollars, while those of Barloworld are in South African rands. Information and results 
for the companies will normally be reported in these currencies, but the US dollar 
equivalent of Barloworld information will be referred to at times to provide a 
perspective. 
1.5 Defmitions and Concepts 
This section sets out the definitions covering the key concepts and terms used in the 
thesis. While this may pre-empt Chapter 3, Literature Review and Theoretical 
Framework, it does introduce the definitions at the outset. 
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A core competence is a bundle of skills and technologies that enable a company to 
provide a particular benefit to customers (Hamel and Prahalad 1996:219). As 
articulated by Prahalad and Hamel (1990), a core competence has three traits: "it 
makes a contribution to perceived customer benefits, it is difficult for competitors to 
imitate, and it can be leveraged to a wide variety of markets" (Mascarenhas, Baveja 
and Jamil 1998:1). Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005:20) state that core 
competencies are resources and capabilities that serve as a source of competitive 
advantage for a firm over its rivals. A core competence is something that a company 
does well relative to other internal activities and a distinctive competence is 
something the company does well relative to competitors according to Thompson and 
Strickland (2003: 122). 
While all the above definitions of core competence are considered valid, the 
definition by Hamel and Prahalad (1996) and the three traits emphasised by 
Mascarenhas et al. (1998) will be followed for purposes of this thesis. Hamel and 
Prahalad are widely regarded as the originators of the core competence concept 
though I am sure that the majority of management practitioners are more conversant 
and at ease with the Thompson and Strickland (2003) definition. 
Develop means to grow, or cause to grow, and become larger or more advanced. 
(Collins 2004:391). 
To transfer is to change or go, or cause to change, from one thing, person or point to 
another (Collins 1987:1064). In this case, it refers to a core competency transferring, 
or being transferred, from one unit to another, but especially from a parent company 
to foreign subsidiaries. 
The multinational corporation (MNC) has substantial direct investment in foreign 
countries and actively manages those operations and regards them as integral parts of 
the company, both strategically and organisationally (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000:2). 
Other definitions which are pertinent to the study follow. 
Strategy is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of 
activities. The essence of strategic positioning is to choose activities that are different 
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to rivals ' (Porter 1998:55). "The word strategy is derived from Greek strategia -
meaning generalship - which itself is compounded from two words meaning army 
and to lead. Your company strategy, therefore, defines how you will win" (Pietersen 
2000:40). A strategy is an integrated and coordinated set of commitments and actions 
designed to exploit core competencies and gain a competitive advantage (Hit! et al. 
2005:7). 
Strategic mission is the statement of a firm ' s unique purpose and the scope of its 
operations in product and market terms, while strategic intent is the leveraging of a 
firm ' s resources, capabilities and core competencies to accomplish the firm ' s goals in 
the competitive environment (Hit! et al. 2005:21-22). 
A capability is the capacity for a set of resources to integratively perform a task or 
activity Resources are inputs into a firm ' s production process, such as capital 
equipment, skills of individual employees, patterns, finance and talented managers 
(Hit! et al. 2005:19). 
Competitive advantage is the ability of a firm to outperform its rivals (Hitt, Ireland 
and Hoskisson 2001 :5). 
Culture, in a broad sense, refers to the learned and shared assumptions of a group that 
produce predictable behaviour and decisions (Pietersen 2002: 148). 
Organisational culture refers to the complex set of ideologies, symbols and core 
values that are shared throughout the firm and that influence how the firm conducts 
business (Hitt et al. 2005:27). 
Value chain - "Every firm is a collection of activities that are performed to design, 
market, deliver and support its product. All these activities can be represented using a 
value chain. A firm ' s value chain, and the way it performs individual activities, are a 
reflection of its history, its strategy, its approach to implementing its strategy and the 
underlying economies of the activities themselves" (Porter 1985:36). 
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An industry' s key success factors (KSF) concern the product attributes, competencies, 
competitive capabilities, and market achievements with the greatest direct bearing on 
company profitability (Thompson and Strickland 2003 :96). 
Knowledge is information that is laden with experience, judgement, intuition and 
values (Hilt, et al. 2001:110). Knowledge management is the management ofa firm's 
intellectual capital (Lajoux 1998:271). 
Intellectual capital is the full spectrum of a company's intangibles, including, for 
example, its databases, software, manuals, trademarks, organisational structure and 
the expertise and abilities of its employees (Lajoux, 1998:271). Intellectual capital 
is the sum of everything that everybody in the company knows (Hit! et al. 2003 :74). 
The major concept in the thesis, apart from those included in the definitions, is that of 
Porter's Diamond. Porter (1990:67) uses his "diamond" framework, or model , to 
analyse the competitive advantage, or competitiveness, of nations. He believes that 
nations succeed where country circumstances support the pursuit of the proper 
strategy for a particular industry or segment. What works well in the country must 
lead to competitive advantage in the industry. Porter' s Diamond examines four broad 
attributes of a nation that individually and as a system, together with government and 
chance form the playing field that each nation establishes and operates for its 
industries, namely factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting 
industries and firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
Certain of the definitions will be repeated in the chapters examining either them or 
related issues. Porter's Diamond is first discussed in Chapter 2. 
1.6 Abbreviations 
Important abbreviations used in the thesis follow: 
CEO 
CFROI 
EBITA 
GDP 
HRM 
IMD 
KPI 
M&A 
MNC 
NPV 
R&D 
ROE 
RONA 
VBM 
WACC 
WCY 
Chief Executive Officer 
Cash flow return on investment 
Earnings before interest, tax and amortization. 
Gross domestic product 
Human resource management 
Institute of Management Development 
Key performance indicator 
Mergers and acquisitions 
Multinational corporation 
Net present value 
Research and development 
Return on equity 
Return on net assets 
Value based management 
Weighted average cost of capital 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 
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Sentences describing methods and other aspects in the research are sometimes 
shortened so that they fit into tables. Abbreviations are also used for companies in 
these instances. 
1.7 Context 
One of the first " lessons" communicated to me when I began teaching in 200 I was 
that managers are primarily interested in results whereas academics are mainly 
interested in process (P. Court, personal communication, circa February 2001). With 
this lesson in mind I mention two articles to set a context for this thesis. 
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Bennis and O'Toole, in an article in the Harvard Business Review of May 2005 
("How Business Schools Lost Their Way") claim that business schools are too 
focused on "scientific research" - and do not give enough attention to context and 
unquantifiable issues - the "stuff of management". Judgements are made with messy 
incomplete data, they write, so that statistical and methodological wizardry blind 
rather than illuminate. 
London, in the Financial Times of 11 January 2005, writes that managers are often 
not even aware of the decision process that they are using, let alone its consequences. 
Important management decisions are often the result of ad hoc, on-the-fly initiatives. 
More generally, he adds, managers are reluctant to integrate either proven 
management thinking or a fact-based approach into practice. 
My intention is not to enter the debate on business school education or whether 
managers generally make effective decisions. I believe that theory has a crucial role 
to play in business education. (Where would we be if everything had to be learned 
by experience?) I also believe that the majority of management decisions are 
generally effective over time. If not, would there be any creation of value or 
economic growth? It is not the lack of theory or knowledge, but rather the constraints 
of time, the demands of other priorities and conflicting constituencies that often limit 
the resources that practitioners apply to any given management issue. There are, 
therefore, gaps between theory and practice. This should be kept in mind as the thesis 
moves from the literature review and theory to the practical experiences of the 
corporations being studied. 
1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter I, as seen above, covers the motivation and development of the idea for the 
thesis, its aims, scope and definitions and outlines the research design and 
methodology. 
The framework or road map to be followed in the thesis is shown in Figure 1.1. The 
framework was largely derived from the literature review in Chapter 3 and is 
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presented here to set out what I intend to do in the thesis. The issues or areas that will 
receive the most attention are shown in bold script. The chronology of the framework 
has similarities to the table of contents. Chapter 3, "Literature Review", and Chapter 
4, "Research, Design and Methodology", are in the right-hand side of Figure 1.1 and 
consequently disrupt the north-to-south and west-to-east flow of the chapters. 
The chapters designated in the framework list the headings of their respective sections 
(sometimes abbreviated) with the exception of Chapter I where the aims of the thesis 
are shown instead. The numbers of the section headings in Figure 1.1 will not 
coincide with the section numbers in the text because of the introductions, summaries 
and conclusions. The "World" as depicted in Figure 1.1 is not covered explicitly as in 
a separate chapter in the study. The world factors listed in the framework are covered 
in the literature review and implicitly in many parts of the thesis. 
While there are overlaps, Chapters 2 through 6 are generally data gathering and 
Chapters 7 through 10 are generally concerned with data analysis. Chapters 7 and 8 
address the first two aims of the thesis relating to practical applicability and 
advancing the general body of knowledge relating to core competencies. Chapters 9 
and 10 focus on the aims of explaining the global success of the South African 
companies and the lessons learned by all four corporations in going global. These 
chapters also contribute to the aims of advancing the body of knowledge and being of 
practical value and applicability. 
Chapter 2 examines South Africa in terms of history, politics, economics and culture. 
AIDS, affirmative action, black economic empowerment, land reform, crime, 
NEPAD, and Zimbabwe are also discussed. A section of the chapter uses Porter' s 
Diamond and Sach's "differential diagnosis" (economic geography and geopolitical 
considerations) to evaluate South Africa in terms of the determinants of 
competitiveness. Another section examines the rankings of South Africa in regard to 
various aspects of competitiveness by the Institute of Management Development's 
World Competitiveness Yearbook. A further purpose of this chapter is to search for 
the factors and events that influenced the development of core competencies and 
competitive advantage for the resident multinational corporations. 
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The literature review and theoretical framework are contained in Chapter 3. It begins 
by explaining how I decided on the areas to be included in the literature review. Nine 
subjects are covered, each as a section of the chapter - strategy, international 
business, culture and international business, learning and knowledge management, 
definition and nature of core competencies, development of core competencies, 
mergers and acquisitions, post-merger and acquisition integration and transfer of core 
competencies. While each has a bearing on the thesis, I will concentrate on the three 
core competency sections. Each section ends with a summary and conclusion as to 
the relevance the literature discussed bears to the thesis. Chapter 3 ends with a 
theoretical framework for the thesis. This framework is later used to analyse and 
review the findings in the final five chapters. 
Chapter 4 "Research Design and Methodology" documents the design and 
methodology followed. Its sections cover paradigm, methods, conceptualisation, 
selection of multinational corporations, data gathering, data analysis, quality issues 
and ethical issues. The methodology is a case study that is supported and 
complemented by surveys and statistical analysis. The multinational corporations 
selected for the study are: Barloworld, SABMiller, Sappi and Wolverine World Wide. 
Two of the SABMiller regions or divisions, SABMiller Africa and Asia and 
SABMiller Europe, rather than the entire group, are used in parts of the thesis. 
The research questions are derived largely from the literature review, interviews with 
company representatives and personal experience. Personal interviews, telephone 
interviews, questionnaires with qualitative and quantitative questions, follow-up 
interviews, documentation, archival records and direct observation are the bases for 
the research. 
Chapter 5 reviews the three South African corporations and Wolverine World Wide 
under the headings of: Industry and Key Success Factors, Profile, History, 
Management, Mission, Strategy, Core Competencies, Operations, Financials and 
Statistics and Performance versus Peer Groups. Management, strategy, core 
competencies and performance versus peer groups receive the most emphasis. The 
last-mentioned is a key to the credibility of the companies' performances and their 
positions on core competencies. 
Figure 1.1 Theoretical Framework of the Thesis 
Ch 1 Introduction (Aims) Ch. 6 to 10 
1. Advance General Body of Ch. 6 Core Competencies 
Knowledge 1. By Corporation 
2. Practical Applicability 2. Value Chains 
3. Explain Global Success Ch. 7 Development 
4. Going Global I Lessons 1. Determinants of 
Learned Competitiveness 
2. Selection 
3. Methods 
Ch.2 South Africa 4. Acquisitions 
5. Practical Problemsl 
Solutions 1. History Ch. 8 Transfer 2. Political 
~ 1. Challenges 3. Economic 2. Success of Transfer 4. Culture 3. Methods 5. Other Factors 4. Measurement 6. Determinants of 5. Avoid Pitfalls Competitiveness 5. Improvement 7. World Competitiveness 7. Practical Problemsl 8. World Perceptions Solutions 9. International Business Ch. 9 Review of Strategies 
(4+2) 
Ch. 5 Corporations Studied Ch. 10 Going Global 
1. Home Base 
2. Defining Event 1 . Industry 3. Country Experiences 2. Profile 
~ 4. Reasons for Success 3. History 5. Learning/Preparation 4. Management 6. Lessons Learnedl Advice 5. Mission 
6. Strategies 
7. Core Competencies 
8. Operations t 9. Financials & Statistics World 10. Comparative Performance 
Markets, Competition, Countries, 
Inst tut i ions Individuals 
.. 
.. 
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Ch. 3 Literature Review 
1. Strategy 
2. International Business 
3. Culture 
4. Learning and Knowledge 
5. Core Competencies 
6. Development 
7. Mergers and Acquisitions 
8. Post M & A Integration 
~ 9. Transfer 
1. Paradigm 
2. Methods 
3. Conceptualization 
4. Selection of Corporations 
5. Data Gathering 
6. Data Analysis 
7. Quality Issues 
8. Ethical Issues 
Ch. 11 Conclusions & Recommendations 
/ 
"-
l. Review of Findings 
2. Interpretation of Findings 
3. Limitations of the Research 
4. Conclusions 
5. Significance of Findings and Conclusions 
5. Recommendations 
7. Performance against Aims 
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In Chapter 6 the core competencies of each corporation are shown in tabular form, 
together with the value chain activities related to each core competency. The core 
competencies are analysed in terms of their value chain activities or location. In cases 
where more than one value chain activity is involved in a core competency, the 
predominant or driving activity is used to allocate the core competency to a value 
chain location. A table shows the location of core competencies by means of value 
chain activities for the four corporations. 
Having established the core competencies for each corporation, I discuss their 
development in Chapter 7. This chapter begins with the application of Porter' s 
Diamond specifically to the South African corporations (as opposed to the country of 
South Africa in Chapter 2) to explain the factors and events leading to the 
development of competitive advantage and core competencies. The next section 
describes the ways in which the corporations select or evolve core competencies. The 
methods of development considered most effective by each corporation are tabulated, 
and comparisons are made between the companies, and between the South African 
companies and the American company, Wolverine World Wide. The most effective 
methods for the corporations as a group for different locations in the value chain are 
presented. The chapter describes how the corporations have used acquisitions to 
develop core competencies and it concludes with and examination of the practical 
problems and solutions experienced in developing core competencies. 
The development of core competencies treated, the thesis moves on in Chapter 8 to 
their transfer. The chapter begins with a discussion of the challenges involved. The 
ratings of success in transferring core competencies are shown for each of the 
corporations by value chain location. Statistical analysis techniques are applied to 
show the relationship between the corporations' rankings of the importance of the 
core competencies and the ratings of success in transferring them and, secondly, the 
relationship between the rankings of performance and the ratings of success in 
transferring core competencies. 
The effectiveness of the methods of transfer is then examined by corporation, value 
chain and individual activities in the value chain. The result is a rating of the 
effectiveness of the different methods for various parts of the value chain. The 
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differences between the South African corporations and Wolverine World Wide are 
examined. Statistical analysis shows the relationship between the ratings of the 
effectiveness of the methods used and the ratings of success in transferring the core 
competencies. This chapter also concludes with a discussion on practical problems 
and solutions. 
Chapter 9 continues the analysis of the corporations by reviewing the strategies 
against the model formulated by Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003). The model 
maintains that companies must excel at four primary practices - strategy, execution, 
culture and structure - and any two of four secondary practices - talent, leadership, 
innovation and mergers and partnerships - if they are to be successful. This chapter 
reviews the four companies under the headings of: Strategy, Execution, Culture, 
Structure and Talent, Leadership, Innovation, Mergers and Partnerships, and Post-
Merger Integration. Special attention is paid to strategy, leadership, mergers and 
partnerships and post-merger and acquisition integration because of the importance of 
these in the strategies of the corporations. Relevant works from the literature review 
are used to complement Nohria et al. (2003) in examining the practices. 
Triangulation, that is, the use of multiple sources of evidence, is applied by examining 
media and share analysts' reports on the corporations studied. Direct observation is 
used as well. 
Chapter 10, "Going Global" examines the international experiences of the three South 
African companies (and Wolverine, to a lesser extent), the lessons that they learned 
and their advice to other companies contemplating or implementing international 
expansion programmes. The sections include assessments of the suitability of South 
Africa as a home base by the chief executives of the South African multinational 
companies and the events or times that "define" the corporations ' transformation from 
local to global players. The chapter describes how culture influences operations and 
hence the development and transfer of core competencies in different countries. The 
reasons for the companies' successes are examined. A separate section covers what 
the companies do to learn and to prepare their staff for the challenges of international 
business. 
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I present my conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 11. This chapter begins 
with a review of the findings and salient points which are then compared to the 
literature review framework. The findings include "road maps" to the methods that 
the companies found more likely to be effective in developing and transferring core 
competencies located in different parts of the value chain. The conclusions and their 
significance are discussed, followed by recommendations. The chapter and thesis 
conclude with an examination of performance against the four aims set out in the 
Introduction. 
1.9 Summary and Conclusion 
The literature review did not uncover any significant material relating to the practical 
specifics of the development and transfer of core competencies of multinational 
corporations, the various methods used and the different circumstances under which 
they are likely to be effective. 
The thesis aims to advance the general body of knowledge and to have practical 
applicability relating to core competencies. It also seeks to explain how three 
corporations originating in South Africa became global leaders in their fields within a 
decade and to translate the lessons they learned in going global into advice for other 
corporations. 
The scope or field of reference focuses on the development and transfer of core 
competencies in multinational corporations. Three South African and one American 
multinational corporation are examined. The scope extends to the related areas of 
strategy, international business, culture, learning and knowledge management, 
mergers and acquisitions and post-merger and acquisition integration. 
This study covers the country-specific factors that lead to the development of 
competitive advantage and core competencies, how the corporations select and evolve 
core competencies and the methods they use to develop and use core competencies. 
The effectiveness of the methods is investigated. 
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The paradigm adopted is post-positivism with the perspective of a CEO combined 
with that of a teacher. The research design and methodology is that of a case study, 
supported and complemented by a survey and statistical analysis. Information was 
obtained through personal interviews, telephone interviews, written questionnaires 
with qualitative and quantitative questions, follow-up interviews, documentation, 
archival records and direct observation. 
As the three multinationals originated in South Africa, the history, politics, economics 
and culture of that country are reviewed. Porter's Five Forces model is used to 
investigate the determinants of competitiveness in South Africa. 
The companies studied are examined in terms of the industry that they compete in, 
their profile and history, management, mission, strategies, core competencies and 
operations and financial results. Their performance is compared with that of peer 
groups or appropriate stock market performances. Management, strategies and core 
competencies are the three factors receiving the most attention. 
As shown by the model, global markets, competition, countries, institutions and 
individuals all influence the country of South Africa and the companies originating 
there. 
The study of core competencies focuses on their nature and definition, development 
and transfer. Study of the development covers the determinants of competitiveness, 
how core competencies are selected and the methods used to develop them. The 
practical problems encountered in development and the ways in which these are 
resolved are also studied. 
In examining the transfer of core competencies, the factors to be covered include 
country, challenges, degree of success in transferring, methods of transfer, 
measurement, how to avoid pitfalls, how to improve transfer and the role of 
acquisitions in the transfer of core competencies. The practical problems encountered 
and how they are resolved are again examined. 
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A separate chapter is devoted to "going global". This details the lessons learned by 
the companies and the resulting advice or guidelines for companies contemplating 
international expansion. 
Chapter 2, "South Africa", is presented next to contextualise the thesis. 
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2. SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a context for the thesis, while at the same 
time searching for answers to the questions raised in the Introduction. It highlights 
the factors and events that are believed to have influenced, or continue to influence, 
national competitiveness, and hence the development of competitive advantages or 
core competencies, and the achievements of the three South African multinational 
compames. 
The following five sections deal with the country's history, politics, the nature and 
direction of its economy, sociocultural aspects and other factors. The issue of 
national competitiveness is dealt with in the next three sections. Firstly, Porter's 
"Diamond" is used to examine the determinants of competitiveness. Secondly, 
Sachs's differential diagnosis concepts are the bases for investigating factors not 
covered by Porter. Thirdly, the Institute of Management Development (lMD) World 
Competitiveness Reports, the World Economic Forum' s Global Competitive Report 
and the Economist show South Africa' s rankings in terms of specific criteria. 
The final two sections of the chapter deal with world perceptions of risk, corruption 
and economic freedom in South Africa and the country's history of international 
business. The following quotations provide images of the South Africa that is 
examined herein. 
South Africa is a Belgiwn within an India ... A dual economy with a high-
skill, capital-intensive modern sector alongside a mass of unskilled people 
scratching a living from subsistence farming, casual employment and seJf-
employment (Lamont 2002:77). 
Diversity is a key feature of South Africa, where II languages are recognised 
as official, where community leaders include rabbis and chieftains, rugby 
players and returned exiles, where traditional healers ply their trade around the 
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comer from stockbrokers and where housing ranges from mud huts to palatial 
homes with swimming pools (BBC News 2003a). 
2.2 History 
The area of modem-day South Africa is believed by some to be one of the cradles of 
human evolution. Homo habilis, the earliest known toolmaker, lived in South Africa 
some 2.3 million years ago. The original inhabitants of contemporary South Africa 
were the hunter-gatherer San and the Khoikho pastoralists. They were subsequently 
absorbed, or forced, into the most marginal areas by more technologically advanced 
migrants to the region. The ancestors of the vast majority of modem black South 
Africans, are thought to have begun arriving in the area about AD 100 with a new 
wave of migration from the north approximately a thousand years later. (Microsoft 
Encarta 2001 e). 
European interest in South Africa began with the Portuguese in the 1400s. In 1486, 
the Portuguese explorer Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape. In 1497, his fellow 
countryman Vasco da Gama pioneered the Cape sea route to the Far East. To put 
these two exploits into an historical perspective, Columbus reached America in 1492 
(Sparks 2003). A group under the leadership of Jan van Riebeek was sent by the 
Dutch East India Company in 1652 with the purpose of setting up a halfway station to 
the East on the site of what is now Cape Town. Former company servants were 
allowed to become "Free Burghers" and set up farms outside the settlement. They 
developed their own distinctive language and culture and came to be known as 
"Boers" (Afrikaaners, the literal interpretation is "farmers") (Microsoft Encarta 
200Ie). Xhosa people and the Boers met in the Eastern Cape for the first time in 
1702. The white settlers had spread 800 kilometres (497 miles) east of Cape Town 
(Sparks 2003). 
In the early 19th century competition for trade and land led to conflict between the 
African clans, known as mfecane. The wars eventually engulfed much of southern 
Africa. Entire tribes disappeared during the fighting and centralisation resulted in the 
creation of powerful African nations, notably the Zulus, led by King Shaka, but also 
the Swazi and Xhosa (Microsoft Encata 200Ie). 
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During the Napoleonic Wars in Europe France occupied the Netherlands and British 
forces occupied the Cape region in both 1795 and 1806. In 1814 the United Kingdom 
purchased the Cape Colony from the Dutch. After 1820, thousands of British settlers 
arrived in South Africa. English became the official language in 1822 and slavery 
was abolished in 1833. These measures were resented by the Boers and some 10,000 
of them moved northward in what is known as the Great Trek, in the period 1836 to 
1838. They defeated the Zulus in battle, but the British subsequently occupied the 
area now known as Kwa-Zulu Natal and established a colony there in 1843. The 
voortrekkers (forerunners) left the area and established the Orange Free State and 
Transvaal republics in the interior. Around the same time the British encroached on 
Xhosa lands along the Eastern Cape frontier, causing several bloody wars (Microsoft 
Encarta 2001 e). 
In 1868, the British annexed Basutoland, and in 1871, Griqualand West, which 
included the Kimberley diamond fields. In 1877, the Nguni territory was annexed, 
and in 1879, following the Zulu wars, Zululand was taken over. Venda in the north 
held out the longest, but its defeat, in 1898, saw the completion of the annexation of 
the African kingdoms. Meanwhile, in the east, the British colony of Natal had been 
granted representative self-government in 1896, and in 1872, Cape Colony gained 
self-government and control over all areas except economic and foreign affairs 
(Microsoft Encarta 2001 e). 
Diamonds had first been discovered in 1867, and the discovery of the world's largest 
gold deposits in the Transvaal Republic in 1886 coincided with the German 
occupation of South West Africa (now Namibia). The mining industry was financed 
largely by British interests and thousands of British miners and fortune seekers 
entered the Transvaal Republic. They sought certain rights that the republic was not 
prepared to extend to them. After compromise discussions failed, financier Cecil 
Rhodes, prime minister of the Cape Colony in 1895, encouraged the uitlanders 
(foreigners) to revolt, supported by a small invasion force under the command of 
Leander Star Jameson. The Jameson Raid was a failure, and, although Rhodes was 
absolved of any involvement in it, he was forced to resign as the prime minister 
(Microsoft Encarta 2001 e). 
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Relations between the Cape Colony, Britain and the two Boer republics worsened, 
and the Afrikaners declared war on Britain in 1899. The British Empire was 
represented by approximately 500,000 troops against some 87,000 Afrikaners and 
volunteers. After some initial success by the Boer forces, British forces occupied 
major centres by mid-1900. The Boers, however, continued to wage a guerrilla war 
that was countered by Britain's scorched-earth policies, which included the 
destruction of farms and the internment of the civilian population in concentration 
camps. Some 25,000 Afrikaner women and children died of disease and malnutrition 
in the camps: 14,000 Africans died in separate camps. The Boers surrendered in 1902 
(Microsoft Encarta 2001e). 
Between the start of the diamond rush to Kimberley in 1870 and the end of the South 
African wars in 1902, the economy was transformed from an economic backwater, 
dependent on agricultural products like wool and wine, to a major supplier of precious 
minerals. South Africa underwent rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. 
Notwithstanding the influx of Europeans to work in the mines, there were still labour 
shortages (Microsoft Encarta 200Ie). 
The Union of South Africa was founded in 1910 with the merging of the conquered 
Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State with the British colonies of the 
Cape and Natal. The former Boer army commander, Louis Botha, became the first 
prime minister (Microsoft Encarta 2001 e). 
The Native National Congress, later renamed the African National Congress (ANC), 
was formed in 1912. In 1913, the Land Act was introduced, which restricted black 
land ownership and land use to 13 percent of the country. The pattern of labour 
recruitment, remuneration and accommodation that characterised the South African 
mining industry for more than a century was established at this time in the gold fields. 
Black labourers, mainly migrants from elsewhere in South Africa (but also from 
neighbouring states) were limited to unskilled jobs, paid low wages and housed in 
single-sex compounds (Microsoft Encarta 200Ie). 
At the outset of World War I in 1914, the South African prime minister, Botha, 
pledged Britain full support. In 1915, he crushed an insurrection by extremist 
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Afiikaner elements and led the South Afiican forces that conquered German South 
West Afiica. In 1920, the tenitory became a League of Nations mandate under South 
Afiica's supervision. There was a coalition governing South Afiica in 1939 when 
Britain declared war against Germany. This act split the coalition and then-prime 
minister James Hertzog, who tried to keep South Afiica neutral , was replaced as 
prime minister by Jan Christian Smuts. South Afiica declared war on Germany, but, 
because of pro-German sentiment among some Afrikaners, conscription was not 
introduced (Microsoft Encarta 2001 e). 
The National Party came to power in 1948 and introduced the policy of apartheid. 
Discrimination against non-whites had been inherent from the early days of European 
settlement. Apartheid was designed to separate the races economically, politically, 
socially and geographically. The population was consequently classified by race and 
the Group Areas Act was passed in 1950. The Communist Party was banned. The 
ANC responded with a campaign of civil disobedience led by Nelson Mandela. 
Seventy black demonstrators were killed at Sharpeville in 1960 and the ANC was 
banned. South Africa was declared a republic and left the British Commonwealth in 
1961. International pressure against the apartheid government began in the 1960s and 
South Afiica was excluded from the Olympic Games (BBC News 2003b). 
Nelson Mandela headed the ANC's new military wing, which launched a sabotage 
campaign. He was captured and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 (BBC News 
2003b). In 1976, major clashes with the police occurred when some 10,000 
schoolchildren in Soweto, near Johannesburg, protested at the enforced use of 
Afiikaans in their schools. Hundreds of children were killed, shocking international 
opinion and reinforcing the growth of the sanctions movement. In the mid-1980s, the 
United States and the European Community (now the European Union) imposed 
sanctions against South Africa (Microsoft Encarta 2001e). 
The period 1984 to 1989 saw widespread revolts in the black townships and several 
states of emergency were declared. In 1989, F.W. de Klerk replaced P.W. Botha as 
president. Public facilities were desegregated and many ANC activists were freed. In 
1990, the ANC was un-banned and Mandela released after 27 years in prison. 
Namibia became independent (BBC News 2003b). 
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Multiparty talks commenced in 1991. De Klerk repealed the remaining apartheid 
laws ~nd most international sanctions were lifted. There was major fighting between 
the ANC and the Zulu Inkatha movement. Agreement on an interim constitution was 
reached in 1993 . The ANC won the first nonracial elections in 1994, and Mandela 
became president. A government of national unity was formed, British 
Commonwealth membership was restored and the remaining sanctions were lifted. 
South Africa took its seat in the UN General Assembly after a 20-year absence (BBC 
News 2003b). 
Mandela (1994) writes that apartheid created a deep and lasting wound that would 
take many years, if not generations, to heal. He saw his mission as one of preaching 
reconciliation and of engendering trust and confidence. In 1996, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, began hearings 
on human rights crimes committed by the former government and liberation 
movements during the apartheid era. It released its report in 1998, branding apartheid 
a crime against humanity (BBC News 2003b). 
In the 1999 general election, the ANC received 66 percent of the vote. It formed a 
coalition with a minority party, which held one seat, and so achieved a two-thirds 
majority in parliament. Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela as president. The 
ANC increased the majority to 69.7 percent in the 2004 elections. The Democratic 
Alliance polled the next highest percentage of 12.4, followed by the Inkatha Freedom 
Party with 7 percent (South African Web 2005a). Eighteen other political parties 
contested the election. 
On June 14 2005 President Mbeki informed parliament that he had decided to dismiss 
his deputy and potential successor, Jacob Zuma, whose future had been under a cloud 
since his personal financial advisor, Shaabir Shaik, was sentenced earlier that month 
to a 15 year prison sentence for corruption and fraud (Economist 2005a). Zuma was 
formally charged with rape on 6 December 2005. A 31 year old woman whose family 
has close ties with Mr. Zuma, accused him in November of having raped her at his 
home (Economist 2005f). 
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2.3 Political 
South Africa became a constitutional democracy in 1994. The country is ruled by a 
president and cabinet appointed by the majority party. Parliament, which is elected 
every five years, has two chambers consisting of a 400-member National Assembly 
and a 90-member Senate. Seats in the National Assembly are awarded on the basis of 
percentage of the total vote achieved by particular political parties. Each of the nine 
provincial assemblies chooses 10 senators (Microsoft Encarta 200 I d). 
The major political parties are the African National Congress, founded in 1912, the 
Inkatha Freedom Party, founded in 1975, the Communist Party, which was 
established in 1921, the Freedom Front and the Democratic Alliance, which was 
formed in 1989. (Microsoft Encarta 2001d). 
The highest court is known as the Constitutional Court. It has a president and 10 
judges selected by the cabinet from a list compiled by an independent nominating 
commission. It determines the constitutionality of all laws. The legal system is based 
on Roman-Dutch law and the constitution that came into effect 4 February 1997 
(Dyer and Morphew 2005). 
Trade union representation is now an accepted fact of industrial practice. Almost all 
sectors of the economy, including the public service, have representative unions that 
engage employers over issues affecting their workforce. The Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) is the biggest of the country's three main labour 
federations , with a combined membership of 1. 8 million workers grouped into 19 
affiliated trade unions (Dyer and Morphew 2005). 
2.4 Economy 
To place the South African economy in perspective, we will first view it 'in a 
nutshell' and compare it to the world and sub-Saharan Africa as outlined in Table 2.1. 
The South African exchange rates can cause distortions to the dollar value of gross 
domestic product and other factors compared to other countries. The South Africa 
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figures below relate to 2005 estimates, the world figures to 2002 and the sub-Saharan 
to 2001. 
Table 2.1 South Africa in a Nutshell 
Sub-Saharan 
South Africa 1 World2 Africa3 
Population 44.8 million 6.2 billion 591 million 
GDP $237.3 billion $32,300 billion $310 billion 
GDP per capita $5,070 $5,200 $525 
Exports $33 billion $8,195 billion $90 billion 
Imports $30.2 billion $7,590 bill ion $96 billion 
Manufactured exports 
as share of total 
merchandise exports 55% 79% 39% 
Infant mortality rate 
(number of deaths 
per 1 000 live births) 54 56 107 
Notes: 1 Financial Times website, Special Survey on South Africa, 2005 
2 The Economist World in Figures 2005 
3 United Nations Human Development Report (2001), cited by Roux (2002: 164). 
Source: Adapted from United Nations Development Report (2001), cited by Roux 
(2002:164), Financial Times (2005) and Economist (2005g). 
The gross domestic product per capita is below the world average, but several times 
that of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. It is well below those of the Western 
industrialised nations where GOP per capita extends from the early US$ 20 thousands 
and is closer to a country like Brazil. Exports and imports are in the range of 20 to 25 
percent ofODP (Roux 2002). 
A map of South Africa together with information on area, population and railway and 
roads is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Map of South Africa 
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Area: 
1,221.038 sq km (470,693 
square miles) 
Coastline: 
2,960 kilometres (1,840 miles) 
Population: 
44.8 million (October 2001 
census) 
Metropolitan area 
populations ('000): 
Pretoria 1,080 
Cape Peninsula 2,185 
Johannesburg/Randburg 1,916 
Durban/Pinetown 1,137 
Railways and roads: 
25,555 kilometres (15,879 miles) 
of track 534,131 kilometres (331, 
894 miles) of road 
Source: Financial Times Special Report on South Africa (2004:3). 
Further details on the economy are shown in Table 2.2. Expenditure on Gross 
Domestic Product and Table 2.3 , National Accounts: Ratios of Selected Data. Gross 
fixed capital formation to GDP has varied between 14.S percent and 17.1 percent for 
the period 1994 to 2004, culminating in 16.S percent in 2004. This component needs 
to consistently exceed 20 percent of GDP to achieve higher economic growth rates 
and absorb the growth in the labour force (SA Reserve Bank 200Sa). Barclays Bank 
of the United !(jngdom acquired the South African ABSA Bank in 200S. The foreign 
direct investment (FDI) of R33 billion or US$S.S billion - the largest such investment 
in South Africa's history - is expected to improve the country' s creditworthiness and 
will hopefully send a signal to foreign investors that the country ' s growth prospects 
have improved while investment risks have declined (Bisseker 2005). 
30 
Table 2.2 Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product 1997-2004 
South African Reserve Bank 
R millions 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
At current prices 
Final consumption (6620J) 563 609 664 223 748150 826080 934 1 025 1138 
expenditure 306 536 719 369 674 
Final consumption (6007J) 431 470 514 271 580802 639 800 722 786316 869738 
expenditure by household1 403 164 091 
Final consumption 131 139 212 
expenditure by general (6008J) 903 371 149952 137348 186280 628 239053 268936 governmene 
Individual consumption (6005J) 62 65 111 66830 72 753 81657 95744 109"349 124011 
expenditure 068 
Collective consumption (6006J ) 69 75260 83122 94595 104623 116 129704 144 925 
expenditure 835 844 
Gross capital formation (6108J) 114 126 133288 146743 155980 187 214881 424907 096 227 642 
Gross fixed capital (6009J) 113 126 125754 139647 153525 175 200290 2261 18 formation 221 913 592 
Chang in inventories' (6010J) 875 -1;86 7534 7096 2455 12050 14591 16 789 
Residual item (6011J) 387 -1820 -4935 1 -1 710 -1;69 -10857 -264 
Gross domestic (6012J) 677 733 192516 894894 980350 1 121 1229 1381 
expenditure 789 943 692 393 317 
Exports of goods and (6013J) 168 190 206144 257011 305584 382 346975 365188 
services 659 453 269 
Exports of goods (to.b.) (6608J) 143 160 174319 222061 265832 333 290544 311 762 796 763 251 
Exports of services (6609J) 24 29690 31825 34950 39752 49018 56431 53426 863 
Less imports of goods and (6014J) 160 181 185037 229757 265927 339 324900 372 029 
services 718 972 016 
Imports of goods (to.b.) (6610J) 133 150 149854 189 41 1 221 235 283 264954 311930 061 705 004 
Imports of services (6611J) 27 31 267 35 183 40346 44692 56012 59946 60099 657 
Expenditure on gross (6006J) 685 742 813 683 833 148 1 020 077 1 164 1 251 1374 domestj~roduct 730 424 945 468 476 
At constant 2000 prices 
Final consumption (6620Y) 704 710 720309 748 150 773663 800 833084 855 799 
expenditure 366 079 288 
Final consumptJon 538 548 620 expenditure by (6007Y) 807 196 557722 580802 601 090 159 641 485 680341 households 1 
Final consumption 165 161 180 
expenditure by general (6008Y) 559 833 162587 167348 172 573 129 191 599 205458 governmenf 
Individual consumption (6605Y) 77 73349 71533 72 753 76184 80221 86764 93774 
expenditure 906 
Collective consumption (6606Y) 87 88534 91064 94595 96389 99908 104835 111684 
expenditure 654 
Gross capital formation (6180Y) 139 143 140654 146743 145859 156 172518 190097 20B 290 674 
Gross fixed capital (6009Y) 138 144 133923 139647 144548 149 163366 178644 formation 338 931 892 
Chang in inventories) (6010Y) 870 ~ 1 641 6731 7096 1 311 6 782 9152 11433 
Residual item (6011Y) 26 15287 5233 1 -3436 2763 461 2 -2168 308 
Gross domestic (6012Y) 869 86B 866196 894894 916086 959 1 010 1073 
expenditure 833 656 725 214 728 
Exports of goods and (6013Y) 226 234 237284 257011 261 541 262 260498 268129 
services 961 329 920 
Exports of goods (f.o.b.) (6608Y) 197 200 203627 222061 223830 220 215092 225855 015 877 794 
Exports of services (6609Y) 29 33 452 33657 34 950 37711 42 126 45406 42274 946 
Less imports of goods and (6014Y) 233 238 218155 299757 230 254 241 262063 295770 
services 319 017 543 
Imports of goods (f.o.b.) (6610Y) 191 1693 175585 189411 189466 200 211 591 246889 225 556 991 
Imports of services (661 1Y) 42 44 461 42530 40346 40808 40552 50472 48881 094 
Expenditure on gross (6006Y) 860 864 885365 922148 941313 981 1 008 1046 domestic product 51. 968 102 649 087 
KB604 
1. Including non-profit institutions serving households. 
2. Current expenditure of salaries and wages and on goods and other services of a non-capital nature by the service departments (not 
business enterprises) of general government. General govemment includes central government, provincial governments and local 
governments. 
3. After inventory valuation adjustment. 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (200Sa :115). 
Table 2.3 National Accounts: Ratios of Selected Data 1990-2004 
Key Information 
National accounts 
Ratios of selected data 
At current prices 
Final Final 
consumption 
consumption expenditure 
by expenditure 
Period households by general 
to GOP' government to GOP' 
(6280J) (6281J) 
1990 61.0 19.7 
1991 61.6 19.8 
1992 62.9 20.2 
1993 61.8 20.1 
1994 61.8 20 .0 
1995 62.6 18.3 
1996 62.2 19.1 
1997 62 .9 19.2 
1998 63.3 18.8 
1999 63.2 18.4 
2000 63.0 18.1 
2001 62.7 18.3 
2002 62 .0 18.3 
2003 62.8 19.1 
2004 63.3 19.6 
Gross Public fixed sector 
capital 
expenditure3 formation to GOP' toG DP l 
(6282J) (6283J) 
19.1 25.7 
17.2 25.7 
15.7 25.5 
14.7 24.4 
15.2 23 .8 
15.9 22.6 
16.3 23 .6 
16.5 24.0 
17.1 24.8 
15.5 23.1 
15.1 22.3 
15.1 22.2 
15.1 22.2 
16.0 24.0 
16.5 24.5 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2005a:155). 
South African Reserve Bank 
Industrial Saving to Gross 
and Compensation savings disposa ble 
commercial of employees to income of inventories to GDp2 GOP' households 10 GOP" 
(6284J) (6285J) (6286J) (6287J) 
17.7 57.2 19.1 2.6 
16.7 57.1 18.6 2.7 
16.0 57.5 16.3 5.3 
14.5 56.6 16.4 4.5 
14.9 55.9 16.9 2.8 
16.0 55.8 16.5 1.8 
16.4 55.4 16.1 1.8 
15.9 55.3 15.1 1.7 
14.7 56.3 15.2 1.5 
14.3 56.0 15.9 1.3 
15.0 53.9 15.8 1.2 
15.0 52.1 15.4 0.9 
15.6 49.7 16.8 0.7 
15.8 51.2 15.7 1.3 
15.6 51.5 14.4 0 .9 
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Household 
debit to 
disposable 
income of 
households 
(6525J) 
54 .3 
55.0 
52.2 
53.2 
55.5 
58.3 
61.3 
61.4 
60.2 
57.1 
53.3 
52.6 
50 .3 
51.7 
55.9 
Gold accounted for roughly 12 percent of exports in 2004, while the total value of the 
exports of all minerals and metals exceeded a third of all exports. The largest 
manufactured-export category was motorcars, accounting for 5.4 percent of the total. 
Other leading exports are stainless steel, motor vehicle parts and accessories, wood 
pulp, oils and chemicals and wine (South African Department of Trade and Industry 
2005a). 
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The 2004 figures show the United Kingdom as the largest importer of South African 
goods, with 10.8 percent of the total. It was followed by the United States (NAFTA) 
with 10.2 percent, Japan with 9.7 percent and Germany with 7.S percent. China was 
the 12th largest export destination with Zimbabwe in 13th place. Other important 
markets are the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Australia (South African 
Department of Trade and Industry 200Sa). 
Petroleum oils and related products form the largest import category with 12.4 percent 
of the 2004 total. Original equipment components for motor vehicle and manufacture 
is the second, with 8.S percent, followed by motor cars and "other" at S.4 percent, and 
aircraft at 3.2 percent. Other significant imports are data processing machinery, parts 
and accessories, and electronic products (South African Department of Trade and 
Industry 2005a). 
Germany is the leading source of imports. It accounted for 14.8 percent of the 2004 
total. There are BMW, Daimler-Chrysler and Volkswagen factories in South Africa. 
Second was the United States with 7.7 percent; followed by the United Kingdom, 
Japan and China. Other important countries for imports are Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Australia, Switzerland, India and Zimbabwe (South African Department of Trade and 
Industry 2005a). 
The changing structure of the South African economy is illustrated in Table 2.4. The 
share of the primary sectors of total GDP declined from 29.7 percent in 1960 to 10.3 
percent in 2000. Mining' s contribution declined from 22.5 percent to 6.0 percent 
during this period. The secondary sector, with manufacturing as the major 
component, increased its contribution from 24.2 percent to 26.2 percent over the same 
period. The tertiary sector increased from 46.0 percent to 63.S percent. The largest 
percentage increases were in the categories of transport, storage and communication, 
financial and business services and community social and personal services (including 
general government). 
Table 2.4 Structure of the South African Economy 
1960 - 2000 
% of total GOP 
Sector 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Primary sector 29.7 23.6 16.8 15.0 10.3 
-agriculture 7.2 4 .8 5.1 5.3 4 .3 
-mining 22.5 18.8 11.7 9.7 6.0 
Secondary sector 24.2 31.5 36.5 33.3 26.2 
-manufacturing 18.8 24.4 28.9 25.5 19.8 
-electricity, gas & water 21 2.3 3.2 4.3 3.6 
-construction 3.3 4.9 4.4 3.5 2.8 
Tertiary sector 46.0 44.9 46.7 51.7 63.5 
-wholesale & reta il trade, 
catering & accommodation 12.2 13.9 14.0 15.0 13.9 
-transport, storage & 
communication 5.9 6.1 7.5 7.4 11 .0 
-financial & business 
services 12.7 12.7 12.8 14.5 19.0 
-community, social & 
personal services (inc!. 
general government) 15.2 12.2 12.4 14.8 19.6 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, cited by Roux (2002:56). 
33 
Tourism now accounts for almost 7 percent of GDP on a value-added basis. Prior to 
1986 the number of arrivals and departures remained steady at around 500,000. There 
was a gradual increase in the number of foreign travellers from 1986 to 1990 and this 
accelerated from 1990 to 1993. After 1993 the pace of increase continued, and in 
2002 the number of foreign travellers visiting South Africa was 6,547,916. Overseas 
travellers accounted for 1,558,325 of the total visitors (Statistics South Africa 2004). 
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South Africa' s economic performance from 1980 to 1993 and from 1994 to 2004 is 
shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 South Africa's Performance 1984-1993 vs. 1994-2004 
Performance Indicator 1984·1993 1994-2004 
Economic Qrowth 1 % a year 3% a year 
Investment -2.9% a year 4.7% a year 
Inflation AveraQe14.3% AveraQe <6% 
Deficit Up to 9.3% in 1993 Down to around 3% 
Financial account Net outflows R46.1 bn Net inflows R169.6 bn 
Unprecedented ratings and 
ForeiQn investment Boycott upgrades 
Deficit to GDP 10.4% 
Government expenditure highest Deficit to GDP 2.6% 2004 
Dollar exchange rate -6.6% a year -4.9% a year 
Taxation 
Value Added Tax 10% introduced 1991 14% 
Corporate 50% 29% Secondary dividends 12.5 % 
Individual marginal rate 50% to 1987 40% 
Source: Cadogan, South African Revenue Services (2005). 
The effects of isolation and economic sanctions are apparent in the period 1980 to 
1993. The improvements since the first democratic elections are reflected in the 1994 
to 2004 period. 
Despite the substantial improvements since the new dispensation in South Africa, 
growth has lagged behind most of the other emerging markets. South Africa has 
sometimes ranked in the lowest quartile of the 25 emerging countries tracked by the 
Economist (Economist 2004b). The country is planning to lift economic growth to 
more than 6 percent from the current 4 percent and is looking to raise investment by 
10 percent a year to help reduce unemployment (Mutikani 2005). 
[ 
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The economy experienced significant turbulence over the period 1994 to 2004, 
notably in foreign exchange rates, interest rates and the rates of inflation. The rand 
exchange rates against the US dollar are shown in Figure 2.2 . The rand ended 1994 at 
3.56 to the dollar, deteriorated steadily to 7.64 in 2000, spiked to 11.68 in 2001, 
declined to 8.95 in 2002, 6.54 in 2003 and 6.52 to the dollar at the end of 2004. The 
prime interest rate varied from 16.25 percent in 1994 to a high of 25.5 percent in 
1998, followed by a gradual decline to 11 percent in 2004 and 10.5 percent in 2005. 
Inflation averaged 14.3 percent, with a high of 18.8 percent, from 1984 to 1993 and 
has averaged below six percent since then (South African Reserve Bank 2005b, 
Cadogan 2005). 
While no country is Immune to sudden currency fluctuations (Drucker 1999), it 
should be noted that the aforementioned oscillations are far more marked than those 
of South Africa's main trading partners such as the United Kingdom, the USA, 
Germany, Japan, China and Saudi Arabia. 
Figure 2.2 South Africa / US Foreign Exchange Rate 
South African Rand to One US Dollar . 
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Source: Department of Trade and Industry (2005b). 
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2.5 Culture 
The sociocultural aspects of a country concern a society' s attitudes and cultural 
values. Attitudes and values often drive demographic, economic, political/legal and 
technological conditions and changes (Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 2005). The 
historical segregation of racial and ethnic groups has resulted in distinct cultural 
developments. Within the white population, English and European cultures have re-
emerged as dominant influences, especially with the erosion of the apartheid system 
and the end of the isolation that it caused. Among blacks, urban and rural cultures 
continue to differ. Urban black culture is multi ethnic and increasingly draws on 
international influences, such as those of African Americans. In rural areas, black 
cultural activities tend to emphasise the traditions of particular ethnic groups 
(Microsoft Encarta 2001b). It is my sense that culture is moving beyond this and is 
forming an African, or South African, identity or consciousness in certain aspects. 
Religion influences attitudes and values, and, once again, South Africa' s diversity 
comes to the fore. About 68 percent of the people of South Africa are Christians, 
mainly Protestants. Some black South Africans follow independent churches that 
combine elements of Christianity and traditional African religions. A significant 
minority of blacks (20 percent) also follow traditional beliefs. Hindus and Muslims 
each make up somewhat over 1 percent of the total. There is also a significant Jewish 
community (Microsoft Encarta 2001 b). 
The diversity of religions, languages and ethnic groups in South Africa is depicted in 
Table 2.6 and illustrated graphically in Figure 2.4. The country has seventeen 
religions compared to an average of seven in the region and eight globally, eleven 
languages compared to an average of five regionally and four globally and seven 
ethnic groups compared to a regional average of six and a global average of five. 
The percentage accounted for by the largest groups in each of the three categories is 
generally less than half of that for the regional and global equivalents. 
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Table 2.6 Key Ethnic Drivers in South Africa 
Key Drivers South Africa Reg. Avg. Global Ave. 
Religions # Present 17 7 8 
" % Largest Group 34 65 69 
Languages # Present 10 5 4 
" % Largest Group 25 55 74 
" Number Official 13 2 1 
Ethnic Groups # Present 9 6 5 
" % Largest Group 24 55 70 
Other Drivers Population (k): 2000 46215 14848 26529 
" GOP/per capita ($PPP) 6800 2054 7416 
Source: South Africa Economic Studies (2000) cited by Rohman and Viljoen 
(2005:7). 
Figure 2.3 South Africa's Diversity 
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Source: South Africa Economic Studies (2000) cited by Rohman and Viljoen 
(2005:7). 
Hofstede (1991) in his study of the impact of culture on management, placed South 
Africa in his Anglo country cluster together with the USA, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, the Netherlands and Norway. South Africa's ratings on power distance, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance are very close to those of the United States and 
Great Britain. South Africa, however, ranks only 16th in individualism, while the 
United States ranks first, and Great Britain third, of the 53 countries in Hofstede ' s 
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study (Hofstede 1991). One would expect these rankings to be different today (and 
even more so in the future) because of the transformation of South African society. 
Hofstede used only white males in his study. A criticism of his work, which he later 
acknowledged, was that he had not taken sufficient account of multi-ethnicities in 
many societies (C.O.Smith, personal communication, 3 December 2005). 
Table 2.7 Hofstede's Rankings 
Uncertainty 
Country Power Individualism Masculinity Avoidance 
Distance 
Australia 41 2 16 37 
Brazil 14 26-7 27 21-2 
Germany 42-4 15 9-10 29 
Great Britain 42-4 3 9-10 47-8 
Japan 33 22-3 1 7 
South Africa 36-7 16 13-14 39-40 
Singapore 13 39-41 28 53 
United States 38 1 15 43 
RANK: f= Highest 53 is the lowest. 
Source: G. Hofstede (1991), cited by Schneider and Barsoux (1997). In: Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (2000: 194-195). 
South Africa is often described as a "sports mad" country, where sport is "the national 
religion" (South African Web 2005, cited by Rohrman and Viljoen 2005). Soccer, 
rugby and cricket are the leading sports. Team sports are encouraged, if not 
compulsory at schools. South Africa hosted the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and the 
Cricket World Cup in 2003. Both events were well managed by general accounts. 
The Soccer World Cup will be held in South Africa in 2010. Racially segregated 
sport was one of the most divisive issues during the apartheid era. Democracy has 
brought the potential for sport to unite the country, as demonstrated when South 
Africa won the Rugby World Cup in 2005. 
2.6 Other Factors 
An analysis of South Africa would not be complete without including the issues or 
factors of AIDS, affirmative action, black economic empowerment, land reform, 
crime and NEPAD. These issues have all had an impact on South Africa and the 
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corporations operating inside the country and are likely to do so for some time to 
come. Companies need to have developed, or to develop, new capabilities and 
competencies to deal with these issues. Some of these factors influence a company's 
ability to develop and transfer capabilities and competencies. Each of the six factors 
is outlined below. 
2.6.1 AIDS 
The United Nations' 2004 report, AIDS Epidemic Update, states that while sub-
Saharan Africa has 10 percent of the world's population, it accounts for 60 percent of 
all people living with AIDS. The report shows that southern Africa is one of the 
worst affected regions. Some ofthe prevalent rates of HI VIA IDS are: Swaziland with 
39 percent, Botswana with 37 percent, Lesotho with 29 percent, Zimbabwe with 25 
percent, South Africa with 22 percent and Zambia with 16 percent (Pile 2004). 
South Africa had the world's highest number of people living with HIV an estimated 
5.3 million people, 2.9 million of them women, at the end of 2003 according to the 
United Nations report. It states that there is no sign yet of a decline in the epidemic. 
Analysis of death registrations shows a rise in the total number of adult deaths in the 
past six years - an increase of more than 40 percent - and 150 percent for women 
aged 40 to 49 years, once population growth and possible improvements in death 
registrations are taken into account. 
2.6.2 Affirmative Action 
The Employment Equity Act (1998) has the purpose of promoting equal opportunity 
and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination and 
implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups, to ensure equitable representation in 
all occupational categories and levels in the workplace (South African Department of 
Labour 2005). 
An employer must prepare and implement a plan to achieve employment equity, 
which must have objectives for each year of the plan, include affirmative action 
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measures, have numerical goals and a timetable for each year, have internal 
monitoring, evaluation and internal dispute resolution procedures and mechanisms 
and identify persons to monitor and implement the plan. An employer with 150 
employees or more must submit yearly reports ; those with fewer than 150, every two 
years. The act has provisions for monitoring, enforcement and legal proceedings 
.(South African Department of Labour 2005). 
2.6.3 Black Economic Empowerment 
Black economic empowerment (BEE) is a government strategy to redress the 
imbalances in South African society created by apartheid. It is an integral part of 
South Africa's transformation process, encouraging the redistribution of wealth and 
opportunities to previously disadvantaged communities and individuals including 
blacks, women and people with disabilities (South Africa Information 2005). The 
socioeconomic strategies envisaged include: increasing black ownership and 
management of businesses; facilitating community and worker ownership of 
"enterprises and productive assets"; skills development; issues around equal 
representation in the workplace; preferential procurement and investment in 
businesses that are owned by black people. 
Empowerment charters have been developed for sectors such as mining, information 
technology and financial services and they are underway in other industries. The 
Department of Trade and Industry says that its black economic empowerment 
programme is working and that it is on schedule to achieving a target of 25 percent 
BEE ownership in South African companies by 2014 (South Africa Information 
2005). 
2.6.4 Land Reform 
In May 2005, the Constitutional Court made it clear that land grabs would not be 
tolerated. And yet, the Economist (2005b) reports, however orderly land reform has 
been, there is growing black frustration with the slow pace of reform. Land reform 
has been a priority of the ANC since coming to power in 1994. The authorities are 
now buying claimed land and giving it back to the original owners while planning to 
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redistribute 30 percent of the white-owned commercial farmland (22 million hectares) 
to black buyers by 2014 on a willing-buyer and willing-seller basis. 
2.6.5 Crime 
South Africa ranks third in the world in both murder and serious assault (per 100,000 
people) and has the eighth largest prison population (Economist 2005a). The murder 
rate is about nine times that of the United States and twenty-seven times that of the 
United Kingdom. With a reputation of having one of the world 's highest crime rates, 
South Africa did report a decrease in most types of violent and property-related crime 
in 2003 (South Africa Information 2005). Rape remains a serious problem, with 
55,000 cases reported, one of the highest rates in the world. Aggravated robbery, 
drug-related crime and illegal possession of firearms increased. 
This was the first time in 10 years that the annual number of murders in South Africa 
dropped below 20,000. Yet, compared with most of the developed world, the country 
is still very violent and criminal. According to Altbeker, a researcher at South 
Africa's Institute for Security Studies, fear of crime is higher in mixed societies than 
it is in homogenous ones (Economist 2005a). 
2.6.6NEPAD 
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a vision and strategic 
plan for Africa's renewal (NEPAD 2005). It arises from a mandate given to five 
states, including South Africa, by the Organisation of African Unity to develop an 
integrated socioeconomic development framework for Africa. 
The prime objectives are to eradicate poverty, to place African countries on a path of 
sustainable development, to facilitate Africa's integration into the global economy 
and to accelerate the empowerment of women. NEP AD plans to mobilise resources 
by improving management, improving Africa's share in global trade, attracting 
foreign investment and increasing capital flows through debt reduction and aid. A 
steering committee oversees project and programme development and the NEPAD 
Secretariat co-ordinates the implementation of projects and programmes approved 
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NEP AD looks to the eight richest nations (G8) and others to help fund the 
organisation. The implicit arrangement is that NEP AD and the African Union will 
uphold human rights and democracy, fight corruption and promote good governance 
in exchange for aid and assistance (Economist 2004d). 
2.6.7 Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe's gross domestic product has shrunk by a third since inflation has been 
running at an estimated 254 percent per year and about a quarter of Zimbabwe's 12 
million-plus population are thought to have emigrated. The recent drive to "clear out" 
the cities by removing informal businesses and destroying houses, said to have been 
built without permission, has left at least 700,000 more people destitute (Economist 
2005e). Further developments in Zimbabwe will impact South Africa directly and 
indirectly via world perceptions of Africa. 
2.7 Determinants of Competitiveness 
Although the works of Porter (1990) are reviewed in Chapter 3, to begin the analysis 
required in the thesis, his "diamond" system is used in this section to highlight certain 
factors in South Africa that determine the country ' s competitiveness and national 
advantage. The determinants of factor conditions, demand, related and supporting 
industries and firm strategy, structure and rivalry interact in Porter's model to 
determine national competitiveness or advantage. Chance and government play 
important roles as well. National advantage, or competitiveness, includes core 
competencies developed by corporations operating in the country while the factors 
promulgated by Porter influence the development of core competencies. 
2.7.1 Factor Conditions 
Natural Resources 
South Africa's total land area is about 1,200,000 square kilometres, or 470,693 square 
miles, which makes it nearly five times bigger than the United Kingdom and more 
than twice as large as France (Roux 2002). The coastline is 2960 kilometres (1 ,840 
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miles) with few indentations. There are few natural harbours, East London and 
Knysna being the exceptions. The coastal plain is fertile and generally narrow, 
varying from 130 kilometres (8 miles) to 30 kilometres (19 miles). (Microsoft Encarta 
200Ia). 
Porter (1990) states that location, relative to other nations that are suppliers or 
markets, affects transportation costs and the ease of cultural and business exchange. 
The time zone of a nation, relative to other nations, may also be significant in a world 
of almost instant global communications (Porter 1990). South Africa' s time zone is 
one or two hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time depending on the season. 
Sparks (2003:306) points out that "South Africa is at the bottom of the world ' s most 
marginalized continent - far from the economic hubs of North America, Europe and 
Japan and that "Africa has this terrible reputation of being the ' hopeless continent' 
in a world where few are disposed to differentiate between its 54 countries. South 
Africa gets lumped in with the rest - tarred with the brush of Afro-pessimism." He 
refers to an interview with Jeffrey Sachs where the economist said that South Africa' s 
chances would be invariably better if it were located where Morocco is (Sparks 2003). 
The climate is temperate subtropical with considerable regional variations caused by 
differences in wind systems and ocean currents. The Western Cape has a 
Mediterranean climate. It is generally dry, droughts are relatively common and water 
for agriculture and industry is at a premium. Sixty-seven percent of the country 
receives less than 27 inches ofrain a year. This, together with infertile soil, restricts 
the areas for suitable crop raising. Rivers are highly seasonal in flow and many are 
dry for much of the year. They are therefore of little use for navigation or hydro-
electrical power or irrigation. There are 200 species of mammals, including lion, 
elephant, hippopotamus and rhinoceros. There is a long history of wildlife 
conservation (Microsoft Encarta 2001 a). 
South Africa has great mineral wealth. It is the world ' s leading producer of gold, 
platinum metals, chromium ore and manganese and aluminium silicates. It has 5 
percent of the world 's coal reserves, and, although it only ranks fifth in diamond 
production, it is the world 's largest buyer and marketer of diamonds through the De 
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Beers Company. Please see Table 2.8 that shows production and estimated reserves 
of the various minerals. 
Table 2.8 South Africa's Mineral Production and Reserve Figures 
Commodity 2003 Production Estimated Reserves 
Global Percentage of 
Metric Position Metric World 
Reserves 
Gold 373 t 1 36000 t 41% 
Platinum Group 266 t 1 72 000 t 88% 
Diamonds 12.8Mct 5 •• 
_. 
Chromium ore 7.4 Mt 1 5500 Mt 76% 
Manganese 3.6 Mt 1 4000 Mt 80% 
Titanium 1.2 Mt 2 244 Mt 30% 
Aluminium 183000 t 1 51 Mt 37% 
Coal 239 Mt 6 33814 Mt 5% 
. . 
_. Sensitive data, not released . 
Source: Adapted from Council for Geoscience (2003), cited by Angelosante and 
Griffiths (2003) and Department of Minerals and Energy (2005). 
Coal provides 79 percent of the total primary energy supply, crude oil 10.0 percent, 
renewable sources 6 percent, nuclear power 3.0 percent, gas 2.0 percent and 
hydroelectric power less than 1.0 percent (South African Department of Minerals and 
Energy 2005). 
There are 8 million hectares (21 million acres) of forested land; of which 1.3 million 
hectares (3.1 million acres) are commercial forest. Pine, eucalyptus and wattle are the 
leading timber species (Microsoft Encarta 2001a). 
Human Resources 
The population was 44.8 million in October 2001. Black Africans made up 79 
percent of this figure, Coloureds (people of mixed ancestry) 8.9 per cent, Indians and 
Asians 2.5 percent and Whites 9.6 percent (Statistics South Africa 2001). 
Of the total population 8.4 percent had education beyond high school - 5.2 percent, 
4.9 percent, 14.9 percent and 29.8 percent for the above race groups respectively. 
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Among Black Africans, 22.3 percent have had no schooling at all (Statistics South 
Africa 2001). 
English is the most universal language and has become the world standard for 
business transactions, the language of technology and electronic commerce. Eighty 
percent of all internet exchanges are conducted in English (Ohmae 1999). Despite the 
fact that English is recognised as the language of commerce and science, only 8.2 
percent of South Africans spoke it at home in 2001. IsiZulu, with 23.8 percent, and 
IsiXhosa with 17.6 percent, were the most commonly spoken home languages 
(Statistics South Africa 2001). 
Estimates of unemployment vary from 29.5 to 41.6 percent. Black Africans are at the 
higher end of unemployment estimates, with 43.3 percent for males and 57.8 percent 
for females. The corresponding figures for Whites were 6.1 percent for males and 6.3 
percent for females (Statistics South Africa 2001). 
Income distribution varies considerably according to race, gender and location. While 
there is great inequality of income among races, it also exists within race groups. 
Median incomes in the rural areas are about half of those earned in urban areas. The 
poverty rate among Black, female-headed households is 60 percent and 30 percent for 
those headed by Black men (IDASA 2001 , cited by Bentley, Cocks, Guambe and 
Rangeiro 2001). 
About half of South Africa's black population live below the poverty line. South 
Africa (0.593) and Brazil (0.61) have two of the highest Gini coefficients in the 
world. (Sierra Leone and Central African Republic actually have higher coefficients.) 
The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality where 0 equals absolute 
equality and I equals absolute inequality (CIA 2002). 
Sparks (2003:220) points out that apartheid' s legacy of poor education for the 
majority of the population, together with the job laws favouring Whites, truncated the 
skills base of the working class. "Education was not only segregated, but hopelessly 
unequal. White public education was equal to the best in the developed world, while 
Black education was poorer than many in the Third World." 
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Capital Resources 
South Africa had the 16th largest stock market capitalisation in the world in 2002 
(Economist 2005g). Its current investment ratio is still below that of most emerging 
market economies (South African Reserve Bank 2004). Section 2.4 shows the 
relative weakness ofthe country's savings and fixed capital formation. 
South Africa's real cost of capital, at 8.6 percent, is the highest of 24 countries 
monitored by the Holt Group, which measures the aggregate cash flow return on 
investment for all publicly quoted companies valued at over 100 million US dollars . 
South Africa's businesses' Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI) is about 9 
percent against the 8.6 percent cost of capital. Equivalent figures for the US are 10.5 
percent and 5.5 percent (Schneider 2002). 
Physical blft'astructure 
The railway systems in South Africa link all mam centres. There are 25,555 
kilometres (15,879 miles) of track, ranking the system 10th in the world although it 
ranks 25th in area. There are 534,131 kilometres (331 ,894 miles) of road (Microsoft 
Encarta 2001 c). 
Postal, telegraph and telephone services are operated by two public companies - the 
South African Post Office and Telkom SA. These were formerly government 
departments but have been partially privatised. Telkom is now listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange. The national airline is South African Airways. 
Several other smaller carriers and foreign airlines serve the country both domestically 
and internationally (Microsoft Encarta 2001c). Sunter (1994) claims that South 
Africa has the best infrastructure of any developing country in the world. Its modem 
network of roads, railways, bridges, electricity, telecommunications, airports and 
harbours is unrivalled. 
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Information Infrastructure 
South Africa is the 23rd largest country in terms of information technology (IT) 
investment, fourth largest in network PCs, 23rd in worldwide telecommunication 
spending and 18th in terms of internet hosts (World Information Technology Alliance 
1999, cited by Sparks 2003). It ranks 44th of the 44 countries listed in the 
information and communication technology (lCT) index, a measure of usage that 
includes per capita measures of telephone lines, Internet usage, personal computers 
and mobile phone users (Economist 2005g). 
Scientific and Technological Inji<astructure 
South Africa's level of investment in research and development (R&D) as a 
percentage of GDP across all technology sectors amounted to 0.7 percent in 200 I. 
The OECD average across public and private sectors exceeds 2.15 percent, with 
countries such as Sweden (3.6 percent) , Finland (3.4 percent), Japan (3.0 percent) and 
South Korea (2.9 percent) spending far more. The US figure is 2.8 percent 
(Economist 2004e). The South African government concluded that the current level 
of expenditure on research and development is significantly lower than it should be to 
ensure national competitiveness in the years to come. It decided in 2002 to double 
this investment over the following three years (South African Department of Science 
and Technology 2004). 
The country does not feature in the 44 countries ranked in the Innovation Index, a 
measure of human resource skills, market incentive structures and interaction between 
business and scientific sectors, compiled by The Economist World in Figures (2005). 
While the South African averages and rankings appear noncompetitive, there are areas 
in which technology is demonstrated to be highly competitive internationally. In the 
early part of the 20th century technology was influenced by the importance of the 
mining sector. The key technology missions after 1950 were the need for military 
dominance in the subcontinent and energy self-sufficiency (South African Department 
of Science and Technology 2004). 
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The world' s only coal-based synthetic-fuels manufacturing facility was begun in 1950 
and the first auto fuel produced in 1955. The Fischer Tropsech technology was 
specially developed by Sasol to manufacture synthetic gas from low-grade coal. This 
was converted into a wide range of petrochemicals (Sasol 2004). 
According to De Klerk (1998:66) South Africa had become a major exporter of 
sophisticated arms. "It had developed the G5 and G6 artillery systems, which were 
generally regarded as the best in world. It had also produced a whole range of 
excellent armoured vehicles, a sophisticated attack helicopter and its own modified 
version of the Mirage fighter." As De Klerk later revealed in 1993, South Africa had 
also acquired its own nuclear capability and, at the end of the 1980s, was about to test 
a medium-range missile system which would soon have enabled it to launch its own 
satellites. The South African unique uranium enrichment process contributed to the 
nuclear project. Six atomic bombs were dismantled and destroyed in 1989. 
Sunter (1987:88) regards South Africa as having a medium-to low-tech environment. 
He does not believe that the country has an education system that could support a 
broad enough high-tech environment to underpin a sophisticated "first world" 
economy and to provide the major impetus for growth in manufactured exports. 
Medicine, he feels , is an exception. Sunter stresses the county's ability to manage 
large projects such as Sasol, Escom (Electricity Supply Commission) and new mines. 
"It is part of the tradition of the mining industry to have superb project management 
skills." The industry is a world leader in deep-mining expertise. Gold is mined below 
3,000 metres (l0,000 feet) in certain areas. 
2.7.2 Demand Conditions 
General market demand has increased with the growth of the economy, but more so in 
the years from 1994 to 2004 when economic growth was 3 percent compared to the 1 
percent average from 1984 to 1993. A feature of the South African market over time 
has been the prevalence of multicultural, diverse and small markets, a challenge to 
marketers and advertisers, especially during periods of slow growth because of 
competition. While industries were protected from imports during isolation there was 
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generally some competition internally because of the structure of the economy. The 
structure is explained in Section 2.7.4. 
2.7.3 Related and Supporting Industries 
Porter (1998) describes a cluster as a geographic concentration of interconnected 
companies, specialised suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries and 
associated institutions (examples: universities, technical colleges and industry 
associations) in a particular industry that compete but also cooperate. The whole is 
greater than the parts. 
The original growth of industry in South Africa was facilitated by the mmmg 
industry, around which engineering and manufacturing organisations were established 
to form clusters. Each of the three South African multinational companies studied are 
parts of a "cluster" and are covered in Chapter 7. 
2.7.4 Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
The isolation of South Africa, sanctions and rigid exchange controls made it very 
difficult for South African firms to expand internationally in the 1980s (Economist 
1998). Since they could not easily operate abroad, the leading companies in the 
country therefore grew sideways through diversification. The Anglo American 
Corporation, the country 's largest company, diversified into motor vehicles, 
aluminium wheels, newspapers, vineyards, fruit juices and many other enterprises 
unrelated to its core expertise, mining. The South African Breweries diversified into 
retailing, food, furniture, footwear, textiles and other areas. Barlow Rand, the 
predecessor to Barloworld, expanded from a capital equipment base into food, sugar, 
electronics, appliances and mining. In the early 1980s, the Anglo American 
Corporation accounted for more than half the market capitalisation of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange with six other conglomerates controlling a further 30 
percent ofthe total. See Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9 Who Controls the JSE 
(JSE control-by % of market capitalization) 
Group 2004 2003 2000 
Anglo American 18,7 22 ,3 23,6 
San lam 2,7 3,8 13,2 
Old Mutual 4,5 6,9 11 ,0 
Rembrandt 7 ,9 8 ,1 11 ,0 
Company directors 5,8 6 ,1 8,9 
Standard Bank/Liberty 4,7 4 ,3 5,2 
Black groups' 6,3 4,7 5,7 
Foreign groups 18,5 17,9 3,9 
Absa 2,2 
Institutions/other 10,3 11 ,2 6,7 
RMB/Firstrand 4,9 4,4 2 ,9 
Sasol 4,2 3,7 2 ,2 
Investec/Fedsure 0 ,8 0,7 1,9 
Anglovaal 
Bidvest 1,2 1,0 1,0 
SABMilier 5,1 3,5 2 ,8 
State 2,2 1,5 
*Includes alt companies that have significant black influence 
Source: McGregor (2004:34). 
1996 
27,5 
11 ,4 
10,2 
10,6 
10,0 
11 ,1 
6,3 
4,1 
0 ,8 
1,7 
2,1 
1,1 
3,0 
1994 
43,3 
10,5 
9,7 
13,0 
7,0 
7,2 
2,2 
0 ,9 
0,5 
1,7 
0,4 
3,6 
1983 
52,5 
9,4 
0,6 
2,1 
9, 1 
1,1 
5,4 
18,1 
1,7 
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The isolation experienced by South Africa in the 1980s affected the general level of 
knowledge, expertise and technology but certain companies ensured that they stayed 
up-to-date with technology and other aspects of world industry (E.A.G. Mackay, 
personal interview, London, 27 November 2001). 
In the new circumstances most of the companies have restructured and sold their non-
core businesses. During the last two decades many acquisitions and divestments have 
taken place so that top management in South Africa, generally, has learned a great 
deal about acquisitions. Managers also experienced, in many cases, the adverse 
results of investing outside their core competencies. 
2.7.5 Government 
The effect of the apartheid policy on corporations was the creation ofa siege economy 
where the companies had very few opportunities outside the country and where their 
operations inside were curtailed by laws. The establishment of democracy and 
subsequent steps taken by the government to get South Africa back into the world 
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arena (reduction of protection, WTO, trade agreements) have resulted in worldwide 
opportunities and, often, more competition at home (Sparks 2003 and Sappi Annual 
Report 2001). 
Sparks (2003) notes that the ANC underwent an astonishing turnabout in the 
formulation of its economic policy. It moved from a left-wing socialist position that 
envisaged large-scale nationalisation to a position where it embraced free market 
orthodoxy that involves large-scale privatisation. It was only in February 1992, at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, in the Swiss Alps, that Mandela finally turned 
against nationalisation. There had been many conferences and much consulting with 
businesses in SA and elsewhere before arriving at this position (Sparks 2003). 
Lamont (2002) commends South Africa for the quality of its domestic institutions 
(that is a free press, an independent judiciary, churches, trade unions, 
nongovernmental organisations and a well-developed and socially engaged business 
, community), and its choices of economic policies toward tariff reductions, capital 
flows, the transfer of knowledge, low inflation, affordable budget deficits, secure 
property rights and efficient and non-corrupt governance. State assets, government 
departments and parastatal organisations have been restructured. Certain of these 
restructurings have been successful, especially that of the South African Revenue 
Service (Cadogan 2005). Table 2.5 above reflects the improvements in taxation rates. 
Wikipedia (2005) supports Lamont's views. It states that the government of South 
Africa demonstrated its commitment to open markets, privatisation, and a favourable 
investment climate with its release of the crucial Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy to cover the period 1996 to 2000. The strategy had 
mixed success. It brought greater financial discipline and macroeconomic stability 
but failed to deliver in key areas. 
South Africa is also credited for great progress In dismantling its old economic 
system, which was based on import substitutions, high tariffs and subsidies, 
anti competitive behaviour, and extensive government intervention in the economy 
(wikipedia 2005). The new leadership has moved to reduce the governnlent's role in 
the economy and to promote private-sector investment and competition. It Ms '. 
~. \\\\ . ~\ \, ..... '. '. ( \\.f\:\\' .... · .) ~\\\\.\ 1 ~ \., " "\ \J \\ <\ j', n. \ " \., 1\\ .' . , . ~ ;I .. ;;;....,:-/ 
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significantly reduced tariffs and exports subsidies, loosened exchange controls, and 
improved enforcement of intellectual-property laws. A new competition law was 
passed and became effective in 1999. 
2.7.6 Chance 
The negotiations that led to the establishment of democracy in South Africa are often 
regarded as being facilitated by the fall of communism. Andrew and Mitrokhin 
(2005) state that the Soviet one-party state and the South African apartheid system 
began to crumble away at almost the same time. Gorbachev' s unwillingness to devote 
more time and money to the struggle in South Africa helped to turn the ANC towards 
negotiations, while the end of the Cold War pushed the South African government in 
the same direction. 
South Africa succeeded in reaching a political accommodation, which many other less 
diverse countries, faced with similar situations, had failed to do throughout history. 
This is sometimes held to be because of the presence of extraordinary individuals -
such as Nelson Mandela, F.W. de Klerk and Archbishop Desmond Tutu - a view that 
I support. Andrew and Mitrokhin emphasise Mandela' s immense moral authority and 
capacity for uniting the South African people which he had "amazingly" preserved 
during more than 27 years in prison. 
2.8 Differential Diagnosis 
Sachs (2005) utilises a differential diagnosis of seven categories to analyse countries. 
These are: poverty trap; economic policy framework; fiscal framework and fiscal trap; 
physical geography; governance patterns and failures; cultural barriers and 
geopolitics. I find physical geography and geopolitics the most useful for this thesis 
when taken in conjunction with Porter' s Diamond. Physical geography, history and 
geopolitics explain the country' s emergence as the most industrialised country on the 
African continent despite the apartheid era. 
South Africa is a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations 
(which it left during the apartheid years), the African Union and the Southern African 
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Development Community (SADC). There are mixed feeling among business people 
and politicians in southern Africa about the country's dominant role in the region. 
South Africa has encouraged peaceful resolution of conflicts in Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi and, most 
recently, Zimbabwe. However, the Economist (2004c), claims that South Africa's 
continuing failure to facilitate a resolution of the political and economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe has cost it dearly in terms of the credibility of its foreign policies as well as 
its efforts to attract foreign direct investment because of concerns about the ANC's 
commitment to property rights. 
2.9 World Competitiveness 
The World Competitiveness Report Yearbook (WCY) reports on the competitiveness 
of nations, ranking and analysing how a nation's environment sustains the 
competitiveness of enterprises. It uses 321 different criteria, grouped into four 
competitiveness factors: economic performance, government efficiency, business 
efficiency and infrastructure (Institute of Management Development [IMD] 2003). 
The format used in the World Competitiveness Report has varied in the past. The 
2005 yearbook ranks South Africa 46th out of 60 countries listed. This is shown in 
Figure 2.4. In contrast the 2003 yearbook ranks South Africa 18th of 30 in overall 
competitiveness of the countries with populations greater than 20 million. The USA is 
in the first position in 2005, followed by Hong Kong and Singapore. Argentina, 
Indonesia and Venezuela occupy the bottom positions. In the 2003 rankings South 
Africa ranks 21 st in infrastructure, 23rd in economic performance, 15th in government 
efficiency, but lOth in business efficiency. Furthermore, in a management practices 
subsection of business efficiency, South Africa rates 9th, ahead of countries such as 
France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. Appendices 2.1 and 2.2 provide more 
information on these aspects. 
The 2001 yearbook lists the strongest and weakest criteria of 49 different countries. It 
regards South Africa's greatest strengths as cheap electricity and investment in 
telecommunications, ranked first and second respectively of the 49 countries 
surveyed. South Africa ranks second of the 49 countries in the cost-of-Iiving index, 
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third in both effective income tax rate and employers ' social security contribution 
rate. The weaknesses include human development, brain drain (well-educated people 
emigrating abroad), personal security, harassment and violence, equal opportunity and 
unemployment. The weaknesses mentioned here rank from 47th to 49th of the 
countries listed. More details on the strengths and weaknesses are available in 
Appendices 2.3 and 2.4. 
The Global Competitiveness Report is produced by the World Economic Forum, an 
independent international organisation committed to improving the state of the world 
by engaging leaders in partnerships to shape global, regional and industry agendas. 
The !,Tfowth competitiveness index identifies three "pillars" in the evolution of growth 
in a country: the quality of the macroeconomic environment; the state of the country's 
public institutions and the level of its technological readiness. The index uses a 
combination of hard data, such as budget deficits, the level of internet access in 
schools and survey data, taking the "temperature" in areas such as judicial 
independence, the prevalence of institutionalised corruption and the extent of 
inefficient government intervention in the economy (World Economic Forum 2005). 
The Forum' s 2005 growth competitiveness ranking has South Africa 42nd out of 104 
countries ranked. Finland is ranked first, followed by the United States of America 
and Sweden. Guyana, Kyrgyz Republic and Chad are ranked in the three bottom 
positions. The rankings are shown in Appendix 2.5 . In a separate business 
competitiveness report the Forum ranks South Africa 25th out of 123 countries. The 
business ranking is based on company operations and strategy, together with the 
quality of the national business environment. This can be seen in Appendix 2.6. 
Both the IMD and the World Economic Forum therefore, rate South Africa's business 
competitiveness, or companies, significantly higher than they do the country as a 
whole. 
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Figure 2.4 The World Competitiveness Scoreboard 2005. 
(1) USA (31) China Mainland 
(2) Hong Kong (32) Catalonia 
(3) Singapore (33) lIe-de-France 
(4) Iceland (35) Scotland 
(5) Canada (36) Czech Republic 
(6) Finland (37) Hungary 
(7) Denmark (38) Spain 
(8) Switzerland (39) India 
(9) Australia (40) Slovak Republic 
(10) Luxembourg (41) Lombardy 
(11) Taiwan (42) Maharashtra 
(12) Ireland (43) Sao Paulo 
(13) Netherlands (44) Jordan 
(14) Sweden (45) Portugal 
(15) Norway (46) South Africa 
(16) New Zealand (47) Colombia 
(17) Austria (48) Turkey 
(18) Bavaria (49) Philippines 
(19) Chile (50) Greece 
(20) Zhejiang (51) Brazil 
(21) Japan (52) Slovenia 
(22) United Kingdom (53) Italy 
(23) Germany (54) Russia 
(24) Belgium (55) Romania 
(25) Israel (56) Mexico 
(26) Estonia (57) Poland 
(27) Thailand (58) Argentina 
(28) Malaysia (59) Indonesia 
(29) Korea (60) Venezuela 
(30) France 
Source: Adapted from IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2005. 
2.10 World Perceptions 
Figure 2.5 depicts the Economist emerging country-risks rankings. The country-risk 
ratings take account of 77 indicators of political stability and other measures of credit 
quality. South Africa ranked 14th of the 26 emerging market countries evaluated, 
rated slightly less risky than Russia but more risky than China and India. Singapore 
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has the least risk followed by Hong Kong and Chile. Iraq and Zimbabwe are judged 
to be the most risky countries. 
Transparency International ranked South Africa joint 44th (with Kuwait and 
Lithuania) of 146 countries included in its 2004 Corruptions Perceptions Index. The 
Index is a poll of polls, reflecting the perceptions of business people and country 
analysts both resident and non-resident. Finland, New Zealand, Denmark and 
Singapore head the list as the countries perceived to be least corrupt with Nigeria, 
Bangladesh and Haiti perceived as the most corrupt (Transparency International 
2005). 
The Fraser Institute, a Canadian think-tank, produces the Economic Freedom of the 
World Index. Economic freedom is the extent to which one can pursue economic 
activity without interference from government. Economic freedom is built upon 
personal choice; voluntary exchange; the right to keep what one earns; and the 
security of property rights. The Index is constructed under the leadership of the 
Fraser Institute and Professor Milton Friedman. The 2004 rankings have South Africa 
in 53rd place out of the 130 countries ranked. Hong Kong and Singapore are in the 
first two positions with the United States, New Zealand and Switzerland in joint third 
position. The lowest rankings include China 95 th, Russia 102nd, Venezuela 126th and 
Zimbabwe 130th (The Fraser Institute 2006). 
Figure 2.5 Country Risk 
O=minimUln ri sk, 100=maximunl fist: 
o 20 t,O 60 80 100 
Iraq 
Argenti na 
Venezuela 
Turkey 
Indonesia 
Colomb'ia 
Philippines 
Egypt 
Peru 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Russia 
Sou th Africa 
China 
India 
Israel 
Poland 
Hungary 
Thailand 
Ma laysia 
Czech Republic 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Chile 
Hong I(ong 
Singapore 
iiiiiiIiiiiiii 
Source: fto nomist Intelligence Unit 
Source: Economist (2004a:98), 
-
Jan 2003 
_ Jan 2004 
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2.11 International Business 
South Africa does not have a history of multinational businesses - unlike say, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Holland which, despite being relatively small countries, 
spawned major multinational companies such as Nestle, Roche, Volvo, Ericsson, 
Royal Dutch Shell and Philips. There are exceptions to South Africa's lack of an 
international business history. The Anglo American Corporation, South Africa's 
largest company, was the single largest foreign investor in the United States in 1981 
when it became the largest shareholder in the US giant Phibro-Salomon Brothers 
through its subsidiary Minerals and Resources Company. It also created and became 
the controlling shareholder in Charter Consolidated in London in 1965 (Pallister, 
Stewart and Lepper, 1987). 
The Ruperts, a South African family, built up a substantial share of the world's 
cigarette market. Dr Anton Rupert began manufacturing cigarettes in his garage in 
Johannesburg in the 1940s. His company, Rembrandt, was incorporated in 1948 and 
in the 1950s expanded abroad through the establishment of various international 
partnerships. Rembrandt was listed on the JSE Securities Exchange in South Africa, 
in 1956. In 1972, the overseas tobacco interests of Rembrandt were consolidated in 
Rothmans International, which was listed on the London Stock Exchange. The local 
and overseas interests of Rembrandt were separated in 1988 with the founding of 
Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG (known as Richemont), a Swiss-listed luxury 
goods group which then also acquired the shares in Rothmans International (Remgro 
2004). 
In 1995 Rembrandt and Richemont consolidated their respective tobacco interests in 
Rothmans International, at the time the world's fourth largest cigarette manufacturer, 
which was then delisted. These interests were merged with those of British American 
Tobacco pic (BAT), the world' s second largest cigarette producer, in 1999. The 
Rembrandt name was subsequently changed to Remgro. Remgro and Richemont 
today have a combined effective 30 percent share holding in BAT (Remgro 2004). 
Richemont is now one of the world's leading luxury goods groups, with particular 
strengths in terms of jewellery, luxury watches and writing instruments. Brands 
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include Cartier, Van Cleef and Arpels, Piagnet, Dunhill, Montblanc, Purdey, Chloe 
and Shanghai Tang (Richemont 2004). 
In addition to the historic examples of Anglo American and the Ruperts there are the 
more recent examples, mostly over the last decade, of companies such as Barloworld, 
Dimension Data, The Old Mutual, The South African Breweries, Sappi and Sasol that 
have all established some global presence. Over and above these companies there are 
many individual instances of South African management and leadership capabilities 
being exported worldwide. 
After developing substantial South African businesses, Sol Kerzner and Donald 
Gordon created offshore empires. Mark Shuttleworth's sale of Thawte Consulting 
turned him into a US-dollar billionaire. Brian Gilbertson is perhaps South Africa's 
best-known business export. From the early nineties he completed the work of Derek 
Keyes in unbundling Gencor, creating a number of separately listed companies. 
Gilbertson then fused the remaining companies into Billiton and listed this in London. 
He subsequently merged it with the Australian firm BHP creating BHP Billiton. 
Gilbertson resigned from this company in to pursue other interests in 2003 (Whitfield 
2004). He was ranked 41st of the world 's most respected business leaders in the 2005 
Financial Times Special Report on the World 's Most Respected Companies. To put 
this ranking into perspective Bill Gates was ranked first and Donald Trump 43rd. 
There are numerous other examples of South Africans succeeding in international 
business. These include Peter Joubert, as Chief Executive of British Oxygen, David 
Lewis, as head of Holiday Inn Europe, and Alastair Morton, who was the chairman of 
the Channel Tunnel (with some controversy). Among the better-known exports are 
Brian Clark, previous Telkom CE and now CEO of Vodaphone Pacific, Kevin 
Benson, who runs the company that owns the Greyhound bus service in the US and 
who was previously CFO of Rennies, and Meyer Feldberg, dean of the Columbia 
Business School, formerly head of the Graduate School of Business at Cape Town 
University (Whitfield 2004). Willie Pietersen, also from South Africa, is a professor 
at the Columbia School of Business and previously headed several prominent 
multibillion-dollar businesses in the United Kingdom and the United States (Pietersen 
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2003). Thus, South Africa has produced management talent that has proved to be 
world-class. 
2.12 Summary and Conclusion 
A democratic government with Nelson Mandela as president was elected in 1994 -
following 46 years of apartheid - and a turbulent history over three centuries. Two 
elections have been held since then and the economy, while not yet achieving the 
growth rates ofleading emerging market countries, has performed vastly better than it 
did in the decade prior to the introduction of democracy. The real cost of capital and 
the levels of investment have been constraints on growth. 
The new democratic dispensation has opened up global opportunities for South 
African companies and improved many facets in the home market. Competition in 
South Africa has increased, and companies must engage issues such as affirmative 
action, black economic empowerment, crime, NEP AD and AIDS. 
History, the location and the coastline, together with the rich mineral resources, led to 
South Africa becoming the most industrialised country on the African continent. 
South Africa is possibly the most diverse country on earth when the different ethnic 
groups, languages, religions, wealth, income and education levels are considered. It is 
a country with vast extremes and disparities. 
The extremes and disparities should caution against judging the country on averages 
or aggregates when considering whether the country is capable of producing world-
class multinational companies. An example of the extremes is South Africa coming 
both first and forty-ninth in different categories out of the 49 countries rated by the 
International Institute of Management in 2001. Despite an overall mediocre 
technological grading, there are categories in which South Africa is a world leader. 
The Institute for Management Development and the World Economic Forum both 
rank the business sector, or companies, considerably higher than they do South Africa 
as an entity. A persuasive statistic is in management practices, where South Africa 
was rated ahead of countries such as France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. 
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While the education overall is considered to be poor, certain sections of the 
population received, and are receiving world-class education. 
The size of the South African economy (in relation to its major trading partners) 
together with the country' s diversity, has meant relatively small and differentiated 
market segments in many industries. I contend that this has provided managers with 
opportunities to learn how to be profitable in small markets by targeting segments, 
controlling costs and managing with limited resources. The 1980s and 1990s were 
periods of great change and uncertainty, challenging companies and their 
managements to learn how to cope in those conditions. The divestment by foreign 
companies, the acquisitions by domestic companies and the subsequent restructuring 
have taught many managers about mergers and acquisitions and the consequences of 
investing outside their core competency. 
The international achievements of the Anglo American Corporation, Rembrandt and 
Richemont prior to 1994 do not imply that other South African companies can be 
successful internationally. The success would clearly depend upon the capabilities of 
the companies concerned. The Anglo American Corporation, Rembrandt and 
Richemont, however, did demonstrate that it could be done. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Mouton (2001) notes that every research project should begin with a review of the existing 
literature. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) state further that the objectives of a literature 
review are to become aware of the current state of knowledge in the subject and to form the 
foundation upon which the research is built. 
The original intention of the literature review was to concentrate on strategy, international 
business, culture and core competencies. After the initial meetings with representatives of the 
companies and reviewing their background materials, it became clear how important 
acquisitions and post-acquisition integration are to their strategies and performance. The 
significance of knowledge and learning also became apparent. Literature reviews in these 
areas were then added to the original list. The section on core competencies was subsequently 
-
di vided into three sections, dealing with their definition and nature, development and transfer. 
The literature review therefore comprises, and is conducted in, the following sequence: 
Strategy, International Business, Culture, Learning and Knowledge, Definition and Nature of 
Core Competencies, Development of Core Competencies, Mergers and Acquisitions, Post-
Merger and Acquisition Integration and Transfer of Core Competencies. The review moves 
from general or broad sections, which provide background information and theory, to the more 
specific sections, while attempting to keep the four aims of the thesis in mind throughout the 
process. 
Each of the nine sections has a summary and a conclusion relating to the literature reviewed. 
The summaries are in the form of figures showing brief descriptions and/or key words for each 
author. These summaries enable an area to be reviewed speedily - almost by glancing at a 
page - and are also useful when comparing the results of the case research with established or 
expert views. The literature summaries and conclusions are used to set out a framework or 
model for the thesis. The framework fonus the basis for the questions to the companies being 
studied, and it is used later to review the results of the study. 
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The nine sections and the summary and conclusion each start at the top of a new page and are 
treated as chapters because of the length of the "Literature Review and Framework" chapter. 
Diagrams are used where I consider them to be unique or where they assist in explaining the 
concepts discussed in the review. The sequences in which the works in the different sections 
of the chapter are reviewed take into account chronology, the importance of the particular 
work to the topic being reviewed, the school of thought or theory and the theme or construct. 
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3.2 History and Overview of Strategy 
The definition of strategy by Pietersen is repeated here to introduce this section. 
"Strategy is derived from Greek strategia - meaning generalship, which itself is 
compounded from two words meaning army and to lead. Your company strategy, 
therefore, defines how you will win" (Pietersen 2000:40). Operational effectiveness 
means performing similar activities better than rivals perform them. In contrast, 
strategic positioning means performing activities different from one's rivals or 
performing similar activities in different ways. Strategy therefore, is the creation of a 
unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities (Porter 1998). 
This section covers the evolution of strategy from a Chinese general in 500 BC to a 
Harvard Business Review article in 2003 and outlines the works of the leading 
strategic thinkers and practitioners. The various stages of evolution are summarised 
by Underwood (2002) as follows: 
1. Prior to 1960. Basic financial planning (budgeting), which is still used as part 
of strategy today. 
2. Early 1960s. Forecasting (extrapolation) introduced as long-range planning. 
3. 1960s and 1970s. External-oriented planning (scenarios, war gaming). 
4. 1980s. Strategic management (including Porter' s work as well as Ansoffs). 
5. 1990s. Complex system strategy. This is divided into "emergence", which is 
based on Darwin and ecological management, and "strategic balance", which 
is based on complex dynamic systems (i.e. Ansoff). 
A brief history of strategy is outlined before conducting an overview and a review of 
the leading researchers, writers and practitioners of strategy. 
3.2.1 Outline History 
Ghemawat (2001) states that the early history of business strategic thinking was 
affected in many ways by military concepts and considerations. He points out that the 
adoption of strategic terminology to a business context had to await the Second 
Industrial Revolution, which began in the second half of the nineteenth century but 
I 
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really took off only in the twentieth century. Indeed, Crainer (1998) states that while 
management has been a fundamental activity throughout history, the recognition and 
study of management as a discipline and profession is a thoroughly modem 
phenomenon. Only in the twentieth century has management come of age, gaining 
respectability and credence. The First Industrial Revolution, Ghemawat continues, 
spanned the mid-1700s and. failed to induce much in the way of strategic thinking or 
behaviour. Virtually all companies lacked the power to influence market outcomes to 
any significant extent most businesses tended to remain small. The chaotic markets of 
this era led economists such as Adarn Smith to describe market forces as an "invisible 
hand" that remained largely beyond the control of individual firms. 
The Second Industrial Revolution, which began in the last half of the nineteenth 
century in the United States of America, saw the emergence of strategy as a way to 
shape market forces and affect the competitive environment. The construction of key 
railroads made it possible to build mass markets for the first time. By the late 
nineteenth century, a new type of finn began to emerge in the United States and 
Europe: the large vertically integrated company that invested heavily In 
manufacturing and marketing, and in hierarchies to coordinate these functions. In 
some capital-intensive industries, Adam Smith's "invisible hand" came to be 
supplemented by what Alfred D. Chandler, Jm, a famous historian, tenned the 
"visible hand" of professional managers (Ghemawat 2001). 
The need for explicit strategic thinking was first articulated at the large companies 
mentioned in the previous paragraph (Ghemawat 2001). For example, Alfred Sloan, 
the chief executive of General Motors from 1923 to 1946, devised a successful 
strategy based on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of his company's critical 
competitor (Ford). In the 1930s, Chester Barnard, a senior executive with New Jersey 
Bell, argued that managers should pay especially close attention to strategic factors 
that depend on personal or organisational action. 
The Second Industrial Revolution saw the founding of many elite business schools in 
the United States, beginning with the Wharton School in 1881. The Harvard Business 
School, founded in 1908, was amongst the first to promote the idea that managers 
should be trained to think strategically rather than just act as functional 
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administrators, although strategy itself was not explicitly invoked until the 19605. The 
structured study of management in Europe is even younger. France's INSEAD 
offered an MBA for the first time in 1959. It was not until 1965 that the UK's first 
two public business schools (Manchester and London) were opened (Crainer 1998). 
Sociology seems to have been the academic field that, with its construct of distinctive 
competence, had the most influence on the early concepts of strategy in business, 
mostly by professors at business schools. Consulting firms helped disseminate 
academic insights and developed a set of tools to aid top managers in monitoring the 
strategies of the business units under them. Although disillusionment with specific 
tools quickly emerged, this line of work framed the agenda for future research and 
development in the field of strategy (Ghemawat 2001). 
Ghemawat (2001) goes on to trace how World War II stimulated strategic thinking by 
sharpening the problem of allocating scarce resources across the entire economy. 
New operations research techniques were devised that paved the way for the use of 
quantitative analysis in formal strategic planning. The learning curve was discovered 
in the military aircraft industry in the 1920s and 1930s and the "learning curve 
concept" became an increasingly important tool for planning. Wartime experiences 
also encouraged the use of formal strategic thinking to guide management decisions. 
Interservice competition in the US military after World War II is said to have 
motivated the US Navy to become highly self-conscious about its distinctive 
competence. 
Peter Drucker in The Practice of Management (1954) provided the key rationale for 
business strategy: that is by using formal planning a company could exert some 
positive control over market forces (Ghemawatt 2001). Underwood's (2002) 
external-oriented planning in the 1960s and 1970s includes combining a company's 
distinctive competencies with the opportunities and threats it faces in the environment 
(Andrews 1971) and strategy following structure (Chandler 1962). Numerous leading 
works on '''strategic management" were published in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
works of Porter, and Hamel and Prahalad were prominent in these decades. While 
there were important publications dealing with complex systems strategy in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, such as Brown and Eisenhardt's (1998) Competing on the Edge and 
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Dudik's (2000) Strategic Renaissance, none of the four corporations studied uses 
these concepts to any significant degree. 
3.2.2 Overview 
A summary of the leading strategic thinkers and practitioners in an approximate 
chronological order is given in Table 3.1. It is a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, 
list. 
Table 3.1 Strategic Thinkers and Practitioners 
Name 
Sun Tzu 
Niccolo Machiavelli 
Adam Smith 
David Ricardo 
Napoleon Bonaparte 
Carl von Clausewitz 
Henry Ford 
Joseph Schumpeter 
Alfred Sloan 
US Navy 
Peter Drucker 
Edith Penrose 
Kenneth Andrews 
Theodore Levitt 
AlfTed Chandler 
Igor Ansoff 
Dates 
+/- 500BC 
1469-1527 
1723-1790 
1772-1823 
1769-1821 
1780-1831 
1863-1947 
1883-1950 
1875-1966 
1909-2005 
1914-1996 
1916 
1925-
1918-
1918-2002 
I 
Concepts and Ideas 
Strategy and competitive tactics 
Power and leadership. Statecraft 
Free markets. Absolute advantage. 
Comparative advantage. 
Execution 
Military strategy 
Mass production 
nnovation 
Divisionalised organisation 
Distinctive competence 
Professional management 
From MBO to knowledge management 
Unique capabilities or " resources" 
SWOT. Industry notes with cases 
Marketing. Globalisation 
Strategy and structure 
Strategic management. Gap analysis 
Synergy 
Major Works 
The Art of War +/- 500BC 
The Prince 1514 
The Wealth of Nations 1776 
On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation 1817 
On War 1832 
My Life and Work 1923 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 1942 
My Years with General Motors 1963 
The Practice of Management 1954 
Managingfor Results 1964 
The Age of Discontinuity 1969 
The Essential Peter Drucker 2003 
The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 1959 
The Concept of COIporate Strategy 1971 
Innovation in Marketing 1962 
Strategy and Structure 1962 
COIporate Strategy 1965 
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Table 3.1 ( continued) 
Bruce Henderson 1915-1992 
McKinsey Company 1926 -
Richard Pascale and 
Anthony Athos 
Michael Porter 
Tom Peters and 
Robert Waterman 
Kenechi Ohmae 
Geert Hofstede 
1938-
1934 -
1947-
1942-
1936-
1943-
1928-
Rosabeth Moss Kanter 1943-
Christopher Bartlett and 1943-
Sumantra Ghoshal 1948-2004 
Peter Senge 
Peter Schwartz 
Fons Trompenaars 
1947-
1946 -
1952-
Experience curve. Growth/Share matrix 
Strategic business units. Consulting. 
Seven "S" framework 
Five forces framework 
Generic strategies 
National competitiveness 
Value chain 
Excellence. Customer service 
Key success factors 
Globalisation. Strategic triangle 
Cultural management 
Empowerment. Post-entrepreneurial 
finn 
Globalisation. Corporate structure 
International management 
The learning organisation 
Scenario planning 
Globalisation. Cultural issues 
The Art of Japanese Management 1981 
Competitive Strategy 1980 
Competitive Advantage 1985 
The Competitive Advantage of Nations 1990 
A" Competition 1996 
In Search of Excellence 1982 
The Mind of the Strategist 197511982 
The Borderless World 1990 
Culture's Consequences: International Differences 
in Work Related Values 1984 
Sojiware of the Mind 1990 
The Change Masters 1983 
When Elephants Learn to Dance 1989 
Confidence 2004 
Managing Across Borders 1989 
Transnational Management 2000 
The Fifth DiSCipline 1990 
The Art of the Long View 1992 
Riding the Waves of Culture 1993 
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Table 3.1 ( continued) 
James Champy and 1942-
Michael Hammer 1948-
Henry Minzberg 1939-
Henry Minzberg, 1939-
Bruce Ahlstrand and 
Joseph Lampel 
Gary Hamel and 
C.K. Prahalad 
Gary Hamel 
Jim Collins 
Adam Brandenburger 
1954-
1941 -
1954-
1958-
Shona L Brown and 1966 -
Kathleen M Eisenhardt 
Evan Dudik 
Nitin Nohria 
William Joyce and 
Bruce Roberson 
1962 -
Identify and improve key processes 
Strategy as craft 
Review of ten approaches to strategic 
management 
Strategic intent. Core competencies 
Strategic architecture. Industry foresight 
Radical innovation 
Seven attributes of great companies 
Level 5 Leadership. Hedgehog concept 
Added valuelValue net 
Complex adaptive systems 
Hybrid approach 
Complex systems approach 
Mastery of business basics 
Reengineering the Corporation 1993 
The Rise and Fall oj Strategic Planning 1994 
Strategic SaJari 1998 
The Core Competence oj the Corporation 1990 
CompetingJor the Future 1994 
Leading the Revolution 2000 
Good to Great 2001 
Co-Option (with Barry Nalebuff) 1996 
Competing on the Edge 1998 
Strategic Renaissance 2000 
What Really Works, Harvard Business Review July 2003 
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Source: Crainer(1997), Crainer (1998), Ghemawat (2001), Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998), Underwood (2002) and certain of the works listed. 
Note: Missing birthdates were sought, but unsuccessfully. 
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Each person or institution on the list in Table 3.1 has made a meaningful contribution 
to the evolution of the theory and/or practice of strategy. The question of who made 
the greatest contributions would depend on personal judgement and the criteria used. 
It appears that on the basis of academic and practitioner acceptance, Adam Smith, 
Igor Ansoff, Peter Drucker, Henry Minzberg, Michael Porter and Gary Hamel would 
have widespread support as leading "strategists" . . 
Peter Drucker, generally considered more of a "prophet" and generalist, has made 
valuable contributions to the field of strategy. Tom Peters and Robert Waterman 
wrote the best-selling business book of all time, In Search of Excellence. I consider 
the work of Kenneth Andrews to be underrated: SWOT analysis is widely used in 
practice, in one form or another. I also favour the article "What Really Works" by 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson in the July 2003 issue of the Harvard Business Review. 
An outline of the major contributions of the leading strategists (researchers, writers 
and practitioners) is presented in the following section. The selections were based on 
my personal business and academic experience, including the review of literature for 
this thesis. The outlines are not in chronological order, but by school of thought or 
theme. 
The military concepts include those of Sun Tzu, Napoleon Bonaparte, Carl von 
Clausewitz and the US Navy and are covered first. These are followed by the 
"economists" Smith, Ricardo, Schumpeter and Penrose. The "strategic managers" 
include Andrews, Ansoff, Hamel and Prahalad, Mintzberg, Nohria, Joyce and 
Roberson and Porter. Japanese management thinking is represented by Pascale and 
Athos, and Ohmae; the learning and cultural contributors are Hofstede, Senge and 
Trompenaars; while Henderson, Peters and Waterman, Champy and Hammer, and 
Collins form the management consultant component. Bartlett and GhoshaI are the 
"international business thinkers", although Ohmae could be included here as well. 
Drucker, in my judgment, qualifies for several of the above categories. 
Diagrams are used where I consider them to be unique or where they assist in 
explaining the concepts discussed in the review. 
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3.2.3 Review 
Sun Tzu (circa 500 BC) is credited with very early concepts and competitive tactics 
(Crainer 1998). "Sun Tzu's central idea is that battles are won by the organisation or 
person who, first, has the greatest competitive advantage and who, second, makes the 
fewest mistakes. Competitive advantage can be provided by many factors including 
supenor manpower, superior position, superior execution and innovation. 
Competitive advantage is not the determining factor in success. It is people who fight 
and win battles. And the most important person in the battle is the general" (Krause 
1996:2). 
"The art of war is simple; everything is a matter of execution" is attributed to 
Napoleon Bonaparte (circa 1800, cited by Huffman 2001:13). This quotation is 
included to emphasise the importance of delivery or execution. Von Clausewitz 
(1832:128), renowned for On War, states that "war is merely a continuation of politics 
by other means" and that "tactics involve the use of armed forces in the engagement, 
strategy is the use of engagements for the object of war". His treatise was considered 
realistic in that it describes the complex and uncertain manner in which real-world 
events unfold, taking into account both the frailties of human nature and the 
complexity of the physical and psychological world (Von Clausewitz 1832, on book 
jacket). 
The US Navy (circa 1946) is said to have originated the term distinctive competence 
when it attempted to distinguish between the army as a "man-power organisation" and 
the navy as a finely adjusted system of technical and engineering skills - a "machine 
centred organisation" (Ghemawat 2001). 
Machiavelli (1514) is famous for The Prince, the treatise on statecraft, power and 
leadership. "A man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to 
grief among so many who are not virtuous" (Machiavelli 1514:48). "It is far better to 
be feared than loved if you cannot be both" (Machiavelli 1514:52). 
Smith (1776) wrote the Wealth of Nations, a free market economics treatise. He 
created the notion of absolute advantage in which a nation exports an item if it is the 
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world's lowest cost producer. Ricardo refined the notion of absolute advantage to that 
of comparative advantage, recognising that market forces will allocate a nation's 
resources to those industries where it is relatively most productive (Porter 1990). This 
means that a nation might still import a good where it could be the lowest cost 
producer if it is even more productive in producing other goods. 
Schumpeter (1950) brought the entrepreneur into prominence and economic thought 
by introducing his notion of creative destruction (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel 
1998). For Schumpeter (1950) the entrepreneur is not necessarily somebody who puts 
up the initial capital, or invents the new product, but the person with the business idea. 
Ideas are elusive, but in the minds of entrepreneurs they become powerful as well as 
profitable. He credited entrepreneurs for employing existing means of production 
differently, more appropriately and more advantageously. The key for Schumpeter 
(1947, cited by Mintzberg et al. 1998) is "new combinations", including "the doing of 
things that are really being done in a new way". 
Penrose (1959) is sometimes regarded as the originator of the resourced-based theory 
of strategy (Mintzberg et al. 1998). She postulated that firms derive their advantages 
from market imperfections. She believes that markets are poor in valuating products, 
technologies and ideas that are novel. Uniqueness thus provides the basis for 
corporate development: 1D creating unique products, firms also develop unique 
capabilities or "resources". They invest more in research and development, learn 
about their customers and create extensive production and marketing capabilities. 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) regard Wernerfelt (1984) as the first in strategy to develop 
Penrose 's insight. He argued that looking at firms in terms of their resources leads to 
different immediate insights than the traditional product perspective. One can identify 
types of resources that can lead to high profits, and strategy for a bigger firm involves 
striking a balance between the exploitation of the existing resources and the 
development of new ones. Wernerfelt later claimed (1995 , cited by Mintzberg et al. 
1998) that his ideas did not really take hold until 1990, when Prahalad and Hamel 
popularised their ideas about dynamic capabilities. 
74 
Barney (1991, cited by Mintzberg et al. 1998) developed the resource-based view into 
a full-fledged theory. He provided a summary of the key concepts by outlining the 
notion of resources - the building block of the entire perspective - which embraced 
physical capital resources, human capital resources and organisational capital 
resources. The firm is thus a bundle of resources, both tangible and intangible. 
Drucker (1954, 1964, 1969, 1986, 1995, 2003 etc) is widely regarded as the major 
management and business thinker of the twentieth century. He is credited with 
management concepts en masse, from management by objectives to managing 
knowledge workers (Crainer 1998). He coined phrases such as "privatisation" and 
"management by objectives". Drucker himself regarded his 1964 book, Managing 
for Results, as "the first book ever on what we now call strategy" (Drucker 1993, cited 
by Crainer 1998 :49). Some of his works were the forerunners of modern concepts 
such as the balanced scorecard, core competencies, portfolio analysis, product 
matrices, value chains and activity-based costing (Harvey 2004). 
Among Drucker' s contributions to strategic thinking is his view that results are 
obtained by exploiting opportunities, not by solving problems (Drucker 1964). 
Resources should be allocated accordingly and concentration of resources is crucial. 
He also spells out the importance of setting priorities: "Opportunities are nearly 
always more plentiful than the means to realise them. There have to be priority 
decisions or nothing would get done" (Drucker 1964:162). He also predicted the 
emergence of knowledge as the new capital and as the central resource of an 
economy, and of the people of knowledge, that is the managers of institutions, as the 
new power centre and leading group (Drucker 1969). 
Andrews (1971) combines the elements of a company' s "strengths" and "weaknesses" 
- its distinctive competences - with the "opportunities" and "threats" (or risks) that it 
faces in its environment, to produce the SWOT framework (Ghemawat 2002). A 
company should consider all combinations to determine the best match of opportunity 
and resources and consequent choice of products and markets. The environmental 
conditions and trends include economic, technical, physical , political, social , 
community, national and global. Distinctive competencies include capabilities in 
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finance, management and organisation, and the reputation and history of a company. 
A diagram in Appendix 3.1 depicts Andrew's Strategic Framework. 
Ansoff (1964) is regarded as "truly the godfather of corporate strategy" (Hamel 1997, 
cited in Crainer 1997: 13). Some sources regard his book Corporate Strategy (1964) 
as the first text to concentrate entirely on strategy. His concepts include strategic 
management, gap analysis, synergy (2+2 =5) and the product-mission matrix. The 
matrix, as shown in Figure 3.1, illustrates the risk involved in strategic decisions 
becoming ever greater as a firm strays from its core of existing products/customers. 
This is especially relevant to the thesis. As the companies originating in South Africa 
expand internationally, they certainly move away from their existing products to some 
extent and customers. The issue of turbulence underlies much of Ansoffs work 
(Crainer 1997). 
Figure 3.1. Ansoffs ProductlMission Matrix 
Present Product New Product 
Present Mission Market penetration Product development 
New Mission Market development Diversification 
Source: Adapted from Ansoff (1964,cited by Ghemawat 2001:8). 
Ansoff believed that the level of complexity and rate of environmental change in the 
environment were generally determined by different factors that make up the 
marketing and the innovation environment. He also believed that it was possible to 
effectively predict the levels of each of these factors in the future. When combined, 
the two broad areas of the future market became what he called "environmental 
turbulence". He developed a number of approaches for studying the future and 
determining which view was most accurate. These are synthesised into a broader 
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model of marketing or innovation turbulence, in a final index on a scale of I through 
5. A level 1 environment, for example, is predictable, simple and slow-changing, a 
level 3 environment will be fast, predictable and competitive while a level 4.5 
environment will involve overwhelming competition, high levels of uncertainty and 
major changes in the value chain (Underwood 2002). 
Research has shown that managers who proactively anticipate change are significantly 
more successful than those who reactively respond to change after the fact; 
additionally, organisations that understand the level of turbulence perform 
significantly better than those that do not (Freidank 1994, Lewis 1989, cited by 
Underwood 2002). According to Lewis (1989, cited by Underwood 2002) experts 
outside of a company may have a much more accurate understanding of an industry'S 
turbulence than do a company's internal managers, thus validating the need for Delphi 
Panels (developed at Rand Corporation when Ansoff worked there). Delphi Panels 
involve the use of six experts in predicting future events or states. The analysis 
includes internal managers' views of the future, perceptions revealed in literature and 
industry experts' views. 
Porter (1980, 1985,1990,1998), certainly one of the few leading strategic thinkers, is 
known for the Five Forces framework, generic strategies, national competitiveness 
and the value chain. The Five Forces framework seeks to relate the average 
profitability of participants in an industry to five competitive forces. These are the 
entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, the 
bargaining power of suppliers and the rivalry among the existing competitors. A 
diagrammatic representation appears in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Porter's Five Forces Model 
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Source: Adapted from Porter (1980:4). 
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In coping with the five competitive forces, Porter (1980, 1985) proposes three generic 
strategic approaches: cost leadership, differentiation and focus, as depicted in Figure 
3.3. 
Figure 3.3 Porter's Generic Strategies 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
COMPETITIVE 
SCOPE 
Broad 
Tar~et 
Narrow 
Tar~et 
Lower Cost 
1. Cost Leadership 
3A. Cost Focus 
Source: Adapted from Porter (1985:12). 
Differentiation 
2. Differentiation 
36. Differentiation 
Focus 
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PO.rter (1990) believes that a nation achieves international success In a particular 
industry because of the four broad attributes of factor conditions, related and 
supporting industries, firm strategy and structure, and rivalry. He views productivity 
as the prime determinant in the long run of a nation's standard ofliving. 
Porter (1985) was also a pioneer of the value chain concept. 
Every firm is a collection of activities that are performed to design, produce, 
market, deliver and support its product. All these activities can be represented 
using a value chain. A firm's value chain, and the way it performs individual 
activities, are a reflection of its history, its strategy, its approach to 
implementing its strategy, and the underlying economics of the activities 
themselves. .. Differences among competitive value chains are a key source 
of competitive advantage. A firm's value chain in an industry may vary 
somewhat for different items in its product line, or different buyers, 
geographic areas, or distribution channels. The value chains of such subset of 
a firm are closely related, however, and can only be understood in the context 
of the business unit chain (Porter 1985:36). 
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The value chain concept is shown in greater detail in Section 3.7, The Development of 
Core Competencies where it is depicted graphically in Figure 3.18. 
Hamel and Prahalad (1990, 1996) Hamel (2000) propose rethinking the corporation 
in terms of core competencies, rather than divisions or strategic business units. A 
core competency is a bundle of skills and technologies that enables a corporation to 
provide a particular benefit to customers. 
Hamel has created a new vocabulary for strategy that includes strategic intent, 
strategic architecture and industry foresight (rather than vision) (Crainer 1998). 
Strategic architecture is basically a high-level blueprint for the deployment of new 
functionalities, the acquisition of new competencies or the migration of existing 
competencies, and the reconfiguring of the interface with customers. 
Strategic intent is similar to an animating dream. Strategic architecture is the brain of 
an organisation; strategic intent is the heart. It is the distilled essence of a firm' s 
strategic architecture that provides a sense of direction, discovery and destiny. It 
should give a particular point of view about the long-term market or competitive 
position that it hopes to build over the coming decade or so. Industry foresight (as 
opposed to vision) is to build the best possible assumption base about the future and 
thereby develop the prescience needed to proactively shape industry evolution (Hamel 
and Prahalad 1996). 
Hamel and Prahalad (1996) prefer the word foresight to vision, as vision connotes a 
dream or an apparition. Industry foresight, on the other hand, is based on deep 
insights into the trends in technology, demographics, regulation, and lifestyles that 
can be harnessed to rewrite industry rules and create new competitive space. They 
give the example of Japanese motor companies realising decades ago that new and 
formidable weapons would be needed to beat US car companies in their home market. 
The new weapons they set about developing were quality, cycle time, and flexibility. 
The authors attribute many of IBM's (International Business Machines) operational 
failures in the early '90s to foresight problems in the ' 80s. 
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Mintzberg (1994) is a long-time critic of formulae, arguing that strategy cannot be 
planned. Planning, he states, is concerned with analysis; strategy making with 
synthesis. Mintzberg's research found that only 10 percent of the results projected in 
most companies ' formal strategic planning processes ever came to fruition (Mintzberg 
1994, cited by Pietersen 2002). The other 90 percent fall by the wayside, vanishing 
into the limbo of "unrealised strategy". The source of the other 90 percent of what 
companies do is what he calls emergent strategy. This describes the series of ad hoc 
initiatives, reactions, decisions and choices that managers make in response to daily 
pressures without any overarching strategic concept. 
Strategy-making, as presented by Mintzberg, is derived from synthesis, informal and 
visionary rather than programmed and formalised, and is reliant on divergent 
thinking, intuition and using the subconscious (Crainer 1997). It is irregular, 
unexpected, ad hoc, instinctive and based on managers being adaptive information 
manipulators and opportunists rather than aloof conductors. It takes place in times of 
instability characterised by discontinuous change. Strategy is the result of an 
approach that takes in broad perspectives and is, therefore, visionary and involves a 
variety of actors capable of experimenting and then integrating. 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003) promulgate the philosophy that mastery of 
business basics is crucial to sustain superior performance. A company must excel at 
four primary management practices - strategy, execution, culture and structure - and 
any two of four secondary practices - talent, leadership, innovation and mergers and 
partnerships. The key to the 4 + 2 formula is not which technique is chosen within 
each practice, but how well and consistently a company sticks with it. 
Pascale and Athos (1981, cited by Crainer 1997) introduced the Seven "s" framework 
(strategy, structure, skills, staff, shared values, systems and style). They conclude that 
Japanese management succeeded in the late 1970s and the early 1980s largely because 
of the attention that they gave to the soft S' s - style, shared values, skills and staff. In 
contrast, the West remained preoccupied with the hard S's - strategy, structure and 
systems. The authors identify the concept of vision as one of the key components of 
Japanese management. Crainer (1997) opines that the general trend of Western 
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managerial thinking since The Art of Japanese Management has been directed toward 
the soft S' s. 
Ohmae (1982, 1990) is best known for certain aspects of strategy, the strategic 
triangle, key factors for success, globalisation and Japanese business thinking (Crainer 
1997). "In the construction of any business strategy, three main players must be taken 
into account: the corporation itself, the customer and the competition. Each of these 
strategic three Cs is a living entity with its own interests and objectives ... the 
strategic triangle" (Ohmae 1982:91). Figure 3.4 illustrates the strategic triangle. 
Figure 3.4 The Strategic Three e's 
Target segments 
Corporation 
Product/service 
differentiation 
Customers 
LJ 
Cost 
Source: Adapted from Ohmae (1982:92). 
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If management allocates the company's resources in exactly the same way as its 
competitors do, then there will be no change in its relative position according to 
Ohmae (1982). The idea is to identify the key factors for success (KFS) in the 
industry or business concerned and then to focus resources into an area where the 
company sees an opportunity to gain the most significant advantage over its 
competitors. Ohmae notes that the key factors for success of different industries lie in 
different functions, distribution channels and so forth. The strategist needs to 
scrutinize the whole vertical (value) chain of business systems involved, from raw 
materials to servicing after the products are sold. Key factors for success concern the 
product attributes, competencies, competitive capabilities and market achievements 
with the greatest direct bearing on company profitability in a particular industry 
(Thompson and Strickland 2003). 
Ohmae (1982) argues that perfect strategies are not necessary because it is 
performance relative to competitors that counts. He recommends four basic 
strategies: readjusting allocation of resources, building on relative superiority, 
aggressIve initiatives (change rules of the game, upset status quo) and utilising 
degrees of freedom (innovation). Ohmae (1998, cited by Crainer 1998) writes that 
the essence of business strategy is offering better value to customers than the 
competition, in a most cost-effective and sustainable way. "But today, thousands of 
competitors from every corner of the world are able to serve customers well . To 
develop effective strategy, we as leaders have to understand what' s happening in the 
rest of the world, and reshape our organisations to respond accordingly" (Ohrnae 
1998, cited by Crainer 1998:171). 
Globalisation is being driven by the emerging power of customers, the dispersion of 
technology and new media, and the importance of fixed costs (Ohmae 1999). 
Companies have to incur (and somehow cover) immense fixed costs in order to 
compete in global markets. In a fixed-cost environment managers need to maximise 
marginal contribution to fixed cost, by boosting sales. This new logic forces 
managers to amortise fixed costs over a much larger market base and this drives them 
toward globalisation. 
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Hofstede (1984) is widely regarded as having more or less invented cultural diversity 
as a management subject. His research concludes that there is a structure to cultural 
differences between countries. Each society faces some similar problems, but 
solutions differ from one society to another. He identifies five basic characteristics 
that distinguish national cultures: power distance (acceptance that power is unequally 
distributed), individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance (the extent to which 
society members feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations) and long-term 
orientation. 
Senge (1990) popularised the concept of the learning organisation m The Fifth 
Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organisation. He studied how firms 
and other organisations can develop adaptive capabilities in a world of increasing 
complexity and rapid change. There are five components to his learning organisation: 
systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, shared vision and team learning. 
Trompenaars (1993) exammes the cultural imponderables faced by managers in 
global business. He points out that just as national cultures conflict, leading to natural 
incomprehension and mistrust, so do corporate cultures. The principal implication of 
this for business strategy is the need for a healthy respect for the "founding" beliefs of 
foreign cultures and the images they have chosen to create coherence. Trompenaars 
says that the international manager therefore needs to go beyond awareness of cultural 
differences. He, or she, needs to respect these differences and take advantage of 
diversity through reconciling cross-cultural dilemmas. (Trompenaars 1993 cited by 
Crainer 1997). 
Henderson founded the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) in the early 1970s. He 
brought business models into the mainstream and was responsible for the 
breakthrough ideas of the experience/learning curve and the growth/share matrix 
(Crainer 1998). BCG's claim for the experience curve was that for each cumulative 
doubling of experience, total costs would decline by roughly 20 to 30 percent because 
of economies of scale, organisational learning and technological innovation. The 
growth/share matrix represents the first use of portfolio analysis. The basic strategy 
recommendation was to maintain a balance between "cash cows" (that is mature 
businesses) and "stars" while allocating some resources to feed "question marks" 
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(potential stars) . "Dogs" were to be sold off or closed. The hypothesis is that 
companies with higher market share and growth are more profitable (Crainer 1998). 
Figure 3.5 shows Henderson's matrix diagrammatically. 
Figure 3.5 Henderson's Boston Consulting Group Matrix 
High Share Low Share 
* 
7 
• 
High Growth 
Star Question Mark 
Cash Cow Dog 
Slow Growth @g %-
Source: Adapted from Henderson (cited by Ghemawat 2001: 11). 
Peters and Waterman (1982) identifY eight attributes that characterise "excellent, 
innovative" companies in their book In Search of Excellence. These are: a bias for 
action, being close to the customer, autonomy and entrepreneurship, productivity 
through people, hands-onlvalue-driven, "stick to the knitting", simple form/lean staff 
and simultaneous loose-tight properties (both centralised and decentralised). Their 
book is the best-selling popular management book of contemporary times, but many 
of the "excellent" companies later declined into mediocrity or even failure (Crainer 
1997). 
According to Crainer (1997), reengineering was the business idea of the first half of 
the 1990s. The basic idea behind reengineering is that organisations need to identify 
their key processes and make them as lean and efficient as possible. Peripheral 
processes (and, therefore, peripheral people) need to be discarded. The pioneers of 
this approach, Champy and Hammer (1993 , cited by Crainer 1997:59), define 
reengineering as "the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business 
processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical measures of performance such 
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as cost, quality, service and speed". Crainer (1997) points out that execution of 
reengineering has often proved to be difficult. Reengineering sometimes ignores 
cultural evolutions that have led an organisation to do something in a certain way. The 
term, he says, has become a synonym for redundancy and fails on the human side of 
organisations. 
London (2005) regards Collins ' s Good to Great as the biggest-selling and most 
influential management book of the new millennium. Collins (2001), like Peters and 
Waterman (1982), identifies attributes that distinguish "great" companies from their 
competitors. The great companies in his study average cumulative share returns of 6.9 
times the general market in the 15 years following their transition points from good to 
great. The seven attributes are "first who - then what" (build a superior executive 
team and then figure out the path to greatness), confront the brutal facts (yet never 
lose faith), the hedgehog concept (simplicity within the three circles), a culture of 
discipline, technology accelerators and the flywheel concept. Getting a huge, heavy 
flywheel to tum requires quiet discipline over long periods. It is the same with 
companies, which explains why one off change programmes rarely succeed (London 
2005). 
According to Collins (2001), "LevelS" refers to a five-level hierarchy of executive 
capabilities, with Level 5 at the top. Level 5 leaders embody a paradoxical mix of 
personal humility and professional will. They are ambitious, but ambitious first and 
foremost for the company, not themselves. The hedgehog concept derives from an 
ancient Greek parable about the difference between foxes (which know many small 
things) and hedgehogs (which know one big thing) (London 2005). Good- to-great 
leaders are hedgehogs. The concept requires a deep understanding of three 
intersecting circles translated into a simple, crystalline concept as illustrated in Figure 
3.6 below. 
Figure 3.6 Three Circles of the Hedgehog Concept 
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Source: Adapted from Collins (2001 :118). 
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Collins (2001) stresses that the key is to understand what your organisation can be the 
best in the world at and what it cannot be the best at. If a company cannot be the best 
in the world at its core business. then its core business cannot form the basis of the 
concept. The "best in the world" understanding is a much more severe standard than 
is a core competence. A company might have a competence but not necessarily the 
capacity to be truly the best in the world at that competence. Collins advises 
companies to get insight into the drivers of their economic engines and search for the 
one denominator that has the single greatest impact. 
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Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989, 2000) are leading thinkers in the areas of globalisation 
and corporate structure. They categorise corporate structure into four forms: 
multinational, global, international and transnational. The last mentioned has to 
combine local responsiveness with global efficiency and the ability to transfer know-
how better, cheaper and faster. 
3.2.4 Summary 
A summary of the subsection in key words and short descriptions is shown in Figure 
3.7, Literature Review Summary: Strategy. The works of Drucker (19541964,1969, 
2003), Porter (1980, 1985, 1990), Hamel and Prahalad (1990, 1996), Collins (2001), 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989, 2000) are the 
most pertinent to the thesis. 
Figure 3.7 Literature Review Summary: Strategy 
1. Sun Tzu (+1-500 BC), Bonaparte (+1-1815), Von Clausewitz (1832), US Navy 
(1946-1950), military considerations. 
2. Smith (1776) Absolute advantage. 
3. Ricardo (1817) Comparative advantage. 
4. Drucker (1964, 1969) Strategy, professional management, MBO, knowledge 
workers. 
5. Andrews (1971) SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats). 
6. Ansoff (1964) Strategic management, gap analysis, synergy, product-mission 
matrix. 
7. Porter (1980, 1985, 1990) Five forces, generic strategies, value chain, national 
competitiveness. 
8. Hamel and Prahalad (1990,1996) Core competencies, strategic architecture. 
9. Mintzberg (1994) Strategy as craft. 
10. Henderson (1970) BCG Matrix 
11. Peters and Waterman (1982) Eight attributes of excellence innovation. 
12. Champy and Hammer (1993) Reengineering 
13. Collins (2001) Good to great attributes. Level 5 leadership, hedgehog concept. 
14. Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003) What Really Works. 4 +2 formula. Strategy, 
execution, culture, structure. Talent, leadership, innovation, mergers and 
partnerships. 
15. Pascale and Athos' (1981) Seven'S ' . 
16. Ohmae (1982,1990) KSFs, globalisation, three Cs. 
17. Senge (1990) Learning. 
18. Hofsteder (1984), Trompenaars (1993) Culture 
19. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989, 2000) Globalisation, structure, international business 
Issues. 
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3.2.5 Conclusion 
This section outlined the history and evolution of strategy, conducted an overview of 
strategy and reviewed the contributions of leading strategists to the theory and 
practice of strategy. The ideas, issues and concepts discussed included military 
considerations and concepts, absolute and comparative advantages, strategic 
management itself, professional management, management by objectives, knowledge 
workers, SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats), synergy, 
the product-mission matrix, core competencies and strategic architecture, Five Forces, 
generic strategies, value chains, national competitiveness. Other topics covered were 
Japanese management philosophies, key success factors, Level 5 leadership, the 
hedgehog concept the learning organisation, globalisation, international business 
issues, cultural diversity and the cultural imponderables faced by managers in global 
business. 
Although all of the concepts and ideas listed in the previous paragraph have some 
bearing on the thesis, the most relevant of these to it are: strategy, international 
business issues, national competitiveness, culture, learning and knowledge, value 
chains and core competencies. These are examined in more detail in the following 
sections of this literature review. 
It can certainly be concluded that strategy is an evolutionary discipline or practice and 
that there is no one universally accepted theory of strategy. The 4 + 2 formulae -
strategy, execution, culture and structure and any two of talent, leadership, innovation, 
mergers and partnerships - is noted as it is a valuable tool for examining the strategies 
of the companies in the thesis. 
Figure 3.8 which illustrates a strategic paradigm (Hit!, Ireland, Hoskisson and Nixon, 
1997, cited by Huffinan 2001 :14) is included in this conclusion because it reflects the 
strategic process that most corporations or academics appear to follow to one extent 
or another. It is a result of the works of most of the contributors listed in Table 3.1. 
Figure 3.8 The Strategic Paradigm 
The Strategic Paradigm 
I. Situation Analysis 
A. General External Environmenl 
1. Political/Legal 
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3. Technological 
4. Demographic 
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1. Porter's Five Forces 
C. Competitive Environment Analysis 
D. Environmental Trends 
E. Strategic Analysis 
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a. Business Level 
b. Competitive Strategy 
c. Corporate Level 
d. Modes of Entry 
3. Core Competencies 
a. Resources 
i. Tangible 
- Financial 
- Physical 
- Human 
- Organizational 
ii. Intangible 
- Resources for Innovation 
- Reputation 
b. Capabilities (Value Chain) 
i. Operations 
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ii i. Service 
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II. SWOT Analysis (Strength, Weakness, 
Opportunity, Threat) 
III. Strategy Formulation and Implementation 
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Source: Adapted from Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson and Nixon (J 997), cited by Huffman 
(2001 :14). 
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3.3 International Business 
As the thesis examines core competencies in a global context, it is essential to explore 
the nature of international business and the influence this has on the development and 
transfer of competencies. 
The origins of international business can be traced back to the seafaring traders who 
were central to the ancient civilizations built by the Greeks and the Egyptians (Barlett 
and Goshal 2000). The international flow of products continued through the centuries 
and, by the 19th century, the newly emerged capitalists of industrialised Europe began 
investing in the less-developed areas of the world (including the USA). Lamont 
(2002) catalogues foreign direct investments by corporations in the period 1870 to the 
present. Current issues are whether the corporate culture of parent firms should be, or 
could be, transplanted overseas. 
Gupta and Westney (2003) list the worldwide ideological shift from the state to the 
market, the emergence of regional free trade zones (NAFTA), the World Trade 
Organisation, the globalisation of currencies and media (CNN, Time etc) and the 
changes in the cost and effectiveness of international communications and 
transportation technologies as influences on globalisation. 
3.3 .1 Review 
The review begins with Porter (1990) because he deals with national competitiveness 
rather than individual companies in this Subsection. Other works that deal with 
international business on a strategic or holistic basis follow: Hitt, Ireland and 
Hoskisson (2003), Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000a, b) and Lamont (2002). Tallman and 
Fladmoe-Lindquist (2003) observe the multinational corporation gaining competitive 
advantage and creating value. The other six works reviewed include Ohmae (1991), 
Kogut (2003) and Govindarajan and Gupta (1998) and examine more specific issues 
such as value chains and the composition of global management teams. 
Porter (1990) believes that a nation's competitiveness depends on the capacity of its 
industry to innovate and upgrade. He advances the view that a nation achieves 
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international success in a particular industry because of four broad attributes. These 
are: factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry. These individually and as a system shape the 
environment in which local firms compete and this promotes, or impedes, the creation 
of competitive advantage. He adds the two variables of chance and government that 
can influence the national system in important ways. Chance events are 
developments outside the control of firms, usually the nation 's government. 
Government, Porter continues, can improve or detract from the national advantage at 
all levels. This is illustrated clearly by examining how government policies influence 
each of the determinants. The relationships between the determinants of a nation's 
competitiveness and Porter's Diamond are discussed in greater detail in Section 3.8 
The Development of Core Competencies. 
Figure 3.9 provides an overview of the opportunities and outcomes of international 
strategy according to Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003). It illustrates the 
relationships among international opportunities, the exploitation of resources and 
capabilities that result in strategies and modes of entry that are based on core 
competencies. 
Figure 3.9 Opportunities and Outcomes ofInternational Strategy 
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The motivations for international business are increased market SIze, return on 
investment, economies of scale and learning and locational advantages. Firms can 
expand the size of their potential market - sometimes dramatically - by moving into 
international markets. Large markets may be crucial for earning a return on 
significant investments, such as plant and capital equipment or research and 
development. By expanding their markets firms may be able to enjoy economies of 
scale, particularly in their manufacturing operations. They may locate facilities in 
other countries to lower the basic cost of the goods or services they provide. These 
facilities may provide easier access to lower-cost labour (for example China), energy 
and other natural resources. 
The international strategies given are international business-level strategy, 
multidomestic strategy, global strategy and trans-national strategy. Table 3.2 shows 
the different types of global market entry and the characteristics of each. 
Table 3.2 Global Market Entry: Choice of Entry Mode 
Type of Entry Characteristics 
Exporting High cost, low control 
Licensing Low cost, little control, low returns. 
Strategic alliances 
Acquisition 
operations. 
New wholly owned 
subsidiary 
Shared costs, shared resources, shared risks, 
problems of integration (e.g. two corporate cultures). 
Quick access to new markets, high costs, complex 
negotiations, problems of merging with domestic 
Complex, often costly, time-consuming, high risk, 
maximum control, potential above-average returns. 
Source: Adapted from Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003 :249). 
Hilt and colleagues (2003) outline the political, economic and management risks of 
international business. The management risks and problems arise from the 
complexity and diversity of international business. Greater geographic dispersion 
across country borders increases the cost of coordination between units and the 
distribution of products. Further, trade barriers, logistical costs, cultural diversity, 
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and other differences by country (for example, access to raw materials and different 
employee skill levels) complicate the implementation of an international strategy and 
hence the development and transfer of core competencies. Political risks are risks 
related to instability in national governance and to war, both civil and international. 
Economic risks are interdependent with political risks . Foremost among these are the 
differences and fluctuations in the value of different currencies. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000a), as seen in Subsection 1.5, defme a multinational 
corporation as having substantial direct investment in foreign countries, actively 
managing those operations, and regarding those operations as integral parts of the 
company, both strategically and operationally. The most fundamental distinction 
between a domestic company and a multinational corporation derives from the social, 
political and economic context in which each exists. The multinational corporation 
faces the political risk of operating in countries with different political philosophies, 
legal systems, and social attitudes toward private property, corporate responsibility 
and free enterprise. The domestic company operates in a single national environment 
where social and cultural norms, government regulations, customer tastes and 
preferences and the social and economic structures of a business tend to be fairly 
consistent. 
Corporate strategy is very different. The multinational corporation must playa far 
more complex competitive game. While a purely domestic company can measure its 
performance in the single local currency, the multinational corporation must measure 
results sometimes achieved against a background of many fluctuating currencies. 
Finally, the multinational corporation organisation is intrinsically more complex, 
since it must provide for management control over its product and functional and 
geographic diversity. The resolution of this three-way tension is compounded by the 
barriers of distance and time, and differences in language and culture (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal 2000a). 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000a) summanse three conditions for the existence of a 
multinational corporation: 
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1. Some foreign countries must offer certain location-specific advantages so 
as to provide the requisite motivation for the company to invest there. 
2. The company must have some strategic competencies to counteract the 
disadvantages of its relative unfamiliarity with foreign markets. 
3. It must also have some organisational capabilities so as to get better 
returns from leveraging its strategic strengths internally rather than 
through external market mechanisms, such as contracts or licenses. 
Barlett and Ohoshal (1998) classify corporate-level strategies for multinational 
corporations into four types: multinational , global, international and transnational. 
The last mentioned is dispersed, interdependent and specialised. The types and their 
organisational characteristics are shown in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3 Organisational Characteristics of the Transnational Corporation 
Organisational 
Characteristics 
Configuration of 
assets and 
capabilities 
Role of overseas 
operations 
Development and 
diffusion of 
knowledge 
Multinational 
Decentralized 
and 
nationally 
self-sufficient 
Sensing and 
exploiting 
local 
opportunities 
Knowledge 
developed 
and retained 
within 
each unit 
Global 
Centralized and 
globally scaled 
Implementing 
parent 
company 
strategies 
Knowledge 
developed and 
retained at the 
centre 
Source: Adapted from Bartlett and Ohoshal (1998:75). 
International Transnational 
Sources of core Dispersed, 
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others 
decentralized 
Adapting and Differentiated 
leveraging contributions by 
parent national units to 
company integrated 
competencies worldwide 
operations 
Knowledge Knowledge 
developed developed 
at the centre jointly and 
and shared 
transferred to worldwide 
overseas 
units 
Prahalad and Doz (1987) define global integration as the centralised management of 
geographically dispersed activities on an ongoing basis. Strategic coordination refers 
96 
to the central management of resource commitments across national boundaries in 
their pursuit of a strategy. Local responsiveness refers to resource commitment 
decisions taken autonomously by a subsidiary in response to primarily local 
competitive or customer demands. 
In Lessons from Late Movers, Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000b) refer to former South 
African president Nelson Mandela, recording his dismay when he boarded an airplane 
and found that the pilot was African. With shock, he realised his reaction was exactly 
what he had been fighting against all his life. Mandela was discussing racism, but the 
same involuntary reactions surface in commerce. Many customers expect products 
from some countries to be inferior. That perception is often shared by managers of 
the local companies that are striving to become global players. The authors do go on 
to state that companies from the fringes of the world economy can become global 
players. "What they need is organisational confidence, a clear strategy, a passion for 
learning and the leadership to bring these factors together" (Barlett and Ghoshal 
2000b:35). 
They caution against companies from peripheral countries falling into several traps, 
which they call "liabilities of origin" . This would include being locked "in a prison of 
local standards", management being either unaware of the company' s global potential 
or being too debilitated by self-doubt to capitalise on it. There are also occasional 
examples of the liability deriving from a limited exposure to global competition, 
leaving companies in peripheral countries overconfident in their abilities, or blind to 
potential danger (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000b). 
Barlett and Ghoshal (2000b) stress that survival in the global marketplace depends on 
companies knowing how to learn. This is the central skill that allows the company to 
move up the value curve, as the global marketplace is information-based and 
knowledge-intensive. In each of the 12 emerging multinationals studied, there were 
leaders who drove the company relentlessly up the value curve. The leaders shared 
two characteristics; an unshakable belief that their company would succeed 
internationally and a remarkable openness to new ideas that would facilitate 
internationalism, even when those ideas challenged established practice and core 
capabilities. 
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Lamont (2002) believes that geographic nearness is favoured over distance between 
nation-states, that cultural similarities are preferable to cultural distance and that 
cultural distance is easier to deal with when administrative and economic distances 
are narrowed. He adds that a global strategy is placed under pressure when all four 
attributes of distance - cultural, administrative, geographic and economic - are 
present. 
Ohmae (1998) writes that country and currency should be added to his previously 
published triad of corporation, competition and customer as a genuinely interlinked 
economy emerges. Country and currency refers to the exposure of organisations to 
fluctuations of exchange rates. He states that the two additional elements are now key 
to the formulation of any global strategy. "When a sudden fluctuation in trade policy 
or exchange rates can turn an otherwise brilliant strategy into a seemingly irreparable 
haemorrhage of cash, making arrangements to deal with such fluctuations must lie at 
the very heart of strategy" (Ohmae 1998:2). 
Zaheer's (1995) research supports the existence of a liability of foreignness and the 
role of a firm' s administrative heritage in providing a competitive advantage to its 
multinational subunits. It also highlights the difficulties firms face in copying 
organisational practices from other firms. 
Multinational companies can gain competitive advantage in the global market by 
basing their strategies on building and leveraging their unique individual capabilities 
(Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist 2002). It is possible for the integrated global firm to 
find capabilities in foreign locations that would otherwise not be available to the 
company and bring them into the broader set of corporate skills. As Nohria and 
Ghoshal (1997, cited by Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist 2002) observe a key 
advantage of the multinational arises from its ability to create new value through the 
accumulation, transfer and integration of different kinds of knowledge, resources, and 
capabilities across its dispersed organizational units. 
However, Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist (2002) add, leveraging capabilities 
developed in the home market, or in previous international experiences, is of 
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importance to the multinational company. Even in a globalizing world market, firms 
move initially into foreign markets on the strength of parent competitive advantages 
based on capabilities from the home market. 
Kogut (2003) sees the key to developing a global strategy as identifying the activities 
of the value chain that give the company its distinctive competitive advantage and 
then, using the differences in comparative advantage across locations, enhancing that 
advantage. Comparative advantage (location-specific advantage) influences the 
decision of where to source and market. Competitive advantage (firm-specific 
advantage) influences the decisions of what activities and technologies, along the 
value-added chain, a firm should concentrate its investment and managerial resources 
on, relative to other firms in its industry. 
According to Kogut (2003) there are three generally accepted modes of international 
competition. One mode rests upon the dispersion of the links in the chain of 
comparative advantage arnong countries. A second rests on differences in the chain 
of competitive advantage among firms. The third consists of the interplay between 
competitive and comparative advantage along a value-added chain. These lead to 
three general sources for a sustainable global advantage. The first is an increase in 
economies of scale as a result of an increase in market size; the second, an increase in 
economies of scope, as a result of the increase in product lines supporting the fixed 
costs of logistics, control, or downstream links, of the value-added chain. The third is 
economies of learning, or experience, as a result of the knowledge gained regarding 
market opportunities or new technologies. 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1998) state that a multinational management tearn must be 
able to integrate different worldviews. It should therefore include a mixture of 
language skills, international experience and nationalities. The obstacles to success 
were given as: the inability to cultivate trust among team members, hindrances to 
communication and geographical, language and cultural barriers. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2001) postulate that global expansion forces companies to 
develop at least three types of capabilities: learning about foreign markets, learning 
how to manage people in foreign locations, and learning how to manage foreign 
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subsidiaries. Among the first issues the globalising company must address is how to 
transplant the core elements of its business model, its core practices and its core 
beliefs to the new subsidiarY. This will be covered in more detail in Section 3.8, The 
Transfer of Core Competencies. 
3.4.2 Summary 
Figure 3.10 summanzes this section. The most relevant contributions are Porter 
(1990), Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000a, b), Ohmae (1991), Zaheer (1998), Kogut (2003), 
Govindarajan and Gupta (1998) and Gupta and Govindarajan (2001). 
Figure 3.10 Literature Review Summary: International Business 
1. Porter (1990) National competitiveness. "Porler's Diamond" Factor conditions, 
demand conditions, related and supporting industries, firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry. Chance and government. 
2. Hitt Ireland and Hoskisson (2003) International strategy. Modes of entry. 
Management, political and economic risks. 
3. Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000a) Defmition, conditions. Sovereignty, currency, 
complexity, distance, time, language, culture. Product, functional and geographic 
diversity. Strategy and structure (2000b). Companies from fringes can become 
world players. 
4. Lamont (2002) Global strategy. Corporate culture. Cultural, administrative, 
geographic and economic distance. 
5. Ohmae (1998) Country and currency. 
6. Zaheer (1995) The liability of foreignness. 
7. Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist (2002), Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) 
Multinational ability to build and create new value. 
8. Kogut (2003) Value-added chains. 
9. Prahalad and Doz (1987) Centralisation versus local responsiveness. 
10. Govindarajan and Gupta (1998) Global management teams. Mixture of 
language skills, international experience and nationalities. 
11. Gupta and Govindarajan (2001) Learning capabilities required: foreign 
markets, how to manage people in foreign locations, how to manage foreign 
subsidiaries. 
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3.4.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, national competitiveness is, according to Porter (1990), determined by 
factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries and firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry, interacting with chance and government. 
A multinational corporation is defined as having substantial direct investment in 
foreign countries, actively managing those operations and regarding the operations as 
integral parts of the company, both strategically and operationally. Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (2000a) describe how multinational corporations face the challenges of 
sovereignty, currency, complexity, distance, time, language and culture. This is 
further complicated by product, functional and geographic diversity. International 
business carries political, economic and management risks. 
A key advantage of the multinational corporation arises from its ability to create new 
value through the accumulation, transfer and integration of different kinds of 
knowledge, resources and competencies across its global operations. Most companies 
move initially into global markets on the strength of a parent's competitive 
advantages based on capabilities and competencies in their home markets. 
Foreignness does incur certain liabilities and a mixture of language skills, 
international experience and nationalities is recommended for global management 
teams. The statement that companies from fringe countries can become world players 
provided they show confidence, have a clear strategy, a passion for learning and 
appropriate leaderslrip should be noted as it is pertinent to the companies being 
studied. 
The key to developing a global strategy is identifying the activities of the value chain 
that give a company its distinctive competitive advantage then, using the difference in 
comparative advantage (location-specific, where to source and market), to enhance 
that advantage. 
It is concluded that international business can be extremely complex. Culture is a 
critical issue and will consequently be examined in the following section. 
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3.4 Culture and International Business 
The prevIOus section revealed how the different works reviewed emphasise the 
importance of culture; it will therefore be examined further. This section outlines the 
work of seven authors or groups of authors on how culture relates to international 
business. Prominent among them are Schneider and Barsoux (1997), Hofstede (1980, 
1999) and Trompenaars (1993). 
3.4.1 Review 
Schneider and Barsoux (1997) present the evidence for national differences and 
consider the impact of culture on organisational structure, systems and processes. 
They find distinct patterns of organisation that prevail despite pressures for 
convergence. They question the transferability of organisational forms across borders 
and the logic of universal "best practices". The works of Hofstede (1980, 1999) and 
. Trompenaars (1993) are among those that they reviewed. Schneider and Barsoux 
(1997) conclude that effectively transferring management structures and processes 
relies on the ability to recognise the inherent assumptions and to compare them with 
the cultural assumptions of the potential host-country recipient. Companies should 
not lose sight of the impact of national culture in their search for a model of 
organisation that could respond best to the demands of the rapidly changing business 
context and the pressures for internationalisation. 
Hofstede (1980, 1999) identifies four dimensions for work-related values associated 
with national cultures in the late 1960s continuing through the next three decades. 
These are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism and 
masculinity/femininity. Chapter 2, "South Africa", included Hofstede's rankings 
(Table 2.7) regarding uncertainty avoidance and power distance. 
Power distance indicates the extent to which a society accepts the unequal distribution 
of power in institutions and organisations. Uncertainty avoidance refers to a society's 
discomfort with uncertainty, preferring predictability and stability. 
Individualism/collectivism reflects the extent to which people prefer to take care of 
themselves and their immediate families, remaining emotionally independent of 
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groups and other collectivities. The masculinity/femininity dimension reveals the bias 
toward either "masculine" values of assertiveness, competitiveness and materialism, 
or toward "feminine" values of nurturing, quality oflife and relationships. 
Hofstede (1980, 1999) claims that management processes have changed little over 
time. Management processes, which are embedded in the societal culture, differ from 
society to society but show strong continuity within each society. Practices are more 
superficial and easier to change than values. He adds a fifth dimension to his original 
four views of countries. This is long-termlshort-term orientation, which measures the 
extent to which a country takes a long or short-term view of life. Hofstede was 
criticised for not taking account of ethnic differences within societies, including South 
Africa, a shortfall that he later acknowledged (CO. Smith, personal communication, 
II October 2005). 
Kotkin (1993), in a study of racial and ethnic factors in international business, focuses 
on the development of five dispersed ethnic groups, or what he calls global tribes -
the Jews, the British, the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Indians - whose impact on 
the world economy has been profound. He believes that despite vastly different 
histories, each global tribe shares quintessential characteristics that will determine 
success in the economy of the 21 st century. These are a strong ethnic identity, with a 
sense of mutual dependence and emphasis on the family structure, a global network 
based on tribal trust that allows the group to function collectively and a passion for 
technology with a belief in scientific progress. 
Although no longer as dominant as they once were, Kotkin (1993) continues, the 
British and their progeny in North America remain the most important ethnic group in 
the world economy, controlling by far the largest accumulation of foreign investment 
and most of the world's largest corporations. He states that in their conquest of the 
world in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Anglo-Americans established the 
essential standards by which the world economy now functions. Even as the Atlantic 
economy fades in importance, he ventures, the technologies, ideas and methods by 
which it was developed will likely shape the world that is to come. As examples of 
leadership in the setting of basic business standards he cites American-based 
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consulting firms - McKinsey, Bain, Booz Allen - which dominate the world of 
consulting, even in difficult markets such as Japan, while New York and, most 
particularly, London have retained their status as the global centres for business and 
financial services. 
Trompenaars ' s (1993) work shows how national culture influences corporate culture. 
The major types of culture to him - power-oriented, role-oriented, project-oriented 
and fulfilment-oriented - are comparable with Hofstede's model. He attempts to 
dispel the notion that there is "one best way of managing and organising" and to give 
readers a better understanding of their own culture and cultural differences. He writes 
that basic to understanding other cultures is the awareness that culture is a series of 
rules and methods that a society has evolved to deal with the problems that it faces. 
He points out that just as national cultures conflict, so do corporate cultures collide. 
The principal implication for business strategy is a healthy respect for the "founding" 
beliefs of foreign cultures and the images they have chosen to create coherence. 
Trompenaars (1993) goes on to examine cultures in organisations and uses two 
dimensions in four quadrants to distinguish different corporate cultures: equality, 
hierarchy and orientation to the person versus orientation to the task. 
Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) conclude that firms investing in global markets 
face cultural adjustment costs. This is especially so when they engage in double-
layered acculturation, which is having to deal not only with a foreign culture, but also 
with the corporate culture of an acquisition, or joint venture, in that country. The 
results of their research show that expanding firms can move along a learning curve in 
such ventures, especially when they choose their expansion paths so that they can 
exploit previous experience in the same country and in other countries in the same 
cultural bloc. The strong learning effect from earlier entries in the same country 
supports the idea that "experiential" knowledge (Penrose 1959, cited by Barkema, 
Bell and Pennings 1996) from a country is relevant and that it enhances the success of 
later expansions in the same country. The beneficial effect from previous experience 
in other countries in the same cultural bloc, the authors observe, may be due to 
learning about common culture characteristics, or because entry in one country allows 
the firm to connect to other countries through supranational networks that more likely 
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connect culturally similar countries than countries that are more dissimilar (Johanson 
and Vahlne 1990, cited by Barkema et al. 1996). 
Research by Palich and Gomez-Mejia (1997, 1999) concludes that increased 
heterogeneous cultural environments did not cause declines in the performance 
returns of international firms they studied. In the aggregate, they state, culture may 
not be as critical a performance determinant as popular theory suggests. They 
conclude that global firms stand to gain more from foreign expansion if they 
judiciously take cultural diversity into consideration. Cultural diversity, within a 
multinational corporation, may bring together divergent perspectives to improve 
decision making, but companies should ensure that these benefits are not ameliorated 
by levels of diversity that reach difficult-to-manage levels. 
Landes (1998:517) concludes that "if we learn anything from the history of economic 
development it is that culture makes all the difference". He sees culture and 
economic performance as linked and changes in one affect the other. He provides 
examples of Thailand, where the culture responded to economic growth and 
opportunity and Russia, where 75 years of anti-market, anti-profit schooling and 
insider privilege have planted and frozen anti-entrepreneurial attitudes. 
3.4.2 Summary 
Figure 3.11 depicts keyword swnmaries of the seven authors reviewed, all of which 
are germane to the issues being researched. 
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Figure 3.11 Literature Review Summary: Culture and International Business 
1. Schneider and Barsoux (1997) Culture and Organization. 
National differences and culture 
2. Hofstede (1980, 1999) Four dimensions (power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individual/collective, 
masculine/femininity). Culture profiles. Importance of culture. 
3. Kotkin (1992) Five global tribes. British remain most dominant. 
4. Trompenaars (1993) How national culture influences corporate 
culture. "Not only one best way". 
5. Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996) Foreign Entry, Culture 
Barriers and Learning. Double layered acculturation. 
6. Palich and Gomez-Mejia (1997, 1999) International expansion 
and performance. Question benefits of greater culture diversity. 
7. Landes (1998) The Wealth and Poverty a/Nations. Culture and 
economic performance linked. 
3.4.3 Conclusion 
Companies should take account of the impact of national culture in their search for a 
model of organisation that could respond to a rapidly changing international business 
context. National culture influences corporate culture, and there is no one best way of 
doing international business. 
Firms investing in global markets face cultural adjustment costs. This is especially so 
when they engage in double-layered acculturation, which is having to deal not only 
with a foreign culture, but also with the corporate culture of an acquisition, or joint 
venture, in that country. Five dispersed "global tribes", with the British still the most 
dominant in international business, are envisaged by one source. Global firms stand 
to gain more from foreign expansion if they judiciously take cultural diversity into 
consideration. There are strong views that culture and economic performance are 
definitely linked. 
From these readings it is once agam concluded that the influence of culture on 
international business is extremely important. Although the authors reviewed have 
some differences on the influence of culture, there is no doubt that it is crucial and 
that one ignores cultural aspects at one's peril. 
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3.5 Learning and Knowledge Management 
Because of the importance of learning and knowledge to international business in 
general and to the development and transfer of core competencies in particular, this 
short section is devoted to these two factors . Seven works are reviewed, beginning 
with Senge (1990) and including Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Voss and Pedersen 
(2001) and Pietersen (2002). 
3.5.1 Review 
Senge (1990, cited by Crainer 1998) studies how firms and other organisations can 
develop adaptive capabilities in a world of increasing complexity and rapid change. 
He argues that vision, purpose, alignment and systems thinking are essential for 
organisations. The organisations that will truly excel in the future will be those that 
discover how to tap people' s commitment, and capacity to learn at all levels in the 
organisation. 
He defines a learning organisation (in its simplest sense) as a "group of people who 
are continuously enhancing their capability to create their future" (Senge 1990, cited 
by Crainer 1998:214). In this context, the traditional meaning of the word learning is 
much deeper than just taking information in. It is about changing individuals so that 
they produce results they care about and accomplish things that are important to them. 
Senge (1990) advocates that managers should encourage employees to be open to new 
ideas, communicate frankly with each other, understand thoroughly how their 
companies operate, form a collective vision and work together to achieve their goal 
(Crainer 1997). 
According to Senge (1990), there are five components to a learning organisation: 
l. Systems thinking. He champions systems thinking, recognising that things are 
interconnected, thereby introducing the idea of systems archetypes. 
2. Personal mastery. This is the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening 
personal vision, of focusing energies, of developing patience and seeing reality 
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objectively. As such it is an essential cornerstone of the learning organisation, the 
learning organisation' s spiritual foundation. 
3. Mental models. This idea essentially deals with the organisation' s driving and 
fundamental values and principles. 
4. Shared vision. When there is a genuine vision (as opposed to the all-too-familiar 
vision statement), people excel and learn, not because they are told to, but because 
they want to . 
5. Team learning. This involves two practices: dialogue and discussion. The former 
is characterised by its exploratory nature, the latter by the opposite process of 
narrowing down the field to the best alternative for the decisions to be made. The two 
are complementary, but the benefits of combining them come only from previously 
having separated them. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, cited by Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 2001) have as a 
starting point a contrast between Western and Eastern philosophies. In the West, 
knowledge is formal, unambiguous, systematic and scientific. A quest for knowledge 
normally involves analysis and interpretation of data and information. New 
knowledge is documented and transferred by means of formal training. This form of 
knowledge is described as explicit. 
In the East, knowledge is intuitive, interpretive, ambiguous, nonlinear and difficult to 
reduce to scientific equations. Knowledge grows from the expertise and experience of 
many people, whose minds are probed for insights. New knowledge is distributed and 
retained through experience. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, cited by Hitt et al. 2001) 
regard this form of knowledge as implicit. They see implicit and explicit knowledge 
not as totally separate, but as complementary entities and refer to the interaction 
between implicit and explicit knowledge as knowledge conversion. They suggest four 
methods of knowledge conversion, otherwise known as the SEcr process. These are: 
socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, cited by Hitt et al. 2001) state that socialisation includes 
the methods that firms employ to help people acquire another's skills by watching and 
108 
practicing. Externalisation is the process used to convert tacit knowledge into explicit 
concepts. Metaphors are often used for this purpose to express complex tacit 
knowledge in more easily understood terms. Combination involves the study of sets 
of knowledge that are held by different individuals. The purpose of combination is to 
integrate what are often unique tacit knowledge sets to create explicit knowledge that 
can be shared readily across the firm. Through internalisation, people throughout the 
firm absorb explicit knowledge that has been created through socialisation, 
externalisation and combination. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define absorptive capacity as the ability of a firm to 
recognise the value of new external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends. They suggest a simple generalisation that prior knowledge permits 
the assimilation and exploitation of new knowledge. By having developed some 
absorptive capacity in a particular area, a firm may, more readily, accumulate what 
additional knowledge it needs in the subsequent period in order to exploit any critical 
external knowledge ·that may become available. The possession of related expertise 
will permit the firm to better understand and evaluate the potential of intermediate 
technological advances. Absorptive capacity affects the formation of expectations, 
permitting the firm to predict more accurately the nature and commercial potential of 
technological advances. The two features of absorptive capacity - cumulativeness 
and its effect on the formation of expectations - imply that its development is domain-
specific and is path - or history-dependent. 
Garvin (2000) defines a learning organisation as an organisation skilled at creating, 
acquiring, and transferring knowledge, and at modifying its behaviour to reflect new 
knowledge and insights. He envisages a learning organisation as skilled at systematic 
problem solving, experimentation with new approaches, learning from experience and 
history and best practices of others, and transferring knowledge quickly and 
efficiently throughout the organisation. The mechanisms to do this include written, 
oral and visual reports, site visits and tours, personnel rotation programmes, education 
and training and standardisation programmes. 
Reports and tours are by far the most popular mediums. Tours are an equally popular 
means of transferring knowledge, especially for large, multidivisional organisations 
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with multiple sites. Reports and tours are sometimes relatively cumbersome ways of 
transferring knowledge. Absorbing facts by reading them or seeing them 
demonstrated is one thing; experiencing them personally is quite another. For this 
reason personnel rotation programmes are one of the most powerful methods of 
transferring knowledge. The maxim "if you can' t measure it you can' t manage it" is 
as true oflearning as it is of any other corporate objective (Gavin 2000). 
Brinkerhoff's (1988) Six Stage model for human resources development is comprised 
of the stages listed below: 
I) A need, problem or opportunity worth addressing 
2) A human resources department capable of teaching this 
3) The organisation successfully implements the design programme 
4) The participants successfully exit the programme 
5) They retain and use their new learning 
6) The organisation benefits when participants use their learning. 
He believes that analysing human resource development programmes in terms of the 
six stages can show whether and how programmes benefit an organisation. This also 
helps trace any failures to one or more of the six stages. 
Voss and Pedersen (2001) postulate that knowledge from different sources has 
different characteristics and is therefore transferred at different costs. When 
management chooses a specific way of sourcing knowledge, it also implicitly chooses 
the characteristics of the sourced knowledge and the ease with which it can be 
transferred inside the multinational corporation. Their research shows that 
organisational choice variables, such as the level of subsidiary autonomy, the level of 
intra-multinational corporation trade and interdependence among the subsidiary and 
other multinational corporation units all have a bearing on the development of 
different sources of subsidiary knowledge. They conclude that multinational 
management can influence the development, characteristics and transfer of knowledge 
through choices regarding organisational control, motivation and context. 
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Voss and Pedersen (2001) make the following six propositions: 
I. Internal knowledge IS likely to be more easily transferable than external 
knowledge. 
2. External knowledge, which tends to be of a more peripheral character in the 
multinational corporation knowledge structure, is likely to be less transferable 
than internal knowledge. 
3. When brought into contact with internal knowledge, external knowledge is 
more likely to be transferred from subsidiaries to other multinational 
corporation units. 
4. The development of external knowledge IS improved by the degree of 
autonomy granted to the subsidiary. 
5. The development of internal knowledge III multinational corporation 
subsidiaries is positively influenced by the perceived interdependencies and 
complementarities between the local subsidiary and other multinational 
corporation units. 
6. Developing internal knowledge in multinational corporation subsidiaries is 
positively influenced by the amount of trade, and transfer of goods and 
services, between multinational corporation units. 
Pietersen's (2002) strategic learning concept was built on the proposition that the 
ability to build and lead an adaptive enterprise is the only sustainable competitive 
advantage in today's complex marketplace. The essence of strategic learning is a 
process with four linked action steps: learn, focus, align and execute, which build on 
one another and are repeated (as the fifth step, if you will) in a continuous circle of 
learning and renewal. The key is to think cycle, not straight line. The challenge is to 
repeat the process over and over, so that the organisation continuously learns from its 
own actions, and from scanning the environment, and then modifies its strategies 
accordingly. 
3.5.2 Summary 
The seven works reviewed are summarised in Figure 3.12. Garvin (2000) mentions 
the methods of visits and personnel rotation to both develop and transfer knowledge. 
Figure 3.12 Literature Review Summary: Learning and Knowledge 
Management 
III 
1. Senge (1990) The Fifth Discipline. Systems thinking, personal mastery, 
mental model s, shared vision and team learning. 
2. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) Socialisation, externalisation, 
combination internalisation. 
3. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) Absorptive capacity. History or path 
dependent. 
4. Garvin (2000) Build a Learning Organization. Personnel rotation, 
visits. 
5. Brinkerhoff (1988) Six Stage model 
6. Voss and Pederson (2001) MNC as knowledge structure. MNC can 
influence development characteristics and transfer of knowledge by 
control, motivation and context. 
7. Pietersen (2002) Reinvellting Strategy. Continuous circle of learning 
and renewal. 
3.5 .3 Conclusion 
In Senge's (1990) view the learning organisation concept has the five components of 
systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, shared vision and team learning. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, cited by Hitt et al. 2001) suggest four methods of 
knowledge conversion as: socialisation, externalisation, combination and 
internalisation. 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of a firm to recognise the value of new external 
information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends. The two features of 
absorptive capacity (cumulativeness and expectation formation) imply that its 
development is specific to a domain and dependent on a path or history. 
The mechanisms to learn and transfer knowledge include reports, visits and tours, 
personnel rotation prograrnmes and standardisation and training programmes. 
Personnel rotation programmes are one of the most powerful methods of transferring 
knowledge (Garvin 2000). He quotes the maxim "if you can' t measure it, you can't 
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manage it" as being as true of learning as it is of any other corporate objective. This 
statement is revisited in other contexts later in the thesis. 
The accumulation of knowledge or learning is a continuous process that multinational 
companies can influence by control, motivation and context. Knowledge from 
different sources has different characteristics and is therefore transferred at different 
costs. The ability to absorb knowledge is path or history-dependent. There should be 
a continuous circle of learning and renewal. The challenge is to repeat the process 
over and over so that the organisation continuously learns from its own actions and 
from scanning the environment and then modifies its strategies accordingly. 
The factor that comes across from all the works is the importance of continual 
learning. Voss and Pedersen (2001) state that it is now almost axiomatic that 
knowledge and learning are at the root of understanding how corporate advantage is 
gained and sustained. This passage is an appropriate transition to the next section: 
The Definition and Nature of Core Competencies. 
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3.6 The Defmition and Nature of Core Competencies 
It was noted in the Introduction that all successful organisations have core 
competencies, but that the ways in which they articulate and utilise them strategically 
vary widely. This section focuses on the definition, composition and nature of core 
competencies. The works of Smith (1776) and Ricardo (1817) are reviewed first as 
absolute and comparative advantages are forerwmers of core competencies. These are 
followed by discussions on contributions by Drucker (1964, 1995) and Porter (1998). 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 1996), as the leading exponents of the core competency 
concept, receive the most attention. The Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005), 
Thompson and Strickland (2003) and Barney, Wright and Ketchen (2001) versions of 
core competencies are then considered. Other works reviewed include Goddard 
(1997) and Manning (1997). 
The definitions of core competencies in the Introduction are repeated to facilitate 
comparisons between the different schools of thought. 
3.6.1 Review 
Smith (1776) wrote the Wealth of Nations, regarded as the free market economics 
treatise. He created the notion of absolute advantage in which a nation exports an 
item if it is the world's lowest cost producer. Ricardo (1817) refined the notion of 
absolute advantage to that of comparative advantage, recognising that market forces 
will allocate a nation's resources to those industries where it is relatively most 
productive. This means that a nation might still import a good where it could be the 
lowest cost producer if it is even more productive in producing other goods (Ricardo 
1817, cited by Porter 1990). Porter (1990) believes that both absolute and relative 
advantages are necessary for trade. 
Drucker (1964) advocates focusing on opportunities and building on strengths. A 
crucial step is to recognise the realities of the firm's individual talents and limitations. 
He does not use the term core competencies, but asks "What can we do well 7" 
(Drucker 1964: 192). He states that opportunities have to be reflected against the 
experience of a company and its past successes and failures. 
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In a later work Drucker (1995:43) does use the term core competencies "To convert 
this potential into reality requires matching the opportunities with the company's 
strength and competence. It requires what I first (in my 1964 book Managing for 
Results) presented as "strength analysis" and what now - thanks mainly to the work of 
Professors C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel - is coming to be known as the analysis of 
"core competence" Drucker goes on to ask what the company is good at, what it does 
well, what strengths give it a competitive edge and to what this should be applied. 
A theory of a business has three parts: assumptions about the environment of the 
organisation, the specific mission and the core competencies needed to accomplish the 
mission (Drucker 1995). The assumptions about environment define what an 
organisation is paid for; the assumptions about mission define what an organisation 
considers to be meaningful results; and the assumptions about core competencies 
define where an organisation must excel to maintain leadership. Drucker goes on to 
state that ·assumptions about environment, mission, and core competencies must fit 
reality and one another. 
Core competencies are different for every organisation and are part of an 
organisation's personality, according to Drucker (1995), but every organisation - not 
just businesses, he insists - needs one core competence: innovation. Every 
organisation needs a way to record and appraise its performance in the practice of 
innovation. Here Drucker (1995) advocates maintaining a careful record of the 
innovations in an entire field , not only the company's own performance, during a 
given period. This practice, he concedes, may be assessment rather than 
measurement. It raises rather than answers questions, he continues, but he does 
conclude that it raises the right questions. 
Porter (1998) does not use the term core competence. He uses the terms value 
activities (discrete activities in the value chain), skills and expertise. "The expertise or 
skills to be transferred are both advanced and proprietary enough to be beyond the 
capabilities of competitors" (Porter 1998:139). It can safely be assumed that 
combinations of value activities, skills and expertise, as envisaged by Porter, would 
include core competencies as defined by some of the other authors. 
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Prahalad and Hamel (1990) originally made a case for rethinking the corporation in 
terms of core competencies, rather than divisions or strategic business units (SBUs). 
They see core competencies as the collective learning in an organisation, especially 
how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of 
technologies. They give as examples Sony' s capacity to miniaturize and Philips' 
optical/media expertise. They go on to discuss the tangible links between identified 
core competencies, core products and end products. Core products are the physical 
embodiment of one or more core competencies. 
They recommend that at least three tests be applied to identify a core competency: 
I. It should provide potential access to a wide variety of markets. 
2. It should make a significant contribution to perceived customer benefits. 
3. It should be difficult for competitors to imitate. 
In Competing for the Future, Hamel and Prahalad (1996) define a core competence as 
a bundle of skills and technologies that enables a company to provide a particular 
benefit to customers. A core competence represents the sum of learning across 
individual skill sets and individual organisational units. It is, therefore, very unlikely 
to reside in its entirety in a single individual or small team. 
Hamel and Prahalad explain that a core competence is not an "asset" in the accounting 
sense of the word. Core competencies do not appear in balance sheets (at least not 
under present accounting conventions: my note) A factory, distribution channel, 
brand or patent cannot be a core competence. These are things rather than skills. 
However, an aptitude to manage that factory (for example, Toyota's lean 
manufacturing), or a distribution channel (Wal-Mart' s logistics), a brand (Coca-
Cola' s advertising) or intellectual property, may constitute a core competence. 
A core competence is a source of competitive advantage in that it is competitively 
unique and makes a contribution to customer value or cost. But, whereas all 
competencies are sources of competitive advantage, not all competitive 
advantages are core competencies. Likewise, every core competence is likely to 
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be a critical success factor, but not every critical success factor will be a core 
competence (Hamel and Prahalad 1996:229). 
Examples are: a licensing agreement that allows umque access to a particular 
technology, an exclusive import licence for a particular product, or the location of 
factories preferentially positioned close to raw material supplies. All the examples are 
competitive advantages and each a critical success factor, but none is a core 
competency. 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 1996) state that the dividing line between a particular skill 
and the core competency to which it contributes may be difficult to defme. They 
suggest that the most useful level of aggregation of core competencies, in a medium-
sized company or business unit, is typically one that yields somewhere between five 
and fifteen core competencies. Few companies are likely to build world leadership in 
more than five or six fundamental competencies 
The entire management team should fully understand and participate in the five key 
competency management tasks according to Hamel and Prahalad (1996): 
I. Identifying existing core competencies. 
2. Establishing a core competency acquisition agenda. 
3. Building core competencies. 
4. Deploying core competencies. 
5. Protecting and defending core competency leadership. 
Unlike physical assets, competencies do not wear out, although a core competency 
may lose its value over time. In general, the more a competency is used, the more 
refined it gets and the better it becomes (Hamel and Prahalad 1996). 
Writing on his own, Hamel (2000) sets out core competencies as part of a total 
management framework. This is illustrated in Figure 3.13. 
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Figure 3.13 Hamel's Management Framework 
_ ._.~~~TOMER BENEFITS .. ,j CONFIGURATION ! COMPANY BOUNDARIES 
~ ~ ~ •.•. ~ ~ ~-
CUSTOMER CORE STRATEGIC VALUE 
INTERFACE STRATEGY RESOURCES NETWORK 
Fulfill ment & Support Busines~ Mission Core COIflletencies Suppliers 
Information & Insight Product/Market Scope Strategic Assets Pan ners 
Rclalio~hip Dynamics Basis of Core Processes Coalitions 
Pricing Strucrure Di ffere ntiation 
EFFICIENT I UNIQUE I FIT I PROFIT BOOSTERS 
Source: Adapted from Hamel (2000:94). 
The four components of the framework encompass customer interface, core strategy, 
strategic resources and value network. Strategic resources consist of core 
competencies, strategic assets and core processes. 
There are four factors to consider in determining the wealth potential of any business 
concept, as illustrated in Figure 3.13 (Hamel 2000): 
I. The extent to which the business concept is an efficient way of delivering 
customer benefits; 
2. The extent to which the business is unique; 
3. The degree offit among the elements of the business concept; and 
4. The extent to which the business concept exploits profit boosters that have the 
potential to generate above-average returns. 
Core competencies are what the firm knows. They encompass skills and unique 
capabilities. What does it know that is a) unique, b) valuable to customers and c) 
transferable to new opportunities? Strategic assets are what the company owns, while 
core processes are what people in the firm actually do. Core processes are 
methodologies and routines used in transferring inputs into outputs (Hamel 2000). 
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Hitt et al. (2005) define core competencies as resources and capabilities that serve as a 
source of competitive advantage for a firm over its rivals. Resources are defined as 
inputs into a firm' s production process, such as capital equipment, skills of individual 
employees, patents, finance and talented managers. A capability is the firm's capacity 
to deploy resources that have been purposely integrated to achieve a desired end state. 
Core competencies distinguish a company competitively and reflect its personality. 
McKinsey & Company (Hitt et al. 2005) recommends that a company have three or 
four core competencies around which their strategic actions can be framed. Core 
competencies, unlike physical assets, tend to become more valuable through 
additional use, echoing the views of Hamel and Prahalad (1996) expressed earlier. 
Hitt et al. (2005) warn that the possible value creation of core competencies should 
never be taken for granted for all core competencies have the potential to become core 
rigidities. A core competency that is emphasised when it is no longer competitively 
relevant can cause organisational inertia. Events occurring in the external 
environment can also create conditions through which core competencies' can become 
core rigidities, generate inertia and stifle innovation. 
Hitt et al. (2005) also specify two tools that help identify and build competencies. 
These are a) internal analysis and b) value chain analysis. The four internal analysis 
criteria used in deciding whether or not capabilities are strategic and, hence, core 
competencies, are whether they are valuable, rare, costly to imitate and non-
substitutable. 
Valuable capabilities help a firm neutralise threats or exploit opportunities. Rare 
capabilities are those not possessed by many others. Costly-to-imitate capabilities 
may be historical such as a unique and valuable organisational culture or brand name. 
Costly-to-imitate capabilities sometimes arise from ambiguous causes where the 
causes and uses of a competency are unclear. Social complexity arising from 
interpersonal relationships, trust and friendship among managers, suppliers and 
customers can also give rise to costly-to-imitate capabilities. Non-substitutable 
capabilities are those for which there is no strategic equivalent (Hitt et al. 2005). 
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Table 3.4 shows the outcomes from combinations of the criteria for sustainable 
competitive advantage: If a company meets all four criteria, then the prognosis is a 
sustainable competitive advantage with above-average returns. If it meets none of the 
four criteria, then a competitive disadvantage with below-average returns is foreseen. 
In between these two extremes are competitive parity and temporary competitive 
advantage depending on the mix of the criteria. 
Table 3.4 Outcomes from the Combinations of the Criteria for Sustainable 
Competitive Advantage 
Is the Is the Is the Is the Competitive Performance 
resource resource resource resource or consequences implications 
or or or capability 
capability capability capability non-
valuable? rare? costly to substitutable? 
imitate? 
No No No No Competitive Below-
disadvantage average 
returns 
Yes No No YeslNo Competitive Average 
parity returns 
Yes Yes No YeslNo Temporary Above-
competiti ve average 
advantage returns to 
average 
returns 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Sustainable Above-
competitive average 
advantage returns 
Source: Adapted from Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005 :88). 
Thompson and Strickland (2003) define a core competence as something that a 
company does well relative to other internal activities. A company' s core competence 
is therefore likely to reside in its people, and its intellectual capital, not in its assets on 
the balance sheet. Core competencies thus tend to be grounded in cross-departmental 
and cross-functional combinations of skills, resources and technologies. They take 
the definition further by using the term distinctive competence, which is something 
the company does well relative to competitors. Consequently, a core competence 
becomes a basis for competitive advantage only when it is a distinctive competence. 
... . 
... 
I 
I 
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For a particular company resource, whether it be a distinctive competence, an asset or 
a competitive capability, to qualify as the basis for sustainable competitive advantage, 
it must pass four tests of competitive value (Thompson and Strickland 2003): 
1. Is the resource hard to copy? 
2. How long does the resource last? 
3. Is the resource really competitively superior? 
4. Can the resource be trumped by different resources/capabilities of rivals? 
Barney, Wright and Ketchen (2001) argue that sustained competitive advantage 
derives from the resources and capabilities a firm controls that are valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and not substitutable. The resources and capabilities can be 
viewed as bundles of tangible and intangible assets, including a firm's management 
skills, its organisational processes and routines, and the information and knowledge it 
controls. 
Fiol (2001 , cited in Barney et al. 2001) questions the premise that it is possible to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage based on any particular core competency, 
no matter how inimitable. She argues that in the current competitive environment, 
skills/resources of organisations and the way organisations use them must constantly 
change to produce continuously changing and temporary advantages. 
Iesenhardt and Martin (2001, cited in Barney et al. 2001), along with Fiol (2001, cited 
in Barney et al. 2001) conclude that competitive advantages cannot be sustained in 
dynamic, rapidly changing markets. However, Iesenhardt and Martin (2001) 
specifically identify the conditions under which sustained competitive advantage is 
possible in these settings where a particular firm appJies its dynamic capabilities 
"sooner, more astutely or more fortuitously" in making strategic choices. 
Barney et al. (2001) suggest that the ability to learn and the ability to change are 
likely to be among the most important capabilities that a firm can possess. 
Goddard (1997) states that the most powerful tool for success is the ability to establish 
a corporate vernacular that can create economic value. He uses Wal-Mart as an 
121 
illustration of how core competence helped to make the company the world 's largest 
and most profitable retailer. He quotes Confucius's advice to a new leader "Fix the 
language" (Goddard 1997:2). 
Goddard (1997) points out that much credit is given to Wal-Mart's "cross-docking" 
technique of inventory replenishment. This is a just-in-time system to keep inventory 
permanently on the move. Like any truly sustainable economic advantage, it took 
years of adaptive control to design and master. It entailed massive strategic 
investments in a variety of interlocking support systems, far beyond what could be 
justified by conventional return on investment criteria. 
Manning (1997) believes that executives who strategise around their core 
competencies often have not given enough thought to what they are doing. Like other 
popular management ideas, that of core competency is open to different 
interpretations. He asserts that there is no recognised, rigorous discipline for 
identifying competencies, so almost any skill or technology may fit the bill. The 
competence label is too readily fixed to things that made a firm famous but no longer 
matter. All too often, Manning continues, companies choose exactly the same 
competencies as their competitors. He concedes that competencies obviously matter. 
But (quoting IMD Professor Derek Abell 1993), he points out that it is not enough 
merely to have a resource or a competence; competitive advantage rests on having 
superior resources and competencies (emphasis mine). "What you do must count. 
And you must do it better that anyone else" (Manning 1997:220). 
3.6.2 Summary 
Figure 3.14 reflects the works reviewed in brief descriptions and key words. Drucker 
(1964, 1995), Hamel and Prahalad (1990, 1996) and Manning (1997) are the most 
important in terms of the later analysis and research results compared to prevailing 
theory. 
I 
I 
I 
I [ 
I 
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Figure 3.14 Literature Review Summary: The Defmition and Nature of Core 
Competencies 
1. Ricardo (1817) Comparative advantage. 
2. Smith (1776) Absolute advantage. 
3. Drucker (1964, 1995) Strengths analysis. Environment, mission and core 
competencies must fit. Innovation essential. 
4. Porter (1998) Value activities. 
5. Hamel and Prahalad (1990, 1996) Transferable, consumer benefits, inimitability. 
Five or six competencies. Competencies versus competitive advantages. 
6. Hamel (2000) Total management framework.. 
7. Hitt Ireland and Hoskisson (2003, 2005) Resources + capabilities. McKinsey = 
three or four competencies. Valuable, rare, costly to imitate and non-substitutable. 
8. Thompson and Strickland (2003) 'Distinctive' competence. lnimitability, long 
lasting, competitively superior, can competition ' trump' ? Two or three competencies. 
9. Barney, Wright and Ketchen (2001) Resources + capabilities. Valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and not substitutable. Sustainability. 
10. Goddard (1997) Corporate vernacular. "Fix the language". Takes time to develop. 
Wal-Mart examples. 
11. Manning (1997) No recognised rigorous discipline for identifying core competencies. 
Must be done better than competition. 
3.6.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is noted that although the experts differ in their definition of core 
competencies, it is clear that they are talking about similar concepts. (This does raise 
the question of how academics differ in their defmitions from practitioners, who are 
driven by results rather than process). While all of the definitions are acceptable to 
me for purposes of this thesis, that of Hamel and Prahalad (1996) - a bundle of skills 
and technologies that enable a company to provide a particular benefit to customers -
is preferred, because of their status as pioneers of the core competency concept. Their 
three criteria are that a core competency must provide access to a wider variety of 
markets, be difficult to imitate and make a significant contribution to the perceived 
benefits of customers. 
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A core competency is not an asset III the accounting sense of the word. Core 
competencies are aptitudes and skills rather than things. A core competency is 
therefore likely to reside in a company's people and intellectual capital , not in its 
assets on the balance sheet. A core competency is a source of competitive advantage 
in that it is competitively unique and makes a contribution to customer value or cost. 
But, whereas all core competencies are sources of competitive advantage, not all 
competitive advantages are core competencies. Correspondingly, every core 
competency is likely to be a critical success factor, but not every critical success 
factor will be a core competency. Core competencies, unlike physical assets, tend to 
become more valuable through additional use, but caution should be exercised to 
prevent core competencies from becoming core rigidities. 
The various experts differ on how many core competencies a company can build. 
This varies from two or three, to three or four, five or six (with world leadership) and 
up to five to fifteen in a medium-sized company. 
There is no recognised ngorous discipline for identifYing competencies. The 
sometimes nebulous nature of some core competencies can be in conflict with the 
statement in Section 3.5 "what cannot be measured, cannot be managed". Related to 
this is Porter' s (1998) mention of discrete (emphasis mine) activities in the value 
chain. The ability to learn and the ability to change are likely to be among the most 
important capabilities that a company can possess. 
Having examined the definition, composition and nature of core competencies, the 
thesis moves to the next section, which covers the development of core competencies. 
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3.7 The Development of Core Competencies 
As observed by Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist (2002), building capabilities and 
developing resources must continue for the life of a company, new ones being created 
as old ones are compromised. Porter's (1990) framework of national competitiveness, 
which was mentioned earlier in both the review on strategy and the review on 
international business is examined in greater detail in this chapter. Porter's (1990) 
work is followed by Sachs' s (2005) perspectives on what drives economic 
development and growth, and hence competitiveness. 
Moving from national to company considerations, vanous models relating to 
development of core competencies, including internal analysis, the value chain and 
other methods, are examined. The works of Hamel and Prahalad (1996), pioneers of 
the modern concept of core competencies, again receive particular attention. 
Contributions by Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005), Thompson and Strickland 
(2003), Drucker (1995) and Porter (1985) are again included, and other views on how 
core competencies are developed or emerge are explored. 
Articles by Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002), Fites (1998) and Mascarenhas, Baveja and 
Jamil (1998) provide practical examples relating to the development of core 
competencies. The last-mentioned is especially relevant to this thesis. The review 
concludes by assessing the role of mergers and acquisitions in the development of 
core competencies. 
3.7.1 Review 
Porter (1998:155) maintains that: 
National prosperity IS created, not inherited. It does not grow out of a 
country' s natural endowments, its labour pool, its interest rates, or its 
currency' s value, as classical economics insists. A nation' s competitiveness 
depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and upgrade. Companies 
gain advantage against the world's best competitors because of pressure and 
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challenge. They benefit from having strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-
based suppliers and demanding local customers. 
Porter (1990, 1998) goes on to state that differences in national values, cultures, 
economic structures, institutions and history all play an important role in shaping 
competitive abilities. 
As seen earlier in both sections 3.3.3 (History and Overview of Strategy Review) and 
3.4.3 International Business Review), Porter's Diamond comprises four broad 
attributes: factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, 
firm strategy, structure and rivalry. These individually and as a system, together with 
additional variables of chance and government, shape the environment in which local 
firms compete, and this promotes or impedes the creation of competitive advantages. 
The difference between core competencies and competitive advantages was examined 
in Section 3.7. It is assumed that certain core competencies would be included among 
the competitive advantages created or developed by the workings of Porter's 
Diamond. His diamond system is shown in Figure 3.15 below and an explanation 
from his writings follows. 
Figure 3.15 Porter's Diamond - The Complete System 
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Factor Conditions 
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Chance 
These are a nation's position In relation to factors of production, such as skilled 
labour or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry. Further details are 
shown in Figure 3.15. Porter (1990) differentiates between basic and advanced 
factors, and generalised and specialised factors_ 
Basic factors are passively inherited, or their creation requires relatively modest or 
unsophisticated private and social investment. Advanced factors are necessary to 
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achieve higher-order competitive advantages such as differentiated products and 
proprietary production technology and their development demands large and often 
sustained investments in both human and physical capital. Generalized factors 
include the highway system, a supply of debt capital or well-motivated employees 
with college educations, and can be utilised in a wide range of industries and services. 
Specialised factors involve narrowly skilled personnel, infrastructure with specific 
properties, knowledge bases in particular fields and factors with reference to a limited 
range or even to a single industry (Porter 1990). 
Another distinction is whether factors are inherited (natural resources) or created 
(telecommunication system). In the sophisticated industries that form the backbone of 
any advanced economy, a nation does not inherit but creates the most important 
factors of production, such as skilled human resources or a scientific base. The most 
important factors of production are those that involve sustained and heavy investment 
and are specialised. To support competitive advantage, a factor must be highly 
specialised to an industry's particular needs. Nations will succeed in industries where 
they are particularly good at creating and upgrading needed factors (Porter 1990). 
Porter (1990) believes that selective disadvantages in the more basic factors can prod 
a company to innovate and upgrade - a disadvantage in a static model of competition 
can become a competitive advantage in a dynamic one. Disadvantages can become 
advantages when they send companies proper signals about circumstances that will 
spread to other nations and where favourable circumstances prevail elsewhere in the 
Diamond. 
Demand Conditions 
Demand conditions refers to the nature of home market demand for the industry'S 
product or service. Home demand, maintains Porter (1990), can influence efficiencies 
through economies of scale, but its effect on the shape and character of improvement 
and innovation by a nation's firms are more important. Sophisticated and demanding 
local customers, customer needs that anticipate those elsewhere and unusual local 
demand in specialised segments that can be served locally are the three characteristics 
especially significant to choosing competitive national advantage. 
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A saturated home market creates intense pressures to push down prices, 
introduce new features, improve product performance, and provide other 
incentives ... saturation escalates local rivalry". Another frequent result of 
home market saturation is vigorous efforts by a nation's firms to penetrate 
foreign markets in order to sustain growth and even fill capacity. It was 
striking how many of the indicators we studied began their first significant 
international activity after the home market saturated (Porter 1990:96). 
Related alld Supportillg Illdustries 
This refers to the presence or absence in the nation of supply industries and other 
related industries that are internationally competitive. Internationally competitive 
home-base suppliers create advantages because they deliver the most cost-effective 
inputs in an efficient, rapid and sometimes preferential way. Home-based, related and 
supporting industries also provide an advantage in innovation and upgrading, based 
on close working relationships. Porter (1990) believes that the nation 's companies 
benefit most when the suppliers are, themselves, global competitors. Home-based 
competitiveness in related industries provide similar benefits: information flow and 
technical interchange speed the rate of innovation upgrading. 
Firm Strategy, Structure alld Rivalry 
Firm strategy. structure and rivalry refers to the conditions in a nation governing how 
companies are created, organised and managed, as well as the nature of domestic 
rivalry. Porter (1990) notes that no one managerial system is appropriate. Countries 
also differ markedly in the goals that companies and individuals seek to achieve. 
Individual motivation to work and expand skills is also important to competitive 
advantage. Nations tend to be competitive in activities that people admire or depend 
on - the activities from which a nation's heroes emerge. 
The presence of strong local rivals, states Porter (1990), is a fmal and powerful 
stimulus to the creation and persistence of competitive advantage. Domestic rivalry 
creates pressures on companies to innovate and improve and perhaps compete for 
"bragging rights". Porter (1990) goes on to say that geographic concentration 
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magnifies the power of domestic rivalry. He continues that it is also vigorous 
domestic competition that ultimately pressures domestic companies to look at global 
markets and toughens them to succeed in them. " It is rare that a company can meet 
tough foreign rivals when it has faced no significant competition at horne" (Porter 
1990:119). 
The willingness and ability of firms to compete globally is partly a function of other 
determinants such as pressure from domestic market saturation or local rivalry and the 
pull-through of international demand. Managerial attitudes play an important role as 
well. A relevant example is management attitude toward globalisation. 
The Diamond as a System 
The points of the diamond are self-reinforcing and constitute a system, according to 
Porter (1990). Domestic rivalry and geographic concentration have especially great 
power to transform the diamond into a system; domestic rivalry, because it promotes 
investment in all other determinants; geographic concentration, because it elevates 
and magnifies the interaction of the four separate influences. 
Porter (1990) observes that nations are rarely home to just one competitive industry. 
The diamond creates an environment that promotes clusters of competitive industries. 
A cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and 
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementaries. Clusters affect competition in three ways: by increasing the 
productivity of constituent firms or industries, by increasing their capacity for 
innovation and thus for productivity growth, and by stimulating new business 
formation that supports innovation and expands the cluster. 
Chance 
Chance events are described by Porter (1990) as occurrences that have little to do with 
circumstances in a nation and are often largely outside the power of firms (and often 
the nation' s government) to influence. Examples are pure inventions, breakthroughs 
in basic technologies, discontinuities in input costs such as oil prices, significant shifts 
130 
in world financial markets or exchange rates, major shifts in foreign market demand, 
wars and external political developments. 
According to Porter (1990) , chance events are important because they create 
discontinuities that allow shifts in competitive position. They play their role partly by 
altering conditions in the "diamond". Major shifts in input costs or exchange rates, 
for example, create selective factor disadvantages that catalyze periods of significant 
innovation. 
Invention and entrepreneurship are at the heart of national advantage. Porter's 
research shows that neither entrepreneurship nor invention is random. "While chance 
events can allow shifts in competitive advantage in an industry, national attributes 
play an important role in what nation exploits them. The nation with the most 
favourable ' diamond' will be most likely to convert chance events into competitive 
advantage" (Porter 1990: 125). 
Government 
Porter (1990) advocates that a government's role is to influence the four determinants. 
He recommends that government should encourage change, promote domestic rivalry 
and stimulate innovation to support national competitiveness. Porter (1998) suggests 
the following specific approaches : focus on specialised factor creation, aim at 
sustained investment, avoid intervening in factor and currency markets, enforce strict 
product and environmental standards, deregulate competition and enforce strong 
domestic antitrust policies. 
According to Porter (1990) , a home base is particularly relevant to the creation of 
competitiveness. The national "diamond" is very difficult to penetrate or replicate 
from afar (not to mention from within the nation) unless a nation is indeed the place 
where strategy is set, products and processes are ultimately created and the firm seeks 
to be an insider in a national cluster. If a nation tries to have many "home bases", he 
continues, the chances are that it will fail to reap the benefits of any. If the 
circumstances in the home nation do not support the innovation required for 
competitive advantage, and cannot be improved, a firm must shift its home base to a 
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nation that better catal yses and provides the needed tools for international success. 
This implies that the management team must be relocated and perhaps replaced and, 
also, that the primary research and development and marketing resources must move 
as well. 
The home base is the nation in which the essential competitive advantages of the 
enterprise are created and sustained (Porter 1990). It is also where a company's 
strategy is set and the core product and process technically (broadly defined) are 
created and maintained. Sophisticated production often takes place in the home base. 
While the shareholding of companies is often concentrated at the home base, the 
nationality of shareholders is a secondary consideration. As long as the local 
company remains the true home base by retaining effective strategic, creative, and 
technical control, the nation will still reap most of the benefits to its economy even if 
the company is own by foreign investors. 
Porter (1990) points out that it can take a decade or more to develop competitive 
advantage. It is assumed, referring back to Section 2.4, that competitive advantages 
would include core competencies. He concludes that companies must recognise the 
central role of innovation and the uncomfortable truth that innovation grows out of 
pressure and challenge. A company should seek out the most capable competitors as 
motivators, welcome domestic rivalry, globalise to use advantages in other nations 
and locate the home base to support competitive advantage. Porter (1998: 195) 
emphasises that this should be "not just once, but continuously". 
The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Porter 1990) does have its critics. Hamel 
(1997, cited in Crainer 1997) maintains that the book tells almost nothing about the 
future of competitiveness, a future in which geography will have less and less to do 
with competitiveness. "In a world of open markets and mobile capital technology and 
knowledge, no firm need be the product of its geography" (Hamel 1997, cited by 
Crainer 1997:219). Hamel (1997) does allow that the book explains industry clusters 
in countries and was a great historical study, useful to governments for competitive 
policies. 
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Van Winden, van den Berg and van der Meer (2004, cited by Winn 2005) maintain 
that Porter's theory of national competitiveness is weak in theory, with a number of 
questionable assumptions. Much has changed since The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations was published in 1990. Developments in information technology, 
communication and transport and the emergence of China as an economic factor have 
all had an impact. While aspects of Porter's framework may be challenged, no 
alternative has emerged to take its place. The Diamond will be used later in the thesis 
to examine some of the reasons for the success of South Africa-originated 
multinational companies. 
Sachs (2005) has a somewhat different perspective from Porter (1990) on the factors 
influencing economic potential and growth. He cites a country's resource base, 
climate, topography, political relations with neighbours, internal ethnic and political 
divisions and proximity to world markets as key factors . His checklist for making a 
differential diagnosis of countries has seven categories: extent of poverty, economic 
policy framework, fiscal framework and fiscal trap, physical geography, governance 
patterns and failures, cultural barriers and geopolitics. 
While certain of Sachs's (2005) deliberations are covered by Porter's (1990) natural 
resources definition, Sachs (2005) is more definitive on economic geography and 
geopolitics. Physical geography includes the proximity of populations to ports, 
international trade routes, and navigable waterways and access of population to 
motorised transport. Geopolitics embraces international security relations, cross-
border security threats and trade barriers. 
The checklist for the extent of poverty asks questions such as, What proportion of 
households live in extreme poverty? What proportion of households lack access to 
basic needs in schooling, healthcare, water and sanitation, electricity, roads, nutrition? 
What are demographic trends that may affect the numbers and distribution of the 
extreme poor? The economic policy framework has systematic questions such as the 
cost of doing business in the country. What is the coverage of key infrastructure? 
What is the trade policy framework, and how are trade barriers impinging on the costs 
of production, especially for export-orientated businesses? 
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The questions relating to the fiscal framework concern the current levels of budget 
spending and public revenue. The share of public spending in gross domestic product 
in various categories (health, education, infrastructure) indicates the efforts that a 
country is making to reduce poverty. The patterns of governments go beyond the 
specifics of the budget and detailed economic policies. Sachs (2005) notes that while 
history has shown that democracy is not a prerequisite for .economic development, a 
regime that is despotic, arbitrary and lawless will easily ruin an economy. He asks 
whether the succession of power from one government to the next is regularised, or 
subject to the power of current rulers. 
The cultural barriers to economic development described by Sachs (2005) include 
reference to the effects of class, caste, ethnicity, religion, and gender inequity. Do 
cultural norms and practices define limits to the economic opportunities of minority 
groups? Is interethnic violence rampant? 
Having reviewed the factors contributing to national competitiveness and hence 
ultimately to the development of core competences, we tum now to the company 
level, beginning with Prahalad and Hamel (1996). They stress that it is essential to 
identify the elements that contribute to each core competency. In addition to this, 
companies should benchmark not only against their competitors, but also against other 
firms that excel in important areas. 
Senior managers must be full participants in the process of identifying 
core competency. The process will involve many meetings, heated debate, 
frequent disagreements, unexpected insights, and a sense of excitement about 
potential new opportunities. . . . The goal of the process is to develop a wide 
and deep understanding of the skills that currently underpin the firm' s success 
... and to provide the basis for actively managing what, after all, are the 
firm' s most valuable resources (Hamel and Prahalad 1996:248-249). 
A company's competence-building agenda is determined by its strategic architecture 
(Hamel and Prahalad 1996). Strategic architecture is a high-level blueprint for the 
deployment of new functionalities , the acquisition of new competencies, or the 
migrations of existing competencies, and the reconfiguring of the interface with 
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customers. Strategic architecture is not a detailed plan. It identifies the major 
capabilities to be built but does not specify exactly how they are to be built. A 
competence product matrix is often useful in setting specific competence acquisition 
and deployment goals (see Figure 3.16 below). The matrix distinguishes between 
existing and new competencies and between existing and new product markets. 
Figure 3.16 Establishing the Core Competency Agenda 
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protect and extend our 
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Source: Adapted from Hamel and Prahalad (1996:250). 
The lower-left quadrant represents the company' s existing portfolio of competencies 
of products and services. By mapping which competencies support which end-
product markets, a company can identify opportunities to strengthen its position in a 
particular product market by importing competencies that may reside elsewhere in the 
corporation. The upper-left quadrant suggests another important question: What new 
core competencies must we be building today to ensure that our customers regard us 
as the premier provider in five or ten years' time? The goal here is to understand 
what new competencies must be built to support and extend a company's franchise in 
its existing markets. 
135 
The lower-right quadrant is used to refer to opportunities that do not fall within the 
product-market orbit of existing business units. The objective here is to imagine 
opportunities to extend existing core competencies into new product markets. 
Opportunities represented in the upper-right quadrant do not overlap the company's 
current market position or its current competence endowment. Nevertheless, a 
company may. choose to pursue such opportunities if they are seen to be especially 
significant or attractive. The authors state that opportunities in this quadrant should be 
approached with great caution, as the company has little or no experience to assist its 
decisions. 
Hamel and Prabalad (1996) state that it may take five, ten, or more years to build 
world leadership in a core competency area. (This compares to Porter's 1990 view, 
mentioned above, that it can take a decade or more to develop competitive 
advantage.) Consistency of effort is crucial. Consistency depends on a deep 
consensus about which competencies to build and support. The stability of the 
management teams charged with competency development is also a key. Slow, 
persistent, cumulative learning is at the heart of competency development. Hamel and 
Prabalad advocate regular "competency review" meetings, which should focus on the 
levels of investment plans for strengthening constituent skills and technologies, 
internal patterns of deployment, the impact of alliances and outsourcing. Their 
recommended goal is not to "hard wire" the core competency into the organisation 
through structural changes, but to "soft-wire" the perspective into the heads of every 
manager and employee. 
Writing on his own Hamel (2003) postulates that it is generally possible to see the 
future ' s broad outline - to anticipate the point at which a growth curve suddenly 
flattens out, or an existing business model runs out of steam. He advocates variety 
and avoiding grandiose strategies. Companies should devote themselves to launching 
low-risk experiments. Experiments should go beyond just products. He does not 
specifically mention core competencies in the above statements; however, core 
competencies are a central part of his strategic philosophy, and I am therefore 
assuming that the development of core competencies is implicitly included in the 
experiments he recommends. 
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The views of others on the development of core competencies are now considered, 
beginning with Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005). They specify two tools, internal 
analysis and value chains that help identify and build core competencies. Internal 
analysis stipulates that a capability be valuable, rare, costly to imitate and non-
substitutable before it can be a core competency. Value chain analysis is used to 
identify and evaluate the competitive potential of resources and capabilities. Figure 
3.17 illustrates the components of internal analysis. 
Figure 3.17 Components of Internal Analysis Leading to Competitive 
Advantage and Strategic Competitiveness 
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Resources, capabilities and core competencies are the factors that make up the 
foundation of competitive advantage. Resources are the source of a firm's 
capabilities. Capabilities, in tum, are the source of a firm ' s core competencies, which 
are the basis of its competitive advantage. As shown in Figure 3.17, combinations of 
resources are managed to create core competencies (Hitt, et al. 2005). 
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Typically, resources alone do not yield a competitive advantage. A competitive 
advantage is created through the unique bundling of several resources. Resources 
(defined in Section 1.5 as inputs to the production process) are divided into tangible 
and intangible assets. Tangible resources are assets that can be seen and quantified 
while intangible resources include assets that typically are rooted in a company' s 
history and have accumulated over time. Because they are embedded in unique 
patterns of routines, intangible resources are relatively difficult for competitors to 
analyse and imitate and are, therefore, generally superior to tangible resources as a 
source of core competencies (Hitt et al. 2005). See Tables 3.5 and 3.6 below. 
Capabilities are often based on developing, carrying and exchanging information and 
knowledge through the company' s human capital. The foundation of many 
capabilities lies in the unique skills and knowledge of a firm's employees and, often, 
their functional expertise. It is crucial to have human capital to develop and use 
capabilities and, ultimately, core competencies. Core competencies emerge over time 
through an organisational process of accumulating and learning how to deploy 
resources and capabilities. It is increasingly believed that the knowledge possessed 
by human capital is among the most significant of an organisation's capabilities and 
may, ultimately, be at the root of all competitive advantages (Hitt et al. 2005). 
Table 3.5 Tangible Resources 
Financial Resources • The firm's borrowing capacity 
• The firm's ability to generate internal funds 
Organisation Resources • The firm's formal reporting structure and its 
formal planning, controlling, and coordinating 
systems 
Physical Resources • Sophistication and location of a firm's plant and 
equ ipment 
Technological Resources • Stock of technology, such as patents , trade-
marks, copyrights, and trade secrets 
Source: Adapted from Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005:81). 
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Table 3.6 Intangible Resources 
Human Resources • Knowledge 
• Trust 
• Managerial capabilities 
• Organisational routines 
Innovation Resources • Ideas 
• Scientific capabilities 
• Capacity to innovate 
Reputational Resources • Reputation with customers 
• Brand name 
• Perceptions of product quality, durability, and 
reliability 
• Reputation with suppliers 
• For efficient, effective, supportive and mutually 
beneficial interactions and relationships 
Source: Adapted from Hilt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2005:81). 
The value chain concept is an essential part of the thesis and is illustrated in Figure 
3.18 below. The value chain figure is well known but is shown here because of its 
central role in the thesis, especially the allocation of core competencies to different 
locations or activities in the chain. Hilt et al. (2005) define it as a template that firms 
use to understand their cost position and to identify the multiple means that might be 
used to facilitate implementation of a chosen business-level strategy. The value chain 
is segmented into primary and support activities. Primary activities are involved with 
a product's physical creation, its sale and distribution to buyers and its service after 
sale. Support activities provide the support necessary for the primary activities to take 
place. 
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Figure 3.18 The Basic Value Chain 
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Value chain analysis allows the finn to understand the parts of its operations that 
create value and those that do not. It shows how a product moves from raw-material 
stage to the final customer. For individual finns, the essential idea of the value chain 
"is to add as much value as possible, as cheaply as possible, and, most important, to 
capture that value" (Hitt et al. 2003 :93). The intent is to detennine areas where the 
finns have the potential to create and capture value. The items should be evaluated 
relative to competitors' capabilities (Hitt et al. 2005). 
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The primary activities of a value chain are described as follows (Hilt et al. 2005): 
1. Procurement. Activities completed to purchase the inputs needed to produce a 
firm's products. Purchased inputs include items fully consumed during the 
manufacture of products (e.g., raw materials and supplies) as well as fixed 
assets - machinery, laboratory equipment, office equipment, and buildings. 
2. Technological Development. Activities completed to improve a firm's product 
and the process used to manufacture it. Technological development takes 
many forms, such as process equipment, basic research, product design and 
servicing procedures. 
3. Human Resource Management. Activities involved with recruiting, hiring, 
training, developing and compensating all personnel. 
4. Firm Infrastructure. Firm infrastructure includes activities such as general 
management, planning, finance, accounting, legal support and governmental 
relations that are required to support the work of the entire value chain. 
Through its infrastructure, the firm strives to effectively and consistently 
identify external opportunities and threats, identify resources and capabilities 
and support core competencies. 
The primary activities of a value chain are described as follows (Hilt et al. 2005): 
1. Inbound Logistics. Activities such as materials handling, warehousing and 
inventory control used to receive, store and disseminate inputs to a product. 
2. Operations. Activities necessary to convert the inputs provided by inbound 
logistics into final product form. Machining, packaging, assembly and 
equipment maintenance are examples of operations activities. 
3. Outbound Logistics. Activities involved with collection, storing and 
physically distributing the final product to customers. Examples of these 
activities include finished-goods warehousing, materials handling and order 
processing. 
4. Marketing and Sales. Activities required to provide means through which 
customers can purchase products and to induce them to do so. To effectively 
market and sell products, firms develop advertising and promotional 
campaigns, select appropriate distribution channels and select, develop and 
support their sales force. 
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5. Service. Activities designed to enhance or maintain a product's value. Firms 
engage in a range of service-related activities, including installation, repair, 
training and adjustment. 
Hitt et al. (2005) state that to be a source of competitive advantage, a resource or 
capability must allow the firm : 
1. To perform an activity in a manner that is superior to the manner in which 
competitors perform it 
OR 
2. To perform a value- creating activity that competitors cannot complete. 
When a firm's resources and capabilities are not a source of competence and 
competitive advantage, then outsourcing is one possible solution. Outsourcing is the 
purchase of a value-creating activity from an external supplier. 
Porter (1985) emphasises that the activities in a value chain are the building blocks of 
competitive advantage. Porter's definitions of competitive advantage as seen in 
Section 3.6 do sometimes encompass what would be defined as core competences by 
others. He stresses that the value chain is not a collection of independent activities, 
but a system of interdependent activities. These activities are related by linkages 
within the value chain. Linkages are relationships between the way one value activity 
is performed and the cost, or performance, of another. 
Thompson and Strickland (2003) point out that a company' s core competencies very 
often emerge incrementally as it moves, either to bolster skills that contributed to 
successes or to respond to new customer problems, technological and market 
opportunities and competition. Core competencies typically reside in the combined 
efforts of different work groups and departments at different locations in a firm' s 
value chain. The key to leveraging a company's core competencies into 
competitively valuable capabilities, with potential for competitive long-term 
advantage, is by concentrating more effort and more talent than rivals do on 
deepening and strengthening these competencies. 
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Building and strengthening core competencies, say Thompson and Strickland (2003), 
is therefore an exercise in managing human skills, knowledge bases and intellect, and 
coordinating and networking the efforts of different work groups and departments at 
every related place in the value chain. The organisation must first develop the ability 
to do something, however imperfectly or inefficiently. As experience builds, the 
ability .begins to translate into a competence and capability. Should the organisation 
become better than rivals at their activity, the capability becomes a distinctive 
competence and carries the potential for competitive advantage. 
Drucker (1995) stresses that it is critical for a business to create resources of 
knowledge and people to respond to opportunities when they arise. He advocates a 
separate budget to create and maintain the resources for the future (in research and 
technology, market share, service, and people and their development) that should be 
sustained irrespective of economic conditions. 
The questions of how to identify both the core competencies one has and those the 
business needs, in order to maintain a leadership position, are raised by Drucker 
(1995). He provides examples of two companies that are developing the methodology 
to measure and manage core competency. The methods are to keep careful track of 
one's own and competitors' performances, looking especially for unexpected poor 
performance in areas where one should have done well. The successes demonstrate 
what the market values and will pay for, while the non-successes should be viewed as 
early indications that the market is changing or that the company's competences are 
weakening. 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) define dynamic capabilities as the firm's ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments. To be strategic, a capability must be honed to a user need, 
unique and difficult to replicate. The firm 's processes and positions collectively 
encompass its competencies and capabilities. A difficult-to-replicate or difficult-to-
imitate competency is defined as a distinctive competency. 
Where a firm can go is a function of its current position and the paths ahead. Its 
current position is often shaped by the path it has travelled. Previous investments and 
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its repertoire of routines (its history) constrain its future behaviour. Path 
dependencies and technological opportunities mark the road ahead. Because of 
imperfect factor markets and the non-trade ability of "soft" assets such as values, 
culture and organisational experience, distinctive competencies and capability 
generally cannot be acquired. They must be built. This, Teece et al. (1997) state can 
sometimes take years, possibly decades. 
Lei, Hitt and Bettis (1996) vIew learning and core competencies as mutually 
interdependent over time. They envisage path dependency as the idiosyncratic pattern 
of learning and application of competencies resulting from the evolution of skills and 
historical investments and developments. They state that organisational learning 
helps firms to continuously develop and change their core competency. 
Organisational learning alone does not translate into a core competence - the firm 
must utilise the learning into firm-specific resources and skills. The development of 
dynamic core competencies requires the accumulation, over time, of skills and 
technology. 
Barney (1995) points out that as firms evolve, they pick up skills, abilities and 
resources that are unique to them, reflecting their particular path through history. 
These resources and capabilities reflect the unique personalities, experiences and 
relationships that exist in only a single firm. He states that strategists are often 
enamoured of the importance of "Big decisions" as determinants of competitive 
advantage. "Big decisions" are sometimes critical in understanding the firm ' s 
position. However, more often, a firm' s competitive advantage seems to depend on 
numerous "Small decisions" through which a firm's resources and capabilities are 
developed and exploited. Success may depend not on doing a few things right, but on 
doing a lot of little things right. 
Oxman (2002) maintains that pans to improve performance management should begin 
by clearly defining and differentiating between core competencies and results - and 
balancing them appropriately. Best-practice firms, he says, look at an employee's 
longer-term contribution to a firm's sustained success and consider the extent to 
which he or she demonstrates and develops competencies. 
144 
Hitt, Keats and de Marie (1998) recommend developing a learning and innovative 
organisational culture with strong tearns (particularly cross-functional ones). There 
should be a sense of responsibility to spread best practices from one unit to others by 
building a structure that diffuses knowledge throughout the organisation. To 
transform an organisation and achieve even moderate levels of success, core skills 
that are critical to build appropriate core competencies must be identified and 
developed. This will require managerial and organisational introspection and 
openness to change. 
Luo (2000) highlights the need for multinational corporations to convert learning 
efforts into firm-specific resources and skills if they are to translate organisational 
learning into a critical competence. This process involves three stages: knowledge 
acquisition, knowledge sharing and knowledge utilisation (integration of learning so 
that it is broadly available, reconfiguration of old and new resources and revitalisation 
of acquired knowledge in new situations). 
The provision of practical examples begins with Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002). They 
maintain that while many companies claim that their people are their most important 
asset, few have built the human resource systems, processes or cultures that can even 
offset, let alone challenge, the deeply embedded bias toward financial assets (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal 2002). Leadership is therefore required from a sophisticated human 
resource professional, who also has to have a strong understanding of the business. 
An example is given of a practice at British Petroleum called "peer assist". This was 
initially a small-scale project that encouraged those on the frontline in one business 
unit to contact other BP operations that had the expertise to help solve problems. 
Cutting through formal layers and complex procedures, the process became an 
accepted way of doing business. Managers soon recognised that it was not acceptable 
to refuse a request for help. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002) conclude that today' s managers must compete, not just 
for product markets or technical expertise, but for the hearts and minds of talented and 
capable people. And, after persuading them to join the enterprise, management must 
also ensure that those valuable individuals become engaged in the organisation' s 
ongoing learning process and stay committed to the company's aspirations. 
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Continuing with practical examples, Fites (1998) describes how Caterpillar's 186 
independent dealers around the world playa central role in helping the company build 
close relationships with customers and gain insights into how it can improve products 
and services. Caterpillar gives their dealers extraordinary support, helps ensure that 
the dealerships are well run and emphasises full and honest two-way communication. 
Caterpillar top management meets annually with key people from the dealerships at · 
regional conferences, where they discuss the sales and goals for each product line and 
what each party has to do to achieve them. The company periodically invites all 
dealers to a week-long conference for a comprehensive review of strategy, product 
plans and marketing policies. 
Mascarenhas, Baveja and J amil (1998) examine the core competencies of 12 leading 
multinational companies. The companies include Campbell Soup, Crown Cork & 
Seal, Merck and Siemens. The core competencies are of three types: supenor 
technological know-how, reliable processes and close external relationships. A 
technological competence involves a deep understanding of a subject area. It includes 
knowledge of the scientific properties, inter-relationships, and latest developments in 
a subject area. A reliable process delivers an expected result quickly, consistently, 
and efficiently, with the least inconvenience or disruptions to customers. Close 
external relationships can identify opportunities for mutual benefit such as cost 
reduction or new ideas. 
The examples given include Campbell's Soup, with technological know-how of food 
growing and processing, such as its flavour-adding technology and reliable process of 
company-wide focus on perfonnance encouraged by a "pay-for" perfonnance that is 
ingrained from the board down to supervisory level. The company has the ability to 
transfer this system to international acquisitions. 
Crown Cork & Seal is cited with technological know-how of tooling investment to cut 
metal and reduce the material requirements handling and cost of cans. Its reliable 
process competency is the culture of cost reduction in its management, structure, 
operations and design of cans. The company has the ability to transfer cost-reduction 
practices to acquisitions. It leverages its close customer relationships across plastic 
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and metal packaging and filling machinery, domestically and internationally, to 
achieve close relationships with external parties. 
Merk is regarded as having excellent functional specialists in research and 
manufacturing that help to achieve superior performance. High ethical standards and 
controls reduce the risks of drug failures. A strong record of obtaining drug approvals 
from policy-makers further improves the reliable process. The company's strong 
relationship with the medical profession helps it to attract talent. Its credibility with 
the Food and Drug Administration in the USA helps it obtain approvals. 
Siemens has semiconductor technological know-how that cuts across its 14 divisions. 
Its reliable process competency is achieved via reliable high-quality, low-cost 
manufacturing derived from master/apprenticeship programmes. Innovation 
productivity is fostered by a long tradition of managing the innovation process. Close 
relationships with external parties are achieved through ties to German banks, which 
provide access to capital to finance customer purchases. 
Mascarenhas et al. (1998) analyse the factors mentioned by executives that contribute 
to the development of the three types of competencies. The most common factor, 
with regard to developing a technical competency, is exposure to a demanding 
technical, operating or economic environment. This is followed by defying 
previously assumed technical or operating limits, using the magnitude of development 
tasks and deadlines to motivate employees, committing substantial resources to an 
area and committing resources early. 
A mix of informal corporate culture and formal operating controls is generally utilised 
to develop a reliable process. Internal analysis, to identify better suppliers and 
outsourcing opportunities, logistical innovations, to improve communication and 
customer response, utilisation of experience associated with having a large installed 
base and company-wide reward and incentive systems, are other important factors. 
The study concludes that close external relations are best developed by the acquisition 
of other firms, international reach to develop relationships across countries, the use of 
compelling technical and/or reliable competencies to forge international relationships 
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and the use of scale and size. A new emphasis on external relationship competency is 
emerging. These new relationship competencies can compliment a firm's traditional 
competencies and enable it to cope with the demands of globalisation, mass 
customisation and higher quality, and shorter product cycles. 
Mascarenhas et al. (1998) conclude that different approaches and multiple methods 
are clearly needed to develop each type of competency. They add that leading 
companies do not rest on their traditional competencies but also develop new 
competencies that respond to , or anticipate, emerging business conditions. A shift, 
they add, is occurring in relative emphasis from internal technological and reliable 
process competencies toward external relationship competencies. 
Contrary perhaps to the view of Teece et al. (1997) view (Section 3.5) that distinctive 
competencies and capabilities cannot generally be acquired but must be built, there 
are occasions when mergers and acquisitions playa key role in the development of 
core competencies. Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist (2002) note that an acquisition 
or alliance in the correct location can access skills and resources not available at 
home. Learning through international expansion confronts the problem of "sticky" or 
location-bound knowledge that multinational corporations can assimilate only by 
establishing new units in the originating location. "Stickiness" refers to difficulties 
experienced in the transfer of knowledge (Szulanski 2002). 
Vermeulen and Barkema (2001), in turn, caution that exploitation of a firnl ' s 
knowledge base through "green fields" investments may eventually make a finn 
simple and inert. The knowledge base could remain more or less the same in this 
case. In contrast, they state, acquisitions may broaden a firm ' s knowledge base and 
decrease inertia and so enhance the viability of its later ventures. Their research 
corroborates the idea that finns learn from related acquisitions, not unrelated ones. It 
suggests that firms do not learn from an acquisition in a country they have never 
entered before; they do learn from an acquisition in a country where they have 
established a position earlier. Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) propose that "green 
fields" and acquisitions should not be judged on their individual performances only. 
The learning opportunities offered by the acquisition of another firm are an important 
factor that has to be considered, but it is surely not the only one. 
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Research conducted by Birkenshaw, Hood and Jonsson (1998) shows that the factors 
that lead to the transfonnation of subsidiary resources into part of multinational 
corporations' specific advantages are related to the transfer of resources, acceptance 
of the subsidiaries' specialised resources in other parts of the multinational 
corporations, and the value of resources. The research results revealed that the 
multinational corporation's subsidiaries contribute significantly to the creation of 
finn-specific advantages. The research also indicated that initiative plays a critical 
role in the early stages of contributory role development, rather than in its subsequent 
growth. 
Lei and Hitt (1995) postulate that acquisitions and leveraged buyouts (LBO) can 
create conditions within the finn that make outsourcing core skills more attractive 
than building these skills and capabilities internally. Over-reliance on outsourcing 
may trap the finn into growing dependence in which it loses its knowledge and skill 
base to the outsourcing partner. Lei and Hitt do allow that related acquisitions may 
improve shareholder value and help to build the critical skills necessary to meet 
foreign competition. Even certain types of related acquisitions, however, may not 
help in building core competencies and skills if senior management uses an asset-
based philosophy that deters learning and skill absorption application. They conclude 
that long-tenn sustained competitiveness comes from nurturing internal knowledge 
and skill sets that fonn the basis of continuous learning and core competencies. 
3.7.2 Summary 
Figure 3.19 summarises the works reviewed in Section 3.7, The Development of Core 
Competencies. Porter (1990) Hamel and Prahalad (1996) and Mascarenhas (1998) are 
especially important. Hitt et al. (2003) are relevant because of the later use of value 
chains to compare the different companies. Methods used to develop core 
competencies are noted for each author. Four of the works listed refer to mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Figure 3.19 Literature Review Summary: The Development of Core 
Competencies 
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1. Porter (1990) National competitiveness. "Diamond". Factor conditions, 
related and supporting industries, demand, firm strategy and rivalry, chance 
and government. Can take a decade to develop competitive advantage. 
2. Sachs (2005) Economic geography, geopolitics, differential diagnosis. 
3. Hamel and Prahalad (1996) Strategic architecture, benchmarking, agenda, 
product competence matrix, regular review meetings. Five to ten years to 
develop. Management stability, cumulative learning. Facilitate development. 
4. Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003) Value chain. Ioternal analysis (four 
criteria). Emerge over time. 
5. Porter (1985) Value chain activities are building blocks for core 
competences. 
6. Thompson and Strickland (2003) Emerge incrementaliy. Concentrate effort 
and talent. Learning + experience. 
7. Drucker (1995) Separate sustainable budget. Methodology to manage core 
competences. 
S. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) Replication, imitation. Path dependency 
and technology. 
9. Lei, Hitt and Bettis (1996) Meta-learning. 
10. Barney (1995) Numerous small decisions. Importance of people. 
11. Hitt, Keats and de Marie (1998) Cross-functional teams. 
12. Luo (2000) Convert learning into specific competences. Knowledge 
acquisition, sharing and utilisation. 
13. Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002) Building Competitive Advantage through 
People. BP peer assist. 
14. Fites (1998) Make Your Dealers Your Partners. (Caterpiliar) Close 
relationships. 
15. Mascarenhas, Baveja and JamiJ (1998) Three types and factors to develop -
12 multinationals. Different and multiple approaches. 
16. Tallman and Fladmoe-Lindquist (2002) Acquisitions can access skilis 
unavailable in home country. 
17. Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) Learning Through Acquisitions. May 
increase knowledge base. 
IS. Berkinshaw, Hood and Jonnson. (1998) Subsidiary initiative 
19. Lei and Hitt (1995) The Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Building 
Firm Skills and Capabilities. Cautions on dangers. 
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3.7.3 Conclusion 
Competitive advantages and core competencies are forged on a playing field of 
national competitiveness. Porter's Diamond, with its factor conditions, related and 
supporting industries, demand conditions, firm strategy, structure and rivalry, 
analyses the determinants of national competitiveness. Chance and government also 
play important roles. Sachs has a somewhat different perspective from Porter. His 
checklist for making a differential diagnosis of different countries has the categories 
of poverty, economic policy framework, fiscal framework, physical geography, 
governance, patterns and failures, cultural barriers and geopolitics (Sachs 2005). 
Economic policies, physical geography and geopolitics influence economic growth 
and the competitiveness of countries. 
Learning is of fundamental importance to the development of core competencies. It 
takes time to develop world-class competencies, sometimes years, and, in the opinion 
of some of the authors, even a decade or so. Different and multiple methods are 
required to develop core competencies. 
The methods used to develop core competencies include benchmarking, review 
meetings, product matrixes, value chains, internal analysis, concentration of effort and 
talent, exposure to demanding environments, corporate culture, formal controls and 
acquisitions, travel, the importance of people and their development, cross-functional 
teams and path dependency. Mergers and acquisitions can significantly affect the 
building of competencies and subsidiary initiative, besides being key to international 
expansion. 
Mascarenhas et al. (1998) employ three types of competency, whereas the basic value 
chain has nine different locations or activities. There can be many subdivisions for 
each of the locations. Luo (2000) uses four categories of competency but does not 
investigate the different methods that could be used to develop and transfer each of 
the categories. 
The literature available on the practical problems and issues that companies confront 
during the development of core competencies is limited. There is little indication of 
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the relative effectiveness of the different methods used to develop and transfer core 
competencies and the context (for example value chain location) which might cause 
them to be more or less effective. My research will explore these aspects as 
satisfactory answers will improve the general body of knowledge relating to core 
competencies and have applicability for academics and practitioners alike. 
The importance of mergers and acquisitions in international expansion and the 
building of core competencies is noted and will accordingly be reviewed in the next 
section. 
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3.8 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions, as seen in Section 3.3 and Section 3.7, are one of the keys 
to global expansion. This section reviews seven works: Hit!, lreland and Hoskisson 
(2005), Lajoux (1998), Eccles, Lanes and Wilson (1999), Gaughan (2002), Drucker 
(1986), Carey (2001) and Noluia, Joyce and Roberson (2003) to examine definitions, 
the rationale for mergers and acquisitions, the success and failure rates, problems and 
solutions, pricing and acquisition strategies and examples from the master acquirers. 
3.8.1 Review 
A merger is a strategy through which two firms agree to integrate their operations on 
a relatively co-equal basis. An acquisition is a strategy through which one firm buys a 
controlling or 100 percent interest in another firm with the intent of making the 
acquired firm a subsidiary business within its portfolio. A takeover is a special type 
·of acquisition strategy wherein the target firm did not solicit the acquiring firm's bid 
(Hit!, lreland and Hoskisson 2005). The annual value of global mergers and 
acquisitions peaked in 2000 at about $3.400 billion and fell to about $1.750 billion in 
2001, rising to $2.900 billion in 2005 (Politi and Saigol 2005). About 40 to 45 
percent of the acquisitions in recent years have been made across country borders 
(Hit! et al. 2005). 
The reasons for mergers and acquisitions include increased market power, lower risk 
compared to developing new products, diversification (geographic, product or 
industry), overcoming entry barriers, avoiding excessive competition, learning and 
developing new capabilities, reducing the cost of new product development and 
increased speed to market (Hit! et al. 2005). 
Despite the compelling reasons for mergers and acquisitions, there is a significant 
failure rate. Lajoux (1998) cites 15 studies on post-merger failure rates. While each 
used different criteria and definitions, the majority of the studies showed failure rates 
in excess of 50 percent. For example, a 1987 McKinsey study of 112 acquisitions 
showed that 77 percent failed to earn back capital in three years. A 1996 Coopers and 
Lybrand study of 125 mergers revealed that 66 percent were financially unsuccessful. 
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A study by Mercer Management Consulting in 1997 found that the mergers of the 
1990s were substantially outperforming those of the 1980s. They attribute the 
improvement to better post-merger management, rather than price or strategy. 
Problems in achieving successful mergers and acquisitions include integration 
difficulties, inadequate evaluation of targets, large or extraordinary debt, inability to 
achieve synergy, too much diversification, managers overly focused on acquisitions 
and taking on an acquisition too large in relation to the acquirer. Conflicting corporate 
cultures, inadequate due diligence (of buyer and/or seller) and lack of a compelling 
strategy are other causes of merger and acquisition failure. Integrating two companies 
following an acquisition can be difficult. Challenges include melding two disparate 
cultures, linking different financial and controls systems, building effective working 
relationships (particularly when management styles differ) and resolving problems 
regarding the status of the newly acquired firm ' s executives (Hit! et al. 2005). 
Hitt et al. (2005) suggest that acquisitions are likely to be more successful when the 
acquired firm has assets or resources that are complementary to the acquiring firm's 
core business and when the acquisition is friendly. The acquiring finn should also 
conduct effective due diligence to select the target firm and evaluate the target firnl's 
health (financial, cultural and human resources). The merged firm should maintain a 
low-to-moderate debt position, and it helps when both firms have had experience with 
change and are flexible and adaptable. 
The reason that mergers fail to create value is often simply because the acquiring 
company paid too much, according to Eccles, Lanes and Wilson (1999). They define 
a "value gap" as the difference between the intrinsic value and purchase price of an 
acquisition. "Synergy value" is the net present value of the cash flows that will result 
from improvements made when the companies are combined. Acquirers generally 
base their calculations on five types of synergies: cost savings, revenue 
enhancements, process improvements, financial engineering and tax benefits. 
Cost saving is the most common type of synergy and the easiest to estimate. Revenue 
enhancements are difficult to estimate because they involve external variables beyond 
management's control. Process improvements occur when managers transfer best 
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practices and core competencies from one company to another. This can result in 
both cost savings and revenue enhancements. Eccles et al. (1999) maintain that 
reducing the weighted average cost of capital (W ACC) through borrowing to finance 
an acquisition is not a good enough reason on its own to do a deal. They also caution 
that companies should not make deals based on real benefits from tax engineering 
alone. 
Eccles et al. (1999) recommend that precautions against overpaYIng include real 
options valuation, an approach that calculates a value for each of the options that the 
deals create. A higher-level manager can also set a price ceiling before negotiations 
begin. Eccles and colleagues give examples of companies with rules as to 
acquisitions: to achieve a minimum return on investment within a specified period, to 
eam at least the company' s cost of capital or the target company' s growth rate has to 
be higher than that of the acquirer itself. Another company compares value created 
by a potential acquisition to the value that could be created by buying back its own 
shares. 
The above-mentioned authors identify two areas where even successful companies 
could improve their performance. The first is risk analysis and the second is external 
communications to the capital markets, customers, suppliers, regulatory bodies and 
geographic communities. 
Gaughan (2002) notes that the anticipated existence of synergistic benefits allows 
firms to incur the expenses of the acquisition process and still be able to give target 
shareholders a premium for their shares. The problem with this is that premiums are 
usually paid up front, with the gains coming over the course of time. He advocates 
that the choice of the appropriate discount rate to calculate the net present value 
(NPV) of the target include the determination ofthe riskiness of the target. One of the 
basic rules regarding the choice of the discount rate is to use the firm ' s cost of capital. 
According to Drucker (1986) there are five simple rules for successful acquisitions 
that have been followed by all successful acquirers over the past century. Firstly, an 
acquisition will succeed only if the acquiring company thinks through what it can 
contribute to the business it is buying, rather than what the acquired company will 
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contribute to the acqUirer, no matter how attractive the expected "synergy" may 
appear. Secondly, successful diversification by acquisition requires a common core 
of unity. The two businesses must have in common either markets or technology, 
although occasionally a comparable production process has provided sufficient unity 
of experience and expertise, as well as a common language to bring companies 
together. 
Thirdly, no acquisition will work unless the people in the acquiring company respect 
the product, the markets and the customers of the company they acquire. The 
acquisition must be "a temperamental fit". Fourthly, the acquiring company must be 
able to provide top management within a year or so for the company it acquires. 
Drucker (1986) considers it an elementary fallacy to believe one can "buy 
management". The buyer must be prepared to lose the top incumbents in the 
companies it buys. Top people are used to being bosses; they don ' t want to be 
"division managers". Drucker (1986) opines that recruiting new top managers is a 
gamble that rarely pays off. 
Fifthly, it is important that a large number of people in the management groups of 
both companies receive substantial promotions from the former companies to the 
other within the first year of a merger. The goal is to convince managers in both 
companies that the merger offers them personal opportunities. It should be noted that 
increased globalization makes following the fourth and fifth rules far more complex in 
the 21 st century than it was in the 1980s. 
Carey (2001) makes important observations based on the views of "master acquirers". 
Alex Mandl-Teligent, previously number two at AT&T, believes that acquiring is 
much faster than building. Speed is absolutely essential in the new economy. Dennis 
Kozlowski (now in serious legal difficulties), when at Tyco International, suggested 
that acquisitions work best when the main rationale is cost reduction. Jan Leschly, of 
SmithKlineBeecham (SKB), focuses on revenues when the company looks at 
acquisitions. He adds that SKB has been much more successful at acquiring products 
and technologies than it has been at acquiring companies. 
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Mackey McDonald, of VF Corporation (the company name, not an abbreviation) 
notes that the company focuses on core businesses that it knows, like jeans and 
intimate apparel, and tries to bling its core competencies to these areas. An 
acquisition becomes attractive if it offers VF a new consumer segment or geographic 
market or if it adds new products to one of its core categories. And Kozlowski of 
Tyco International said "I have worked at companies that did diversify outside their 
core businesses and I can tell you that they were never very successful." (Carey 
2001:8). 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003) recommend that companies enter new businesses 
that leverage existing customer relationships and complement core strengths. 
Companies should also develop a system for identifying, screening and closing deals. 
Only a small number (22 percent) of the 160 companies in their study were able to 
make acquisitions and partnerships a winning practice. Their research indicates that 
companies that do relatively small deals (less than 20 percent of the acquirer's 
existing size) on a consistent basis (about two or three every year) are likely to be 
more successful than organisations that do large occasional deals. 
3.8.2 Summary 
Figure 3.20 summanzes the contributions of the seven works reviewed. The 
complexity of Drucker' s fourth and fifth rules in the 21st century should be kept in 
mind. 
Figure 3.20 Literature Review Summary: Mergers and Acquisitions 
1. Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003) Definitions. Reasons (market power, 
diversification, reduce risk, entry barriers, develop new capabilities) Problems 
(integration difficulties, no synergies, size of acquisition) and solutions 
(complementary assets, friendly acquisitions, due diligence). 
2. Lajonx (1998) Majority generally unsuccessful. 
3. Eccles, Lanes and Wilson (1999) Pricing - precautions against overpaying. 
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Synergies - cost, revenue, process, financial engineering and tax benefits. W ACC 
4. Ganghan (2002) Premiums paid up-front, performance later. 
S. Dr ucker (1986) Five rules: acquirer's contribution, common core of unity, 
"temperamental fit", provide top management, promotions. l\hllagement ri ~ks. 
Cannot read ily "buy" management. 
6. Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003) System required for identifying, screening and 
closing deals. Leverage customer relationships and complement core strengths. 
Consistent bases of acquisitions. 
7. Carey (2001) Practical examples -"faster than building", cost reduction rationale etc. 
3.8.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is noted that the majority of mergers and acquisitions are generally 
unsuccessful and that companies that diversify outside their core business are seldom 
very successful. 
The reasons for acquisitions include increased market power, lower risk compared to 
developing new products, diversification (geographic, product or industry), 
overcoming entry barriers, avoiding excessive competition, learning and developing 
new capabilities, reducing the cost of new product development and increased speed 
to market. "Acquiring is much faster than building." The problems associated with 
acquisitions include integration difficulties, inadequate evaluation of targets, inability 
to achieve synergy, management risks, conflicting corporate cultures and inadequate 
due diligence. Acquisitions are likely to be more successful when assets are 
complementary, acquisitions are friendl y and there is adequate due diligence. 
According to Drucker (1986), there are five simple rules for successful acquisitions. 
The acquiring company should think through what it can contribute to the business it 
is buying; a common core of unity is needed; the people in the acquiring business 
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should respect the product, the markets, and customers of the company they acquire; 
the acquiring company must be able to provide top management for the company it 
acquires; and a large number of people in the management groups of both companies 
should receive substantial promotions from one of the former companies to the other. 
The fourth and fifth rules are more complex in the 20th century than they were in the 
1980s because of globalization. 
Companies should be cautious about overpaying and evaluate the various synergies: 
cost savings, revenue enhancement process improvements, financial engineering, and 
tax benefits. Weighted average cost of capital or other methods should be used as a 
discipline when calculating returns expected from acquisitions. Companies should 
have systems for identifying, screening and "closing" deals. 
It can be concluded from the above that it is crucial to have effective methods of 
valuing and pricing acquisitions, to conduct effective due diligence studies (which 
should include the human factor) to identify and realistically quantify synergistic 
opportunities and to be aware of Drucker' s (1986) five rules. 
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3.9 Post-Merger and Acquisition Integration 
It can be seen from the previous section that the majority of mergers and acquisitions 
are generally considered unsuccessful. The difficulties of post-merger integration 
were also mentioned. This section explores the importance and nature of post-merger 
and acquisition integration and reviews the recommendations of experts in that field. 
The section begins with contributions by Lajoux (1998), Pritchett, Robinson and 
Clarkson (1997), a major work based on GE Capital (Ashkenas, Demonarco and 
Francis 2001) and again includes the observations of master acquirers cited by Carey 
(2001). 
3.9.1 Review 
Lajoux (1998) regards the term merger and acquisition (M&A) integration as 
referring to the art of combining two or more companies - not just on paper but in 
reality - after they have come under common ownership. 
She refers to a 1990 study of 31 acquisitions by the New Jersey Institute of 
Technology, which found that post-merger performance depends more on post-
merger integration than on strategy, and al996 study by Coopers and Lybrand that 
found that 66 percent of 125 companies were financially unsuccessful in their post-
merger period. The later study found a correlation between a slow pace of post-
merger transition and low levels of revenue, cash flow and profitability. 
The process of post-merger integration faces problems of differences in language, 
law, accounting, technology, and culture according to Lajoux (1998). She provides 
appropriate advice to deal with these challenges. The advice includes the view that it 
is always desirable to hire local communications experts to deal with unique cultural 
and legal requirements. When selecting senior managers for a merged organisation, it 
is usually best to look for the managers who are most able to integrate the two 
organisations. If cultures are extremely different, it may not be wise to force them to 
work together. She quotes Hippocrates: "the first rule is to do no harm" (Lajoux 
1998: 1 05). 
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Lajoux (1998) continues with the observations that companIes acquired must 
obviously comply with legal and accounting requirements in their host countries. A 
headquarters manager will usually be preferable when entering a new country where 
key decisions will be investment-oriented. A local manager will be preferable when 
the company has existing operations. Important human resources questions to be 
addressed very early on are: To whom will senior management of the acquired 
company report? Conversely, who, in the acquiring organisation, may directly 
interface with the acquired company and who must work through the acquired 
company's CEO? What personnel will be reassigned from the acquiring company to 
the acquired company and vice versa? 
If people are an organisation's most important resource, she continues, then the most 
important aspect of post-merger integration must be the task of retaining key human 
resources from both companies and then merging them at all levels, from the board of 
directors to the frontline of sales. The acquirer's strongest defence against employee 
defections is a good reputation as an employer, substantiated by actions consistent 
with that reputation. 
Pritchett, Robinson and Clarkson (1997) list coaching points for management in the 
acquiring firm: The most important of these are: don 't promise things will remain the 
same in either company, make few promises and keep them, talk in specifics 
whenever you can, provide more communication than usual during and after the 
merger/event. Their additional counsel is that if you don 't have the answer people in 
the acquired firm need, help them find it, provide a clear sense of direction and keep 
people in the acquired firm focused and future-oriented. 
According to Pritchett et al. (1997), an acquiring company should do one of two 
things: embrace the people and make them yours, or terminate them and get them out 
as quickly as possible. Clear, well-defined, reporting relationships and lines of 
authority should be established as soon as possible. The parent-company managers 
that are to be "sent across" to the acquisition should be coached on how to make their 
entrance or debut. (Consideration of cultural difference and management styles is 
especially important). 
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Numerof and Abrams (1998) make the observation that international mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) face fundamental challenges that stem from the cultural 
differences between the companies involved. They recommend four measures to 
assist successful integration. Firstly, establish the purpose, goal and focus of the 
merger. This is the time to develop a new corporate mission, vision and strategic 
objectives where appropriate. In addition it is imperative to integrate 
communications, human resources, information materials and other critical operating 
systems. Secondly, adopt a project management orientation. Thirdly, establish a firm 
notion of sponsorship and membership and fourthly, manage communications and 
expectations effectively. It is important to identify the people who need to be aware 
of, can support, or will participate in the acquirer's efforts. 
GE Capital has been working to make acquisition integration a core capability and a 
competitive advantage that will enable it to continue its growth in the future. 
Ashkenas, Demonarco and Francis (2001) draw on their experiences at that company 
to provide guidelines for effective post-merger and acquisition integration. GE 
Capital has developed a model that divides the integration process into four stages, 
starting with the work that goes on before the acquisition is completed, followed by 
foundation building rapid integration and continuing all the way through to 
assimilation. There are two or three sub-processes in each action stage, such as due 
diligence during the pre-acquisition stage and strategy formulation during the 
foundation-building stage. Finally, each stage includes several best practices, specific 
and practical steps managers can take to support the process. The model is shown in 
Figure 3.21 below. 
Figure 3.21 Wheel of Fortune 
3 
Stort 
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Besl Practices 
Source: Ashkenas, Demonarco and Francis (2001:154). 
162 
Ashkenas et al. (2001) view acquisition integration as much art as science. While 
their model recommends a particular sequence, there are aspects of every acquisition 
integration process that are new or unique. Managers will have to improvise as they 
do in any major organisational transformation. 
Decisions about management structures key roles reporting relationships, 
layoffs, responsibilities and other career-affecting aspects of the integration 
should be made, announced and implemented as soon as possible after the 
deal is signed, within days if possible. Creeping changes, uncertainty and 
anxiety that last for months are debilitating and immediately start to drain 
value from an acquisition (Ashkenas et al. 200 I: 165). 
The acquirer should act in a straightforward and truthful manner. "Never tell the 
acquired staff that it will be business as usual" (Ashkenas et al. 2001: 169). A 
successful integration melds not only the various technical aspects of the business, 
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but the different cultures as well. The best way to do this is to get people working 
together quickly to solve business problems and accomplish results that could not 
have been achieved before. And finally, communicate, communicate, communicate 
and then communicate some more. 
The authors conclude that there are four lessons to be learned and applied in post-
acquisition integration. Firstly, begin the integration process before the deal is signed. 
Secondly, dedicate a full- time individual to managing the integration process. 
Thirdly, implement any necessary restructuring sooner rather than later and finally, 
integrate not only the business operations, but also the corporate cultures. 
Carey's Lessons from Master Acquirers (2001) discussed in the previous section on 
mergers and acquisitions is followed by applying it to the post-acquisition phase. Jan 
Leschley of SmithKlineBeecham believes that even if the rationale for a deal is 
terrific, it can still fall apart because of cultural differences. Merging US and 
European companies, as his · company did recently, is a particularly complicated 
process. The management styles of the two continents are totally different according 
to Leschley. Nicholas Moore, of PricewaterhouseCoopers, adds to these comments by 
stressing that cultural differences are not just a matter of geography; different 
companies can have very different attitudes and ways of working. 
Ed Liddy (Allstate) maintains that one does not always have to have a higher degree 
of cultural integration. In the end, what one does with an acquisition depends on the 
channels and the products the acquirer, and the acquired company are in. Raj Gupta 
of Rohm & Haas proposes that once the deal closes, first settle the uncertainty of 
who ' s going to report to whom and who 's responsible for what. Liddy continues that 
one should try to have the management structure completely laid out when an 
acquisition is announced. The work of integration really needs to start when the 
acquisition is being planned because it is tied up with the reason that the company is 
being acquired. He stresses how crucial communications are at this stage. According 
to Tig Krekel of Hughes Space and Communications, people in companies that have 
been acquired become extremely sensitive to every detail. Constant communication 
is needed to avoid paralysis and maintain morale. Another flashpoint is the customer. 
In the drive to complete a deal , it is easy to lose sight of the concerns of customers. 
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A very interesting statistic I once read says that people are normally 
productive for about 5.7 hours in an eight-hour business day. But any time a 
change of control takes place, their productivity falls to less than an hour ... 
inevitably, people immediately start thinking about themselves. So moving 
fast and getting the right people in place are extremely important. (Dennis 
Kozlowski, 2000, Tyco International, cited by Carey 2001: 17). 
3.9.2 Summary 
The five works reviewed are summarised in Figure 3.22. 
Figure 3.22 Literature Review Summary: Post Merger and Acquisition 
Integration 
1. Lajoux (1998) Definitioll. International complications - law, 
accounting, culture, language, technology. Post-merger integration 
leading reason for failure . Communicate. 
2. Pritchett,Robinson and Clarkson (1997) "Coaching" list (limit 
promises, keep promises, reporting relationships and structure). 
Communicate. 
3. Numerof and Abrams (1998) Four measures - goals, project 
management, sponsorship / membership, communication. 
4. Ashkenas, Demonarco and Francis (2001) GE Capital examples. 
Begin before signature, full-time person, restructuring sooner rather 
than later, integrate cultures and operations. Communicate. 
5. Carey (2001) Practical examples, culture, reporting relationships, 
speed. Communicate. 
3.9.3 Conclusion 
Several studies cite post-merger integration as the leading reason for the failure of 
acquisitions. The process of post-merger integration in international business faces 
problems with differences in language, law, accounting, technology and culture. 
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Cogent advice for the management of an acquiring firm includes the following: make 
few promises and keep your promises, do not promise things will remain the same in 
either company, provide more communication than usual during and after the 
merger/event, establish clear, well-defined, reporting relationships and lines of 
authority and either embrace the people and integrate them or terminate their services 
and get them out as quickly as possible. 
Four lessons recommended for successful integration are: begin the integration 
process before signature, dedicate a full-time individual to manage the integration 
process, implement any necessary restructuring sooner rather than later and integrate 
not only the business operations, but also the corporate cultures. 
Advice from master acquirers of our age covers the following examples: even if the 
rationale for a deal is terrific, it can still fall apart because of cultural differences; 
cultural differences are not just a matter of geography, different companies can have 
very different attitudes and ways of working; the first thing that should be done once 
the deal closes is to settle the uncertainty of who is going to report to whom and who 
is responsible for what. Moving fast and getting the right people in place are 
extremely important. 
While the works reviewed in this section provide a wide scope of advice to acquiring 
companies, they all have in common the importance of culture, the need for 
communication; and resolving the management structure as soon as possible. 
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3.10 The Transfer of Core Competencies 
The success of a company's international expansion is partly determined by its ability 
to transfer its core competencies to its foreign operations from both its head office and 
other global operations. This section examines the various models relating to the 
transfer of knowledge, operational practices and core competencies, the factors 
affecting the success of transfer, and (most important), the methods used to transfer 
core competencies, the problems and obstacles encountered in transfer and the 
requirements for effective implementation. 
The key models are those ofSzulanski (1996, 2000), Kogut and Zander (1993,1995) 
and Kostova (1999). The factors affecting the success of transfer are covered by 
Minbaeva, Pedersen, Bjoerkrnan, Fey and Park (2001), Petersen and Pedersen (2001) 
and Luo (2000), in addition to what is discussed in the models. The work of Luo 
(2000) is especially important in this regard. The methods of transfer are discussed 
by Hamel and Prahalad (1996), Hilt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003), Thompson and 
Strickland (2001), Porter (1996), and six other contributors. The problems and 
obstacles encountered are examined by certain of the aforementioned authors. 
Bossidy and Charan (2002) and Pietersen (2002) address the question of 
implementation. 
3.10.1 Review 
The vanous works by Szulanski (1996, 2000) present models of the transfer of 
knowledge, describe the difficulties experienced In transfer and make 
recommendations for dealing with them. Szulanski's (1996) studies show the major 
barriers to internal knowledge transfer to be related factors, such as the recipient's 
lack of absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity and an arduous relationship between the 
source and the recipient. These results contrast with conventional wisdom, which 
attributes stickiness, almost exclusively, to motivational factors. He quotes Porter's 
statement that "the mere hope that one business unit might learn something useful 
from another is frequently a hope not realised" (Porter 1985:353 cited by Szulanski, 
1996:28). 
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Szulanski (1996) uses the word transfer rather than diffosion to emphasise that the 
movement of koowledge within an organisation is a distinct experience, not a gradual 
process of dissemination, and depends on the characteristics of everyone involved. 
The transfer process is divided into four sections: initiation, implementation, ramp up 
and integration. He suggests that the problems encountered as the transfer unfolds will 
vary according to the stage of the transfer. This is discussed later in his 2000 study. 
Four sets of factors are likely to influence the difficulty of koowledge transfer 
(Szulanski 1996). These are the characteristics of the koowledge transferred, of the 
source, ofthe recipient and of the context in which the transfer takes place. 
Knowledge with a proven record of past usefulness is less difficult to transfer. A lack 
of motivation and perceived reliability of the source is likely to influence the 
behaviour of a recipient adversely. The lack of motivation of some recipients to 
accept koowledge from the outside is koown as the "not invented here" or Nlli 
syndrome. A source of koowledge may be reluctant to share crucial koowledge for 
fear of losing ownership, position of privilege or superiority. They may resent not 
being adequately rewarded for sharing hard-won success. 
The recipient may also lack absorptive or retentive capacity (Szulanski 1996). 
Lacking absorptive capacity means that recipients might be unable to exploit outside 
sources of koowledge. The ability of recipient to institutionalise the utilisation of new 
koowledge reflects its "retentive capacity". In the absence of such ability, initial 
difficulties during the integration of received koowledge may become an excuse for 
discontinuing its use and, when feasible, reverting to the previous status quo 
(Zaltrnan, Duncan and Holbeck 1973, cited by Szulanski 1996). An organisational 
context that facilitates the development of transfers is said to be fertile while a context 
that hinders the gestation and evolution of transfers is said to be barren. 
According to Szulanski (1996), when best practices do not transfer, a gap develops 
between what is koown within the organisation and what is actually put to use. The 
findings of his research suggest that this is not so much because organisations do not 
want to learn and transfer what they koow, but rather because they do not koow how 
to do so. 
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Szulanski (2000) goes into more detail in a later work by examining the different 
stages of transfer. The transfer of knowledge is a process in which an organisation 
recreates and maintains a complex set of routines in a new setting. Stickiness 
connotes difficulties experienced in that process. A distinction is usually made 
between the initiation and implementation of a transfer. Within the implementation 
phase, further distinctions are often made among: a) the initial implementation effort; 
b) the ramp-up to satisfactory performance and c) subsequent follow-through: an 
evaluation of the efforts to integrate the practice with other practices of the recipients. 
Initiation stickiness is the difficulty in recognising opportunities to transfer and acting 
upon them. The implementation stage may depend on how challenging it is to bridge 
the communications gap between the source and the recipient and to fill the 
recipient's technical gap. Bridging the communications gap may require solving 
problems caused by incompatibilities of language, coding schemes and cultural 
conventions. Ramp-up stickiness depends on the number and seriousness of 
unexpected problems and the efforts required to solve them. Unexpected problems 
are easier to solve when cause/effect relationships for the new practice are understood 
and when it is possible to forecast and explain results . The absorptive capacity of the 
recipient (i .e. the ability to utilise new knowledge) depends on the existing stock of 
knowledge and skills (Szulanski 2000). 
Szulanski (2000) suggests that organisations can leam to transfer knowledge by 
making the transfers less "eventful". An organisation equipped with effective 
routines to handle all aspects of a transfer is unlikely to consider that transfer sticky. 
The organisation should learn to cope with stickiness by drawing on the lessons of 
prior knowledge transfer. Szulanski's model offers the possibility of leaming to 
manage organisational learning, that is, to plan knowledge transfers more effectively 
and to "un-stick" sticky transfers. Szulanski (1996) questions using incentive systems 
alone to mitigate internal stickiness. His findings suggest that it might be profitable 
rather to devote scarce resources and managerial attention to develop the learning 
capacities of organisational units, foster closer relationships between units and 
systematically understand and communicate practices. 
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One of the most prevalent and effective practical manifestations of organisational 
learning is the so-called transfer of knowledge and best practices within the firm 
(O'Dell, Grayson and Essaides 1998, cited by Szulanski 2000). Upon discovering 
differences in the performance of similar units, firms multiply efforts to leverage 
existing knowledge through transfers of best practice. 
Kogut and Zander (1993) regard firms as social communities that specialise in the 
creation and internal transfer of knowledge. Their research clearly indicates that the 
costs of transfer are related to the accumulation of experience in learning. They 
conclude that technology transfer lies at the heart of the issue of the growth of firms, 
domestically and internationally. Firms grow on their ability to create new 
knowledge, to replicate this knowledge and so expand their markets. 
In a later work, Zander and Kogut (1995) point out that the capabilities of a firm, or 
any organisation, lie primarily in the organising principles by which individual and 
functional expertise is structured coordinated and communicated. They note that the 
characteristics of social knowledge influence the time taken to transfer major product 
and process innovations. Zander and Kogut use five central constructs to characterise 
a firm's knowledge at the levels of individual competence and group and 
organisational capabilities. These are: codifiability, teachability, complexity, system 
dependence and product observability. These constructs are ways to measure the 
degree to which a capability can be communicated and understood. 
Codifiability is the degree to which knowledge can be encoded while system 
dependence is the extent to which a capability is dependent on many different 
experienced people for its implementation. Capability transfer often requires the 
sending of engineers and workers from the originating plant to help the "building up" 
of know-how in an associated plant. Zander and Kogut (1995) understand capability 
transfer and imitation as diffusion processes determined by a common, though not 
exclusive, set of factors. They demonstrate that the degree of codification, and how 
easily capabilities are taught, has a significant influence on the speed of transfer. 
Kostova (1999) defines strategic organisational practices as those practices considered 
to be dominant, critical or crucial for achieving the strategic mission of the firm. 
170 
These are held to reflect the core competencies of the firm and to provide a distinct 
source of competitive advantage that differentiates the firm from its competitors. The 
focus of her model is on the transfer by a parent company to a foreign subsidiary of 
the same company, but she believes that the underlying ideas of her model are general 
enough to accommodate transfers in various directions within the MNC (foreign 
subsidiary to parent company, one subsidiary to another). She suggests that the 
process of transfer has two aspects: the diffusions of a set of rules and the 
transmission, or creation, of an "infused-with-value" meaning of these rules among 
the employees of the recipient unit. 
According to Kostova (1999), three sets of factors (social, organisational and 
relational), at three levels (country, organisational and individual), affect transfer 
success. The social context refers to institutional distance between home and 
recipient and covers regulatory cognitive and normative factors. The organisational 
context refers to the organisational culture of the recipient unit and encompasses 
favourability for learning and change and compatibility with existing practices. The 
relationship context covers the attitudes of the transfer coalition (commitment to 
parent, identification with parent, trust in parent), and dependence on the parent 
company. 
The success of transfer is defined as the degree of institutionalisation of the practice at 
the recipient unit. Institutionalisation is the process by which a practice achieves a 
taken-for-granted status in the recipient unit: "This is how we do things here." 
Institutionalisation has two levels: implementation and internalisation. 
Implementation is the degree to which the recipient unit follows the formal rules 
implied by the practice. Intemalisation is the state in which the employees at the 
recipient unit view the practice as valuable for the unit and become committed to the 
practice. Implementation and intemalisation, although theoretically distinct, are likely 
to be interrelated. This is illustrated in Figure 3.23. 
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Figure 3.23 Model of Success of the Transnational Transfer of 
Organizational Practices. 
Social context 
Institutional distance between 
home & recipient 
Regulatory 
• Cognitive 
• Normative 
Organizational context 
Organizational culture 
of the recipient unit 
• Favorability for learning & 
change 
• Compatibitity with practice 
Relational context 
Attitudes of transfer coalition 
• Commitment to parent 
Identity with parent 
Trust in parent 
Dependence on parent 
company 
Source: Adapted from Kostova (1999:2). 
Success of Transfer 
Implementation 
Of practice at recipient unit 
Internalization 
Of practice at recipient unit 
• Commitment to practice 
• Satisfaction with practice 
• Psychological ownership of 
practice 
Kostova (1999) uses the concept of country institutional profile, drawing on 
institutional theory. Institutional environments are characterised by regulatory, 
cognitive and normative factors. The regulatory component reflects the existing laws 
and rules in a particular national environment that promote certain types of behaviours 
and restrict others. The cognitive component reflects the cognitive categories widely 
shared by people in a particular country. Schemas, frames, inferential sets and 
representations affect the way people notice, categorise, and interpret stimuli from the 
environment. The normative component of an institutional environment focuses on 
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normative systems, values and norms held by the individuals in a given country. 
Institutional distance is the difference between the institutional profiles of the two 
countries: the home country of the practice, and the country of the recipient 
organisational unit. 
The success of transfer of a strategic organisational practice, from a parent company 
to a recipient unit, is concluded by Kostova (1999) to be: 
1. Negatively associated with institutional difference between the countries of 
the parent company and the recipient unit. 
2. Positively associated with the degree to which the unit's organisational culture 
is generally supportive ofieaming, change and innovation. 
3. Positively associated with the degree of compatibility between the values 
implied by the practice and the values underlying the unit's organisational 
culture. 
4. Positively associated with a) the commitment of the transfer coalition at the 
recipient unit to the parent company, b) the identity of the transfer coalition 
with the parent company, and c) the trust of the transfer coalition in the parent 
company. 
5. Positively associated with the implementation, but not the intemalisation, of 
the practice that is being transferred to that unit where the unit is perceived to 
be dependent on the parent company. 
It is therefore of strategic importance for multinational corporations to learn what 
factors might facilitate or impede the process of transfer. This is especially important 
for knowledge critical to the competitive advantage of the firm, such as the 
knowledge embodied in strategic organisational practices (Kostova 1999). 
In a further study, Kostova and Roth (2002) anticipate tension between the need for 
global integration and local adaptation. This gives rise to institutional duality, where 
foreign subsidiaries are confronted with two distinct sets of isomorphic pressures, and 
a need to maintain legitimacy with both the host country and the multinational 
corporations. 
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The results of the research by Kostova and Roth (2002) show that both 
implementation and internalisation vary across foreign subsidiaries, as a result of two 
factors : the institutional environment in the host country and the relationship context 
within the multinational corporation. Specific examples are: the relational context 
influences practice implementation. Units that perceive themselves to be more 
dependent on their parent reported lower levels of implementation. Identification and 
trust were positively associated with levels of implementation. The effects of host 
country institutional pressures on the level of internalisation were negatively affected 
by the regulatory profile and positively affected by the cognitive and normative 
profile. The authors suggest that what really matters for internalisation is having 
social knowledge about a practice, which helps people understand the practice too. 
Internationalisation is positively affected by the cognitive profile and negatively 
affected by the normative institutional profile. 
Kostova and Roth (2002) identifY four patterns of local adoption: active, minimal, 
ascent and ceremonial. Active adoption means implementing and believing in and 
recognising the value of a practice. Minimal adoption connotes relatively low levels 
of both implementation and internalisation while assent pattern has belief in the value 
of the practice yet a low level of implementation. The ceremonial is characterised by 
a relatively high level of implementation and a low level of internalisation. They 
conclude that there appear to be substantial challenges in general to the diffusion of a 
practice perceived at a corporate head office to be technically efficient. Only a small 
portion of the foreign subsidiaries of the multinational corporations in the sample 
reported high levels of both implementation and internalisation. 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) examine the Cohen and Levinthal model of the theory of 
absorptive capacity. Their research results show that interorganisational learning is 
positively related to the similarity of basic knowledge, lower management 
formalisation, research centralisation, compensation policies and research 
communities. 
Research by Minbaeva, Pedersen, Bjoerianan, Fey and Park (2001) supports the 
argument that the absorptive capacity of the subsidiary facilitates transfer of 
knowledge from the other parts of the multinational corporation. The larger the 
,-
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absorptive capacity the more effective the transfer of knowledge. The results 
indicated that ability is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of absorptive 
capacity. It needs to be combined with employee motivation in order to effect the 
reception of knowledge from other parts of the multinational corporation. 
Petersen and Pedersen (2001) contend that entrant firms familiarise themselves with 
foreign markets at different paces. To some extent, these differences are due to the 
varying management control of the entrant firms. Their study emphasises managerial 
discretion as a potentially important factor, whereas (they say) the general approach to 
the liability of foreignness issue is somewhat deterministic. A large number of entrant 
firms seem to master a rapid reduction of liability of foreignness , possibly by 
engagement in learning prior to the market entry. The research suggests that the 
liability of foreignness and the associated costs of doing business abroad will decline 
over a period of time for the majority of the firms in their sample. 
Luo (2000) contends that dynamic capabilities require a strong base of established 
capabilities or resources (capability possession), as well as the ability to efficiently 
deploy these resources (capability deployment), and to continuously create bundles of 
new resources and knowledge (capability upgrading) . Capability possession concerns 
a firm' s established distinctive resources, including critical assets, knowledge, or 
capabilities that are fum-specific, difficult to imitate, and able to generate economic 
returns and a competitive advantage. Capability deployment involves both quantity 
and quality-based resource commitment and allocation (Luo 2000). 
Transferability is the extent to which a parent firm is equipped with, or controls, 
distinctive capabilities that can be transferred to a foreign sub-unit, resulting in a 
competitive advantage. Although the transfer of critical capabilities can take place 
from one sub-unit to another, the movement from parent to foreign sub-unit is of the 
most practical relevance because a substantial part of critical capability is usually 
based in parent companies and located in home countries (Luo 2000). 
Luo (2000) continues that the degree to which the same critical capability contributes 
to a firm ' s competitive advantage is generally not homogenous across markets. 
Transferability is also heterogeneous among various capabilities. He holds that 
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transferability is also influenced by the nature of differences in industrial, 
macroeconomIC, socio-cultural, and regulatory-political environments between 
markets and is also influenced by the nature of distinctive resources and capabilities. 
Capability transfer must consider what can create a competitive edge in a host market 
and also consider the reconfiguration of transferred and locally developed capabilities. 
The alignment with entry mode selection (examples: export, licensing, franchising, 
joint venture, wholly owned subsidiary) must be considered when transferring 
capabilities. 
According to Luo (2000), technological capabilities are more transferable than 
organizational capabilities and financial capabilities are more transferable than 
operational capabilities. He postulates that global experience and reputation are more 
transferable than home-country-based experience and reputation. By the same token, 
global distribution and marketing skills are more transferable than home-country-
based distribution and marketing skills. Relationship-building (with suppliers, buyers 
and governments) expertise is more transferable than market-power-based 
capabilities. 
Luo (2000) envisages human resource practices facilitating knowledge sharing and 
utilisation. Transferability can be improved by a global compensation system, 
transferring managers globally and global training systems for example, "centre of 
excellence" (Ernst and Young). A global company culture, as opposed to regional or 
local cultures, may also playa fundamental role in the transfer of critical capabilities. 
Hamel and Prahalad (1996) point out that leveraging a core competency across 
multiple businesses and into new markets often requires redeploying that competency 
internally from one division or strategic business unit to another. Some companies 
are better at this than others, and hence get more effective use of their competencies. 
The mobility of competencies is facilitated when employees, who provide a particular 
competency, meet frequently to exchange ideas and experience (Hamel and Prahalad 
1996). Seminars and conferences are important for instilling a sense of community 
among people working in the same competency. Geographic proximity can also aid 
competency mobility. Where a competency is spread across facilities , in a dozen 
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countries or more, collective learning and the reallocation of individuals to new 
products can become difficult. A company should avoid unnecessary fragmentation 
of its core competencies. 
Corporate core competencies are complex sets of resources and capabilities that link 
different businesses, primarily through managerial and technological knowledge, 
experience and expertise (Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 2003). Related firms often 
transfer competencies across businesses, thereby creating value by eliminating the 
need for the second unit to allocate resources to develop the competence and/or 
through corporate relatedness by resource intangibility. Intangible resources are 
difficult for competitors to understand and imitate. The transfer of competencies can 
be facilitated by moving key people into new management positions. Some managers 
of business units may be reluctant to transfer key people who have accumulated 
knowledge and experience crucial to the unit's success. 
In terms of implementing strategies and best practices (and hence sometimes core 
competencies), Thompson and Strickland (2003) state that corporations must be 
willing to shift resources from one area to another to support new initiatives and 
priorities. They suggest that each department and unit should benchmark a value 
chain as to how it performs specific tasks and activities against best-in-industry or 
best-in-world performers. They also believe that the use of incentives and rewards is 
the single most powerful tool management has to win strong employee commitment 
to diligent, competent execution. 
As seen in previous sections, Porter (1998) does not use the term core competencies 
as such. He does, however, address transferring skills as a concept of corporate 
strategy. He lists strategic prerequisites for transferring skills as proprietary skills in 
activities important to competitive advantage in target industries, ability to 
accomplish the transfer of skills among units on an ongoing basis and acquisitions of 
beachhead positions in new industries as a base. Organizational prerequisites for 
transferring skills are the existence of largely autonomous but collaborative business 
units, high-level corporate staff members who see their role primarily as integrators 
and cross-business-unit committees, task forces, and other forms of organisation to 
serve as focal points for capturing and transferring skills. He advocates that the 
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objectives of line managers should include skills transfer and that incentives should be 
based in part on corporate results. 
Porter (1998) cautions against the pitfalls in transferring skills of mistaking similarity 
or comfort with new businesses as a sufficient basis for diversification, providing no 
practical way for skills transfer . to occur and ignoring the fact that an industry 
structure may not be attractive. He notes that transferring skills leads to competitive 
advantage only if the similarities among businesses meet three conditions. Firstly, the 
activities involved in the business are similar enough that sharing expertise is 
meaningful. Broad similarities alone are not enough. Secondly, the transfer of skills 
involves activities important to competitive advantage. Transferring skills in 
peripheral activities may be beneficial but not effective at producing competitive 
advantage. Thirdly, the skills transferred represent a significant source of competitive 
advantage for the receiving unit. 
The transfer of skills is an active process that significantly changes the strategy or 
operations of the receiving unit. The prospect for change must be specific and 
identifiable. Almost guaranteeing that no shareholder value will be created, too 
many companies are satisfied with vague prospects or faint hopes that skills will 
transfer (Porter 1998:140). 
The transfer of skills does not happen by accident or by osmosis. Critical personnel 
will have to be re-assigned, perhaps even on a permanent basis, and the support and 
involvement of top management in skills transfer is essential. Many companies have 
failed at skills transfer because of the lack of incentive programmes (Porter 1998). 
Research by Bresman, Birkinshaw and Nobel (1999) shows that the transfer of 
technological knowledge is facilitated by communication, visits and meetings, and 
time elapsed since acquisition. They demonstrate that the immediate post-acquisition 
period is characterised by imposed one-way transfers of knowledge from the acquirer. 
Over time, this gives way to high-quality reciprocal knowledge transfer. 
People approaching best-practice replication are often overly optimistic and 
overconfident according to Szulanski and Winter (2002). Getting it right the second 
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time (and all the times after that) involves adjusting for overconfidence in one's own 
abilities and imposing strict discipline on the process and organisation. They 
recommend ensuring that you have got something that can be copied and is worth 
copying, work from a single template, copy the example exactly and make changes 
only after you achieve acceptable results. Best-practice replication, while less 
glamorous than innovation, contributes enormously to the bottom line of most 
companies (Szulanski and Winter 2002). "Placing too much trust in experts and 
documents is the first big mistake organisations can make when trying to replicate 
best practice. .. The second big mistake is when one forgets that one is trying to 
replicate a practice and instead, starts trying to improve it" (Szulanski and Winter 
2002:64). 
Sutton (2002) stresses that there is no knowledge advantage unless it leads to an 
action advantage. He proposes three overarching lessons from research into how 
organisations can go from theory to practice. Philosophy matters is the first lesson. 
Firms that consistently tum knowledge into action have concise, and widely followed, 
philosophies, or general beliefs, that are used to guide action across a range of 
situations. Know by doing, is the second lesson. If you know by doing, there is no 
gap between what you know and what you do. The third lesson is to forgive and 
remember failure. Forgiveness is crucial when people fail because it enables them to 
maintain their self-esteem and to continue as useful and respected members of the 
organisation. Remembering failure is also crucial so that the same mistakes are not 
repeated. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000:709) highlight issues relating to transferability: 
In a truly transnational company, overseas subsidiaries can be the source of 
capabilities, expertise and innovation that can be transferred to other parts of 
the organisation. Such an administrative ability to transfer new ideas and 
developments requires a considerable amount of management time and 
attention to break down the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome that often 
thrives in international business. In this process, those with worldwide 
functional responsibilities are ideally placed to play the central cross-
pollination role. Through informal contacts, formal evaluations, and frequent 
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travel, they can identify where the best practices are being developed and 
implemented. They can arrange cross-unit visits, and transfers, host 
conferences, form task forces, or take other initiatives that would expose 
others to the new ideas." 
Govindarajan and Gupta (2000) state that among the first issues a globalising 
company must address is how to transplant the core elements of its business model, its 
core practices, and its core beliefs to a new subsidiary. Obstacles to transferring the 
"corporate DNA" can emerge from employees, customers, regulations and so forth in 
the new location. The company therefore needs to develop clarity regarding what 
exactly its core "beliefs", practices and competencies are. 
In transplanting core beliefs and practices to a new subsidiary, Govindarajan and 
Gupta (2000) say that there is always a transformational event. They stress that it is 
highly likely that the transplanted beliefs and practices are, at best, partially 
understood and often seen as alien and questionable (especially in the case of an 
acquisition). Transferring core beliefs and practices to a new subsidiary almost 
always requires transferring a select group of committed believers (the "DNA 
carriers") to the new operation. The size of this group would depend largely on the 
scale of the desired transformation effort. 
The transplanting of the corporate DNA can be regarded as successful only when the 
new beliefs and practices have become internalised in the mind-sets and routines of 
employees at the new subsidiary (Govindarajan and Gupta 2000). This requires a 
visibly explicit and credible commitment by the parent company to its core beliefs 
and practices, deepening the process of education within the new organisation, and a 
concrete demonstration that the new beliefs and practices yield rewards and benefits. 
Research by Ghoshal, Korine and Szulanski (1994) shows that subsidiary autonomy 
has no discernible influence on inter-unit communication. Interpersonal relationships 
develop through lateral networking mechanisms, such as joint work in teams, task 
forces and meetings, and these have significant positive effects on the frequency of 
both subsidiary-headquarters and intersubsidiary communication. The authors 
recommend that management in multinational companies make the requisite 
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investment In inter-unit networking as this is a key source of the multinational 
corporation's ability to develop, share, and leverage knowledge. 
The final stage of Pietersen' s (2002) Strategic Learning Cycle, previously discussed 
in Section 3.5 is implementation and experimentation. He states that it is a misnomer 
to refer to the final step alone as "implementation". This is because the entire 
strategic learning process - learn, focus, align and execute - is a challenge of 
implementation. 
The difference between a company and its competitors is the ability to execute 
(Bossidy and Charan 2002). These authors see execution as a discipline and a system. 
It has to be built into a company' s strategy, its goals and its culture. They state that 
the single biggest difference between businesses that execute and those that do not is 
the rigour and intensity with which the leader prosecutes the processes of people, 
strategy and operations. Leaders need to master the individual processes and the way 
they work together as a whole. A leader's most important job is selecting and 
appraising people. 
Bossidy and Charan (2002) recommend clear specific targets, rewards linked to 
achievement of targets, and follow-up and follow-through, together with quarterly 
performance reviews, which should conclude with an agreement on what is to be 
done. There should be contingency plans, and the assumptions likely to be the most 
vulnerable should be checked thoroughJy. They conclude that companies should place 
a high premium on getting things done, winning and attracting the very best and most 
diverse talent. 
3.10.2 Summary 
This section is summarised in Figure 3.24. Nine of the 21 entries list methods used to 
transfer core competencies. All the contributors are considered important Kostova 
(199) , Luo (2000), Hamel and Prahalad (1996), Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002) and 
Govindarajan and Gupta (2000) especially so. 
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Figure 3.24 Literature Review Summary: The Transfer of Core Competencies 
1. Szulanski (1996) Stickiness, barriers. Characteristics ofIcnowledge, source, 
recipient, context. 
2. Szulanski (2000) Initiation, implementation, ramp-up and integration. 
3. Kogut and Zander (1993) Costs of transfer. Experience and learning. 
4. Zander and Kognt. (1995) Codifiability, teachability, complexity, system 
dependence and product observability. 
5. Kostova (1999) Three sets of factors (social, organisational and relational) at three 
levels (country, organisational and individual) affect transfer success. 
6. Kostova and Roth (2002) Institutional profile of host country and MNC relational 
context affects adoption. 
7. Minbaeva, Pedersen, Bjoerkman, Fey and Park (2001) Absorptive capacity of 
subsidiaries facilitates transfer. 
8. Petersen and Pedersen (2001) Firms familiarise with foreign conditions at different 
speeds . 
9. Luo (2000) Capability possession, deployment and upgrading. Transferability 
varies by country and capability. Transferability influenced by nature of distinctive 
resources and capabilities. HOW and WHAT of transfer. Technological capabilities 
> organisational capabilities. Financial > operational capabilities. 
10. Hamel and Prahalad (1996) Competence allocation process recommended. 
Mobility facilitates transfer. Geographic proximity, seminars, conferences all assist. 
11. Ritt, Ireland and Roskisson (2003) Move key people to facilitate transfer. 
12. Thompson and Strickland (2003) Shift resources. Value chain. Benchmarking. 
13. Porter (1996) Strategic and organizational prercquisites. Cmss-busincss-unit 
committces and task forces. Objcctives and incentivcs. Pitfalls. 
14. Bresman, Birkinshaw and Nobel (1991) Transfer facilitated by communication, 
visits and meetings, time. 
15. Szulanski and Winter (2002) Adjust for overconfidence. "Getting it right the second 
time", 
16. Sutton (2002) Forgive but remember failure. 
17. Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002) "Not invented here" . Informal contacts, frequent 
travel. 
18. GOVindarajan and Gupta (2000) Recommend clear communication on core beliefs, 
practices and competencies. "DNA carriers". 
19. Ghoshal, Korine and Szulanski (1994) Joint work in teams, task forces and 
meetings. 
20. Pietersen (2002) Implementation is a cycle of learn, focus, align, execute. 
21. Bossidy and Charan (2002) Leaders must understand and be competent in 
processes of people, strategy and operations. Seek best and diverse talent. 
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3.10.3 Conclusion 
"Stickiness" is the barrier to the transfer of knowledge. The transfer of knowledge is 
influenced by the characteristics of the knowledge, the source, the recipient and the 
context in which the transfer takes place. Experience and learning are critical 
elements. The success of transfer is influenced by codifiability, teachability, 
complexity, system dependence and product observability. 
There are three sets of factors, at three levels, that affect the success of transferring 
operational practices (which might or might not be core competencies). The factors 
are social, organisational and relational; while the three levels are country, 
organisational and individua1. The adoption of a practice is affected by the 
institutional profile of the host country and the multinational corporation relational 
context. 
The absorptive capacity of subsidiaries facilitates the transfer of knowledge. 
Companies should adjust for overconfidence when attempting to transfer management 
practices. Companies are counselled to forgive, but also to remember failure as part 
of the learning process. 
The potential for transferability varies by country and capability. Transferability is 
also influenced by the nature of the distinctive resources and capabilities. 
Technological capabilities are held to be generally more transferable than 
organisational capabilities, and financial capabilities more transferable than 
operational capabilities. 
Research shows that firms familiarise themselves with foreign conditions at different 
speeds. 
The methods used to transfer core competencies include: moving key players, "DNA" 
carriers, holding seminars and conferences, incorporating into objectives, shifting 
resources, value chains, benchmarking, rewards and incentives, visits, meetings, 
communication, informal contacts, travel, joint work in teams, task forces and 
meetings. 
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The difficulties companies confront in transferring core competencies include: the 
"not invented here", or Nlli, syndrome, recipients lacking absorptive or retentive 
capacity, language, culture, institutional duality, poor relationships and reluctance to 
transfer key people. The actions that can be taken to resolve the difficulties include 
effective routines to handle transfers, developing the learning capacities of 
organisational units, closer relationships between units, drawing on the lessons of 
prior transfers and ensuring that the prospects for change are specific and identifiable. 
Implementation is a cycle oflearn, focus, align and execute. Leaders must understand 
and be competent in the processes of people, strategy and operations if they are to 
implement successfully. Companies are counselled to seek the best and diverse talent. 
There is agam (as in the case of the development of core competencies) little 
indication of the relative effectiveness of the methods used to transfer core 
competencies and the context (for example value chain location) in which they would 
be most effective. For example, transferring a marketing core competency may 
require completely different methods from those of transferring an operational 
competency. 
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3.11 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this section is to integrate the results of the literature review into a 
workable framework or model for the thesis. The nine areas have each been 
summarised near the end of each subsection, before the conclusion, and are therefore 
not repeated here. The section revisits the conclusions reached in each of the areas, 
discusses the gaps and opportunities in the body of knowledge ascertained during the 
review and then sets out the theoretical framework or model to be followed in 
compiling the thesis. 
3.11.1 Conclusions 
The conclusions reached for each of the nine areas are summarised, or paraphrased, 
below. The conclusions relating to the three sections on core competencies -
Definition and Nature of Core Competencies, The Development of Core 
Competencies and The Transfer of Core Competencies - are more comprehensive 
than those of the other six sections. 
History and Overview of Strategy 
Strategy is an evolutionary discipline or practice with no universally accepted theory. 
Each of the persons listed in Table 1 made a meaningful contribution to strategic 
thinking andlor practice. The Strategic Paradigm in Figure 3.8 depicts the strategic 
process that most academics or companies follow to one extent or another. 
International Business 
International business is extremely complex. The complexity is probably best 
articulated by Ohmae (1991) as country and currency, and by Barlett and Ghoshal 
(2000) as the factors of sovereignty, distance, time, language and culture together 
with product and functional and geographical diversity. Culture is considered to be 
crucial. 
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A key advantage of the multinational corporation is its ability to create new value 
through the accumulation, transfer and integration of different kinds of knowledge, 
resources and competencies across its global units. Most companies move into global 
markets on the strength of competitive advantages based on capabilities and 
competencies in their home markets. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal 's (2000b) conclusion that companies from fringe economies can 
succeed in global business is noted, as are their views on the composition of global 
management teams. A mixture of language skills, international experience and 
nationalities is recommended for global teams. 
Culture and International Busilless 
The influence of culture on international business is extremely important. Although 
the authors reviewed have some differences on the particular influences of culture, 
there is no doubt that it is crucial and that one ignores cultural aspects at one's peril. 
National culture influences corporate culture, and there is no one best way of 
conducting international business. Multinational corporations face cultural 
adjustments costs, which can include double-layered acculturation, which is having to 
deal not only with the foreign culture but also with the corporate culture of an 
acquisition or joint venture in that country. Multinational corporations stand to gain 
more from foreign expansion if they judiciously take cultural diversity into 
consideration. 
Learnillg and Kllowledge Mallagement 
The accumulation of knowledge or learning is a continuous process that multinational 
companies can influence by control, motivation and context. The ability to absorb 
knowledge is path-or history-dependent. 
"If you can't measure it, you can't manage it" is said to be as true of learning as it is 
any other corporate objective. 
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Definition and Nature of Core Competencies 
Experts differ in their definition of core competencies, but they refer to a similar 
concept. The Hamel and Prahalad definition (1996) that core competencies are a 
bundle of skills and technologies that enable a company to provide a particular benefit 
to customers is the preferred definition for the thesis. Their three criteria are that a 
core competency must provide access to a wider variety of markets, be difficult to 
imitate and make a significant contribution to the perceived benefits of customers. 
Core competencies are aptitudes and skills rather than skills alone. All core 
competencies are sources of competitive advantage, but not all competitive 
advantages are core competencies. Every core competency is likely to be a critical 
success factor, but not every critical success factor will be a core competency. 
Experts differ on how many core competencies a company can build - varying from 
two to five - or even fifteen for a medium-size company. 
The ability to learn and the ability to change are likely to be among the most 
important capabilities that a firm can possess. Innovation is an essential core 
competency for any organisation. There is no recognised, rigorous discipline for 
identifying competencies. 
Development of Core Competencies 
Competitive advantages and core competencies are forged on a playing field of 
national competitiveness. Factor conditions, demand, related and supporting 
industries, firm strategy, structure and rivalry, chance and government all play key 
roles (Porter 1990). Economic geography and geopolitics are further key 
considerations. 
Learning is of fundamental importance to the development of core competencies. It 
takes years or even a decade or so to develop world-class competencies. Different 
and mUltiple methods are required to develop core competencies, including 
benchmarking, review meetings, product matrixes, value chains, internal analysis, 
concentration of effort and talent, exposure to demanding environments, corporate 
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culture, formal controls, acquisitions, travel, people and their development, cross-
functional teams and path dependency. 
There is little indication of the relative effectiveness of the different methods used to 
develop core competencies and the context (for example value chain location) in 
which they would be most effective. There is limited literature available on the 
practical problems and issues that companies confront in the development of core 
competencies. 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Despite compelling reasons to acqUire and merge, the majority of mergers and 
acquisitions are generally considered to be unsuccessful. Although "acquiring is 
faster than building", companies that diversify outside their core competencies are 
seldom very successful. The problems relating to mergers and acquisitions include 
integration difficulties, inadequate development of targets, inability to achieve 
synergy, management risks, conflicting corporate cultures and inadequate due 
diligence. 
Companies should have systems for identifying, screening and "closing" deals. It is 
crucial to have effective methods of valuing and pricing acquisitions, to conduct 
effective due diligence studies (which should include human resources), and to 
identify and realistically quantify synergistic opportunities. W ACC or other methods 
should be used as a discipline when calculating returns expected from acquisitions. 
Drucker (1986) proposes five rules for successful acquisitions, two of which are 
complex in today's globalisation environment. 
Post-Merger and Acquisition Integration 
Inadequate post-merger and acquisition integration is widely regarded as the major 
reason that most mergers and acquisitions are not successful. The recommended 
actions to improve the situation include: begin the integration process as soon as 
possible, dedicate individuals to it, institute well-defined reporting relationships and 
organisational structures as soon as possible, make few promises and keep them, do 
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not promise that things will remain the same in either company, pay particular 
attention to the different cultures and either embrace the people, and integrate them, 
or terminate them and get them out as soon as possible. Communication is crucial. 
The Transfer of Core Competencies 
The transfer of knowledge is influenced by the characteristics of the knowledge, the 
source, the recipient and the context in which the transfer takes place. Experience and 
learning are critical elements. The success of transfer is influenced by codifiability, 
teachability, complexity, system dependence and product observability. 
Social, organizational and relational factors affect the success of transferring 
operational practices (which might or might not be core competencies) at the levels of 
country, organization and individual. 
The potential for transferability varies by country and capability. Transferability is 
also influenced by the nature of the distinctive resources and capabilities. 
Technological capabilities are held to be generally more transferable than 
organisational capabilities, and financial capabilities are more transferable than 
operational capabilities. 
The methods used to transfer core competencies include: moving key players, "DNA 
carriers", holding seminars and conferences, shifting resources, value chains, 
benchmarking, rewards and incentives, visits, meetings, communication, informal 
contacts, travel, joint work in teams, task forces and meetings. 
The issues and problems confronted in transfer of core competencies include "not 
invented here" or NIH syndrome, recipients lacking absorptive or retentive capacity, 
language, culture, institutional duality, and reluctance to transfer key people. Transfer 
does not happen by accident or osmosis. The possible measures to resolve the 
difficulties include effective routines to handle transfers, developing the learning 
capabilities of organisational units, closer relationships between units, drawing on the 
lessons of prior transfers and ensuring that the prospects for change are specific and 
identifiable. 
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There is little indication of the relative effectiveness of the methods used to transfer 
core competencies and the context in which they would be most effective. 
3.11.2 Gaps and Opportunities 
The review of the literature revealed the following major "gaps", or opportunities for 
improving the body of knowledge relating to the development and transfer of core 
competencies: 
1. There is little indication of the relative effectiveness of the different methods 
used to develop and transfer core competencies and the context (for example 
value chain location) in which they would be most effective. 
Mascarenhas, Baveja and J ami I (1998) cover three types of competence and 
the methods to develop them. Luo (2000) uses four categories of competence 
but does not investigate the different methods that could be used to develop 
and transfer each of the categories. His findings are not based on empirical 
research. 
The basic value chain has mne different locations of activities. There is 
therefore an opportunity to evaluate different methods and relate these to 
different activities in the value chain. This will open up a new perspective. 
Companies will have better chances of success in both the development and 
transfer of core competencies once they become aware of the likely 
effectiveness of the various methods of development and transfer by value 
chain location. 
2. While the various models in the literature covered the process and concept of 
development and transfer, there is nevertheless an opportunity to contribute to 
the general body of knowledge by examining the practical problem and issues 
confronted by the four companies during the development (especially) and 
transfer of core competencies. What, for example, are these problems and 
how are they resolved? How do the companies assess or measure the success 
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of transfer? And how do the companies believe that pitfalls can be avoided 
and transfer improved? 
3. South Africa-originated multinational companies are relatively new to the 
global business arena. There is consequently a further opportunity to examine 
and report on the reasons for their success (or lack of it). 
4. The lessons learned by the compames In "going global" can be used to 
formulate guidelines for other companies contemplating or implementing 
international expansion. 
3.11.3 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework, derived from the literature review, is shown in Figure 1.1 
in the Introduction. The literature review is used both for the research questions and 
for determining the structure of the thesis. While core competencies are at the centre 
of the thesis, the influence of other factors upon them is considered. The framework 
and the nine separate area summaries and conclusions are used to analyse and review 
findings in the final five chapters. 
Having reviewed the relevant literature and constructed a theoretical framework to 
guide the writing of the thesis, we may now examine the methodology used in 
conducting the research study. 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter begins with a discussion of different paradigms and the methods used in 
the research. It then describes the concepts and key topics covered in the thesis. 
Criteria are set out for the selection of the multinational corporations to be studied. 
Profiles of the corporations in question are shown. 
A section on data gathering describes the methods used to collect data. A further 
section on data analysis describes how data were analysed, how questionnaires were 
reviewed and checked, and the statistical methods used. Subsequent sections deal with 
the issues of quality and ethics. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the 
limitations of the research project. 
The primary works consulted for this chapter were Mouton (2001) How to Succeed in 
Your Masler's & Doctoral Studies, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) Research 
Methods for Business Students and Yin (2000) Case Study Research. Other references 
were Cantrell (1993), Guba and Lincoln (1994), Moore (2000), Rhodes University 
Environmental Education Unit (2001), Siegel (1956), Stake (2003), Winegardner 
(2002) and Zehna and Weiss (2002). 
4.2 Paradigm 
Guba and Lincoln (1994:105) define a paradigm as the basic belief system or 
worldview that guides the investigator not only III choices of method but III 
ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways. It represents a worldview that 
defines for its holder the nature of "the world", the individual 's place in it and the 
range of possible relationships to that world and its parts, as for example, cosmologies 
and theologies do. Guba and Lincoln (1994) believe that questions of method are 
secondary to questions of paradigm. They state that both quantitative and qualitative 
methods may therefore be used appropriately with any research paradigm. 
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The four paradigms analysed by Guba and Lincoln (1994) are positivism, post-
positivism, critical theory and related ideological positions, and constructivism. Table 
4.1 outlines the basic ontology, epistemology, methodology and knowledge interests 
of each. 
Table 4.1 Research Paradigms 
POSITIVISM 
Onlology - Stable 
external reality; 
law-like 
Epistemology -
Objective, detached 
observer 
Methodology -
Experimental , 
quantitative, hypothesis 
testing, analytical 
Knowledge interest -
Technical 
POST·POSITIVISM INT 
Ontology - Stable 
external reality; law-like; 
but can only be 
approximated 
Epistemology -
Observers are subjective 
but need to strive for 
objectivity and to control 
their bias 
Methodology· 
Descriptive, interpretive, 
both quantitative and 
qualitative 
Knowledge interest -
Technical or practical 
Source: Janse van Reneburg (2001:12-19). 
INTERPRETIVISM CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Ontology -Internal Ontology - Socially 
reality of personal, constructed reality; 
subjective experience discourse 
Epistemology - Epistemology-
Empathic, observer Suspicious, political, 
intersubjectivity observer constructing 
versions 
Methodology - Methodology - Often 
Interactional. deconstruction, textual 
interpretive, analysis. discourse 
qualitative analysis 
Knowledge interest - Knowledge interest -
Practical Politlcallemancipatory 
troubling given 
understandings 
Returning to Guba and Lincoln (1994), the ontology of post-positivism is viewed as 
critical realism. Reality is assumed to exist but to be only imperfectly apprehensible 
because of basically human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable 
nature of phenomena. It is possible to approximate but never to fully know real ity. 
The epistemology IS classified as modified dualist/objectivist. Objectivity is a 
"regulatory ideal" with special emphasis placed on "external guardians" of 
objectivity, such as critical traditions. The appropriate criteria for judging the 
goodness or quality of a post-positivism enquiry are the conventional benchmarks of 
"rigour", internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity. Tests are 
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whether findings "fit" with pre-existing knowledge and the critical community, such 
as editors, referees and professional peers. The post-positivism methodology is 
modified experimentaV manipulative. Emphasis is placed on "critical multi pi ism", a 
refurbished version of triangulation. 
My study relates to post-positivism as it meets the criteria in Table 4.1. Reality can 
only be approximated. I am a subjective observer striving for objectivity and 
attempting to control my biases. I describe and interpret the events at four 
multinational corporations, using both qualitative and quantitative data. By default, 
the other three paradigms on the table do not match my research, although there may 
be small areas that overlap. 
According to Winegardner (2002), the development of a case study begins with the 
establishment of a theoretical framework and the set of questions to be answered by 
the research. The way the questions are framed and what they seek to know are 
influenced by the epistemological orientation of the researcher, how he or she sees the 
world and the acquisition of knowledge. This is in part a reflection of the researcher's 
professional discipline and review of its body of literature. For example, a study of 
organisational behaviour could be devised from the perspective of a cultural 
anthropologist, a behavioural psychologist, an information scientist, an economist and 
so on. 
I am endeavouring to bring the perspective of a general manager or CEO, combined 
with that of a teacher, to the thesis. There are similarities between the roles of CEOs 
and teachers (Harvey 2005). As a CEO I should know which core competencies to 
develop and transfer and how best to do so - in other words, find the most effective 
methods available for the different core competencies. I should also be interested in 
the conditions pertaining to these, the obstacles involved and how to improve the 
development and transfer of core competencies. The lessons learned by South 
African companies in going global and the reasons for their successes and mishaps are 
other important aspects I should wish to understand. As a teacher my interest would 
be in what contributions I could make to the existing body of knowledge and how I 
could impart these to students and practitioners. This discussion raises the questions 
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of my own partiality and objectivity and I shall describe my relationships with the 
four corporations covered by the thesis . 
I was employed by The South African Breweries (the forerunner of SABMiIler) from 
1966 to 1978 and by Wolverine World Wide from 1979 to 1986. I consequently have 
some knowledge of these companies and operating experience of both the beer and 
footwear industries. My responsibilities at The South African Breweries at one time 
included Zambia Breweries (Harvey 1993a) and at Wolverine World Wide, the 
International Division, which included subsidiaries in several countries and licensees 
in over sixty. The terms used at the time were "expertise", "skills" and "knowledge" 
but core competencies were certainly developed and transferred at both those entities. 
I also have direct operating expenence m the earthmoving-equipment industry 
(Barloworld's Caterpillar was its largest division in 2002) through responsibility for 
the Komatsu business in Southern Africa from 1990 to 1995. Komatsu is a 
competitor of Caterpillar. I have no direct operating experience in the paper and pulp 
industry in which Sappi operates but do have indirect knowledge through serving on 
the Anglo American Industrial Corporation Board when that company controlled 
Mondi, a major competitor of Sap pi 's. 
I know the CEOs of Barloworld, SABMiller and Wolverine World Wide as well as 
several executives at each of those companies. My friends include retirees from both 
SABMiIler and Wolverine World Wide. My daughter is employed by Wolverine 
World Wide. I manage a portion of my retirement fund portfolio and have shares in 
all four companies. 
SABMiller is the largest of the four comparnes studied and, being listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, together with the nature of its product, is more visible and 
receives more media coverage than the other South African companies. This 
company, as will be seen later, also volunteered more access to staff. Wolverine 
World Wide is the smallest of the four companies but because it is located in the 
United States there is a vast variety of information and data available on it. 
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While I have made every effort to remam impartial and objective, the possibility 
exists that my knowledge and background could result in some unconscious bias. A 
recognition that there may be a bias is at least a "start" in dealing with the situation. I 
measured and assessed the performances of the different companies and compared 
their performances with competitors and stock market indices to facilitate objectivity. 
I also employed the method of triangulation by examining other sources of 
information. 
4.3 Methods 
There are several ways of doing social science research. These are case studies, 
experiments, surveys, histories and the analysis of archival information (Yin 2003). 
Table 4.2 lists the five strategies and, for each, the form of research question, whether 
control of behavioural events is required and whether focus is on contemporary 
events. 
Table 4.2 Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
STRATEGY FORM OF RESEARCH REQUIRES CONTROL 
QUESTION OF BEHAVIORAL EVENTS 
Experiment How, why? Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, No 
how many, 
how much? 
Archival Who, what, where No 
analysis how many, 
how much? 
History How, why? No 
Case study How, why? No 
Source: Yin (2003:5). 
FOCUSES ON 
CONTEMPORARY 
EVENTS 
Yes 
Yes 
YeslNo 
No 
Yes 
Referring back to the questions raised or aims of the thesis in the Introduction, "how" 
and "why" are the most prevalent among these, although there are some "what", 
"where", "how many" and "how much". The most suitable methods for the research 
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are therefore deemed to be a case study together with a survey (or a survey within a 
case study). The histories of South Africa and the four companies are also covered 
and there is limited archival analysis. 
Yin (2003:13) defines a case study as "an empirical enqUiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". Case study data collection 
is typically multifaceted and usually involves interviewing, observing and analysing 
documents. Multiple sources of information are normally sought and used because no 
single source of information should be regarded as providing a comprehensive 
perspective (Yin 2003). 
Winegardner (2002) states that case studies can be categorised by the epistemology of 
the researcher and research framework. The case study method can be applied to 
interpretive, post-positivist, positivist and critical approaches to research. The case 
study has an especially strong tradition in anthropology, sociology, education, 
psychology, history and management science (Merriam 1998, cited by Winegardner 
2002). Its unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence -
documents, artefacts, interviews and observations - beyond what might be available 
in a conventional history study (Yin 2003). 
Case studies can be classified by purpose - description, explanation, evaluation and 
exploration (Gall, Borg and Gall 1966, cited by Winegardner 2002). When the 
purpose is descriptive, the researcher looks for constructs to organise the data and 
relate it to other research findings and for themes which identify the salient features of 
a case. 
In an explanatory case study, the operative dynamic is identification of patterns, in 
which one type of observed variation is systematically related to another type. If 
causality is claimed, the pattern is termed causal if not, it is termed relational. 
Evaluation is an umbrella term for various types of case study in which the researcher 
makes judgements. Exploratory research endeavours to find out what is happening, 
seeks new insights, asks questions, and assesses phenomena in a new light. It 
consequently normally focuses on current events and concerns and seeks to answer 
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questions of how and why. A particular application of the exploratory case study is as 
a diagnostic tool to develop a range of objective possibilities that could occur. Some 
researchers see significant value in the ability of case studies to suggest a range of 
possibilities for a future which cannot be assumed to be a projection of the past 
(Robson 1993, cited by Winegardner 2002). Aspects of all four types of case study 
are present in the thesis with exploratory research being predominant. 
Yin (2003) prefers multiple cases over single cases as this improves the chances of 
doing a good case study and, more important, the analytic benefits from having two or 
more cases may be substantial. There is the possibility of direct replication even 
though the contexts of the different cases are likely to differ to some extent. If 
common conclusions can be arrived at under the varied circumstances, the external 
generalisability will expand. I found that there were methods of developing and 
transferring core competencies that the companies agreed on despite having different 
histories and being in different industries. 
4.4 Conceptualisation 
Stake (2003) envisages six major conceptual responsibilities of the qualitative case 
researcher. These are bounding the case, conceptual ising the object of study; 
selecting phenomena, themes or issues - that is, the research questions - to 
emphasise; seeking patterns of data to develop the issues; triangulating key 
observations and bases for interpretation; selecting alternative interpretations to 
pursue and developing assertions or generalisations about the case. 
The case is "bounded" by focusing the thesis on four companies and supporting this 
by references to several other companies and executives. The aims and objectives of 
the thesis are: 
1. To advance the general body of knowledge relating to the development 
and transfer of core competencies. 
2. To have practical applicability for both management practitioners and 
academics. 
3. To explain how three corporations, originating in South Africa, with 
limited international experience, became global leaders in their fields 
within a decade. 
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4. To examine the lessons learned by the corporations and glean advice from 
these for other corporations contemplating or implementing international 
expansIOns. 
The purpose of the thesis is to explore the methods used for developing and 
transferring core competencies in the context of international business. The core 
competencies are related back to the value chain activities underlying them so that 
development and transfer can be described under different conditions. The problems 
and issues confronted during development and transfer, how success of transfer can 
be assessed and measured, how pitfalls can be avoided and transfer improved are all 
considerations. 
The key concepts and topics of interests are: core competencies, value chain activities, 
methods for developing core competencies, methods for transferring core 
competencies and the degrees of success in transferring core competencies. National 
and organisational culture are important influences on these concepts. 
4.5 Selection of Multinational Corporations 
Convenience, access and geographic proximity can be the main criteria for selecting 
cases according to Yin (2003). The agreement of the chosen three South African 
corporations and a US multinational to participate in the research was obviously vital. 
I added another five criteria for the selection of the three South African multinational 
corporations studied in the thesis. 
The first criterion was contained in the definition that a multinational corporation has 
substantial direct investment in foreign countries and actively manages those 
operations and regards them as integral parts of the company, both strategically and 
organisationally (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000:2). 
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The second criterion was that at least 50 percent of sales and profits should be derived 
from outside the country of origin. Thirdly, companies should also be well 
established, substantial in size, with information relatively freely available, that is, 
publicly listed. Fourthly, companies should be successful in that their performance 
must be clearly superior to that of most oftheir peer groups. 
Fifthly, companies in the mining, information and technology and finance sectors 
were excluded from consideration because their core competencies and value chains 
differ significantly from industrial and consumer product companies with which I am 
familiar. Richemont, a luxury-goods company listed in both South Africa and 
Switzerland, was not considered as one of the three South African companies, because 
it was created out of the Rupert family ' s European tobacco interests and the Ruperts 
had no similar luxury goods businesses in South Africa at the time of formation. 
Table 4.3 illustrates the leading South African companies in 2002, at the time the 
research commenced. The companies selected were the South African Breweries 
(SAB), ranked seventh in South Africa by turnover at the time; Sappi ranked ninth; 
and Barloworld ranked eleventh. Similar criteria to those applicable to the South 
African companies were used in the selection of the US multinational, with less 
stringent requirements on the criteria of sales and profits from outside the country of 
ongm. The US multinational chosen was Wolverine World Wide. Yin's (2003) 
criteria of convenience, access and geographic proximity were all met. I am resident 
in Grand Rapids, Michigan, approximately 30 kilometres from Wolverine World 
Wide's headquarters in Rockford, Michigan. While not being held out as necessarily 
representative of US multinationals, it has been in international business for 50 years, 
markets its products in more than 140 countries and is highly successful by any 
standard of measurement. 
In 2002 Wolverine World Wide may have fallen marginally short of the second 
criterion that at least 50 percent of sales and profits should be derived from outside 
the country of oril,rin. As seen in Table 4.4, 49 percent of the company' s sales in pairs 
in 2002 were outside the USA. It is conceivable that the monetary value of the sales 
of their products at retail prices outside the USA may have exceeded 50 percent of 
their total sales. It is noted that many US-based multinational companies may derive 
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more than 50 percent of their sales of profits from within the USA because of the size 
of the US economy in relation to the rest of the world. In any event, 53 percent of 
Wolverine World Wide's sales in pairs were outside the United States in 2005 
(Wolverine World Wide 2005 Annual Report). 
Table 4.3 Leading South African Companies 2002 
(Ranked by Turnover) 
Rank 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
5 
6 
6 
7 
9 
8 
8 
9 
5 
10 
12 
11 
10 
12 
13 
13 
14 
11 
15 
14 
16 
15 
17 
16 
Company 
BHPBill ... 
BHPBill .. 
Anglo. 
Anglo ... .. 
Old Mutual 
Old Mutual 
Sasol ... . 
Sasol ... . 
Sanlam 
Sanlam 
Metcash .. 
Metcash . 
SAB . .. . . . 
SAB . . 
Bidvest 
Bidvest 
Sappi. 
Sappi .. 
Richemont 
Richemont 
Barworld 
Barworld .. 
Stanbank 
Stanbank 
Nedcor . 
Nedcor . . . 
Absa ... . . 
Absa . ... . 
FirstRand . 
FirstRand . 
Imperial . .. 
Imperial . 
Didata ... . 
Didata ... . 
Turnover Total Market 
Rm Assets Cup 
Rm Rm 
163,979 299,752 92,309 
143,460 221,774 130,766 
129,444 269,658 154,923 
176,024 281,833 246,530 
70,277 661,069 40,926 
58,121 735,035 63,816 
61,587 62,523 52,738 
41 ,289 49,384 75,335 
44,811 179,256 16,007 
47,148 196,502 23,625 
43,054 8,864 3,012 
35,626 7,308 3,928 
42,239 43,671 49,940 
28,992 27,296 71 ,896 
41 ,950 14,357 12,382 
29,415 9,349 14,571 
39,252 48,705 21,493 
37,694 40,478 31 ,271 
37,843 47,177 56,167 
25,586 27,958 125,280 
35,999 25,310 10,735 
27,945 20,464 13,823 
33,849 396,279 38,894 
24,961 285,124 45,743 
30,187 267,067 26,831 
21,220 195,470 33,470 
30,095 247,016 20,784 
27,732 196,510 20,198 
28,334 373,550 38,768 
23,051 264,763 
28,122 19,317 
21 ,874 16,015 
22,322 12,841 
21,635 17,076 
43,018 
10,719 
10,807 
2,416 
12,146 
Source: Financial Mail Top Companies 2003 :28. 
Equity 
Funds 
Rm 
138,835 
98,307 
135,145 
139,119 
15,986 
5,207 
32,657 
25 ,165 
17,486 
19,662 
326 
551 
6,398 
9,152 
4,755 
3,748 
20 ,200 
16,333 
21 ,490 
11,403 
9,574 
7,651 
30 ,246 
20 ,721 
11 ,575 
13,328 
16,108 
15,507 
20,527 
17,876 
6,954 
6,725 
2,919 
3,777 
Net Financial 
Profits Year End 
Rm 
19,567 Jun 2002 
10,371 Jun 2001 
15,667 Dec 2002 
25,417 Dec 2001 
6,750 Dec 2002 
8,310 Dec 2001 
8,588 Jun 2002 
7,374 Jun 2001 
-894 Dec 2002 
4,207 Dec 2001 
501 Apr 2002 
249 Apr 2001 
4,011 Mar 2002 
3,032 Mar 2001 
1,204 Jun 2002 
1,048 Jun 2001 
2,758 Sep 2002 
1,901 Sep 2001 
6,196 Mar 2002 
4,601 Mar 2001 
1,151 Sep 2002 
911 Sep 2001 
6,343 Dec 2001 
4,152 Dec 2000 
2,577 Dec 2001 
640 Dec 2000 
2,813 Mar 2002 
3,287 Mar 2001 
3,718 Jun 2002 
3,807 
1,215 
1,013 
253 
1,132 
Jun 2001 
Jun 2002 
Jun 2001 
Sep 2002 
Sep 2001 
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Salient details of the four corporations for the financial years ending in 2002 or 2003 
are shown in Table 4.4. Most of these figures have changed since then. For example 
Barloworld revenues were $6,344 million, SA Breweries (now SABMiller) 
$12,901 million, Sappi $4,728 million and Wolverine World Wide $992 million for 
their 2004 or 2005 financial years. Further updated information is provided in 
Chapter 5. 
Table 4.4 Prof1les of the Four Multinational Corporations 2002-2003. 
Barloworld' SABMilier Sappi Wolverine 
I Year established 1903 1895 1936 1883 i 
--
f Business Industrial brand Brewing Paper & pulp Footwear ! 
------------------------ -'---'-------'-'"'--'-'.'-I Head office location South Africa UK South Africa USA I 
1 __ P_rim_~ry ~~t_i n_g _______________ ~_()h~!1_n_e~_~u_rg______ London _J_()ha~~~~~_.~.'~ . __ ._~_~vv Y 00.. i 
I Secondary listing LSE, Frankfurt, J h b Brussels , Zurich 0 annes urg 
f Sales Rands millions 27,945 78,803 
I Sales US$ millions 8,295 
I Net profit after tax 160 421 
I Total assets 2,573 12,879 
! 
New York 
33,294 
3,729 
220 
4,641 
Pacific i 
i 
i 
- , 
8272 I 
48 i 
532 I 
I -P-er-c-e-nt-a-ge- sa-Ies abroad 56.0----------7s-:13- ---87-:O-------4-9~4-1 
I Countries with operations 31 40 85 13 ! 
._--_._"-,-_ .•.•. _ .•._-------_ .. __ ._----_._--_._--_._-, .. _,-----,-_._----_._------- ------
I Countries products sold 100+ 60+ 100+ 140+ i 
LEmployees 23,192 42,402 17,572 4,426 ! 
Year end Sept 2002 March 2003 Sept 2002 Dec 2002 
Notes: 
1. Barloworld financials translated at RI 0.5 to the dollar as of September 2002. 
2. Wolverine World Wide sales reflect ollly licence fees from sales made by foreign licensees. 
Total worldwide sales of their products are therefore substantially higher than the revenues 
shown. 
3. SABMiller sales abroad refer to sales outside South Africa, not the United Kingdom. 
4. Wolverine World Wide sales abroad based on pairs. 
5. Sappi' s operations of 8 units refer to manufacturing facilities. 
Source: Barloworld Annual Report 2002. Barloworld 2003a. Barloworld 2003b. 
SABMiller Annual Report 2003. SABMiller 2003a. SABMiller 2003b. 
Sappi Annual Report 2002. Sappi 2003a. Sappi 2003b. 
Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2002. Wolverine World Wide 2003. 
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Barloworld is the world 's largest distributor of Hyster products, accounting for 20 
percent of that brand's global sales. It is the largest distributor of Caterpillar products 
outside the United States, if not the largest single distributor in the world. SABMiller 
is the second largest brewer in the world and the leading brewer in emerging markets. 
Sappi is the world leader in fine coated paper. Wolverine World Wide is generally 
regarded as the world's leading marketer of branded, non-athletic footwear. 
SABMiller acquired the Miller Brewing Company in the United States in July 2002. 
When I began the thesis, insufficient time had elapsed to allow for adequate 
evaluation of the development and transfer of core competencies at Miller. In 
addition to the time problem, the situation was further complicated by a change of the 
CEO at the company. The Miller Brewing Company is consequently not analysed in 
the thesis. Discussions were nevertheless held with management representatives, and 
lessons from their experiences are shown where considered appropriate. The 
SABMiller investment in South America was less than 24 months old at the time and 
is not included in the thesis. 
I did not believe that it would be possible to have sustainable access to the SABMiller 
group head office in London to study the entire group as an entity. My contact person 
for purposes of the thesis was relatively new to the company, and the two or three 
people in the head office with the requisite knowledge would not have been readily 
available for my research on a continual basis. Because of the largely decentralised 
policy of the company it was possible to obtain the required information from 
executives in the field. SABMilIer is evaluated as a single company in Chapter 5, 
"Corporations Studied", Chapter 6, "Core Competencies of the Corporations", 
Chapter 9, "Review of Strategies of the Corporations" and Chapter 10, "Going 
Global". However, in Chapter 7, "Development of Core Competencies" and Chapter 
8, "Transfer of Core Competencies", two of SABMilIer's regions - SABMiller Africa 
and Asia, and SABMiller Europe - are analysed as distinct entities. There were 
certain advantages to this as the two regions of the same company with a common list 
of core competencies could be compared and contrasted. In certain instances the 
experiences of both the two regions and the London head office are exanlined. 
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The SABMiller Africa and Asia region had sales of $1 ,209 million for the year ending 
March 2003 . This covered operations in China and India and numerous African 
countries. The region had 55 lager breweries, 30 commercial sorghum breweries (and 
12 soft-drink bottling plants) at this date with 7,305 employees. SABMilier Europe 
had sales of $1,646 million and operations in eight countries for the same period. 
There were 18 breweries, one bottling plant and 8,959 employees (SABMilier Annual 
Report 2003:2-3). Both of the regions are therefore very substantial international 
businesses. 
4.6 Data Gathering 
According to Yin (2003), evidence for case studies may come from six sources: 
documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation 
and physical artefacts. Overriding principles important to data collection in doing 
case studies are the use of: a) multiple sources of evidence (evidence from two or 
more sources, but converging on the same set of facts or findings), b) a case study 
database (a formal assembly of evidence distinct from the final case study report) and 
c) a chain of evidence (explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected 
and the conclusions drawn). 
My methods of gathering information or collecting evidence included personal 
interviews, telephone interviews, questionnaires, documentation such as company 
annual reports and websites, written reports, reports by share analysts and media, and 
direct observation. A case study database was maintained in both electronic and hard-
copy format. This comprises files for each of the four companies and the major 
chapters and research topics in the thesis. I believe that there is an adequate chain of 
evidence from initial establishment of the core competencies for each company, the 
methods used to develop and to transfer them and the practical operating experience 
ofthe companies through to the final conclusions. 
4.6.1 Chronology 
Appendix 4.2 shows the record of research and fieldwork practice. The purpose of the 
present section is to provide an outline chronology of the major research practices that 
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were followed, to assist readers in understanding the process. The series of interviews 
and questionnaires and respondents involved was fairly complex. There was also 
some interchange between questionnaires and interviews, because executives were not 
always readily available for interviews and I took the opportunities when they 
presented themselves. 
I met with Dr. T. Johnson, the Dean of Business School Lausanne, in Switzerland, on 
10 April 2002 to discuss the possibility of enrolling for a Doctor of Business 
Administration (DBA) degree and the possible topics for a thesis. I was accepted into 
the programme on 27 June 2002. Professor R. Pai was appointed as my advisor. I 
met with him in the USA and submitted a topic and outline thesis on 27 September 
2002. He and Dr. Johnson approved these on 17 October 2002. 
The next step was to approach the chief executives of the three South African 
companies that I hoped to study in the thesis. I had already met with E.A.G. Mackay, 
the Chief Executive of the South African Breweries, in London on 27 November 
2001. He had agreed to endorse and support the thesis and referred me to A. Miller 
Salzman, Head of Investor Relations, as the contact person for this purpose. I met 
with AJ. Phillips, the CEO of Barloword, in Johannesburg on 22 October 2002. He 
named P.M. Drewell, Head of Corporate Communications, to be the Barloworld 
coordinator for the thesis. The Chief Executive of Sappi, E. van As, was out of the 
country when I attempted to approach him. His secretary, S. Oliver, however, 
endorsed the approach in principle and then arranged with R. Hope, Director Strategic 
Development of Sappi to participate in the thesis with him as the coordinator of my 
work. I subsequently met with A. Miller Salzman in London on 7 November 2002. 
South African Breweries had in the meantime acquired Miller Brewing in the USA to 
form SABMiller in July 2002. 
I drew up an initial questionnaire relating to the companies' backgrounds, human 
resources and cultures and the development and transfer of core competencies, which 
was based on review of the literature and personal experience, cleared this with 
Professor R. Pai, and then submitted it to P.M. Drewell, A. Miller Salzman and R. 
Hope at the end of January 2003. The initial questionnaire contained elements of a 
pilot study in its sections relating to the development and transfer of core 
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competencies. The initial questionnaire is shown in Appendix 4.3. I met with A. 
Miller Salzman on 3 February 2003 , and she referred me to R. van der Schyff, Human 
Resources Development Manager, at SA Breweries in South Africa, F. Miller, Human 
Resources Development Manager, at SA Breweries Africa and Asia, and N. 
Mogilnicki, Human Resources Manager SABMiller Europe, for further research. 
I met with and interviewed P.M. Drewell on 9 May 2003, R. van der Schyff on 10 
June 2003, and R. Hope on 13 June 2003. The purposes of the meetings were to 
establish contact with these executives, review the draft questionnaire, discuss the 
issues in the questionnaire, and agree on and format the core competencies of the 
three companies. The core competencies were discussed with the three executives 
based on the definitions in the Literature Review and the information submitted with 
the initial questionnaire. 
The core competencies were subsequently submitted to the three executives and A. 
Miller Salzman (in the case of SABMiller) for confirmation. Tape recordings were 
made of the discussions and transcripts were sent to the executives for review and 
agreement. Further detail s on how the core competencies were obtained are provided 
in Section 4.6.2 and Chapter 6. The (revised) Questionnaire 2, Development and 
Transfer of Core Competencies, was submitted to P.M. Drewell, R. Hope, F. Miller 
and N. Mogilnicki with a copy to A. Miller Salzman in August 2003. These were 
completed and returned by the four executives (excluding A. Miller Salzman) by the 
middle of October 2003. An abridged version of the Initial Questionnaire (QIA) was 
also completed by Miller and Mogilnicki. 
I approached T. O'Dovonan, the CEO of Wolverine World Wide, in January 2003 to 
follow through on Dr. Johnson's suggestion that a leading American multinational be 
included in the thesis to provide the basis of comparison with the South African 
companies. I met with and interviewed him on 6 October 2003, and he and J.C. 
Tegner, Director of Corporate Communications, provided the information and 
completed Questionnaire 2 and an abridged version of Questionnaire 1 on October 9 
and 13. 
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Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, was submitted to, completed and returned by 
A.J. Phillips and E. van As in November 2003. The questions were similar to those 
raised with E.A.G. Mackay in November 2001. 
In February 2004 I submitted a draft thesis to Professor R. Pai and met with him to 
discuss it on 7 May 2004. He advised me that the thesis needed to take more account 
of practical problems and solutions experienced by the companies. I drew up 
Questionnaire 4, Practical Problems, Solutions and Lessons Learned, on 25 May 
2004. I met with and interviewed G. Leibowitz (successor to A. Miller Salzman as my 
contact person), Vice President Investor Relations of SABMiller, in London on 13 
July 2004, and E. van As in Johannesburg on 22 July 2004 to discuss the 
questionnaire. Transcripts of interviews were made and are available. I had not met 
either of these people before and took the opportunity to have personal interviews 
with them. P.M. Drewell of Barloworld and J.C. Tegner of Wolverine World Wide 
completed and returned this questionnaire by email and telephone as did F. Miller of 
SAB Africa and Asia and N. Mogilnicki ofSAB Europe. 
While teaching at Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa, I received 
advice on the thesis from Professor P. Court, the Head of the Department of 
Management. I realised at the time that I would be able to do a Doctor of Philosophy 
(PhD) at Rhodes with an additional year or two of work if I could transfer the thesis 
from Business School Lausanne to Rhodes. I met with Dr. Johnson in Lausanne and 
Professor A. Webb, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce at Rhodes, to see if I could 
arrange this. Dr. T. Johnson agreed that I could retain the advisory hours not already 
used should I wish to do research through BSL or submit a different thesis for a DBA 
at some later date. 
The thesis was transferred to Rhodes University in December 2004 and Professor P. 
Court and Dr. C.O. Smith of the Department of Education at Rhodes were appointed 
to be my supervisors. Questionnaire 5, Foreign Assignment, and Questionnaire 6, 
South Africa, were sent out on 25 August and 25 October 2005 respectively, to the 
representatives of the four companies and different information was exchanged by 
email and telephone. These were follow-up questionnaires arising out of my analysis 
of the previous questionnaires and interviews. The original draft thesis written for 
208 
Business School Lausanne (BSL) was reviewed between January 2005 and June 2005 
and then rewritten between July 2005 and September 2006 to meet the requirements 
of the Rhodes PhD Programme. The most noteworthy changes were to Chapter 4, 
"Research Design and Methodology", the statistical procedures used, the sequence of 
chapters and general presentation and style. The contents of the Literature Review 
remained substantially unchanged, although the presentation was rearranged. 
To summarise and clarity the situation, I dealt or interacted with two executives in 
three of the companies, namely the CEO and the contact person at Barloworld (AJ. 
Phillips and P.M. Drewell), Sappi (E. Van As and R. Hope) and Wolverine World 
Wide (T.J. O' Donovan and J.C. Tegner). In the case of SABMiller, I initially met 
with E.A.G. Mackay, the Chief Executive, and A. Miller Salzman. I subsequently 
dealt with R. Van der Schyffin South Africa, F. Miller at SABMiller Africa and Asia 
and N. Mogilnicki at SABMiller Europe. Miller Salzman was succeeded by G. 
Leibowitz in 2004. The other SABMiller personnel whom I dealt with either through 
personal and/or telephone interviews were A. Parker, Managing Director of 
SABMiller Africa and Asia, M. Makanjee, Corporate Affairs Director of SABMiller 
Africa and Asia, B. Smith, Senior Vice President Corporate Strategy, Miller Brewing 
Company and now Head of the SABMiller South American Region, J. Nel, Human 
Resources Director of the entire SABMiller group and K. Russell, Senior Trade 
Brewer at the Ibhayi Brewery in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. I did not deal with R. 
Van der Schyff in South Africa again as the South African region was not directly 
included in the research. The region was, however, invaluable for background and 
other information. 
In addition to the above I interviewed retired executives from SABMiller. These 
included M.B. Hofrneyr, a prior Chairman, H.F.G. McCallum, previously 
Commercial Manager, P.R. Savory, retired Marketing Director and E.M. Turner, 
whose career with SABMiller at times included responsibility for Appletizer and fruit 
drinks and African operations outside of South Africa. 
I also interviewed executives outside of the four companies, and sometimes the 
industries, to obtain different viewpoints. These included T. Moore, Managing 
Director of the Grand Rapids branch for Baird and Company, a member of the New 
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York Stock Exchange; B.M. Musham, President and CEO of Gear Holdings in New 
York; P. Reddy, a previous President of K-Swiss International; and G. Pitman, 
Chairman of both Inview Television and Professional Pacific in London. M. Moore, 
Chairman of Boart Longyear International, the multinational mining equipment 
company previously owned by Anglo American, completed a version of 
Questionnaire I to give me another perspective. The contributions by these people 
are discussed and quoted where considered relevant in the thesis. 
The vanous methods of gathering information and evidence are now discussed 
individually in the following subsections. 
4.6.2 Personal Interviews 
Saunders et al. (2000:242, citing Kahn and Cannell 1957) describe an interview as "a 
purposeful discussion between two or more people". Interviews can help to gather 
valid and reliable data that are relevant to research questions and objectives. The 
"research interview" is a general term for several kinds of interview. The nature of 
any interview should be consistent with research questions and objectives. Interviews 
may be categorised as structured interviews, semi-structured interviews and 
unstructured interviews. There is overlap between these different typologies. 
According to Yin (2003), interviews have the advantage of being able to focus 
directly on a case study topic. They can also be insightful and provide perceived 
causal inferences. The disadvantages of personal interviews may include bias due to 
poorly constructed questions, response bias and inaccuracies due to poor recall and 
reflexivity, where an interviewee gives what the interviewer wants to hear. 
According to Saunders et al. (2000), structured interviews use questionnaires based on 
predetermined or standardised or identical set of questions. Semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews by comparison are nonstandardised. In semi-structured 
interviews, the researcher has a list of themes and questions to be covered, although 
these may vary from interview to interview. Unstructured interviews are informal. 
One should use these to explore general areas of interest further. 
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Each type of interview has a different purpose. Structured or standardised interviews 
can be used in survey research to gather data, which can then be the subject of 
quantitative analysis. Semi-structured and in-depth, or nonstandardised, interviews 
are used in qualitative research in order to conduct exploratory discussions not only to 
reveal and understand the "what" and the "how" but also to place more emphasis on 
exploring the "why". In descriptive studies structured interviews can be used as a 
means to identify general patterns, while semi-structured and in-depth interviews can 
be very helpful to "find out what is happening and to seek new insights" (Robson 
1993 :42, cited by Saunders et al. 2000). 
Qualitative interviews may be divided into "one-to-one" and "one-to-many". The 
former covers face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews, while the latter is for 
focused group interviews (Saunders et al. 2000). By "personal interview" I mean a 
face-to-face, one-to-one meeting. 
Yin (2003) regards the interview as one of the most important sources of case study 
information. He divides interviews into three categories: those of an open-ended 
nature, a focused interview or a formal survey. He considers most case study 
interviews to be of an open-ended nature. Key respondents are asked about the facts 
of a matter as well as their opinions about events. A focused interview is where a 
respondent is interviewed for a short period of time (for example, one hour) . In such 
cases the interviews may still remain open-ended and assume a conversational 
marmer, but one is more likely to follow a certain set of questions derived from case 
study protocol. A formal survey interview is the third type. It is normally designed as 
part of a case study to produce quantitative data. 
I regard the interviews in my research to be predominantly semi-structured (Saunders 
et al. 2000 definition) or open-ended (Yin 2003 definition). This corresponds with 
Yin's observation that open-ended interviews are suitable for case studies and with 
Robson's (1993 cited by Saunders et al. 2000) views that semi-structured interviews 
are useful to reveal and understand "what" and "how" and to explore "why" (see 
Table 4.2). There were also informal meetings to discuss issues that arose. These 
include those at the Wits Business School in Johannesburg with J. Job on 31 October 
2002, AJ. Phillips, on 24 June 2003, 21 October 2004, 4 August 2005 and 18 May 
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2006, F. Miller and A. Parker, 20 October 2004 and M. Makanjee on 18 May 2006. 
My Rhodes University Strategic Management Honours class visited the Ibhayi 
Brewery in Port Elizabeth, South Africa on 22 May 2003, 19 August 2004, 3 
March 2005.and 9 March 2006. I used these opportunities to interview K. Russell and 
benefited from his interaction with the students. 
The first interview was with E.A.G. Mackay, the Chief Executive of The South 
African Breweries (the forerunner to SABMilIer) in London on 27 November 2001. 
While I had not decided on the exact thesis topic, or registered for a doctorate, I 
wanted to take advantage of being able to meet with him before access became more 
difficult as SAB continued its expansion. I did not send him a list of questions in 
advance but had written points, such as the advantages and disadvantages of South 
Africa as the original home base, to guide me on the course of enquiry to be followed. 
I made notes on the discussion and sent them to him for approval. While I did not 
alter any meaning, I did moderate some strong statements that I thought had been 
made for emphasis. He replied with a polite note re-establishing his original wording. 
After this I decided to use a tape recorder for interviews, provided the interviewees 
approved. Only one person preferred not to have an interview recorded. I do agree 
with Saunders et al. (2000) that taping an interview allows an interviewer to 
concentrate on questioning and listening and provides an accurate and unbiased 
record. 
The purposes of the exploratory interviews with A.J. Phillips, on 22 October 2002, R. 
Hope, on 25 October 2002 and A. Miller Salzman, on 7 November 2002, were to 
establish initial contact and discuss the guidelines for each company to be followed in 
gathering information and liaising on the thesis. My contacts were to be P.M. 
Drewell at Barloworld, A. Miller Salzman at SA Breweries (in London) and R. Hope 
at Sappi. These executives would answer any questions and provide information. If 
they could not do so themselves, they would either refer me to others or consult with 
other sources within their respective companies. I did agree to discuss, or inform 
them, of any issues that in my judgement could be contentious, before publication. A. 
Miller Salzman adopted the approach that I could contact anyone in SA Breweries for 
information and assistance and should revert to her if I encountered any problems in 
obtaining the desired information or cooperation. 
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The second interviews were to review Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire, dated 28 
January 2003, with the three contacts. I met with and interviewed P.M. Drewell on 9 
May 2003 and A. Miller Salzman on 3 February 2003, R. Van der Schyff (SA 
Breweries in South Africa) on 10 June 2003 and R. Hope on 13 June 2003. A. Miller 
Salzman referred me to F. Miller, of SABMiller Africa and Asia, and N. Mogilniki, 
SABMiIler Europe, to assist with my research. 
The initial questionnaire included background information on value chains, internal 
analysis procedures for determining core competencies and the defmitions used in the 
thesis. It asked: "What are your core competencies? Where possible link each core 
competency to an activity in the value chain." The executives responded to this 
question, and we discussed the core competencies, format and locations or activities 
in the value chain. A temporary obstacle at the time was that none of the South 
African companies had "official" or formal lists of their core competencies. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. I submitted written confirmations of the 
competencies and locations in each company to the respective respondents and A. 
Miller Salzman in London, in the case of SABMiller, for review as to accuracy. All 
of the executives accepted the confirmations. 
The choice of seven core competencies by Barloworld and SABreweries and six by 
Sappi may appear fortuitous at first glance. This is not the case when one considers 
that there are nine main locations in a value chain and a successful multinational 
business would need to succeed in at least several of these to be a world leader. 
I contacted T. O'Donovan President and CEO of Wolverine World Wide, the US 
multinational, about participation in the project in August 2003. He consented and I 
interviewed him and J.C. Tegner, Director of Corporate Communications, in 
Rockford Michigan on 6 October 2003 and 2 May 2004 respectively. The first 
meeting was to discuss the questionnaires, and the second was to obtain more 
information on some qualitative issues such as human resources policies. I again met 
with J.C. Tegner on 20 January 2006 to extend the scope of enquiry with questions 
relating to the operations in Japan and Russia and other issues. The interview with T. 
O'Donovan was of special interest, because he had been with the company for 34 
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years and had been a colleague of mine when I was employed there from 1979 to 
1986. 
Other important personal interviews were with O. Leibowitz, Senior Vice President 
Investor Relations (who took over the role of contact person when A. Miller Salzman 
went on maternity leave), in London on 13 July 2004, and E. van As in Johannesburg 
on 22 July 2004. These interviews were to discuss the questions raised in the 
questionnaire relating to practical problems, solutions and lessons learned (Q4) dated 
25 May 2004. I considered both these interviews to be particularly rich experiences. 
O. Leibowitz is an American citizen who had recently joined SABMilIer from Merrill 
Lynch. His was, therefore, a perspective from outside both the company and South 
Africa. E. van As led the international expansion of Sappi, so I found the discussion 
very frui tful. 
Interviews with persons from outside of the four companies were with T. Moore, 
Managing Director of Baird and Company in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on 4 June 
2002, where we discussed the operations of Wolverine World Wide. Interviews with 
B.M. Musham, President and CEO of Gear Holdings, on 14 December 2003, and P. 
Reddy, ex-President of K-Swiss International in Grand Rapids, on 27 February 2004. 
L. Whipple, President of Whipple Associates, on 8 June 2004, and G. Pitman, 
Chairman of Inview Television Limited and Professional Pacific Limited, on 14 July 
2004, covered international business in general and the development and transfer of 
core competencies more specifically. Whipple is a consultant to Wolverine World 
Wide and previously held the position of Vice-President of International Licensing, 
Europe, Asia and Africa for the corporation. JC Tegner (2 May 2004) agreed that I 
could utilize Whipple's services for research related to Wolverine as well. 
A list of the transcripts of interviews that are available is shown in Appendix 4.4. 
4.6.3 Telephone Interviews 
According to Saunders et al. (2000), qualitative interviews by telephone may have 
advantages associated with access, speed and lower costs. A disadvantage is the loss 
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of personal contact. It is difficult to conduct an interview by telephone and record 
data at the same time. Saunders et al. therefore believe that qualitative interviewing 
by telephone is likely to be appropriate only in particular circumstances. For 
example, it may be appropriate to conduct a short follow-up telephone interview to 
clarify the meaning of some data when one has already undertaken a face-to-face 
interview or when access would otherwise be prohibited because of long distance. I 
discovered that another reason for a telephone interview is that information may be 
required urgently. 
The majority of my telephone interviews, or discussions, were to enquire further into 
or to clarify issues with the contact people. There were several notable exceptions to 
this. N. Mogilnicki, who was to complete the initial questionnaire, asked that the 
qualitative questions be discussed over the telephone rather than his submitting a 
written report. We did this on 21 April 2003, and I confirmed the conversation in 
writing by way of a transcript. 
I had two telephone interviews with A. Miller Salzman on 12 March 2002 and 10 
September 2003. The first discussion related to SA Breweries that was being studied 
by my Strategic Management class at Rhodes University. The second interview 
involved the acquisition of Miller Brewing. A group of students, in a class other than 
my own, was writing a paper on this topic. Their lecturer directed them to me in the 
belief that I could obtain vital information for their paper. Both these conversations 
proved useful for my thesis. 
As mentioned earlier, Miller Brewing is excluded from the study of SABMiller. 
There are however lessons to be learned from (what was then) the pending 
turnaround. J. Nel, Human Resources Director of SABMiller (located in London), 
and B. Smith, Vice President Corporate Strategy of Miller Brewing, whom I had 
approached for information, telephoned me from Milwaukee on 3 January 2004 and 
12 February 2004, to discuss specific issues. They were both extremely busy and 
communicated in this way when they found the time. I made notes of the discussions. 
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A further important telephone interview was with F. Miller on 1 June 2004. I had sent 
her questionnaire 4, which covered practical problems, and she advised me when she 
was ready to discuss the issues. 
4.6.4 Questionnaires 
Questionnaire is a general tenn to include all techniques of data collection in which 
each person is asked to respond to the same set of questions in a predetennined order 
(de Vaus 1996, cited by Saunders et al. 2000). It therefore includes structured 
interviews and telephone questionnaires, as well as those in which the questions are 
answered without an interviewer being present. 
Questionnaires generally work best with standardised questions which one can be 
confident will be interpreted the same way by all respondents (Robson 1993, cited by 
Saunders et al. 2000). Questionnaires can be used for descriptive or explanatory 
research. It is usually better to link questionnaires with other methods in a multi-
method approach rather than as the only data collection method (Saunders et al. 
2000). 
The six types of questions are list, category, ranking, scale, quantity and grid. List, 
ranking and scale were used (Saunders et al. 2000). List questions offer the 
respondent a list of responses any of which can be chosen, not necessarily one only. 
Category questions, in contrast, are designed so that each respondent's answer can fit 
only one category. A ranking question asks the respondent to place things in rank 
order. This means that one can discover relative importance to the respondent. Scale 
or rating questions are often used to collect attitudes and belief data. The most 
common approach is the Likert-style rating scale in which one asks the respondent 
how strongly he or she agrees or disagrees with a statement or series of statements, 
usually on a four- or five-point scale. A response to a quantity question is a number 
which gives the amount of a characteristic. A grid or matrix enables one to record the 
responses to two or more questions at the same time. 
Open questions are used widely in in-depth and semi-structured interviews. They are 
useful in questionnaires if one is unsure of the response, such as in exploratory 
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research when a detailed answer is required or when one may want to find out what is 
uppermost in the respondent's mind (Saunders et al. 2000). 
Questionnaires can be divided into self-administered and interviewer-administered. 
The self-administered include on-line questionnaires, postal questionnaires and 
delivery and collection questionnaires. The interviewer-administered questionnaire 
consists of the telephone questionnaire and the structured interview. The choice of 
the type of questionnaire used is influenced by the characteristics of the respondents 
from whom one wishes to collect data, the type of questions that need to be asked to 
collect the data, and the numbers of questions that need to be asked to collect the data 
(Saunders et al. 2000). 
I used six questionnaires, including the initial one. These were: 
I. Questionnaire 1. Initial Questionnaire on the Development and Transfer of 
Core Competencies and Competitive Advantages. 28 January 2003 
2. Questionnaire 2. The Development and Transfer of Core Competencies. 31 
July 2003 
3. Questionnaire 3. Questions for a CEO. 2 November 2003 
4. Questionnaire 4. Practical Problems, Solutions and Lessons Learned. 25 May 
2004 
5. Questionnaire 5. Foreign Assignments. 25 August 2005 
6. Questionnaire 6. South Africa. 25 October 2005 
Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire was reviewed by both a market research expert, 
V. Yeh, previously the head of market research at Wolverine World Wide and now an 
academic in Detroit, Michigan, and Professor R. Pai at Business School Lausanne in 
Switzerland. 
Questionnaires 2 to 4 could have been handled through personal interviews. Some of 
them were, but logistics meant that questionnaires sent and received bye-mail were 
generally the most effective ways of obtaining the information. The questions, 
particularly those relating to the various methods used to develop and transfer core 
competencies, were largely derived from the literature reviews. 
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The Initial questionnaire (Questionnaire 1) was sent to P.M. Drewell, R. Hope, 
A. Miller Salzman and R. van der Schyff. The resulting meetings are covered in 
personal interviews, Subsection 4.6.2. This questionnaire included open-ended, 
qualitative questions in four categories. These referred to the general background of 
the company, human resources and culture, the development of core competencies 
and the transfer of core competencies. It also included information on Porter's 
Diamond, value chains, value chain activities or locations and definitions and 
concepts used in the thesis. This information was necessary to provide background on 
the thesis to the respondents and to facilitate their answering the questions. The initial 
questionnaire is shown in Appendix 4.3. Section Three and Section Four of this 
questionnaire are shown in the pages that follow. 
Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core Competencies was sent to 
the same respondents with F. Miller of SABMiller Africa and Asia, and N. 
Mogilnicki, of SABMiller Europe, added to the list. The questionnaires were sent out 
on 31 July 2003 and had all been reviewed and completed by 8 October 2003. The 
delay occurred because two of the respondents were travelling internationally. These 
were later sent to T. O'Donovan and J.C. Tegner at Wolverine World Wide, on 7 
October 2003, and completed on 10 October 2003. An abridged version of 
Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire, was supplied to Miller, Mogilnicki, 
O'Donovan and Tegner at the same time that they received Questionnaire 2. The 
abridged version contained the same background information and qualitative 
questions (see Questionnaire I, Section Three and Section Four) as Questionnaire I 
but not Tables A and B, which had been amended and included in Questionnaire 2. 
These were completed by the respondents at the same time that they did 
Questionnaire 2. 
There were two minor changes made to the initial questionnaire of 28 January 2003. 
It was decided that four, rather than tlrree, methods used to develop core competencies 
would be sought to give broader coverage. The original request for the percentage of 
success of transferring of core competences was changed to a degree of success 
marked out of seven points as this was more practical than respondents providing 
percentages. "Competitive Advantages" had in the meantime been dropped from the 
218 
thesis title and consequently from the questionnaires. The resulting Questionnaire 2 is 
shown on page 221. 
The tables in the questionnaire used ranking, lists and scale questions. Rankings were 
used for what were considered to be the most important core competencies and what 
were considered to be the core competencies which were performed best. Because of 
the complexity of core competencies, respondents were asked to list four methods 
used to develop core competencies. As seen in the literature review, it can take up to 
a decade to develop core competencies so scale measurements were not realistic. 
Scale measurements were, however, used for the transfer of core competencies. 
Transfer is more immediate and tangible than development. A scale of seven was 
used to provide a wider spread than, say, a scale of five would. 
The questionnaire included two tables, A and B. Table A related to the methods used 
to develop core competencies. Respondents were asked to choose the four most 
effective methods they used out of seventeen possibilities for each of the core 
competencies. In Table B, using a scale of one to seven, where one equals not 
effective at all and seven equals very effective, respondents were asked to estimate the 
degree of success in transferring each of their core competencies. In the same table, 
and using the same scale, respondents were also asked to rate the effectiveness of 
twelve different methods that could be used to transfer each of the core competencies. 
Questionnaire 1. Initial Questionnaire. 29 January 2003 
Core Competencies Questions 
SECTION THREE. DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
(AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES) 
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1. "A nation's competItIveness depends on the capacity of its industry to 
innovate and upgrade. Companies gain advantage against the world ' s best 
competitors because of pressure and challenge. They benefit from having 
strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local 
customers." Michael R. Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) 
Given this statement, the definition of Porter's Diamond together with the two 
diagrams - please list what you consider to be the FIVE most important 
factors or issues illustrated in the Diamond which led to your company 
becoming the competitive force that it is today. 
2. Do you explicitly use 
a) A Value Chain 
b) Internal Analysis (please see diagram) in deciding upon and developing 
Core Competencies? 
3. What are your core competencies? Where possible please link each core 
competency to an activity in the value chain. 
4. Please explain in a few sentences how core competencies are chosen and 
developed in your company. 
5. For each of your core competencies please list what you have found to be the 
most effective methods used (up to three) to develop or facilitate the 
development of each core competency. Table A provides a check list of some 
methods. If there are methods that you use that are not on the check list, could 
you please add them. 
6. Have new acquisitions contributed to the development of core competencies? 
7. Please explain in a few sentences how you instigate and maintain a learning 
process. 
8. What specifically do you do to assist managers and key employees in dealing 
with the challenges of geography, language and culture? 
9. What competitive advantages do you have that would not be core 
competencies as defined in this document? 
Questionnaire 1. Initial Questionnaire (continued) 
SECTION FOUR. TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
I. How do you determine the success or otherwise of transferring a core 
competency? 
2. What were the greatest challenges your company faced in transferring core 
competencies? 
3. Please list (key words) what you consider to be the problems and issues 
involved in the process of transferring core competencies. 
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4. List the measures taken to avoid pitfalls in the transfer of core competencies. 
5. What do you believe you could do to improve the transfer of core 
competencies? 
6. Table B relates to the transfer of core competencies. Using your subjective 
judgement first estimate the percentage success you believe has been achieved 
in transferring each of your core competencies. 
Then, using a scale of I to 7 - where: 
I = not effective at all and 7 = very effective 
Grade the methods listed for transferring, in tenus of effectiveness (in your 
judgement), each of the core competencies in your company. 
If you use methods of transfer which are not listed - please add them to the list 
and assign grades. 
7. With all the successful acquisitions that you have made - list what you 
consider to be the five most important points in post M&A integration. 
Questionnaire 2. Development and Transfer of Core 
Competencies. 31 July 2003 
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The Core Competencies of your company are attached. These relate to question 3 of 
Section 3 of the Draft Questionnaire dated 28 January 2003 and subsequent 
correspondence and discussions. Each of the core competencies is designated by a 
capital letter. [Note: The SABMiller core competencies follow this as an example. 
The capital letters were subsequently replaced by codes and the sequence of core 
competencies changed to standardise the answers by value chain location for the four 
companies]. 
I. Using your subjective judgement, please rank the core competencies in terms 
of: 
a. How important you consider each competency to be in terms of being 
competitive in the markets in which you compete. 
b. How well you consider each competency is performed by your 
company. 
Rankings are relative i.e. the most important would be 1, second would be 2 
and so forth. You may rank some equal in importance or in how well they are 
performed. 
RANKING CORE COMPETENCIES 
A B C D E F G 
a. Importance 
b. Performance 
Any comments? 
2. Table A provides a check list of methods that can be used to develop or 
facilitate the development of core competencies. Under each core competency 
designated by a capital letter please mark the methods you have found to be 
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most effective for that competency with an X - up to 4 methods per 
competency. 
If you use methods that are not listed, please add them to the list and specify 
what they are. 
Any comments? 
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Questionnaire 2. Development and Transfer of Core Competencies (continued) 
TABLE A. METHODS USED TO FACILITATE OR DEVELOP CORE COMPETENCIES 
.METHOD CORE CmvIPETENCIES 
A. B C D E F I 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economi c environment 
, Commi subs an lal resources to an area 
-. 
3. Use of 'comp an,··',\·ide re 'ard and inc entive syst ern s 
-1 . Corporate culture that demands high perfomlance standards 
5. Internal anal';sis ha identifies activiti es tha shot d be de\' eloped 
6. Inc usioll in p an ling process objecti\'es, goals etc) 
7. Formation of speci al multidisciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benc1unark corpor ate competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular revie ': of exiS'ing and nascent core competenci<-s 
11. : location of key managers and exper 5 to areas 
L . Commitmen to long,term paJls or trajectories of deyel opment 
13. Im'estmen in skills and klw\':ledge, development of human resources 
1-1. Serninars"conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recru it outside tal ent 
17. \'a!ue chains 
18. Others (p ~ea se specify) .. .......... . . 
19. Others ....... .. .. .. . . ... . . . 
20. Others ... .. ... . .... .... . . . . 
Questionnaire 2. Development and Transfer of Core 
Competencies (continued) 
3. Table B provides a check list of methods which can be used to transfer or 
facilitate the transfer of core competencies. 
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Based on your subjective judgement, first estimate the degree of success that 
you believe has generally been achieved in transferring each of your core 
competencies. 
Use a scale of I to 7, where: 1 = not effective at all and 7 = very effective. 
Then, using the same scale, please grade the methods used for transferring in 
the check list, in terms of effectiveness (in your judgement), for each of the 
core competencies designated by the capital letters. 
If you use methods of transfer which are not listed, please add them to the list, 
specify what they are and assign grades to them. 
Any comments? 
Completed by: 
Designation: 
Company: 
Date: 
THANK YOUl 
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Questionnaire 2. Development and Transfer of Core Competencies (continued) 
TABLE B TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
1IETHOD CORE C01IPITEl\CITS 
A B C D :E F G 
A Estimated degree of 5llccess in transferring each CNe competency. 
B. Effecti,·etle;s ofmethodsmed: 
1. Appoint key people from , ithin company to mana gementpositialH in 
new a cquisitiOlH 
-. 
Post merger and acquisition integlation teams 
3. Expert 5 ddi .... r. install and return 
4. Shorl-term secondments 
" lode!> or examples (other acquisitions or inn stments) - . 
6. Rotate managers and k ey people from new ac quisitiom in " ider company 
- Seminars conferences 
3. \ lsit5 
9. r-la=15 and yideo material 
10. Inclusion inmamgement proces; (priority obj ecti, 'e;; etc) 
11. Compensation in centi 'e s based on achie"ement of transfer 
1 . BenchmaJi.:: core competencies against competitors and other fums 
13 . Other ..... .. . ...... .. 
14 . Other. ..... ... . ...... 
1:. Other . .... .... . ... ... 
Questionnaire 2. Development and Transfer of Core 
Competencies (continued) 
SABMILLER CORE COMPETENCIES (EXAMPLES) 
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CORE COMPETENCE VALUE CHAIN LOCATION 
A) Human Capital/Corporate Culture 
B) Low Cost Quality Production 
C) "Hi-Tech" 
D) Marketing 
E) Merger and Acquisition Capabilities 
F) Purchasing I 
G) Distribution' 
Human resource management 
Firm infrastructure (General 
Management) 
Operations 
Procurement 
Technological development 
Technological development 
Marketing and Sales. 
Firm infrastructure (General 
Management, Finance, Legal, IT) 
Human Resource Management 
Procurement 
Inbound logistics 
Outbound logistics 
1 This includes sources of supply, purchasing methods and effectiveness, as well as 
global purchasing capability 
2 This includes effective servicing of customers and minimising the cost of product 
movement 
Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, is shown below. This was submitted to AJ. 
Phillips and E. van As on 2 November 2003 and completed and returned by them on 
11 November 2003 and 19 November 2003 respectively. The questions are similar to 
those raised with E.A.G. Mackay in November 2001. This questionnaire was not sent 
to T. O'Donovan at Wolverine because the questions related specifically to South 
Africa as a home base or country of origin. 
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Questionnaire 4, Practical Problems, Resolutions and Lessons Learned, was sent to 
P.M. Drewell, F. Miller and N. Mogilnicki on 25 May 2004. Copies were also sent to 
E. van As of Sappi (with a copy to R. Hope) and G. Leibowitz of SABMiller. Drewell 
responded on 9 June 2004, Mogilnicki on the same day, and this was finalised by F. 
Miller by telephone on 17 June 2004. As mentioned previously, E. van As and G. 
Leibowitz were available for personal interviews which were used to complete the 
questionnaire on 22 July 2004 and 13 July 2004 respectively. J.C. Tegner answered 
this by email on 10 October 2004. It had been submitted to him earlier that month. 
Following a discussion with F. Miller on 20 October 2004, I decided that a brief 
questionnaire relating to what executives posted to foreign assignments were expected 
to treat as priorities would add to the quality of the research relating to "going global" 
and the reasons for the success of the four companies. This is shown in Questionnaire 
5, Foreign Assignments. This was completed and returned via email byAJ.Phillips 
on 30 August 2005 following on an interview at the Wits Business School on 4 
August 2005, F. Miller on 9 September 2005, N. Mogilnicki on 29 August 2005, and 
R. Hope on 8 September 2005. This was discussed with J. Tegner at a personal 
interview on 20 January 2006. 
In section 2.7.4 I outlined how South African managers learned a great deal about 
acquisitions because of the many acquisitions and divestments that occurred from the 
1980s until the present time. They also experienced, in many cases, the adverse 
results of investing outside their core competencies. I decided to inquire how strongly 
these experiences had aided South African managers in their global endeavours. I 
therefore sent Questionnaire 6, South Africa, to various respondents on 25 October 
2005. P.M. Drewell , N. Mogilnicki, A. Parker and R. Hope replied on 26 October 
2005, and E. van As on 27 October 2005. 
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Questionnaire 3. Questions for a CEO. 2 November 2003 
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of having South Africa as the 
home-base? 
2. What are* some of the reasons for the decision to retain SA for the primary 
listing and head office? 
3. Corporate culture has been one of the reasons for your company's success. 
What pressures has this come under as the company expanded globally? 
4. The global expansion has been partly a function of exporting expertise and 
core competencies. In which aspects of these do you consider that you have 
been more successful and in which less successful? 
5. Research shows that the majority of mergers or acquisitions are NOT 
successful - depending of course on the criteria. Could you explain why you 
have been so VERY successful with your acquisition strategy? 
6. List the key factors for success in your industry. 
7. What are the key reasons for your success in expanding globally? 
8. What do you consider to be the defining events or times in your 
transformation to a global company? 
9. Are there any comments that you would like to make? 
* Original question was "Could you give" 
Questionnaire 4. Practical Problems, Solutions and Lessons 
Learned. 25 May 2004 
1. What practical problems were encountered in 
a) developing core competencies? 
b) transferring core competencies? 
2. How were the practical problems in I a and 1 b resolved? 
3. What lessons were learned in going global? 
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4. What advice would you give to a company about to embark on global/international 
expansion? What to avoid and what to be cautious about? 
Questionnaire 5. Foreign Assignments. 25 August 2005 
What is the first thing (or things) that you expect an executive to do when transferred 
to a foreign country? 
Questionnaire 6. South Africa. 25 October 2005 
A. The size of the South African economy (in relation to its major trading partners), 
together with the country's diversity, resulted in relatively small and 
differentiated market segments in many industries. This situation provided 
managers with opportunities to learn how to be profitable in small markets by 
targeting segments, controlling costs and managing with limited resources. 
Please check one: 
I. 
2. 
, 
.). 
4. 
5. 
Any comments? 
Strongly agree with the above statement 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
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B. The 1980s and 1990s were periods of great change and uncertainty in South 
Africa, challenging companies and their managements to learn how to cope in 
such conditions. The divestments by foreign companies, the acquisitions by 
domestic companies and the subsequent restructuring taught many managers 
about disposals, mergers and acquisitions and the consequences of investing 
outside their core competencies. 
Please check one: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Any comments? 
4.6.5 E-mail 
Strongly agree with the above statement 
Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
E-mail is a means of communication rather than a source of evidence. The 
questionnaires for example were mostly sent and received bye-mail. In one way 
e-mails did almost become a source of information. When I needed information, I 
often sent an e-mail to one of my contact people at the companies. Invariably, the 
information was supplied, usually within days. One example is when I decided that 
knowing the number of South African expatriates serving in the companies of global 
operations would be useful information. Many personal communications were also 
by email. Details are shown in Appendix 4.2. 
A second example is when I needed views of the contact persons in the South African 
companies and Wolverine World Wide on the effectiveness of methods for 
developing core competencies. I e-mailed and received responses from M.A. Drewell 
and L. Whipple on 8 August 2006, F. Miller and N. Mogilnicki on 31 July 2006. The 
analysis of leadership in chapter 9 is a third example. This subject assumed some 
personal tones so I wanted the CEOs to have sight of the drafts before including them 
in the thesis . AJ. Phillips replied on 14 August 2006 and O'Donovan on 24 August 
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2006. A. Godbeer replied for E.A.G. Mackay on 29 September 2006 and J. Maree for 
.van As to convey his message (that he had not found the time to read the 
information) on 14 September 2006. There were no requests for changes to what I 
had written. 
4.6.6 Analysis of Documents 
The advantages of this source of evidence include stability, as documents can be 
reviewed repeatedly. The analysis is unobtrusive and exact (with respect to names, 
references and details of an event). The disadvantages can be low retrievability and 
bias selectivity, if collection is incomplete. There may be reporting bias if a work 
reflects the (unknown) bias of an author (Yin 2003). The variety of documents 
includes letters, memoranda, written reports of events, administrative documents, 
formal studies or evaluations of the same "site" and newspaper clippings and other 
articles appearing in the mass media or community and news letters. According to 
Yin (2003) the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment 
evidence from other sources. Firstly, documents are helpful in verifying information 
that might have been mentioned in an interview. Secondly, documents can provide 
other specific details to corroborate information from other sources. If the 
documentary evidence is contradictory rather than corroboratory, one needs to pursue 
the problem by inquiring further into the topic. Thirdly, one can make inferences 
from documents. 
I added the category of share analysts' reports to the variety of documents to be 
studied. I used Investec Securities (very useful because of their overseas operations) 
and Andisa Securities (Standard Bank) to review the South African companies, as I 
had access to these two institutions. I used Value Line, Standard & Poor's, Prudential 
Equity Group and Susquehana Financial Group for information on Wolverine World 
Wide. 
The annual reports of the corporations were examined thoroughly. The main sources 
of media information were the Financial Times (including its search programme), The 
Economist, and the Financial Mail, both hard copy and websites for all three 
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publications. The archival records of the four companies and the three publications 
were all accessed to retrieve pertinent previous reports and articles. 
4.6.7 Direct Observations 
By making a field visit to the case study "site" one is creating the opportunity for 
direct observations. Observations of relevant behaviours or of environmental 
conditions serve as yet another source of evidence in a case study. The observations 
can range from formal to casual data collection activities, which can involve 
observations of a corporate environment, factories, classrooms and the like (Yin 
2003). 
Direct observations cover events in real time and also cover the context of an event. 
They may, however, be time-consuming, selective unless there is broad coverage and 
reflexive where an event may be perceived differently because it is being observed 
(Yin 2003). 
r did not make any direct observations of employees in any of the companies 
developing or transferring core competencies. I do not, however, believe that it is 
possible to deal closely with an organisation without forming some impressions. I 
visited the corporate headquarters of the four companies at least twice each, was 
exposed to their reception areas and staff, and interacted and communicated with my 
contact people and others on an ongoing basis. A visit to the Ibhayi Brewery in Port 
Elizabeth, as part of a conducted tour for my students, took place in each of the past 
four years . I will return to my impressions from these observations in Chapter 9. 
4.7 Data Analysis 
Yin (2003) states that data analysis consists of examining, categorising, tabulating, 
testing, or otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to 
address the initial propositions of a study. He believes that every case study should 
strive to have a general analytic strategy, defining priorities for what to analyse and 
why. The three strategies he advocates are relying on theoretical propositions, setting 
up a framework based on rival explanations and developing case descriptions. Five 
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specific techniques can be used for any of these strategies: pattern matching, 
explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models and cross-case synthesis. 
The strategies that I followed were relying on theoretical propositions and developing 
case descriptions. I did look for patterns in the data but not to the technical degree 
advocated by Yin (2003). Time series analysis and logic models are not used. The 
major emphasis is on cross-case synthesis, and I touch on explanation building. 
Saunders et al. (2000) make key distinctions between quantitative and qualitative 
data. Quantitative data are based on meanings derived from numbers. The collection 
of data results in numerical and standardized data and analysis is conducted through 
the use of diagrams and statistics. Qualitative data, on the other hand, are based on 
meanings expressed through words. The collection of data results in nonstandardized 
data requiring classification into categories. Analysis is conducted through the use of 
conceptualisation. I will deal with qualitative data and quantitative data separately. 
4.7.1 Qualitative Data 
Qualitative analysis, according to Mouton (200 I), involves the breaking up of data 
into manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships. The aim of analysis is to 
understand the various constitutive elements of the data through an inspection of the 
relationships between concepts, constructs or variables and to ascertain whether there 
are any patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated, or to establish themes in 
the data. Interpretation involves the synthesis of data into larger coherent wholes. 
Dey (1993:28, cited by Saunders et al. 2000:381) points out that "the more ambiguous 
and elastic our concepts, the less possible it is to quantify data in a meaningful way." 
A contrast can thus be drawn between the "thin" abstraction or description associated 
with quantitative data collection and the "thick" or thorough abstraction or description 
associated with qualitative data (Dey 1993, Robson 1993, cited by Saunders et al. 
2000). 
The nature of qualitative data according to Saunders et al. (2000) has implications for 
both its collection and its analysis. The richness and fullness associated with 
qualitative data cannot be captured by a standardised method of collection, as can 
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quantitative data. During analysis the non-standardized and complex nature of the 
data that have been collected will need to be classified into categories before they can 
be meaningfully analysed. According to Saunders et al. (2000) the most likely way to 
analyse qualitative data that have been collected is through the creation of a 
conceptual framework. Saunders and colleagues take the approach of disaggregating 
the mass of qualitative data into meaningful and related parts or categories as they are 
collected. This requires identifying key themes or patterns for further exploration and 
recognising relationships and developing the categories being used. Data collection, 
data analysis and the development and verification of relationships and conclusions 
form an interrelated and interactive set of processes. 
The key concepts used in the thesis are discussed in Section 4.4 on conceptualisation. 
These are core competencies, value chain activities, methods for developing core 
competencies, methods for transferring core competencies and the degrees of success 
of transferring core competencies. In addition to these concepts, there are the 
categories or sections outlined in Figure 1, Theoretical Framework of the Thesis. For 
example, in Chapter 7, The Development of Core Competencies, these would be the 
determinants of competitiveness, the selection process, acquisitions, and practical 
problems and solutions. My questionnaires and interviews were structured around 
these categories so that much of the qualitative data was collected in this form. 
An example of working with the qualitative data is the cross-synthesis between the 
four corporations and the review of their strategies and performance not only in the 
light of the Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003) 4+2 formula but also in media and 
analysts' reports. In the 4+2 formula companies have to excel at four primary 
management practices - strategy, execution, culture and structure - and any two of 
four secondary practices: talent, leadership, innovation and mergers and partnerships. 
The issues with which I grappled included how much weight should be given to each 
of the eight management categories. I chose to allocate the most effort to the strategy, 
leadership and merger and partnership practice (including post-merger integration), 
because of their importance in global expansion, and the development and transfer of 
core competencies. A related issue was how much credence to give to the different 
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media and analysts ' reports, especially where they had different views on the same 
company or issue. In these instances I gave both points of view. 
4.7.2 Quantitative Data 
I followed the suggestions of Saunders et al. (2000) that initial quantitative analysis 
should explore data using both tables and diagrams. The choice of table or diagram is 
influenced by the research questions and objectives, the aspects of the data to be 
emphasised and the level of measurement at which the data were recorded. 
Subsequent analysis involves describing the data and exploring relationships using 
statistics. 
In analysing data, I checked the incoming completed questionnaires against one 
another and also other reports from the companies for consistencies. I contacted the 
relevant respondent to discuss the issues where there were apparent inconsistencies. 
Descriptive and statistical procedures were applied to the data where appropriate. The 
statistical methods that would normally be used are correlation and regression 
analysis. These explore the relationships between different variables and support the 
reliability of the data provided by the companies. 
Saunders et al. (2000) note that a correlation coefficient enables one to quantifY the 
strength of the relationship between two ranked and quantifiable variables. Its value 
is always between plus one and minus one. Positive values suggest that two variables 
are linearly correlated, with the tendency being greater the closer the correlation 
coefficient is to one. Negative values suggest that the variables are negatively linearly 
related with one tending to increase linearly as the other decreases, with the tendency 
being greater the closer the coefficient is to minus one (Zehna & Weiss 2002). In 
contrast to the correlation coefficient the regression coefficient (sometimes known as 
the coefficient of determination) enables one to assess the strength of relationship 
between a quantifiable dependent variable and one or more quantifiable independent 
variables. Its values can range from zero to one, or zero to one hundred percent 
(Zehna and Weiss 2002). 
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The statistical significance of a result tells something about the degree to which the 
result is "true" (in the sense of being representative of the population) (Statsoft 2002). 
P-value expresses the probability that an observed outcome would take a value as 
extreme or more extreme than the one actually observed. The smaller the P-value the 
stronger the evidence that the observed result is unlikely to occur just by chance 
(Moore 2000). In many areas of research the P-value of 0.05 is customarily treated as 
a "borderline acceptable" error level (www.statsoft.com). The decisive level of P is 
called the significance level. When the event or one that is more deviant would occur 
five percent of the time or less, by chance, one takes the inductive leap and asserts 
that the results are due to non-chance factors (Runyon 1977). 
Because of the small number of variables (five entities and four companies involved) 
nonparametric calculations such as the Spearman coefficient and Kruskal- Wallis 
levels of significance were used instead of the better-known Pearson coefficients. A 
nonparametric test of significance makes no assumption concerning the shape of the 
parent distribution or population distribution-free test of significance (Runyon 1977). 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient rs is a measure of association which 
requires that both variables be measured in at least an ordinal scale so that the objects 
or individuals being studied are ranked in two ordered series (Siegel 1956). Pearson 
scattergrams were used to show positive or negative relationships graphically, but no 
calculations are presented. 
4.7.3 Interpretation and Synthesis 
According to Mouton (2001), interpretation involves the synthesis of one ' s data into 
larger coherent wholes. One interprets and explains observations or data by 
formulating hypotheses or theories that account for observed patterns and trends in the 
data. This means relating one's results and findings to existing theoretical 
frameworks or models, and showing whether these are supported or falsified by the 
new interpretation. Interpretation also means taking into account rival explanations or 
interpretations of one's data and showing what levels of support the data provide for 
the preferred interpretation. 
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I follow Mouton's guidelines in interpreting my results in Chapter II. These results 
are related to the theoretical framework constructed for the thesis and existing views 
on core competencies expounded in the literature reviews. My data are synthesised 
into larger wholes and are presented so as to address the four basic aims of the thesis. 
The synthesis includes two matrices, one for the development of core competencies 
and another for the transfer of core competencies. They set out the methods for 
development and transfer that the companies have found to be most effective for the 
different value chain locations. 
I discuss how my results support, deviate from, or add to the existing body of know 
ledge. The subsequent conclusions and recommendations are presented to assist 
management practitioners to improve their management of the development and 
transfer of core competencies and to enable academics to improve their research into 
and teaching of core competencies. I also address other possible interpretations of 
some of my findings, but these do not receive the same attention as the 
aforementioned issues. 
4.8 Quality Issues 
This section agam deals with qualitative and quantitative issues separately and 
concludes with generic quality issues. 
4.8.1 Qualitative 
Four tests are commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical social research 
(Kidder and Judd 1986, cited by Yin 2003). They are: 
I. Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied 
. 2. Internal validity: (for explanatory or causal studies only, and not for descriptive or 
exploratory studies) establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are 
shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships 
3. External validity: establishing the domain to which a study' s findings can be 
generalised 
4. Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study - such as the data 
collection procedures - can be repeated with the same results. 
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Yin (2003) recommends using multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of 
evidence and having key informants review drafts of important parts of cases to 
achieve construct validity. I followed these recommendations, as shown . in the 
coming chapters. 
The issue of multiple sources raises the subject of triangulation. Triangulation means 
that researchers can corroborate information in one or more ways: data triangulation 
by using different data sources, investigator triangulation by using two or more 
researchers, theory triangulation by using different perspectives to interpret data and 
methodological triangulation by using multiple methods to gather data (Guba and 
Lincoln 1985, cited by Cantrell, 1993). I used different data sources (interviews, 
questionnaires, documents, archival records, media, observation) and multiple 
methods (case study and a survey within the case study, statistical analysis) as seen in 
sections 4.3 and 4.6 above. 
I do not see internal validity as significantly relevant to the thesis, as the cases are 
more exploratory and descriptive than explanatory or causal. Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) may have alternate views on this in post-positivist research. They consider the 
appropriate criteria for judging the quality of an enquiry to be the conventional 
benchmarks of "rig our" internal validity, external validity (generalisability), reliability 
and objectivity. They note that these criteria depend on the realistic ontological 
position where reality is "real" but only imperfectly and probablistically 
apprehensible. 
Yin (2003) advocates replication logic for mUltiple-case studies in the pursuit of 
external validity. He explains that survey research relies on statistical generalisation, 
whereas case studies rely on analytical generalisation. A major purpose of my survey 
was to ascertain which methods of developing and transferring core competencies 
were found to be the most effective by the corporations studied. In analytical 
generalisation the investigator is attempting to generalise a particular set of results to 
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some broader theory. I follow this concept m the chapters exammmg the four 
multinational corporations. 
The test of reliability is that a later investigator, following the same procedures as set 
out in this thesis, and conducting the same case studies and questions all over again, 
would arrive at the same findings and conclusions reached here (Yin 2003). The 
procedures and data base are well documented, and I believe that the same findings 
and conclusions would be reached again. 
Yin (2003) continues that four principles underlie all good social-science research: 
\. The analysis should show that all the evidence was attended to. 
2. The analysis should address, if possible, all major rival interpretations. 
3. The analysis should address the most significant aspect of the case study. 
4. The investigator should use hislher prior expert knowledge in the case 
study. 
Once again, I believe that I followed these principles. All the evidence is available 
either in the text or in the appendices, or by request should a reader wish to assess 
whether all the evidence was attended to and whether the most significant aspects of 
the case are addressed. I also use my own prior knowledge and judgement where I 
consider this appropriate. An example of this use of knowledge is the compilation of 
the questionnaires, notably the methods used to develop and transfer core 
competencies. 
Mouton (2001) supports many of Yin's (2003) contentions and stresses that the data 
collection process should be documented as accurately, and in as much detail, as 
possible. Every aspect of the study - the sample design, fieldwork procedures and so 
on - should be meticulously documented and recorded. Keeping track of fieldwork is 
also a form of quality control. Items to be recorded should include: dates when access 
was gained to the field, dates when interviews were conducted, the length of 
interviews, information on interviewees and factors that influence fieldwork. 
Appendix 4.2 is a record of data collection and fieldwork and it details the 
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information that Mouton recommends. Transcripts and notes on personal interviews 
and telephone interviews are also available. 
According to Winegardner (2002) there is little distinction between validity and 
reliability in the post-positivist approach, as both are assessed in context rather than 
against an external and objective standard. Reliability is more a function of the 
credibility of the researcher's knowledge claims and acknowledgment of his or her 
central role, relationship and biases in the research, and less a function of replicability. 
The post-positivist school of qualitative research, according to Winegardner (2002), 
generally rejects objectivity as a criterion of validity and instead focuses on the 
validity of interpretation as determined by various criteria. These include usefolness, 
the extent to which a case study is enlightening or liberating, contextual completeness, 
in which comprehensiveness is a standard of credibility, and researcher positioning, 
which is a demonstrated sensitivity by the researcher to how he or she relates to the 
case being studied. Other factors are the reporting style, which Winegardner regards 
as the ability to reconstruct the participants' reality credibly and authentically, 
triangulation, chain of evidence, member checking, the corroboration of data by 
participants in the case study and outlier analysis, the use of exceptions to test and 
strengthen the basic findings. Transcripts of interviews were sent to the respondents 
for review and agreement. 
I see the case as being very useful from the viewpoint of a CEO or a general manager 
because of the road maps and practical experiences involved. I trust that I clarified 
my positioning as a researcher. Triangulation, establishing a chain of evidence and 
corroboration of important data by participants were all employed. 
Overcoming the various forms of bias is integral to the way in which interviews are 
conducted. Saunders et al. (2000) recommend that the following points be considered 
to attempt to avoid sources of bias in qualitative interviews: preparation and readiness 
for the interview; the level of information supplied to the interviewee; the 
appropriateness of the researcher's appearance; the nature of the opening comments; 
and the researcher' s approach to questioning, ability to demonstrate attentive listening 
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skills and approach to recording infonnation. I took these points into account and 
believe that I avoided bias from the viewpoint of the respondents in this regard. 
Saunders et al. (2000) state that there are likely to be concerns surrounding the 
generalisability of findings from qualitative research that are based on the use of a 
small and unrepresentative number of cases. They note two arguments that have been 
advanced to clarify and modify the approach often adapted to the generalisability or 
transferability of qualitative research. Firstly, Bryman (1988, cited by Saunders et al. 
2000:259) states that "within a case study a wide range of different people and 
activities are invariably examined so that the contrast with survey samples is not as 
acute as it appears at first glance". A well-completed and rigorous case study is thus 
more likely to be useful in other contexts than one that lacks such rigour. 
Secondly, the argument is related to the significance of this type of research to 
theoretical propositions (Bryman 1988, Yin 1994, cited by Saunders et al. 2000). 
Where one is able to relate a research project to existing theory one will be in a 
position to demonstrate that one's findings will have a broader significance than the 
case or cases that fonn the broader basis of one's work (Marshall and Rossman 1999, 
cited by Saunders et al. 2000). I do relate many of the findings back to theoretical 
principles emanating from the literature review. 
The research was confined to three multinational corporations originating in South 
Africa and one US multinational corporation. Four corporations is a limited universe 
(although the three South Africa companies represent a significant portion of South 
African companies that met the five criteria used for selection at the time). 
Stake (2003) points out that researchers cannot avoid generalisation in case studies. 
They generalise to happenings of their cases at times yet to come and in other 
situations. They expect the reader to comprehend the reported interpretations but to 
modify their (the reader's) own. Thus researchers use the methods for casework that 
they actually use to learn enough about their cases to encapsulate complex meanings 
into finite reports; and so describe the cases in narrative sufficiently descriptive that 
readers can vicariously experience these happenings and draw conclusions (which 
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may differ from those of the researchers). It is therefore up to the readers in similar 
kinds of companies or with similar experiences to make the generalisation. 
4.8.2 Quantitative Quality Issues 
Mouton (2001) describes different sources of error in questionnaires with scale 
construction, errors in data capturing and errors in analysis and interpretation. Errors 
in questionnaires most commonly occur when no piloting or pretesting is done, 
ambiguous or vague words or phrases are used and double-barrelled questions 
(questions that combine two or more questions in one) are posed. Other possible 
weaknesses are leading questions, where the respondent is influenced or led to give a 
certain response and fictitious constructs, for example, asking people about matters of 
which they have no knowledge. 
As discussed in Subsection 4.6.4 the initial questionnaire was reviewed by a market 
research expert and a professor at Business School Lausanne in Switzerland, in order 
to minimise the potential errors listed in the previous paragraph. Babbi (1998, cited 
by Mouton 2001) discusses the issue of whether respondents are competent to answer 
certain types of question. This is another instance where having a contact person at 
each of the companies proved advantageous. If the contact person in question 
experienced any difficulty or challenge with questions he or she had the resources of 
the entire organisation to call on. 
The closed-ended quantitative questions, Tables A and B, are based on the 
respondents' subjective judgement. The respondents, nevertheless, all hold senior 
management positions, and their subjective judgements represent their corporations' 
positions for the purpose of the thesis. 
The most common errors in data capturing, according to Mouton (2001) , are human 
errors, post-coding errors, too many missing values and omission of data validation 
procedures as a first step in data analysis. My exposure to these risks was limited, 
because of the small sample of five entities. I did, however, follow the procedures of 
reviewing and checking all incoming questionnaires, looking for illogical 
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relationships and checking that rules and filter questions were followed. I found two 
with errors where data had been placed in the incorrect columns. 
The mam errors m analysis and interpretation are using inappropriate statistical 
techniques in quantitative analysis, drawing inferences from data that are not 
supported by the data and biased interpretation of the data through selectivity. I use 
nonparametric statistical procedures because of the small sample in order to avoid the 
first source of error. 
4.8 .3 Generic Quality Issues 
I used a variety of methods in gathering data. This meant that different methods were 
at times used to carry out the same research. For example the questionnaire dated 
25 May 2004, Practical Problems, Resolutions and Lessons Learned, was researched 
through a personal interview with E. van As, while the other respondents replied by 
e-mail. I contend that the richness of the interview compensated for the different 
methods of gathering information in this instance. 
My experience was that the methodology that I followed has proven flexible while at 
the same time facilitating thoroughness and depth of enquiry. It was possible to 
obtain information, follow up and enlarge or expound on themes and issues fairly 
quickly. An example of this is the questionnaire on foreign assignment, dated 25 
August 2005. Each company assigned the responsibility of overseeing my research to 
a senior manager, and I believe this further facilitated quality control. 
I believe that my age and experience enabled me to obtain more access to CEOs and 
executives at the four companies than would be the case with a "typical PhD 
candidate" in their twenties or thirties (For example three of the four CEOs came 
down from different locations in their headquarters to greet me personally in their 
reception areas on my arrival for the first interviews with them.) This, I contend, 
contributed to the quality of the research. A disadvantage of this access, however, 
means limitations on the valuable time that can be expected of the executives 
concerned. I tried to be aware of the value of executive time and my "privileged 
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position" and therefore imposed restraints on my requests for meetings and time. I 
was able to gather all the information that I felt was necessary. 
4.9 Ethical Issues 
Mouton (2001) sees the ethics of science as what is wrong and what is right in the 
conduct of research. Because scientific research is a form of human conduct, he 
continues, such conduct should conform to generally accepted norms and values. 
Researchers should, at all times, strive to maintain objectivity and integrity. They 
should always indicate the limits of their findings and the methodological constraints 
that determine the limits of their findings and report them fully, with no 
misrepresentation. 
I believe that I adhered to Mouton' s (2001) principles and turn to Saunders et al. 
(2002) for a more detailed discussion of key ethical issues. They summarise the key 
issues arising in a research project as: 
1. Privacy of possible and actual partners 
2. Voluntary nature of participation and the right to withdraw partially 
or completely from the process 
3. Consent and possible deception ofparticipants 
4. Maintenance ofthe confidentiality of data provided by individuals or 
identifiable participants and their anonymity 
5. Reactions of participants to the way in which a researcher seeks to collect 
data 
6. Effects on participants ofthe way in which a researcher uses, analyses 
and reports data 
7. Behaviour and objectivity of the researcher 
These issues are dealt with in the three stages of design and initial access, data 
collection and analysis and reporting as set out by Saunders et al. (2002). 
Questionnaire 2. Development and Transfer of Core 
Competencies. 31 July 2003 
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The Core Competencies of your company are attached. These relate to question 3 of 
Section 3 of the Draft Questionnaire dated 28 January 2003 and subsequent 
correspondence and discussions. Each of the core competencies is designated by a 
capital letter. [Note: The SABMiller core competencies follow this as an example. 
The capital letters were subsequently replaced by codes and the sequence of core 
competencies changed to standardise the answers by value chain location for the four 
companies]. 
I. Using your subjective judgement, please rank the core competencies in terms 
of: 
a. How important you consider each competency to be in terms of being 
competitive in the markets in which you compete. 
b. How well you consider each competency is performed by your 
company. 
Rankings are relative i.e. the most important would be 1, second would be 2 
and so forth. You may rank some equal in importance or in how well they are 
performed. 
RANKING CORE COMPETENCIES 
A B C D E F G 
a. Importance 
b. Performance 
Any comments? 
2. Table A provides a check list of methods that can be used to develop or 
facilitate the development of core competencies. Under each core competency 
designated by a capital letter please mark the methods you have found to be 
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4.9.1 Design and Initial Access 
Ethical problems should be anticipated and dealt with during the design stage of any 
research project. The right to privacy should not be infringed upon by the nature and 
timing of any approach or by attempts to apply pressure on intended participants. As 
I approached the four CEOs directly, I certainly followed the recommended etiquette 
(one was away and his secretary and a senior manager took the decision in his 
absence). 
Researchers should distinguish between absence of consent, implied consent and 
informed consent where participants' consent is given freely and based on full 
information about participants' rights and use of data. One CEO initially expressed 
reservations about participating but gave his full consent when I undertook to conduct 
the research within parameters that resolved the reservations. 
4.9.2 Data Collection 
Participants should not be asked to participate in anything that goes beyond the scope 
of the access agreed upon, and the researcher should remain within the aims of the 
research project as originally shared with the participants. I adhered to these 
requirements with one exception, where an initial advisor asked me to undertake 
additional research when I (and some of the participants) believed that the subject had 
already been fully covered. This necessitated an explanation and a request to the four 
research contacts in each company. Almost all of the people I dealt with in all four 
companies had, in any event, ended meetings, or personal communications, with an 
offer of further help ifrequired. 
The maintenance of objectivity is a general ethical principle. This means that 
researchers should make sure that data are collected accurately and fully and that 
subjective selectivity is avoided in what is recorded. I believe that I followed this 
principle. Althougb parts of the process itself, and certain interviews, were 
interactive, I followed a framework in asking questions and, to the best of my 
knowledge, maintained a higb level of objectivity. 
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The question of confidentiality and anonymity arose on only a few occasions. 
Participants were provided with transcripts of interviews to review. Only two 
modifications were made to the original transcripts submitted. 
4.9.3 Analysis and Reporting Stages 
Researchers should maintain objectivity during the analysis stage to make sure that 
they do not misrepresent the data collected. This includes not being selective about 
which data to report or, when applicable, misrepresenting their statistical accuracy 
(Zikmund 1997, cited by Saunders et al. 2000). 
Referring specifically to case studies, Stake (2003) points out that case study research 
shares an intense interest in personal views and circumstances. It is important (but 
never sufficient) for targeted persons to receive drafts revealing how they are 
presented, quoted and interpreted and for the researcher to exercise great caution to 
minimise the risks. Issues of observation and reportage should be discussed in 
advance. My agreement with the companies was that I could certainly utilise any 
information that they provided but that I should extend the courtesy of discussing any 
significant surprises or controversial findings before publication. In this regard, I did, 
for example, did send the three South African companies Table 5.1 from Section 5.2 
which shows their share prices and share price growth rates compared with the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange Index from J 994 to 2005 for their perusal before 
including it in the thesis. I also sent drafts of the leadership issues in chapter 10 to the 
tbree CEOs and the chairman of Sappi for review, as I believed these were of a 
personal nature. 
A further ethical concern stems from the use made by others of the conclusions which 
a researcher may reach and any course of action to which explicit reference is made, 
or is implicitly suggested, based on the research data. On the few occasions where 
research findings could potentially reflect adversely on a company, I did discuss this 
with the managers concerned and gave them opportunities to provide explanations 
before committing the research to writing. One of the ethical considerations of my 
actions was that they should not have affected my objectivity. 
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A digital copy of the first draft of my initial thesis was sent to each of the four 
contacts for review in April 2004. There were no negative responses to any of the 
content. 
I am fully aware of the responsibility to produce research that is valid, objective, 
reliable, and conducted with integrity. 
4.10 Summary and Conclusion 
The paradigm, or worldview, of post-positivism is followed in the thesis. External 
reality is regarded as stable but can only be approximated by researchers. Researchers 
are subjective but should strive for objectivity and control their bias. The basic 
methodology followed in the thesis is that of a case study, supported by a survey 
within the case (questionnaire) and complemented by statistical analysis. I endeavour 
to bring the perspective of a CEO, combined with that of a teacher, to the thesis. 
The idea is to evaluate the methods used for developing and transferring core 
competencies in the context of international business. The key concepts, or topics 
used, are core competencies, Porter's Diamond, value chain activities, methods used 
for developing core competencies, degrees of success in transferring core 
competencies and methods used for transferring core competencies. 
Strict criteria were applied in the selection of the multinational corporations. 
Barloworld is the world's leading distributor of Hyster products and the largest 
distributor of Caterpillar products outside the USA. SABMiIler is the second largest 
brewer in the world and the leading brewer in emerging markets. Sappi is the world 
leader in fine-coated paper. Wolverine World Wide is generally regarded as the 
world's leading marketer of branded, non-athletic footwear. Two regions of 
SABMiIler - SABMiller Africa and Asia and SABMiller Europe - are analysed in 
certain portions of the research because of the impracticalities of obtaining 
information for the entire group. 
In gathering data, evidence for case studies may come from six sources: documents, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical 
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artefacts. Multiple sources of evidence should be used, a case study database 
maintained and a chain of evidence established between the questions asked, the data 
collected and the conclusions drawn. I believe that I followed these guidelines. The 
data were collected through personal interviews, telephone interviews, documents and 
questionnaires. Archival records and direct observation were utilised to a lesser 
extent. . 
Data anal ysis consists of examining, categorising, tabulating, testing, or otherwise 
recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the initial 
propositions of a study. Three strategies of data analysis are relying on theoretical 
propositions, setting up a framework based on rival explanations and developing case 
descriptions. Five specific techniques can be used for any of these strategies: pattern 
matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models and cross-case 
synthesis. I followed the strategies of relying on theoretical propositions and 
developing case descriptions, with the major emphasis on techniques being cross-case 
synthesis and limited explanation building. I used nonparametric statistical 
procedures to support certain of my findings. 
The four tests commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical social research 
are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Researchers 
should use multiple sources of evidence, establish a chain of evidence and have key 
informants review drafts of interviews. I believe that I followed these guidelines. I 
contend that my age and experience enabled me to gain better access to the most 
senior executives for research purposes than would be the case with most younger 
PhD candidates. 
The ethics of science concerns what is right and wrong in the conduct of research. I, 
once again, believe that I followed the guidelines and principles necessary to produce 
research that is valid, objective, reliable and conducted with integrity 
Having covered the design and methodology followed in the research, the empirical 
part of the thesis begins by examining the four multinational corporations in the next 
chapter. 
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5. CORPORATIONS STUDIED 
S. 1 Introduction 
Following on Chapter 2 which outlined South Africa's situation and salient features 
relating to the thesis, this chapter examines the South African-originated multinational 
corporations and Wolverine World Wide, the US multinational corporation. An 
understanding of the corporations is essential to answering the questions raised in the 
thesis. 
The corporations are reviewed in subsections: Industry (including key factors for 
success), Profile, History, Management, Mission, Strategy, Core Competencies, 
Operations, Financial and Statistics, and Performance versus Peer Groups. The 
most important of these are Management, Strategies, Core Competencies and 
Perfonnance versus Peer Groups. 
The section on perfonnance versus peer groups is included for three reasons. Firstly, 
one of the criteria for the selection of the multinational corporations was that their 
recent perfonnance should be better than their peer groups. Secondly, good 
perfonnance does give credibility to the viewpoints of the companies' representatives. 
Thirdly, while successful perfonnance in relation to history, industry standards and 
peer groups does not necessarily mean that core competencies are (or have been) 
effectively developed and transferred, perfonnance certainly improves the likelihood. 
S.2 Peer Groups 
The peer groups, which are common to the three South African companies, are the 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) and the different 
share indices derived from them. Table 5.1 contextualises the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange in relation to other stock markets, both in developed and 
developing countries. 
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Table 5.1 World Stock Markets, 30 December 2005 
Stock Markets Dividend Yield Percentage Price Earnings MultiI1le 
Argentina 1.75 9.3 
Australia 3.5 17.5 
Brazil 3.8 10.3 
Canada 2.12 19.6 
Chile 2.58 17.3 
China 1.23 13.9 
Hong Kong 3.07 13.2 
India 1.62 17. I 
Malaysia 3.65 I J.3 
Russia 1.27 17.3 
Singapore 2.82 14.5 
South Africa (All Share) 2.9 14.2 
Thailand 2.62 10.2 
UK (FTSE 100) 3.02 14.5 
US (Dow Jones Industrials) 1.72 18.6 
Source: Financial Times (2006:2 I). 
Incidentally, the US, with the second highest price earnings (PE) multiple ratio in the 
table, had one of the worst growth records in 2005. The Dow Jones Industrial Index 
fell by 0.61 percent while the JSE All Share Index increased by 25.5 percent in US 
dollar terms (New York Times 2006:9). By the same measurements the stock 
exchanges in London increased by 4.6 percent, Canada by 27.5 percent and India by 
33 .1 percent. The JSE PE multiples were similar to those of the London Stock 
Exchange but below that of the United States. 
The three South African companies are also listed on other stock markets and, 
because of their overseas business, are "rand hedge" shares. Their share prices on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange are likely to improve in relation to companies with 
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largely domestic interests when the rand weakens (or is expected to weaken) against 
the US dollar and other currencies. 
One way to assess the performances of different companies is to compare their share 
prices with those of competitors, peer groups and share indices over time. Other peer 
groups are companies or composites of companies in similar industries. Examples are 
the Value Line Industry Composites that are used in Sections 5.5 .10 and 5.6.10 of this 
chapter. Table 5.2 presents the share pnces of Barloworld, SAB 
Breweries/SABMiIler and Sappi, as well as JSE and All Share Index from December 
1994 to December 2005. This information is shown graphically in Figure 5.1. Each 
company will be dealt with separately in the following subsections. The share price 
returns shown for the three companies (and the JSE Index) do not include dividends 
which were typically around 4.0 percent for Barloworld, 2.2 percent for SABMiller 
and 2.6 percent for Sappi. Table 5.1 shows the dividend yield for the JSE as 2.6 
percent in 2005. 
Table 5.2 JSE Share Prices December 1994 - 2005 
Cents 
Year Barloworld SABMiller (1) 
Close High Low Close High Low Close 
1994 3,625 5,700 2,650 3,407 3,717 2,797 7,150 
1995 5,190 5,200 3,025 4,847 4,901 3,122 5,600 
1996 4,160 5,950 3,965 4,540 5,555 4,061 4,200 
1997 4,130 6,500 4,015 4,917 6,187 4,392 2,450 
1998 2,260 5,500 1,860 4,420 1,899 3,248 2,275 
1999 4,430 4,480 2,200 6,260 10,820 4,275 6,080 
2000 4,760 5,200 3,300 5,320 6,560 4,080 5,410 
2001 5,960 6,200 4,305 7,830 8,850 5,000 11,640 
2002 6,080 7,300 5,400 6,080 9,000 6,020 11,450 
2003 7,015 7,050 4,750 6,801 6,994 4,500 9,100 
2004 10,630 10,726 6,520 9,545 9,810 6,550 8 ,300 
2005 11 ,053 11 ,730 8,685 11 ,725 12,780 8,780 7,251 
Compound growth rates 
1994- 4.64 -1 .52 3.72 7.71 9.93 6.49 -4.54 2000 
2000- 18.35 17.67 21 .35 17.22 14.21 16.56 6.03 2005 
1994- 10.67 6.78 11.40 11.93 11.85 10.96 0.13 2005 
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Sappi JSE 
High Low JSE All JSE Ind 
7,000 2,975 5,867 6,984 
7,650 5,025 6,228 7,987 
5,950 3,800 6,657 7,921 
4,950 2,350 6,202 7,425 
3,400 1,800 5,430 6,284 
6,450 1,895 8,543 9,211 
7,000 3,800 8,326 8,084 
12,700 5 ,100 10,361 7,731 
16,200 10,500 10,815 6,775 
12,950 7,720 10,387 8,243 
10,450 7,452 12,676 11,768 
8,575 5 ,830 18,097 15,568 
0.0 4.16 6.01 2.46 
4.14 8.94 16.18 14.00 
1.86 6.30 10.78 7.56 
(1) When SABMiller listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1999, 773.7 million new shares were issued to replace 349 million 
outstanding at the end of 1998. Share prices for 1994 - 1998 were calculated by using shares in issue at the end of each year divided by 
773.7 million. 
Source: Johannesburg Securities Exchange (2004), Standard Bank (2006) and Financial Mail (2006a). 
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Figure 5.1 JSE All Share Index Performance 1994-2005 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Years 
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5.3 Barloworld 
5.3.1 Industry 
Barloworld is involved in a variety of industries relating to infrastructure, capital 
equipment and distribution. 
The key factors for success for the overall group are the ability to strategically understand 
each industry and have the depth of management competence and financial resources to do 
what is required (P.M. Drewell, personal interview, Sandton, 9 May 2003). The key factors 
for success for the largest business, the Caterpillar distributorship, are building and servicing 
a machine population. This includes the ability to keep a customer's equipment running, 
service at short notice and supply parts within 48 hours (Harvey 1999). 
5.3.2 Profile 
Barloworld is an industrial brand management company that achieves durability in 
business through long-term value creation. Their goal is to create val ue through 
leadership in every market in which they operate. 
Sales are approximately R39 billion or $6 billion. There are 23,000 employees in 31 
countries. Barloworld markets products and services in over 100 countries. It 
represents some of the "world ' s great brands in the marketplace". These include 
Caterpillar, Hyster, Perkins, Ditch Witch and many of the world' s leading automotive 
brands. Barloworld is arguably the largest Caterpillar dealer outside the United States 
and is the world ' s largest lift truck dealer, selling 20 percent of Hyster' s global 
production. The company is a significant player in both motor retailing and car hire 
in South Africa. There are also Barloworld's own brands that are market leaders in 
their respective product and service niches. These include cement, lime, coatings, 
scientific equipment and steel tube brands. 
The head office is in Johannesburg, South Africa. There is a primary listing on the 
JSE Securities Exchange, South Africa, with secondary listings in London, Frankfurt, 
Antwerp, the joint Swiss exchanges and Namibia. The portfolios of 20 institutional 
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investment companies account for 63 .05 percent of the company shareholding. All 20 
are located in South Africa (Barloworld Annual Report 2005). 
Other information in this subsection was obtained from Barloworld (2005a). 
5.3.3 History 
Major Ernest (Billy) Barlow formed Thomas Barlow and Sons in Durban, Natal, in 
1902. It was an independent company based on a family business of the same name 
in England. It initially handled woollen goods, such as blankets and coats. 
Engineering components were added within five years. 
A Johannesburg office was opened in 1920. "Punch" (Charles Sydney) Barlow joined 
the company in 1927 and sold the first Caterpillar tractor. Barlow and Sons became 
the official Caterpillar dealer and two years later added the forklift dealership. The 
company was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1941. 
The company acquired the Ford dealership's Nagington Motors and entered the motor 
distribution business in 1959. It expanded rapidly into many fields in the 1960s 
embracing motor vehicle retailing, steel and building materials, materials handling 
equipment, consumer electronics and steel manufacturing and sale. It also acquired 
trading interests in the UK, Zimbabwe, Botswana and what was then South West 
Africa. It was listed on the London Stock Exchange in 1969. 
In 1970, Barlow Rand was formed with the acquisition of Rand Mines. Cement, 
stainless steel, telecommunications, paint and additional motor franchises were added 
to the business portfolios. There were further acquisitions in the 1980s as growth 
continued through diversification. Information technology, electrical engineering and 
textile businesses were acquired. Barlow Rand also managed the IBM and Merck 
brands in South Africa at the time. In 1984, Barlow Rand acquired J. Bibby and Sons 
pic in the United Kingdom. This was to be a major springboard to further 
international expansion. The Bibby business included scientific products. 
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In 1989, the company had profits after tax of Rl billion. The exchange rate in that 
year was R2.54 to the dollar. There were 240,000 employees. International 
expansion continued in Europe in the early 1990s, absorbing Lamson in Belgium, 
Finanzauto in Spain and Stet in Portugal. Finanzauto was the Caterpillar distributor in 
Spain, listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, and the acquisition of it by Barlow Rand 
was the second-ever contested takeover in Spanish corporate history. This is now a 
case study that is taught at leading business schools around the world (Miller and 
Velamuri 1998). Barlow Rand sales in 1992 were $12.6 billion, when the exchange 
rate was R2.80 to the dollar. 
During the period of political transition in South Afiica (1990 to 1994), Barlow Rand 
played a major part in the peaceful transition to democracy and assisted in the 
management of the elections. In 1993/94, it focused and streamlined its businesses to 
concentrate on capital goods, specific industries and motor retailing. The other 
businesses were unbundled. 
The period 1995 to 2000 was a time of consolidation and investment. Three billion 
rand was invested in business units to achieve the world-class capabilities required for 
the 21 st century. Global activities were expanded with the acquisition of Lanes 
Limited and Taubmans in Australia, the Ditch Witch franchise in Georgia, USA, the 
Perkins distributorship in South Afiica and the Caterpillar franchise in Siberia. 
The value based management strategy and philosophy was adopted in 1999 (P.M. 
Drewell, personal interview, 9 May 2003). The name Barloworld was adopted in 
2000. International expansion continued in 2001 with the acquisition of Freightliner 
in the USA, three motor dealers in Australia, a laboratory business in the UK and a 
cement business in Zimbabwe. The company also launched a new business unit 
called Barloworld Logistics, formed from operations in its other businesses. In 2004 
the company acquired the balance of the shares it did not already own in Avis 
Southern Afiica. 
Information for this subsection was obtained from Barloworld (2005b). 
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5.3.4 Management 
Warren Clelow (68), the Non-Executive Chainnan, joined the group in 1963. He was 
appointed CEO of Barlow Rand Limited (now Barloworld Limited) in 1983 and was 
appointed Chief Executive Officer in 1985. The CEO, AJ. (Tony) Phillips joined 
Barloworld in 1968. He led the turnaround to profit of the then-listed Spanish 
subsidiary Finanzauto from 1993 to 1995, and became CEO of Barloworld in 1999. 
The ten executive directors of Barloworld are listed in Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3 Barloworld Management 
Name Responsibility Age Year Joined 
A.J. (Tony) Phillips CEO 59 1968 
J. (John) Blackbeard Scientific 48 1996 
M.D. (Mike) Coward Steel Tube 52 1977 
L.S. (Lester) Day Equipment 58 1973 
B.P. (Brandon) Diamond Industrial Distribution 54 1970 
J .E. (John) Gomersell PP Cement and Lime 59 1971 
A.J. (Andre) Lamprecht Barloworld Coatings 53 1981 
M. (Martin) Laubscher Barloworld Motor 45 1980 
P.M. (Peter) Surgey Executive Director HR 50 1983 
C.B. (Clive) Thompson Finance Director 39 1997 
Source: Barloworld Annual Report 2005: 18. 
Four of the directors each have more than 30 years of service while another three have 
more than 20 years of service each. Two of the executive directors are British citizens 
and the other seven are South African citizens. There have been only five CEOs in the 
1 03-year history of the company (Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
The company had 107 managers and technical experts serving outside South Africa in 
October 2005 (P.M. Drewell, personal communication, 15 November 2005). Fifty 
one of these were stationed in Botswana, 10 in Angola and 10 in Namibia. Only 14 of 
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the 107 employees were serving outside Africa, with one each in Australia and Spain, 
three in Siberia, three in the UK and six in the USA. 
5.3.5 Mission 
The overall miSSIOn is to achieve durability in business. through long-term value 
creation for all stakeholders. 
Our overriding goal is to sustainably add value for our stakeholders - our 
shareholders, our customers, employees, principals and suppliers - and the 
communities in which we operate, including our custodianship of the physical 
environment. We strive to make a distinct and positive contribution in the 
local markets in which we compete. Our strategies are designed to ensure that 
the benefits we bring to all stakeholders will continue for the long term 
(Barloworld Annual Report 2004:6). 
5.3.6 Strategy 
"Value Based Management (VBM) is at the heart of how we do business. What 
makes VBM different is the recognition that we seek to create value for all our 
stakeholders simultaneously" (Barloworld Annual Report 2004:6). This philosophy 
or strategy requires a minimum cash flow return on investment of 8 percent. Further 
details of the strategies are presented in the 2002 to 2005 Annual Reports and the 
Barloworld website (2005a) and (2005b) as shown below: 
1. The focus is to build an International Brand Management Company that 
delivers world-class performance and profitability. 
2. Constantly strive to improve financial and operational performance usmg 
Value-Based Management (VBM) as the driving force to achieve this goal. 
VBM principles are applied to every facet of the business, from strategy to 
capital allocation (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
3. Build "a dynamic, innovative and forward-looking organisation that allows us 
to attract people of the highest calibre, people who will continue on the path 
toward creating a value enterprise with a global footprint... We encourage 
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best practice to create value through new, different and better ways of doing 
things ... We rely on the calibre and commitment of our people, based on 
teamwork, care for the customer, loyalty, integrity, honesty and 
entrepreneurship". 
4. Expand within existing activities. 
5. Develop grassroots opportunities within core competencies. 
6. Expand geographic footprint. 
7. Add new products and service "in what we do well". 
5.3 .7 Core Competencies 
These include the ability to create and sustain long-term relationships, the ability to 
evolve and innovate, a unique organisational ability to function together and 
implement coherent strategies across the organisation and corporate culture (value-
based management philosophy). Others are corporate governance, merger and 
acquisition capabilities (including post-merger integration) and the unique ability to 
operate under difficult circumstances (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
5.3.8 Operations 
Barloworld has nine divisions: Capital Equipment, Industrial Distribution, Motor, 
Cement and Lime, Scientific, Coatings, Steel Tube, Logistics and Financial Services 
and Other. Figure 5.2 below shows the countries and regions in which each of the 
divisions has operations. 
Figure 5.2 Barloworld Operations 
Asia 
• Scientific 
Australia 
• Motor 
• Coatings 
• Logistics 
Canada 
• Scientific 
Europe 
• Capital Equipment 
• Industrial Distribution 
• Scientific 
• Logistics 
Russia 
• Capital Equipment (Siberia 
Southern Africa 
• Capital Equipment 
• Motor 
• Cement and Lime 
• Coatings 
• Steel Tube 
• Logistics 
• Financial Services 
United Kingdom 
• Industrial Distribution 
• Scientific 
• Logistics 
United States 
• Industrial Distribution 
• Scientific 
• Financial Services 
• Logistics 
Source: Barloworld Annual Report 2004:17. 
5.3.9 Financials and Statistics 
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Table 5.4 summarises financial and operating results for the financial years ending 
September from 1999 to 2005. Appendix 5.1 provides similar information for the 
period from 1993 to 1999. 
Sales increased from R12,874 million in 1994 to R39,401 million in 2005, a growth 
rate of 10.7 percent per year, some of the growth stemming from acquisitions. Net 
profit increased from R338 million to R2,176 million over this period, a growth rate 
of 18.4 percent a year. Significantly higher growth rates were experienced from 1999 
to 2005 - sales 12.6 percent per year, and profit before exceptional items, 23.5 percent 
a year. 
The return on equity calculations, for the period 1993 to 1999 shown in Appendix 5.1 , 
includes exceptional items. Once the exceptional items are excluded the return on 
equity declines to 9.4 percent in 1994 and 8.6 percent in 1999, with mid-teen figures 
achieved in between. These are not high returns when one considers the inflation and 
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interest rates over this period, which were discussed in Chapter 2. The return on 
equity has improved steadily since 1999, rising to 16.0 percent in 2005. P.M. Drewell 
(9 May 2003) attributes the improvements to the introduction of Value Based 
Management in 1999. Operating margins improved from 4.4 percent in 1999 to 8.8 
percent in 2005. Targets are shown on page 117 of the 2005 Barloworld Annual 
Report. The target for return on equity is to exceed 15 percent and for operating 
margin to exceed 7 percent. Total borrowings to total shareholders funds increased 
from 42.1 percent in 1999 to 63.2 percent in 2005. 
The market capitalisation of R24,260 million at 30 September 2004 included a 
premium over the interest of shareholders of R12,181 million compared to the 
discount of R943 million on a market capitalisation of R6,301 million at the same 
date in 1999. 
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Table 5.4 Barloworld Seven-Year Summary 2005 
Comoound 
annual 2005 200':' 2003 2002- 2001- 2000' 1999-
Gro\'.1n 1)., Rm Rm Rm Rm Rm Rm Rm 
BALANCE SHEETS 
Assets 
Prop-:m . olam ano equipment 87 7 922 i 10t 6 655 7 65 60 3 5 297 J 81 
GoodWin and Irtanglble as:,ets 299 2 745 2675 • 580 1903 i 530 890 57 1 
tnvestmen:.s 10 a tes & 'Id 
101m vunt.ures and ether 
non..curffint assets 93 2853 3 0<6 3503 4 0 19 2 74 1 14 1674 
D~,ferr(::d taxaLOn assets 2'7 550 17 472 385 2 188 169 
Non -current assets 117 14 070 13946 I :" 2'0 13872 10 71~ 8318 722!1 
Current asset$ 10 7 14 535 13 sm 11 548 1322£, 111.3:J 8419 1 891 
Total assets 11 .2 28605 2 8" 3 '3758 27 097 21946 16738 151 2 
Equity and liabilities 
Cap:tal and reserves 
Silarc ~rol and ptCfT'I1Um 1397 1 209 712 682 68 690 749 
Rc.:.'";erves ana r m ned inco:n~ 10 682 9 93 6 972 10552 8 39:> 7 208 6 4!!5 
Intcros t of shareholders of 
Ba rloworld Limited 8g 12079 11 ~n~ 968" 23--1 9 071 7898 7244 
MIflOllty IOterest 648 7 1(1 7!l6 i • &25 ::5G :,54 
Intcmst of all shareho lders 12725 1 ! 32' 10390 12025 9 70? (i .154 7 108 
Non-currcnt (iabihllcS 176 7103 € 938 4 916 5 195 3 845 ?as! m.iO 
Deferred taA~hon tlabilloos 90S 7 97 617 6 17 318 281 277 
n CI!! It."Ilt liabilities 8 197 6 141 4299 4576 3527 2600 2 ,103 
Current liabilities , - Z S 77i 9 ()8.: 8 ~52 9677 8399 5 403 4 6<2 
1 otal e'Uuity and habillties 1 2 2860S 27 843 23 756 27 097 21946 16 738 15 120 
INCOM!:' STATEMENTS 
Rt!venue 126 39401 36672 • G03 35 999 2794 :!2 4!j7 19337 
Oper.:mng profit boforo 
goodwill arrmrtlsatlon 2" .; 3 480 2 979 ~ 442 207 1487 t 155 BS-> 
GaDO": n arnor...satlOll (1 48) (113) (1 16) ( ) (-H) (34) 
Operating profit 27 ? 3 480 2 8-' 2 329 1 951 1399 1 '106 820 
I-a l ~ va lie adlustmeClu; on 
',nancla! tnslrutnentS (56) (l 07) I 34) 55 
FlI'lan~ COSts (-163) 1474) (531 ) (401) (305) (2.17"1 (293) 
ncome Irorn Investments 187 259 274 253 25-1 256 296 
Prof1t n-om contlfluing operations 25_1 3148 2 509 1 738 1 858 1 348 1 117 823 
Loss frcm dlsccntl'1umf, operallOns (30) (85) 
Profit bofore exceptional items 3 148 2 509 1 738 1 858 1 348 1 0S7 738 
Exc pilooal stems 4 40 81 3G9 (278) 008 95 1 
Profit before taxation 3152 2549 1 819 2 ::.:27 107 , 755 18 9 
T~xatlOn (1033) (8BS) (GOO) (536) (383) (3021 182) 
Profrt a!te. t,u:_ation 2 119 1661 1 219 I 59 1 687 , J,SJ , 507 
'ncQtOO ~om ass.oc\Clte5 ana 
JOin! ventu~es 57 107 114 110 31 40 6 1 
Net profit 2176 i 768 1333 1 no 71 - 4 15i13 
Ai utal)5C to 
\~I!\O . sh2retlOlders 315 259 :.:11 207 101 87 73 
Ba"'o-.',ortd l lm,ted Sharehokl 1861 1 509 11 22 1 503 11 ' 4C$ 1495 
2 116 1768 1 333- 17 1(l 718 1493 1 568 
Attributable net profit f!xcluding 
cxceptional items and (os£. from 
d l!:Ocontinulny o pcra !.;ons 203 1855 1 492 1 031 1 156 ss-: 766 613 
Table 5.4 Barloworld Seven-Year Summary (continued) 
CASH FLOW STATEMENTS 
Cash flow from operations 
Dividends paid (including 
minority shareholders) 
Net cash flow (used in) from 
investing activities 
Net cash flow from (used in ) 
financing activities 
Net (decrease)/increase in 
cash and cash equivalents 
2005 
Rm 
3576 
(1 197) 
(2980) 
601 
0 
2004 
Rm 
3153 
(897) 
(2 124) 
(258) 
(100) 
PROFITABILITY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT 
Operating margin % 
Net asset turn X 
Return on net assets 
% 
Return on ordinary 
share holders funds' 
% 
Cash flow return on 
investment** % 
Target 
>7 
>2 
>15 
>15 
>8 
8.8 
1.9 
17.8 
16.0 
10.3 
.. 
'excluding exceptional items CFROI 
LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE 
Total liabilities to total 
shareholder funds <150 
Total borrowing to 
shareholder funds 
Net 
borrowingsiEBITDA 
Number of years to 
repay interest bearing 
debts 
Current ratio 
VALUE ADDED 
Number of 
employees 
Revenue per 
employee 
Value created per 
employee 
Employment cost 
per employee 
<2 .5 
<5 
>1 
ROOD 
ROOD 
ROOO 
117.7 
63.2 
1.2 
2.2 
1.7 
25963 
1539.2 
473.4 
250.5 
8.1 
2.0 
17.1 
14.4 
8.9 
128.8 
65.2 
1.4 
2.4 
1.5 
25233 
1528.6 
451 .3 
249.8 
2003 
Rm 
241 9 
(940) 
(1 812) 
487 
154 
7.1 
2.0 
14.7 
9.9 
8.1 
122.7 
59.1 
1.2 
2.5 
1.4 
22749 
1506.4 
407.3 
237.3 
Source: Barloworld Annual Report 2005:115-119. 
2002 
Rm 
3037 
(649) 
(2 621) 
(24) 
(257) 
5.7 
2 .0 
12.8 
11.2 
8.5 
120.2 
59 .8 
1.6 
2.4 
1.3 
23192 
1550.8 
430.6 
251.3 
2001 
Rm 
2317 
(436) 
(2 834) 
1 625 
672 
5.2 
1.9 
11.8 
10.4 
8.3 
122.9 
64.1 
1.8 
4.2 
1.3 
23233 
1236.4 
304 .9 
193.2 
2000 
Rm 
1 494 
(381 ) 
(1 764) 
411 
(240) 
5.5 
1.9 
12.2 
9.7 
6.6 
94.7 
43.7 
1.4 
2.6 
1.6 
21966 
1018.1 
300.6 
169.8 
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1999 
Rm 
1 176 
(324) 
724 
(1 122) 
454 
4.4 
1.8 
10.7 
8 .6 
6.2 
90.3 
42.1 
1.2 
2.3 
1.7 
22148 
774.2 
253.6 
137.9 
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5.3.10 Perfonnance versus Peer Group 
P.M. Drewell (9 May 2003) states that one of the insights of the value based 
management system and Holt Methodology (discussed in Subsection 2.7.1) is the 
recognition that the Barloworld peer group, in tenns of performance, is the South 
African stock market. The company compares its stock market perfonnance to the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) indices in its 2005 annual report. 
Table 5.2 shows the JSE share prices from 1994 to 2005. Barloworld, based on the 
closing price at year end, achieved a compound growth rate of 10.7 percent compared 
to the JSE All Share Index of 10.8 percent and JSE Industrial Index 7.6 percent for the 
11 years from 1994 to 2005 (Barloworld ' s value to investors would have been higher 
than the JSE because their dividends averaged 4.0 percent compared to the JSE 
average of 3.1 percent). The Barloworld share price growth rates were even better in 
the five years from 2000 to 2005 - 18.4 percent - compared to 16.2 percent for the 
All Share Index and 14 percent for the Industrial Index. 
The Barloworld price earnings multiple (PE) varied from 8.5 to 11.0 from 1999 to 
2004 and stood at 13.2, compared to the JSE All Share Index of 14.2 on 30 December 
2005 . 
The company's results ill other currencies such as the US dollar are shown ill 
Appendix 5.2. 
5.4 SABMiller 
5.4.1 Industry 
The company is involved in the brewing industry, soft drinks and fruit juices. Its 
southern African interests include hotels and gaming, and a 30 percent interest in a 
leading wine and spirit company (SABMiller Annual Report 2005). 
Thompson and Strickland (2003) believe that the key factors for success in the 
brewing industry are: full utilisation of brewing capacity (to keep manufacturing costs 
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low); a strong network of wholesale distributors (to give access to as many retail 
outlets as possible) and clever advertising (to induce beer drinkers to buy a particular 
brand). I would add the importance of brands - whether global , national, regional or 
local- to this list. Consistent quality and taste are crucial. 
Key factors for success for the soft drinks industry would be similar, although global 
brands would be even more important. The four leading global brewing players held 
32 percent of the world beer market in 2002, while the four top players in consumer 
products generally hold from 60 to 85 percent of their markets (Mackay 2003, cited 
by Crotty 2003). 
5.4.2 Profile 
SABMiller is the second largest brewer in the world, by volume, with a brewing 
presence in over 40 countries. It is one of the world's diverse international brewers, 
with leading market positions in the United States and certain countries in Europe, 
Central America, Asia and Africa. The company recently acquired the second largest 
brewer in South America. It is one of the largest bottlers and distributors of Coca-
Cola products outside of the United States. SABMiller has a diverse and 
comprehensive portfolio of local, regional and global brands. Its major brands 
include Miller Lite, Miller Genuine Draft, Pilsner Urquell, Castle Lager, Peroni 
Nastro Azzurro, Tyskie Gronie and Snow (SABMiller Annual Report 2005). 
Sales for the 2005 financial year exceeded $14.5 billion, the equivalent of R87.4 
billion. There were 40,668 employees at the end of 2005, while associate companies 
in China employed a further 28,000 people (SABMiller Annual Report 2005). 
The head office is in London, England, where the company is domiciled. SABMiller 
is listed on both the London Stock Exchange and the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange. 
Nine companies held in excess of 3 percent of the share capital (having normal voting 
rights) as of May 2005. These b'fOUPS accounted for 67.4 percent of the total 
shareholding, the Altria Group Inc, in the United States, having 23.8 percent, groups 
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in the United Kingdom 7.9 percent, with the remaining 35.7 percent held by groups in 
South Africa (SABMiller Annual Report 2005:114). 
5.4.3 History 
The company was founded in 1895·and listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange as 
the first industrial share on that exchange in 1897. It was listed on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1898. 
Expansion continued north of the Limpopo River border of South Africa with the 
formation of Rhodesian Breweries in 1910. In 1911, South African Breweries (SAB) 
assisted the local barley industry by supplying seed free of charge and contracting to 
buy the crop at market prices. 
In 1917, it acquired the defunct Union Glass Company to counter the shortage of 
bottles during World War I. In 1925, SAB acquired a stake in Schweppes carbonated 
soft drinks. In 1935, SAB and rival Ohlsson's established extensive hop fields at 
George in the Western Cape. The same two companies promoted the local barley 
industry in 1945. In 1950, the SAB head office and seat of control moved from 
London to Johannesburg. Rhodesian Breweries invested in a new brewery in Ndola, 
Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, in 1951. 
In 1955, a new excise duty structure was introduced that discriminated against beer in 
favour of wine and spirits, making beer the most heavily taxed beverage in South 
Africa. The demand for beer fell because of the increased taxes. SAB responded by 
consolidating with the two other larger brewers in SA at the time: Ohlssons and 
United Breweries. In 1960, SAB bought control of the Stellenbosch Farmers ' 
Winery. 
In 1962, the government lifted restrictions on the drinking of alcohol by black South 
Africans. This, together with focused marketing activities, began to remedy a static 
situation in beer consumption. In 1964, SAB was granted a license to brew Guinness 
in South Africa, Amstel in 1965 and Carling Black Label in 1966. 
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Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery merged with Moni's Wineries, but SAB was 
compelled to reduce its holding to 34 percent. Excise duties on beer were again 
increased significantly in 1966. SAB positioned itself to diversify by forming Barsab 
Investment Trust, a joint venture with Thomas Barlow and Sons for acquisitions 
outside both their mainstream activities. From the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, SAB 
followed a strategy of growth through diversification. This involved the food 
industry, real estate, Southern Sun Hotels (including Sun City), mass market retailing, 
furniture, footwear, plate glass, textiles, matches and clothing retail (Wits Business 
School 2003). 
In 1972, a new competitor, Luyt Breweries, entered the market. It was unsuccessful 
and was salvaged and revitalised by the Rembrandt Group (a leading tobacco and 
spirits company) as Intercontinental Breweries. The so-called 'beer wars ' went on for 
some seven years, generating unprecedented interest in beer and stimulating 
marketing sophistication and product and packaging innovation never seen before. 
In 1973, SAB established breweries in Botswana and Angola. Barsab was dismantled 
in the same year, and the two shareholders each took control of different companies 
from the portfolio. A small taste change in Castle Lager impressed the brewers at the 
time but nearly cost the brand its life - the mistake was quickly reversed, hammering 
home the lesson that the brand does not belong to the brewer or the marketer, but to 
the consumer. 
In 1975, SAB acquired its failed competitors, Whitbreads and Old Dutch; 
Stellenbosch Farmers ' Winery once again became a wholly owned subsidiary. In 
1976, SAB acquired Swaziland Breweries. 
In 1978, SAB published a code on non-discriminatory employment, the first in the 
country. 
In 1981 , the company secured a controlling interest in Lesotho Breweries. In 1983, 
SAB made some investments away from the southern African subcontinent through 
beverages in the USA such as soft drinks, juice and a niche beer, Rolling Rock. The 
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US investments were reluctantly terminated III 1988, because of political 
considerations at the time. 
Hungary's largest brewery, Dreher, was acquired in a SAB beachhead move into 
Central Europe in 1993. Dreher was located in the middle of Prague, and SAB 
experienced difficulties with supply deliveries and convincing people to come to work 
because of expensive bus fares. SAB also learned a lesson when competitors did not 
follow their price leadership (A. Miller Salzman, personal interview, London, 
3 February 2003). 
Following the first democratic elections in SA in 1994, SAB was invited to revitalise 
the beer industry in Tanzania by that country's government and also re-entered the 
markets in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. By the end of the 1990s, SAB was the 
largest brewer in Afiica, producing over half of the beer consumed on that continent 
(Wits Business School 2003). SAB continued the process of international expansion 
by obtaining joint control of the second largest brewer in China in 1994 and further 
investments in Poland and Rumania in 1996. 
A new CEO, Graham Mackay, was appointed in 1999. There was a renewed focus on 
core brewing activities, and non-core interests were sold. The company became the 
largest brewer in Eastern Europe with the acquisition of breweries in the Czech 
Republic (Pilsner Urquell) and became active in Russia and India as well. 
In 1999, SAB moved its primary listing back to London, and the head office was 
moved from Joharmesburg to that city. In 2001, turnover from SAB's international 
operations accounted for 42 percent of group turnover. SAB formed a pan-Afiican 
strategic alliance with the Castel Group and also entered Central America with 
brewing and soft drink acquisitions in Honduras and El Salvador. 
SABMiller pic was formed in 2002 as SAB acquired 100 percent of The Miller 
Brewing Company, the second largest brewery in the United States. SABMiller 
became the second largest brewer, by volume, in the world. In 2003 , it made its first 
significant investment in Western Europe with a majority interest in Birra Peroni in 
Italy. In 2005 SABMilier obtained a controlling interest in Bavaria S.A., the second 
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largest brewer in South America with leading market positions in Colombia, Peru, 
Ecuador and Panama. 
The SABMilier history is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.3. 
Information in this subsection was obtained from SABMilier (2006b). 
Figure 5.3 
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5.4.4 Management 
Jacob Meyer Kahn (65), the chairman, joined the group in 1966. He was appointed 
Group Managing Director of SAB Limited in 1983 and Executive Chainnan in 1990. 
He was seconded full-time to the South African Police Service as its Chief-Executive 
in 1997, serving for two and a half years. In 1999, he assumed the chairmanship of 
SAB pIc. 
E.A.G. (Graham) Mackay joined SAB Ltd in 1978. He held a number of senior 
positions before becoming Chief Executive in 1999, overseeing the company's 
relisting on the London Stock Exchange in the same year. Malcolm Ian Wyman has 
been with the company since 1986. He became Group Corporate Financial Director 
in 1990 and Chief Financial Officer in 2001. Table 5 summarises details of the top 
management. Only three of the executives listed have less than 15 years service with 
the company and are all in "staff' positions, engaged to bring in new expertise 
required by the changed circumstances of the company. Five of the 10 have more 
than 20 years service. Eight of the 10 are South African citizens. 
Table 5.5 SABMiller Management 
Name Responsibility Age Year Joined 
E.A.G. Mackay Chief Executive 56 1978 
M.L (Malcolm)Wyman Chief Financial Officer 59 1986 
N.J. (Norman) Adami Miller Brewing Company 50 1979 
A. (Alan) Clark SABMiller Europe 45 1990 
S. (Sue) Clark Corporate Affairs Director 41 2003 
J. (Johan) Nel Human Resources Directo 48 1998 
A.C. (Andre) Parker SABMiller Africa and Asia 54 1975 
M. (Mark) Sherrington Marketing Director 49 2002 
A. (Andrew) Tonkinson Group Company Secretary 60 1976 
A. (Tony) van Kraligen The South African Breweries 47 1982 
Source: SABMiller Annual Report 2005:46-48. 
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B. (Barry) Smith joined this management team with responsibility for the South 
American operations when the Bavaria S.A. transaction finalised. He was engaged by 
The South African Breweries in 1984. 
J.M.Kahn's predecessor, RJ. (Dick) Goss, served as Chief Executive of SAB for 17 
years. 
The vast majority of the company's approximately 55 breweries around the world are 
headed by management teams originating in South Africa. About 140 managers and 
technical experts had been "exported" from South Africa by 200 1 (E.A.G Mackay, 
personal interview, London, 27 November 200 I). This number had risen to 168, stationed 
in 24 countries, by the end of 2004. Twenty of the 168 were non-SA Breweries or 
expatriate employees. SABMiller Europe headquartered in Budapest accounted for 24 
of the total, Tanzania 10, India 10, and the USA (Miller Brewing) 9. Secondments to 
11 African countries accounted for 63 of the 168 total. There are trends of the 
numbers declining in certain countries as local nationals were trained to replace 
seconded people (M. van Eyk, personal communication, 21 October 2005). 
5.4.5 Mission 
The mission statement of the group in December 2003 (SABMiller 2003a) was as 
follows: 
SABMiller pIc is an international company committed to achieving sustained 
commercial success, principally in beer and other beverages, but also with 
strategic investments in hotels and gaming. We achieve this by meeting the 
aspirations of our customers through quality products and services and by 
sharing fairly among all stakeholders the wealth and opportunities generated, 
and by seeking business partners who share our values. Thereby, we fulfil our 
goals of business growth and maximised long-term shareholder value while 
behaving in a socially responsible and progressive manner. 
The current website (sabmiller.com 2005) lists guiding principles for dealing with 
shareholders, partners, other providers of capital, customers/consumers, suppliers, 
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employees, communities, government and current and future generations. An 
example relating to shareholders is that SABMiller is committed to increasing long-
term shareholder value, exceeding that achieved on comparable investments. 
5.4.6 Strategy 
SABMiller's strategy as communicated in the 2003 Annual Report was to: 
I . Drive volume and productivity. 
2. Optimise and expand its existing positions through acquisition. 
3. Seek value-adding opportunities to enhance its position as a global brewer. 
4. Grow its brands in the international premium beer market. 
"In Africa we learnt, on a small scale, how to run foreign companies. Then we went 
into Eastern Europe and learnt more; we also made mistakes and learnt our experience 
didn' t always work. Probably most important was that we learnt how to be 
adaptable" (EAG. Mackay 2003, cited by Crotty 2003). 
Mackay (2005) expounded on this strategy in the 2004 and 2005 annual reports. 
SABMiller saw gains to be made in the near term from its strong established 
operations in growth markets: South Africa, the rest of Africa, Europe and Central 
America. It then envisaged, somewhat later, growth from the recent big acquisitions, 
Miller in the United States and Peroni in Italy. The developing markets of China and 
India and the growing contribution of their international premium brands make up the 
longer-term part of the strategy. 
5.4.7 Core Competencies 
Core competencies are human capital/corporate culture, low-cost quality production 
(the lowest cost quality manufacturer and distributor of beer in the world), "high 
tech", marketing, merger and acquisition capabilities (including post-M&A 
integration), purchasing and distribution (R. van der Schyff, personal interview, 10 
June 2003 and A. Miller Salzman, personal interview, 3 February 2003). 
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The above were the core competencies used for purposes of the thesis. SABMiller set out 
explicit core competencies to be used globally in 2004 (G.Leibowitz, personal interview, 
London, 13 July 2004). These are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
5.4.8 Operations 
The company IS divided into five geographic regions for brewing and bottling 
businesses. The North American region has eight breweries; Central America three 
breweries and six bottling plants; Europe eighteen breweries and one bottling plant; 
Africa and Asia have sixty-one breweries and ten bottling plants; South Africa has 
seven breweries. Twenty-nine of the Africa and Asia breweries are commercial 
sorghum breweries. The Other Beverage Interests Division, located in South Africa, 
has an additional ten bottling plants. The Hotels and Gaming Division in Southern 
Africa, in which SABMiller now has a 49 percent shareholding, has four casinos and 
seventy-seven hotels (SABMilier Annual Report 2005). 
5.4.9 Financials and Statistics 
Table 5.6 summarises the financial results for the years ending March from 2001 to 
2005. These are in US dollars. The years 1997 to 2001 are shown in both US dollars 
and South African rands and are available in Appendix 5.4. Appendix 5.3 covers the 
years from 1992 to 1998 in South African rands. 
The adjusted earnings mentioned in Table 5.6 exclude the impact of amortisation and 
other nonrecurring items, to present a more meaningful comparison for the years 
shown in consolidated financial statements (SABMilier Annual Report 2005:81). 
Group sales increased from $4,543 million in 1997 to $12,901 million in 2005, an 
annual compound growth rate of 13.9 percent over the eight-year period. Net profits 
increased from $363 million to $1,141 million over the same period, a growth rate of 
15.4 percent a year. 
Return on equity averaged 24.6 percent from 1992 to 1998 and declined to an average 
of 16.9 percent from 1999 to 2005. The return on equity declined to a low of 10.4 
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percent in 2003 but improved to 16.3 percent in 2005. The temporary decline in 
return on equity is attributable to the acquisition programme. Brewing companies 
generally have a price earnings (PE) multiple in the high teens, and premiums are 
usually paid in an acquisition. Examples of PE multiples are Anheuser-Busch (US) 
15.8, Fosters (Australia) 12.5, Heineken (Holland) 16.6, Interbrew (Belgium) 16.9 
and Scottish and Newcastle (UK) 21.2 (Financial Times 2005:14). 
Operating margins, which have been as high as 16.7 percent, declined to 11.1 percent 
in 2003 but improved to 14 percent in 2005 . Total borrowings to total assets varied 
from 23.9 percent in 2001, rising to 28.8 percent in 2003 and reducing to 21.9 percent 
in 2005. This ratio had exceeded 60 percent at times in the 1990s. 
The business segment analysis shown in Appendix 5.5 is worth studying. Beer South 
Africa, which accounted for $2,522 million of the $14,543 million sales, including 
associates, contributed $708 million of the $2,043 million operating profit, recording 
net operating assets of$284 million out of the group total of$10,499 million in 2005. 
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Table 5.6 SABMiller Five-Year Financial Review 2005 
Years ended 31 March 
2001 2002 2003# 2004 2005 
Restated Restated 
US$m US$m US$m US$m US$m 
Income statements 
Turnover (including associates share) 4,184 4,364 I 8,984 12,645 14,543 
Turnover (excluding associa tes share) 3,624 3,71 7 ! 8,167 11 ,366 12,901 
Profit before interest and taxation (including 700 704 I 933 1,579 2,361 
associates) 
Net interest payable -54 -98 -163 -188 -167 
Taxation -195 -208 -349 -579 -850 
Minorities -99 -105 -125 -167 -203 
Profit for the year 352 293 296 645 1,141 
Adjusted earnings 372 350 581 925 1,251 
Balance sheets 
Fixed assets 3,667 4,758 10,431 11,483 12,287 
Current asset investments/cash at bank and in hand 218 290 561 682 1,143 
Other current assets 514 643 1,258 1,634 1,798 
Total assets 4,399 5,691 12,250 13,799 15,228 
Interest-bearing debt -1 ,053 -1,535 -3,523 -3 ,707 -3,339 
Other creditors and provisions -1 ,054 -1,102 -2,377 -3,108 -3,586 
Total liabilities -2,107 -2,637 I -5,900 -6,815 -6,925 
Net assets 2,292 3,054 6,350 6,984 8,303 
Shareholders funds 2,006 2,309 5,572 6,165 7,665 
Equity minority interests 286 745 778 81 9 638 
Capital employed 2,292 3,054 6,350 I 6,964 8,303 
Cash flow statements I 
EBITDA 854 I 904 1,483 2,185 2,740 
Working capital movements 5 71 85 107 52 
Net cash inflow from operating activities 859 I 975 1,568 2,292 I 2,792 
Net interest and dividends -93 -158 -238 -286 -251 
Taxation -179 -179 -286 -456 -625 
587 638 1,044 1,550 1,916 
Net capital expenditure -331 -250 -429 -549 ·738 
Net investments 7 -49 -6 -2 11 456 
Net acquisition of subsidiaries and associates -700 -768 -54 -515 -897 
Net cash (shortfall)/surplus -437 -429 555 275 737 
Management of liquid resources 64 19 44 -16 -658 
Net cash inflow/(outflow) from financing 491 699 -48 12 -100 
Dividends paid -177 I -173 -203 -309 -412 
(Decrease)/increase in cash in the year -59 116 I 248 -38 ·433 
Performance per share (US cents per share) 
Basic earnings 50.4 40.7 27,5 54.1 94.1 
Diluted earnings 50.3 40.3 27.4 53.0 91 .1 
Adjusted basic earnings 53.3 48.7 54.0 77.6 103.2 
Net asset value 258.9 274.6 438.3 484.4 569.2 
Share statistics 
Total number of shares (mill ion) 775.0 840.9 1,271.20 1,272.70 1,346.50 
W eighted average number of shares (million) 697.1 718.5 1,076.10 1,192.20 1,212,10 
Weighted average number of shares (diluted) (million) 699.4 766.6 1,079.10 1,264.70 1,272.80 
Returns and productivity 
Return on equity (%) 18.5 15.2 10.4 15.0 16.3 
Operating margin (%) I 16.7 16.1 11.1 12.2 14.0 
Cash operating margin (%) ~ 23.6 24.3 18.4 19.3 21.2 
Operating return (%) I 42.6 37.5 I 34.9 44.0 55.6 i 
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Table 5.6 SABMiller Five-Year Financial Review 2005 (continued) 
I Cash operating retum (%) 22.2 17.9 13.2 16.7 18.9 
! Group tumover per employee (US$OOOs) 115.7 111 .9 192.6 287.2 315.5 
Average monthly number of employees 31,327 33,230 42.402 39,571 40,892 
Solvency and liquidity 
Net interest cover (times) 13.0 7.2 6.1 8.2 12.2 
Free cash flow 349 496 755 1.161 1,825 
Total borrowings to total assets (%) 23.9 27.0 28.8 26.9 21.9 
Cash flow to total borrowings (%) 81.6 63.5 44.5 61.8 83.6 
# 2003 figures have been restated to reflect the adoption of FRS 5 Reporting the substance of transactions, application 
note G and UITF 38. Earlier years have not been restated. 
Source: SABMlller Annual Report 2005: 121 
5.4.10 Performance versus Peer Group 
The following graph compares the company' s total shareholder return (TSR) over the 
period from 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2005, with the FTSE 100 Total Return Index 
over the same period. TSR is the combination of share price appreciation and 
dividends returned over the medium-to-Iong-term. 
Figure S.4 SABMilIer TSR Performance Graph 200S 
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Source: SABMiller Annual Report 2005:57. 
Since SABMiIler moved its primary listing to the London Stock Exchange in March 
1999 the FTSE 100 has produced a TSR of 12 percent, while the company produced a 
TSR of 164 percent as at 31 March 2005 (SABMiller Annual Report 2005). 
278 
The 2002 Annual Report compared TSRs with other brewing and liquor companies, 
but this has not been done in subsequent reports. The comparison showed that 
SABMiller outperformed the FTSE 100 TSR but not certain of the beer competitors 
over the three years to March 2002. Table 5.4 shows that the SABMiller performance 
improves significantly in 2003 , improving further in 2004 and 2005. 
Referring to Table 5.2, the SABMiller share price on the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (JSE) increased at an annual rate of 11.9 percent compared to the 10.8 
percent achieved by the JSE All Share Index and the 7.6 percent achieved by the JSE 
Industrial Index in the 11 years to December 2005. The growth rate of the SABMiller 
share price from 2000 to 2005 was 17.2 percent compared to the JSE All Share index 
of 16.2 percent and the JSE Industrial Index of 14.0 percent. 
The SABMiller PE multiple on 30 December 2005 was 18.8 compared to the JSE All 
Share Index multiple of 14.2 (Financial Times 2006:20). 
5.5 Sappi 
5.5.1 Industry 
Sappi is engaged in the forestry, pulp and paper industries. 
The paper industry, in which Sappi competes, is generally divided into the printing 
and writing market segment, consisting of newsprint, ground wood paper and fine 
paper, and the packaging market segment, consisting of container board, box board 
and sack kraft. Paper pulp is the main raw material used in the production of printing, 
writing and packaging paper. Pulp is the generic term that describes the cellulose 
fibre derived from wood. Dissolving pulp is used in a variety of textile products 
rather than paper products. It is manufactured by similar processes, but purified 
further to leave virtually pure cellulose fibres. Timber products mean sawn timber for 
building construction and furniture manufacturing (Sappi Annual Report on Form 20-
F 2004). 
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According to E. van As (personal communication, 19 November 2003) the key factors 
for success in the industry are to focus on the customer and deliver what he or she 
needs in a cost-effective manner. These are amongst the usual key factors for success 
that one would expect in most industries. He stipulates the following as specific 
differentiating factors in the paper industry: 
1. Low cost, that is dependent on four main drivers: wood, energy, people and 
capital costs. 
2. Productivity -large machines that must run at their "sweet spot". 
3. A large enough market share to run the variety of grades efficiently on each 
piece of production equipment, i.e. not having to run a full range of products 
on one or two pieces of equipment that can, by their nature, run only a small 
proportion of the grades efficiently. 
The paper and pulp industries are highly capital-intensive and cyclical. The timing of 
capital expenditure and acquisitions is therefore critical. 
5.5.2 Profile 
Sappi is one of the most global paper companies, with 20 mills across Europe, North 
America and southern Africa with a joint venture mill in China. There is a global 
customer base and the brands are internationally known. Sappi is the world's largest 
producer of chemical cellulose and coated fme paper. The company' s coated fine 
paper market shares are given as approximately 24 percent in the USA, 20 percent in 
Europe and more than 60 percent in southern Africa. Its share of the world market for 
chemical cellulose is approximately 15 percent (Sappi Armual Report on Form 20-F 
2004) Coated paper has a higher level of smoothness than uncoated paper with higher 
repro graphic quality and printability (Sappi Annual Reports 2002 and 2004). End 
uses range from glossy magazines and catalogues to books (Sappi 2005a). 
Sales for the fiscal year ended September 2005 were $5 018 million, the equivalent of 
R30 billion. There were 15,618 employees (Sappi Armual Report 2005). 
Sappi is incorporated in the Republic of South Africa with its principal offices in 
Johannesburg. The primary listing is on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, with 
1-
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secondary listings on the New York and London Stock exchanges (Sappi Annual 
Report 2005). 
Geographic ownership of the company as of September 2005 was South African 
investors 42 percent, European investors 12 percent and North American investors 46 
percent. Two beneficial holders of more than 5 percent of the issued share capital 
were the Public Investment Commission (SA), with 11 .2 percent and the Industrial 
Development Corporation (SA), with 6.8 percent. Two fund managers located in 
South Africa were each responsible for managing 5 percent or more of the share 
capital of Sappi (Sappi Annual Report 2005). 
5.5.3 History 
South African Pulp and Papers Industries Limited was registered as a company in 
1936, and construction of a pulp and paper mill began near Springs in the Transvaal in 
the following year. In 1947, it purchased two farms north of Tugela in Natal with the 
aim of establishing a second paper mill. In 1950, it bought another farm in Natal to 
establish pine plantations. The first reel of paper for kraft packaging was produced at 
Tugela in 1954. 
In 1959, the majority share was acquired in Union Corrugated Cases and, in 1960, a 
further majority share in Cellulose Products, a manufacturer of tissue wadding. In 
1966, construction of the Ngodwana Mill was completed, and the new mill produced 
its first unbleached kraft pUlp. In 1968, the company applied for international patents 
covering the Sapoxyl bleaching process, using oxygen rather than chlorine. Trials 
began on the world's first commercial Sapoxyl bleaching reactor at the Springs mill in 
1970. 
The company re-registered as "Sappi Limited" in 1973. Three operating subsidiaries 
- Sappi Fine Papers, Sappi Kraft and Sappi Forests, each with its own board of 
directors - were formed in 1977. Eugene van As was appointed Group Managing 
Director in 1978. Sappi acquired Stanger Pulp and Paper in 1979 and formed a new 
division, Sappi Timber Products, specialising in saw milling, in 1980. 
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In 1981, a new waste-based mill in Cape Town produced its first linerboard made 
entirely from waste paper. In 1982, it acquired Novabord, a particle board 
manufacturing operation and, in 1983, Timberboard. In 1985, expansion of the 
Ngodwana mill was completed. Production included newsprint, linerboard, 
unbleached pulp and the first saleable tonnages of bleached pulp. 
In 1986, 50 years after the establishment of the company, Sappi International was 
created to handle the export marketing of all Sappi products. Particle board expansion 
was commissioned at Sappi Novabord, near White River in what was then Transvaal, 
now Mpumulanga Province. The company acquired the Usutu Pulp Company in 
Swaziland, one of the world's leaders in unbleached softwood kraft pulp production, 
the following year. In 1989, it acquired Saiccor, the world's single largest producer 
of dissolving pulp. 
Until 1990, the company had primarily expanded its operations witIUn southern 
Africa. In 1990, it purchased five fine paper mills in the United Kingdom and 
established Sappi Europe, with its head office in London. In 1991 , it acquired 
Speciality Pulp Services of Hong Kong and established Sappi Trading, the group ' s 
international trading company. 
In 1992, Sappi acquired Hannover Papier, Germany' s leading producer of coated 
wood-free paper. Sappi shares were listed on the London and Frankfurt Stock 
exchanges and the Paris Bourse. In 1994, a 75 percent stake was acquired in S.D. 
Warren, the USA's largest manufacturer of coated wood-free paper. This established 
Sappi as the world's leading producer of these grades. Eugene van As, the CEO of 
Sappi, moved to the United States temporarily, to manage Warren in the first year 
after its acquisition (J. Job, personal interview, 31 October 2002). 
In 1995, an R800 million expansion was completed at Sappi Saiccor, reinforcing its 
position as the world' s leading producer of dissolving pulp. Major modernisation and 
upgrading projects on all of Sap pi ' s older mills in southern Africa were completed the 
following year. A further 22 percent shareholding in Warren was acquired, raising 
Sappi ' s ownership to 99 percent. 
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In 1997, Sappi acquired KNP Leykam, Europe's largest producer of coated wood-free 
paper. The Sappi Group was restructured into two focused operation divisions: Sappi 
Fine Paper, domiciled in London, managing the coated and uncoated fine paper 
businesses, and Sappi Forest Products, located in Johannesburg, managed the 
diversified forestry, pulp, particle board and container board businesses. Sappi Fine 
Paper became the world ' s largest producer of coated fine paper. It also became the 
market leader in North America, Europe and Afiica and the largest exporter of coated 
papers to Asia. 
In 1998, all companies in the group shed their former names and assumed the name 
"Sappi" worldwide. The group listed its shares on the New York Stock Exchange in 
the same year. 
In 2000, the company sold Sappi Novabord, the particle board and medium density 
fibre board division, and, in 2001, it sold Sappi Mining Timber. In the same year, 
Sappi Fine Paper, North America, exited the US uncoated paper business. In 2002, 
Sappi closed its Transcript Mill subsidiary in Scotland and exited the carbonless paper 
market. All these actions were taken to focus on its core businesses, pulp and coated 
fine paper and to dispose of non-core operations. 
In 2002, Sappi acquired Potlatch Corporation's fine coated fine and its pulp and paper 
mill in Minnesota, USA. These were adjudged an excellent fit with Sappi 's existing 
operations in North America and Europe. 
Eugene van As retired as CEO in 2003 and assumed the position of Non-executive 
Chairman. 
In 2004 Sappi acquired a 34 percent equity stake in Jiangxi Chenming in China. This 
company is building a light paper machine and mechanical pulp mill. 
Information for this subsection was obtained from Sappi (2003b) and (2006b). 
Milestones in Sappi's history are shown in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5 Milestones for Sappi 
o 1978 - Eugene van As appointed group MD 
o 1980 - Cape kraft mill built 
o 1981-1985 - Expansion of Ngodwana, in 
Mpumalanga, in one of SA's largest industrial 
projects at the time. 
o 1988 - Acquisition of Sappi Salccor, a low-cost 
producer of chemical cellulose, 50 km south of 
Durban 
o 1989 - Management control of Usulu pulp mill in 
Swaziland acquired. 
o 1990 - Sappi Europe established , with 
purchased of five fine-paper mills in the UK. 
o 1991 - Van As appointed executive chairman. 
o 1992 - Acquisition of Hannover Papler, 
Germany's leading producer of coated woodfree 
paper, making Sappi one of Europe's top three 
producers in the sector. 
o 1994 - Acquistion of SW Warren in the US for 
$1 ,45bn, then the largest-ever foreign 
investment by a SA company. The group gains a 
leading market share of more than 20% in the 
US coated paper market. 
o 1995 - Completion of $250m expansion at 
Saiccor, which becomes the world's largest 
single producer of chemical cellulose. 
o 1991-1996 - Upgrades and expansions 
completed at Ngodwana, Tugela and Enstra 
mills in SA. 
o 1996 - Gencor unbundles its controlling stake in 
Sappi; shareholder base starts to diversify. 
o 1997 -Acquisition ofKNP leykam, the leading 
European producer of coated fine paper, for 
$1,7bn. 
o 2002 - Acquisition of Potiach coated paper 
business in the US for $480m. 
o 2003 - Jonathan Lesl ie appointed group CE, 
Van As retires as an executive director; 
becomes nonexecutive chairman. 
o 2004 - Acquisition of 34% interest of Jiangxi 
Chenming Paper in China. 
Source: Adapted from McNulty (2006c). 
5.5.4 Management 
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Eugene van As, the Non-executive Chainnan, joined the company as Managing 
Director of a Sappi subsidiary in 1977. He was appointed Group Managing Director 
and CEO of Sap pi Limited in 1978, becoming Executive Chainnan in 1991. 
] .C.A. (Jonathan) Leslie joined as CEO in April 2003. He is a British citizen. He was 
employed by Rio Tinto from 1977 to 2002. He has wide experience of Africa, 
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Australia, Latin America and the USA, including having been Managing Director of 
Rossing Uranium in Namibia. He was Mining Director of Rio Tinto in 1994 and was 
appointed CEO of the Gold and Diamonds Group in 1997. Wolfgang Pfarl, an 
Austrian citizen, is CEO of Sappi Fine Papers, Europe, and came to the group via a 
merger in 1993. Details of top managers are summarised in Table 5.7. Job and 
Wilson are the other executive directors. Two of the six executives listed have more 
than 10 years service with Sappi. Four of the six were recruited from outside the 
company in the past six years. 
Table 5.7 Sappi Management 
Name Responsibility 
J.c.A. (Jonathan) Leslie CEO 
W. (Wolfgang) Pfarl Sappi Fine Papers 
J.L. (John) Job Technology 
D.G. (David) Wilson Finance 
V. (Ronee) Hagen Sappi Fine Paper USA 
A. (Albert) Lubbe Sappi Fine Paper SA 
Source: Sappi Aru1Ual Report 2005:12-15. 
Age 
54 
60 
60 
47 
59 
57 
Year Joined 
2003 
1993 
1999 
1999 
2004 
1996 
Sappi typically has about 40 people on assignment between their different regions. 
Over half of these would be from South Africa to about eight countries (R. Hope, 
personal communication, 21 December 2005). 
5.5.5 Mission 
Sappi's objective is to be the outstanding company in the global pulp and paper 
sector. This requires that the company return superior value to shareholders. The 
company has undertaken to measure performance using appropriate metrics: total 
shareholder return versus their peers; and internally growth in net present value per 
share. Sustaining these returns requires being recognised by all the company' s 
stakeholders - customers, employees, local communities and regulators - as a 
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company that adds outstanding value in all areas of its business, and one that does so 
responsibly (Sappi Annual Report 2004). 
5.5.6 Strategies 
Sappi plans to build on its position as the global leader in the market and explore 
opportunities across the broad spectrum of coated paper and dissolving pulp. The 
company business model is built on the major cornerstones of: 
1. Coated-paper focus 
2. Full pulp integration 
3. Global manufacturing platform 
4. Financial discipline 
(Sappi Annual Report 2002 and 2003). 
The strategies listed below were obtained from the Sappi 2002 Annual Report and 
accessed from the website on 12 September 2003. 
1. Staying focused on branded fine paper, the fastest-growing sector in the paper 
industry. 
2. Growing leading market shares in North America and Europe and entering 
new areas. 
3. Providing new innovative products and services. 
4. Continuing to improve the efficiencies of world-class assets. 
5. Supporting the coated fine paper business with a high level of pulp integration. 
6. Superior service. 
7. Systems. 
5.5.7 Core Competencies 
Sappi's core competencies are marketing, operations, a culture of innovation in 
products, technology and business practices, merger and acquisition capabilities 
(including post-merger integration), systems and human capital (R. Hope, personal 
interview, Joharmesbw·g, 13 June 2003). 
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5.5.8 Operations 
Sappi ' s organisational structure is shown in Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6 Sappi Organisational Structure. 
Sappi 
limited 
I 
Sappi Fine Sappi 
Paper Forest Products 
_ Sappi Fine Paper _ SappiSai 
North America 
ceor 
r- ~appi Fine Paper r- Sappi 
Europe -
Kroft 
Sappi Fine Paper 
I-- South Africa 
L-Sappi Fa rests 
L- I ther Fine Fa er 0 orations o p p 
Source: Sappi Annual Report (on Form F-lO) 2004:16. 
Sappi Fine Paper's operations are conducted from London. They are managed 
through three regional business units; Sappi Fine Paper, North America, Sappi Fine 
Paper, Europe and Sappi Fine Paper, South Africa. There are four fine paper mills in 
North America, seven in Europe and three in South Africa. There are sales and 
trading offices throughout these regions and additional Sappi trading offices in 
Central America, South America, Central Africa, Australia and four in Asia (Sappi 
Annual Report [on Form F-IO] 2004:16). 
Sappi Forest Products, headquartered in Johannesburg, is a pulp and commodity paper 
products business that operates three business units, Sappi Kraft, Sappi Saiccor and 
Sappi Forests. Sappi Saiccor is the world ' s largest producer of dissolving pulp. Sappi 
Forest Products also produces newsprint and kraft packaging paper and beneficiates 
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wood into timber products. It operates five mills (Sappi Annual Report Form F-IO 
2004). 
5.5.9 Financials and Statistics 
Appendix 5.6. shows results from February 1991 to September 1999 in South African 
rands. Sales increased at a rate of 26.5 percent per annum while net profit increased at 
a rate of 7.8 percent over this period. Return on equity averaged 9.2 percent, with a 
high of21.2 percent in 1995 and a low of2.4 percent in 1997. 
Table 5.8 reviews financial and operating results for the period from September 2001 
to September 2005. Results are shown in US dollars. Sales grew at 4.6 percent per 
year but net profit declined from $217 million in 2002 to $213 million in 2005. 
Return on equity averaged 6.2 percent over this period, with a high of 15 .3 percent in 
2001 and a negative return of 10.5 percent in 2005. Sappi's recent results not only 
were impacted by the slowdown in the industry but exacerbated by the strengthening 
of the rand, as their pulp is produced in South Africa and exported to its subsidiaries 
in North America and Europe. The 2005 Annual Report attributed the loss for that 
year to extremely difficult industry conditions. Surplus capacity depressed prices on 
the one hand while rising input costs, led by accelerating oil prices, increased costs on 
the other hand. There were nonrecurring "impairment charges" of $183 million for 
Muskegon Mill in the USA and $50 million dollars for the Usutu Mill in Swaziland. 
The company's debt/equity ratio was 0.41 in 1994, rose to a peak of 1.55 in 1997, 
reflecting borrowings to finance acquisitions and expansion and improved to 0.88 in 
2005. 
Sappi sets out its financial goals on page 5 of the 2005 Annual Report, where return 
on equity is targeted to exceed the American risk-free rate by at least five percentage 
points and is set at more than II percent. 
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5.5.10 Performance versus Peer Group 
Sappi's miSSIOn (Subsection 5.5.5 above) mentions the company' s undertaking to 
measure performance using total shareholder return versus their peers. This 
measurement is not yet available in the annual report or on the website. 
R. Hope (persona] interview, 25 October 2002) reported that Sappi would rank in the 
top three in the world in terms of overall financial performance compared to 
companies in similar industries. It might rank first in overall return on equity for the 
past few years (at that stage). 
The following table shows Sappi 's return on equity versus the Value Line Paper and 
Forest Product Composite for US-listed companies: 
Table 5.9 Return on Equity: Sappi versus Value Line Composite 
Percentages 
Year 
Value Line 
Sappi 
2001 
3.6 
15.9 
Source: Roth (2005 :91 0). 
2002 
3.5 
] 4.3 
2003 
2.7 
8.1 
2004 
9.0 
4.8 
Figure 5.7 below shows Sappi and its European and US peer groups. It can be seen 
that Sappi rerated significantly relative to its peers in 2001 and 2002, but that this 
rerating has unwound since the middle of last year, particularly relative to the 
European peer group which more closely resembles Sappi. 
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Figure 5.7 Sappi and Its International Peers 2001 - 2005 
250 
200 
100 
;Or.---r--~---,----r---~--~--~---r---r 
i:m-O i Jul OI Itfl-O~ 
1$) SEPAPER ($. 
Source: Bloomberg, cited by Rasmussen (2005:7). 
Table 5.10 shows Sappi 's rating compared to its main international peers. "It is clear 
that Sappi is accorded a rating well below all but Abitbi and M-Real, which continues 
to make losses" (Investec Securities 2005 :7). Investec believe there is potential for 
Sappi to rerate relative to the large European peer. 
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Mondi, Sappi's South African-based competitor, reported operating profits of $569 
million for 2004 and $495 million for 2005 , compared to Sappi's loss in the latter year 
(Anglo American Annual Report 2005). With net operating assets of $6,365 million 
Mondi is of a comparable size to Sappi. 
Referring back to Table 5.2, Sappi ' s share price growth rate from 1994 to 2005, based 
on closing prices, was 0.1 percent versus the JSE All Share Index of 10.8 percent. 
Based on these statistics it has substantially underperformed in comparison with the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange. The cyclical nature of the industry and the timing 
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of measurement should however be taken into account when judging Sappi's 
performance. For example if this study had been undertaken in 2002, with the high 
price of 16,200 cents and the low price of 2,975 cents in 1994, the growth rate would 
have substantially exceeded that of the JSE. The question therefore is what recovery 
Sappi will make in the next year or two as the cycle changes. 
E. van As (personal interview, Johannesburg, 22 July 2004) points out that Sappi 
outperformed its global competitors over the period 1994 to 2003 but did not beat the 
JSE over this period because of the cyclical, capital-intensive and competitive nature 
of the paper and pulp industry. 
In addition to the above there is evidence that the company's performance and rating 
since 2003 have declined relative to competition. This is discussed further in Chapter 
10. 
Sappi shares were at a price earnings multiple of 48.9 and a dividend yield of 2.6 
percent on the JSE on the 30 September 2005. 
5.6 Wolverine World Wide 
5.6.1 Industry 
The company competes in the footwear and related industries markets. The key 
success factors include brand, styling and product development, distribution, customer 
service and operations/sourcing. The relative importance of each key factor for 
success depends on the particular market segment (Harvey 1993b). 
5.6.2 Profile 
Wolverine World Wide is a leading marketer of branded casual, rugged outdoor, 
work, outdoor sport and uniform footwear. The company's global portfolio of owned 
and licensed brands includes: Bates Uniform Footwear, CAT Footwear, Hylest, 
Harley-Davidson Footwear, Hush Puppies, Merrell, Sebago, Stanley Footgear and 
Wolverine Boots and Shoes. Products are marketed in over 140 countries worldwide. 
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The company also operates a retail division to showcase its brands, a tannery that 
produces Wolverine Performance Leathers, and an apparel and accessory licensing 
division to extend its own brands into product categories beyond footwear. 
The company sales approximate $992 million, while the sales of its brands under 
licence are not far behind the same figure. There are approximately 5,130 employees. 
The head office is in Rockford, Michigan, USA. The company is listed on both the 
New York Stock Exchange and the Pacific Exchange (Wolverine World Wide Annual 
Report 2004). 
5.6.3 History 
The Krause family, the company's founders, has handed down their trade of bark 
tanning (using vegetable matter) from father to son since 1630. Henry Krause, born 
in Prussia in 1829, learned the trade from his father before emigrating to America in 
1844. His son, G.A. Krause, formed a partnership with his uncle in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, to buy and sell leather and hides and wholesale shoes. 
In 1903, a shoe factory was built in Rockford, Michigan, and the firm was 
incorporated as the Hirth-Krause Company in 1906. In 1908, a new process was 
developed for tanning cordovan horse hide. The Wolverine Brand name was selected. 
In 1921, the company adopted its most successful brand name and became the 
Wolverine Shoe and Tanning Corporation. The first glove factory was opened in the 
same year. The company grew and prospered through the 1920s; while market 
conditions fluctuated, the national popUlarity of the Wolverine brand provided a solid 
foundation for continued growth. In 1925, it began an unprecedented farm-
publication advertising campaign that made Wolverine Shell horsehide shoes a widely 
recognised brand name. 
The Depression years were difficult for Wolverine, but it managed to keep its 
employees working and continued to produce and sell despite the Great Depression. 
Toward the end of the Depression, the supply of horses dwindled as automobiles and 
tractors rapidly replaced the animals. As horsehide shortage reached critical 
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proportions another cataclysmic event, World War II, presented the company with a 
new opportunity. The War Production Board asked Wolverine to explore the 
possibilities of tanning pig skins for gloves. In spite of the considerable difficulty 
involved, Wolverine produced large quantities of pigskin gloves for the war effort. 
In 1945, the tannery was expanded and modernised for tanning pig skin and, in 1950, 
a revolutionary pig-skinning machine was developed and patented. In 1957, Hush 
Puppies shoes were introduced and in 1958 the Hush Puppies Brand was launched 
with a heavy marketing and advertising campaign. In 1959, Greb Shoes, Canada, 
became the first foreign licensee to produce Hush Puppies shoes. 
The name Hush Puppies was suggested by the company sales manager. While on a 
trip to Tennessee, he asked why the little fiied corn dough balls were called "hush 
puppies"; the reply was that "the fiied dough was used by farmers to quiet their 
barking dogs" . In 1965, the company was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
and in 1966 it was renamed Wolverine World Wide Inc, to better reflect its 
international scope and stature. Several acquisitions of other shoe companies were 
made, and in 1975 manufacturing began in West Germany, Wolverine's first 
manufacturing facility abroad. A retail stores operation was established in 1976 and 
in 1977 an advanced, high-capacity computer system became operational. 
The company prospered in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Imports began to increase 
their share of the US footwear market; athletic shoes became very popular and 
competed with traditional footwear. Wolverine World Wide's profitability began to 
decline and culminated in a loss in 1986. The return on equity did not exceed 1 ° per 
cent in any year between 1984 and 1992 (Wolverine World Wide annual reports, 1986 
-1992). 
Geoffrey Bloom was hired away from Florsheim to become President of Wolverine in 
1987. A further loss was experienced in 1990. The company began to focus on 
marketing, product development and sourcing. Results improved from 1994 onward 
with net income to sales exceeding 6 percent in 1996. The company has maintained a 
net income to sales ratio of more than 5 percent from 1996 until the present, with the 
exception of 1999 (4.9 percent) and 2000, when once-off nonrecurring charges were 
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made for sourcing realignment charges (factory closures) and write-off of the Russian 
wholesale business (Wolverine World Wide Annual Reports 1999, 2000). 
The company introduced CAT Footwear, under licence from Caterpillar, in 1993, 
acquired Merrell Footwear in 1997, introduced Harley-Davidson footwear, under 
licence,.in 1998 and acquired Sebago in 2003 (Wolverine World Wide annual reports, 
1993-2004). 
Information for this subsection was obtained from Wolverine World Wide (1983) and 
annual reports from 1990 to 2004. 
5.6.4 Management 
Geoffrey B. Bloom (63) the Chainnan, joined Wolverine as President and Chief Operating 
Officer (COO) in 1987. He was appointed CEO and President in 1993 and Chainnan in 1996. 
He retired as CEO in 2000. Timothy J. O'Donovan was appointed CEO and President in 
2000, having been COO and President since 1996. He joined Wolverine in 1969. 
O'Donovan and seven other executive officers are listed in Table 5.11 below. 
Table 5.11 Wolverine World Wide: Management 
Name Responsibility Age Year Joined 
T.J. (Timothy) O'Donovan CEO 59 1969 
S.M. (Steven) Duffy Executive Vice President 52 1989 
V.D. (Dean) Estes Vice President 55 1975 
S.L. (Steven) Gulis Executive Vice President 47 1986 
CFO & Treasurer 
B.w. (Blake) Krueger Executive Vice President 51 1993 
& Secretary 
N.P. (Nicholas) Ottenwess Vice President of Finance 42 1993 
& Corporate Controller 
R.J. (Bob) Sedrowski Vice President 55 1990 
Human Resources 
J.D. (James) Zwiers General Counsel & 37 1995 
Assistant Secretary 
Source: Wolverine World Wide Annual Report (on Form lO-K) 2004:15. 
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All eight of the managers shown in Table 5.11 have at least 10 years service with the 
company, with two having more than 30 years ' service. All members of the Board of 
Directors and all executive officers are American citizens except for Alberto 
Grimoldi, an Argentinian shoe manufacturer and retailer, who became a director in 
1994. (Wolverine World Wide Annual Report on Form 10-K 2004:15). Less than a 
dozen employees have been appointed from the US to the company's foreign 
operations in the last eight years (J.C. Tegner, personal interview, Rockford, 20 
January 2006). 
Bloom retired from the board in July 2005. O'Donovan was elected Chairman. 
Krueger was promoted to President and Chief Operating Officer of the company. 
Estes, Duffy and Sedrowski retired before the end of 2005. Cheryl L Johnson, 
recruited from outside the corporation, was appointed Vice President of Human 
Resources (Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2006). 
5.6.5 Mission 
Wolverine World Wide' s mission is to become "the world ' s premier non-athletic 
footwear company". The vision to achieve this is to be consumer-focused, fact-based 
and market-driven (Wolverine World Wide 2003 and 2005). 
5.6.6 Strategies 
The strategies are summarised as follows: 
I. Build the strongest brand portfolio in the industry. 
2. Expand global reach. 
3. Accelerate growth in the women' s segment of the market. 
4. Create an environment that enables the company to attract and retain the best 
people in the industry (build a strong team and company culture). 
5. Ensure the entire organisation is following a market-driven and consumer-
focused operating philosophy. 
6. Provide "best in class" service to customers. 
7. Achieve product excellence from design through production (product 
innovation). 
8. Provide community service. 
(Wolverine World Wide Annual Reports, 2002, 2003 and 2004). 
5.6.7 Core Competencies 
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The company' s core competencies are: the ability to build brands; the ability to 
operate globally (mind-set, reach, scope, distribution); the ability to recruit and 
maintain a highly motivated management team; a global operations capability; merger 
and acquisition and business start-up capabilities (including post-merger integration); 
innovative product design and development and marketing (TJ. O'Donovan, 
personal interview, Rockford, 6 October 2003). 
5.6.8 Operations 
Besides the United States, the company has owned operations in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and 
Switzerland. It has a worldwide network of independent licensees and distributors. 
The company controls the sourcing and manufacture of approximately 76 percent of 
the pairs of footwear marketed under the company' s brand wilnes globally. The 
company' s licensees control the balance. Approximately 88 percent of the pairs 
controlled by the company are purchased, or sourced, from third parties, with the 
remainder produced at company-owned facilities . These facilities are located in 
Michigan and Arkansas, in the US and the Dominican Republic. The company 
sources the majority of its footwear from a variety of foreign manufacturing facilities 
in the Asia-Pacific region, Central and South America, India and Europe. It maintains 
technical offices in the Asia-Pacific region to facilitate the sourcing and importation 
of q uali ty footwear. 
The Wolverine Leathers Division operates the largest pigskin tannery in the US. The 
Retail Stores Division operated 63 domestic retail stores in February 2003 ; the 
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Apparel and Accessory Licensing Division licenses the company's brands for use on 
non-footwear products, including apparel, socks, handbags, gloves, eyewear, watches 
and plush toys. 
The Office of the Chairman (OTC) consists of the five semor executives. The 
Operating Board (OB) consists of the general managers of each of the brands, the 
heads of the primary business functions and the senior executives. The OTC and OB 
meet regularly to share and exchange business information, strategic direction, plans 
and results . (1. Tegner, personal communication, 7 October 2003). 
(Wolverine World Wide Annual Reports on Form 10-K, 2002 and 2004). 
5.6.9 Financials and Statistics 
Table 5.12 depicts the financial highlights from 2002 to 2004 and Appendix 5.8 
provides a five-year operating summary from 2000 to 2004; Appendix 5.9 the same 
information from 1993 to 1997. Further details from the years 1994 to 2002 are 
available in Appendices 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12. 
Sales increased from $387.5 million in 1994 to $991.9 million in 2004, a compound 
growth rate of 9.9 percent. Net earnings improved from $16.6 million to $65.9 
million over the same period, a compound growth of 14.8 percent. Net income to 
sales exceeded 5.5 percent for each of the 10 years when non-recurring items are 
excluded. Return on equity varied from 11.8 percent in 1995 to 15.5 percent in 1997 
and was generally in the low teens (Sirios 2005). 
The total debt-to-total capitalisation ratio stood at 42 percent in 1999 and was steadily 
reduced, reaching 8.7 percent by 2004. 
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Table 5.12 Wolverine World Wide: Financial Highlights 2004 
FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHT:, 
lin niltion,) 
Revenue 
E:(lliog OOf.'" income I, os "Id millO!'il nle,. ;! 
locOlTl9 tilxe~ 
Net ~JrniJlgs 
Wcrking capit 1 
Cash proviOOd by o~rnh'lg ,tCliviti&s 
~PitiiI expoodltUf~S 
Gross m ..'1rgin percentag<? 
S-e.ing .:nd attnil~trJbJ~ elpen _ :i:. J I)o3(ce nt.:Jge of 1 enue 
Eftfilcble income ta rate 
Net e.1 rnings J pgrc entl g~ of r ~Il' .. ~ 
Toto! debt to total capn,i::ation 
Return 011 average equ~J 
Return on average (lssat5 
R_ienue IJ r employee ijn thou5<Jldsla 
muted net e:imings 
..ash dr"dends decbre<i 
Slur.s used TOr cOfTl'Ul ing dM.d ",,"mgs per w<Ye (Ifl mOI""md:;)' 
Nurnoor 01 shareholders of r ,d,' 
Number of (llnployees ;:It Y~Jr-elld 
(J} 8Jsed ('fj tlio? nl4'r.'Je~ (If emoXJi'a\ ,; .:1
' 
,'e;:! -€:;i. 
S 
S 
$ 
200, 
991.9 S 8. 
97.1 75.1 
30.9 . 3.3 
65.9 51.7 
320.6 3_\J. 
106.4 102.2 
18.1 16. ' 
37.7'" 36. i'\ 
27.6'" 27.?~ 
31.8'" 3LC'lo 
6.6'1. 5.&', 
8.7% 12.2'\, 
15.1'10 13.4', 
10.8% 9 3". 
193.2 S 185.8 
1.09 $ 0 85 
0.19 0.15 
60.474 0 1.081 
1.518 1.590 
5.134 4,]8i 
C' A:J MlOUl! ) .ir ad.iUS .. d ~r the ,Pi'l.rr,. 's wee·i1X-i\'.o :; r sp..1 c/sr. !iW 011 F~b; ['1tl 1. 2005. 
(3) As 01 !/'~ applc.1I>:e , - o:d d,11 
MARKET III FO~MATIUtl 
200l 
~ S~7.I 
7L7 
236 
.\7.<; 
28i5 
883 
13.9 
36~. 
2'" .3'l. 
32.~. 
5.89. 
16 59, 
12.69, 
8.69. 
S 1869 
S 0.77 
0.12 
6~ ,334 
1.721 
4,426 
WoIm i,. \\t, f;i ;,.....,. nc. comnon !.lock i. tr JdW 00 the Nav Vorl< Stock EYch.l:lge and P,ldfiC E - ,"ge Und9rtlle 
5)'I11hol W~/\'I.' TIte rolb-ving Ulbl. !JlaiIs the high awl low stock pri:eo on the ~.., ... Yorl< Stock Ext 10ge >00.1 m.Jffi1, 
deck.od b c~, ~rt'" IeI' 2004 and 2001 Tho rumll« I shareholders 01 I'toCOCd 00 I.JI'ch I , ZOOS VoJ> 1.518. 
- -- -2004 2003 
Stod Pric~ Hr~h L"'_' __ • __ Hi h LON 
Fr' Quater $16.10 $13.40 SI 1.72 9.53 
Secood Quart r 18.81 15.38 12.87 10 , 0 
Thir quarter 17.92 1427 14.OC, J . ~5 
Fourtll qU JltH 21.66 16.18 14.39 13.1)) 
Cash DIVi:1onds Decl" ed PH hare 2004 2003 
Fir. Quat , $.043 $.037 
S cond qlLlrt J .043 .037 
Th.d quart'" .043 ,037 
Fourtll qUJrt;,r .065 .037 
A qJOrtet~ di.oiOOnd 01 S.GQ5 I"" slu e was dedJl'oo durillg ti;e fi rst (J!.lrter of fisc.;l 2Oc"'6. 
All prICes JOd diAoonds are aqu:;tgd lor the C~ny's three-ior{\\() stock Sj.it distributed 011 Febru:;rj 1, :1lOf. .. 
Source: Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2004: Inside cover. 
299 
5.6.10 Perfonnance versus Peer Group 
Wolverine compares its performance against both footwear competitors and other companies 
in general. 
Figure 5.8 below compares the cumulate t,otal stockholder return on Wolverine 
common stock to the Standard & Poor' s Small Cap 600 Index and the Standard & 
Poor's 600 Footwear Index, for the five years from 1999 to 2004, assuming an 
investment of $1 00 at the beginning ofthe period indicated. Details of similar indices 
for the period from 1994 to 1999 are shown in Appendix 5.13 and were used in 
conjunction with Figure 5.8 and Table 5.13 to calculate the various returns. 
Wolverine is part of the Standard & Poor's Small Cap 600 Index and the Standard & 
Poor's 600 Footwear Index. In addition to Wolverine, the Standard & Poor's 600 
Footwear Index consists of Brown Shoe Company, Inc., K-Swiss Inc. (Class A), and 
,The Stride Rite Corporation. These indices are weighted based on the market 
capitalisation of the companies included in each index. 
Cumulative total stockholder return is measured by dividing: (a) the sum of the 
cumulative amount of dividends for the measurement period, assuming dividend 
reinvestment, and the difference between the share price at the end and the beginning 
of the measurement period; by (b) the share price at the beginning of the measurement 
period. 
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Figure 5.8 Wolverine World Wide and Peer Group Total Return 1999-2004 
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Source: Wolverine World Wide: Notice of Annual General Meeting 2005:21. 
The dollar values plotted in the graph are shown in Table 5.13 below. 
Table 5.13 Wolverine World Wide: Total Stockholder Return 1999-2004 
S&P 
Fiscal Small Cap 
S&P 
6000 
Footwear 
Year-
End 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Wolverine 
$ 100.00 
$ 141.18 
$ 142.51 
$ 145.73 
$ 198.76 
$ 303.95 
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600 Index Index 
$ 100.00 $ 100.00 
$111.80 $ 194.03 
$120.10 $ 146.38 
$ 101.54 $ 177.79 
$ 141.35 $ 294.57 
$ 173.08 $ 337.45 
Source: Wolverine World Wide: Notice of Annual General Meeting 2005: 11. 
Wolverine World Wide achieved a compound return of 16.1 percent a year for the 10 
years to 2004, achieving 8.2 percent for the first five years and improving to 24.9 
percent for the second five years. This was significantly ahead of the Small Cap 
Index but marginally below the Footwear Composite. The Footwear Composite was 
17.9 percent for the 10 years, attaining 9 percent for the first five years and 27.5 
percent for the second five years. The Wolverine return from 2002 to 2004 exceeded 
the Footwear Composite, the two being respectively 44.4 percent and 37.8 percent. 
Its share appreciation over this period was almost 120 percent, compared to 40 
percent for the Standard & Poor's 500 and 30 percent for the Dow Jones Industrial 
Index (Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2004:15). 
The Wolverine World Wide return on sales figures are in line with the Value Line 
Shoe Industry Composite statistics of 5 to 6 percent, while the return on equity returns 
are slightly below the composite of 16 to 18 percent (Sirios 2005). 
5.7 Summary and Conclusion 
All four of the corporations studied are long established; three of them are more then 
a century old. Each of the four is engaged in very different industries but all are 
world leaders in some aspects of their business. 
Hamel and Praha1ad (1996), discussed in the literature review, stress the importance 
of management stability in the development of core competencies. The average tenure 
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for a chief executive of an FTSE 100 finn is four years (Haywood 2003); 5.9 years for 
CEOs in the USA (Challenger, Gray and Christmas 2003, cited by Whitfield 14 July 
2004). All four corporations have histories oflong-serving chief executives. Three of 
the companies have exceptional stability and continuity in their managements. Sappi 
having the lowest long-service records of top executives. 
Of the four companies, however, Sappi is closest to the Govindarajan and Gupta 
(1998, 2001) ideal of heterogeneous management teams. These authors recommend 
that teams include a mixture of language skills, international experience and 
nationalities. Bossidy and Charan (2002) also advocate seeking the best and diverse 
talent. My reference to diversity here is based on what is required for effective 
management and a corporation's realistic acceptance of its environment and not on 
what may be seen to be politically correct or fashionable. The achievements of the 
four management teams clearly demonstrate what relatively homogeneous teams can 
accomplish, although one does not know what would have happened if the teams had 
been more diverse. 
The remarks in the prevIOus paragraph are based on an anal ysis of the top 
management teams of the corporations. I do know that all of the companies have 
local people in the management of their foreign interests. It should also be noted, 
from the different tables summarising the managements of each of the companies, that 
it can take 20 to 30 years for a recently employed graduate to rise to top management. 
The three South African companies have been in multinational business for only a 
decade, while Wolverine World Wide has only recently begun to manage its own 
wholesale distribution in parts of the world having previously relied on licensee 
networks. All four company boards of directors have greater diversity than their 
management teams at present. 
The three South African corporations made crucial appointments from within their 
own ranks when faced with crisis or challenge, rather then recruiting outsiders 
experienced in a particular country or culture. Tony Phillips from Barloworld was 
transferred to Finanzauto in Spain in 1993 without any working knowledge of Spanish 
at the time (A.J.Phillips, personal interview, 22 October 2002). Eugene van As of 
Sappi acted as CEO of SD Warren in the USA for almost a year after that corporation 
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was acquired in 1994. SABMiller appointed Norman Adami as President of Miller 
Brewing Company from his position of head of the South African operations in 2003 
(SABMiller Annual Report 2003). In contrast Wolverine World Wide recruited 
Geoffrey Bloom from Florsheim, a leading US footwear company, when it faced 
challenges in 1987. 
Barloworld had 107 managers and technical experts serving outside South Africa in 
October 2005. Only 14 of the total were however, in assignments outside continental 
Africa. SABMiller on the other hand had a 168 employees serving outside South 
Africa of whom 103 were outside continental Africa. Sappi generally has somewhat 
more than 20 people from South Africa on assignments outside the country plus 
somewhat less than 20 from other countries rotating throughout the group. There are 
therefore significant differences between the three companies in the numbers of staff 
transferred or seconded out of South Africa to posts outside continental Africa. 
Wolverine has transferred less than a dozen employees to foreign interests over the 
past eight years. 
Mission statements and strategies of the four corporations are set out clearly in annual 
reports and on websites. Barloworld is somewhat broader than the others in this 
regard, but it has a wider range of industries under its management. All of the 
corporations have core competencies relating to both human resources and acquisition 
and post-acquisition integration. 
The recent financial results of the four companies are superior to those of the majority 
of their peers and peer groups. The share price and dividend performances of both 
Barloworld and SABMiller matched or exceeded that of the JSE All Share Index for 
the II years to 2005, notwithstanding the 42.8 percent increase in the index from 
2004 to 2005. SABMiller's total shareholder return substantially exceeded that of the 
FTSE 100 for the period March 1999 to March 2005. Sappi ' s share performance over 
this period was well below the JSE All Share Index, but it did outperform most of its 
global competitors for several years up to 2003. There is some evidence that its 
performance relative to competitors declined in 2004 and 2005. 
, 
I 
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Wolverine World Wide is the only one of the four companies that publically 
compares its performance to both competitors and a general share market index. 
SABMiller did show these in 2002 but has shown only performance against the FTSE 
100 Index for the past three years. Barloworld compares its performance to the JSE 
All Share Index in its 2005 Annual Report, but not to competition. (There are 10 
divisions). Sappi states and reports on its financial performance against objectives 
and standards but as yet not against competition or share indices. 
Wolverine's total return to shareholders of 16.1 percent over 10 years is slightly ahead 
of the II -year returns of Barloworld of 14.67 percent or SABMiller of 13.93 percent 
when estimated dividends of the latter two companies are taken into account. 
Having examined the corporations, we can now investigate their core competencies in 
the next chapter. 
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6. CORE COMPETENCIES OF THE CORPORATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
Core competencies are defined in Section 1.5. The preferred definition for the thesis 
is that of Hamel and Prahalad (\996:219) who define a core competence as a bundle 
of skills and technologies that enable a company to provide a particular benefit to 
customers. A core competence, as articulated by them, has three traits: it makes a 
contribution to perceived customer benefits it is difficult for competitors to imitate 
and it can be leveraged to a wide variety of markets (Mascarenhas, Baveja and Jamil 
1998). Based on my own management, consulting and executive education 
experience, I believe that the majority of management practitioners are more 
conversant and at ease with the Thompson and Strickland (2003), or similar 
definitions of a core competence than they are with other definitions. Thompson and 
Strickland (2003) describe a core competence as something that the company does 
well relative to other intemal activities and a distinctive competence as something that 
the company does well relative to competitors. 
Chapter \ mentions the Kaplan and Norton (2004) observations that strategies can 
exist around many doctrines. All successful companies have core competencies but 
the ways in which they are articulated vary widely. These observations apply to the 
four corporations in question. 
P.M. Drewel (personal interview, Sandton, 9 May 2003) points out that Barloworld's 
strategy is crafted around its value based management (VBM) philosophy and long 
term relationships. J. Nel of SABMilier considers drivers and processes as key 
components of the company's strategy (telephone interview, 30 January 2004). 
Sappi ' s Annual Report of2004 as well as R. Hope (personal interview, Johannesburg, 
13 June 2003) have leadership as a core element of Sappi 's strategy based on six core 
leadership competencies: leading others, strategic thinking, operational delivery, 
driving change, commercial insight and self awareness. Wolverine World Wide 
follows a consumer-focused, fact-based and market-driven strategy (Wolverine World 
Wide 2004 and 2005). 
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All four of the companies mention core competencies in annual reports and company 
documents, and take them into account when formulating strategy. All of them use 
varieties of strategic frameworks, as described by Figure 3.8 in Subsection 3.3.3. 
None of them, however, has core competencies as the "lead" driving factor in its 
strategies. Only Wolverine World Wide had an "official" or formal list of core 
competencies which was given to me at my first interview with the company. 
Executives in the other three companies seemed to know what their core 
competencies were, and I found no significant differences in the perceptions of 
overall core competencies within a corporation. 
The three South African companies, however, did not produce any formal lists or 
codified descriptions of core competencies, mainly because core competencies were 
not the major drivers of their strategies. It was therefore necessary for me to discuss 
the core competencies in depth with company officials and agree on what they were. 
Question three of section three of the core competencies questionnaire, dated 29 
January 2003, asked the question "What are your core competencies? Where possible 
link each core competency to an activity in the value chain." The value chain is the 
concept or mechanism used to analyse and compare the core competencies by 
corporation. 
The core competencies agreed upon with the companies were subsequently coded to 
reflect their locations in the value chain. A company's initial code begins with the 
first letter of its name (e.g. Barloworld is "B"). SABMiller is signified by "AE" 
because Sap pi begins with an "S" and two of the regions of SABMiller, Africa and 
Asia and Europe are analysed separately in parts of the research. The core 
competencies are reported in terms of their locations in the value chain with primary 
locations followed by support locations. Primary locations commence with service, 
followed by marketing and sales, outbound logistics, operations and inbound logistics. 
These are set out in Figure 3.18 on the value chain in Subsection 3.7.1. The support 
activities are firm infrastructure, human resource management, technological 
development and procurement. The merger and acquisition activity is used as a 
distinct part of the firm infrastructure because of the importance of mergers and 
acquisitions in international expansion and all of companies listing this as a core 
competency. I also devised a standard format so that the core competences could be 
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allocated to the relevant locations in the value chain, enabling me to compare and 
contrast the companies in the analysis phase. Draft formats of the core competencies 
were subsequently submitted to the companies for review and approval. 
The core competencies for each of the four companies are presented, together with 
background and explanatory information, in the following sections. Several value 
chain activities may support, or make up, a core competence. In these cases the most 
important of the activities is classified as the "predominant" value chain activity and 
the others as the "secondary" activities, so as not to confuse the terminology with that 
of primary and support activities in the values chain. The predominant activity for 
each core competence is listed first in the right-hand column of the tables, with the 
secondary activities following below. For example, Wolverine World Wide' s core 
competency of recruiting and maintaining a highly motivated management team (see 
Table 6.4) is "placed" in the human resource management section of the value chain, 
although general management activity is also involved. Value chains and the locations 
of the core competencies are discussed in Section 6.6 of this chapter. 
In practice the core competencies are interdependent; some overlap, while most could 
not exist without support from others (see also Porter's [1985] value chain activities 
in Subsection 3.6.1). Very few core competencies, for example, would exist without 
adequate management and people competencies. However, it is necessary to 
demarcate and compartmentalise core competencies for the purposes of analysis . 
6.2 Barloworld 
Barloworld' s seven core competencies are shown in Table 6.1. These are merger and 
acquisition capabilities (including post-merger and acquisition integration), culture (a 
value based management philosophy), the ability to create and sustain long-term 
relationships, the ability to evolve and innovate, a unique organisational ability to 
function together and implement coherent strategies across the organisation, corporate 
governance and a unique ability to operate under difficult circumstances. 
In the case of merger and acquisition capabilities, firm infrastructure is the 
predominant value chain activity, with human resource management as a secondary 
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value chain activity. The ability to create and sustain long-term relationships 
comprises (or is located in) the value chain activities of a firm 's infrastructure 
(general management) and service. Infrastructure (general management) is the 
predominant value chain activity and service is the secondary activity. Six of the 
seven core competencies have firm infrastructure (general management) as the value 
chain activity directly related to the core competencies concerned because of the 
nature of Barloworld as an industrial brand manager. It is diversified and the 
corporate office manages the divisions and not the primary value chain activities 
which the three other industry-specific corporations do. 
Table 6.1 Barloworld Core Competencies 
Code Core Competence 
B6 Merger and acquisition capabilities 
(including post-M&A integration) 
B7 Culture 
(value based management philosophy) 
B10a Ability to create and sustain long-term 
relationships 
B10b Ability to evolve and innovate 
B10c Unique organisational ability to 
function together and implement 
coherent strategies across the 
organisation. 
B 1 Od Corporate governance 
B10e Unique ability to operate under 
difficult circumstances 
Value Chain Activity or Location 
Firm infrastructure 
(general management, finance, legal , IT) 
Human resource management 
Human resource management 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Service 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Firm infrastructure (general management, 
finance) 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Human resource management 
Core competence B6 merger and acquisition capabilities (as practiced by Barloworld) 
are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9. 
B7 Culture: "Value Based Management (VBM) is the framework through which we 
are building a value-creating culture throughout our company" (A.J. Phillips, personal 
communication, 22 March 2002). The core of the financial component of VBM is 
309 
cash flow return on investment (CFROI), which eliminates accounting distortions and 
allows companies to exceed their real cost of capital (Barloworld Annual Report 
2002). Phillips (22 March 2002) adds that through teamwork and communication, 
Barloworld's goal is to harness the exceptional intellectual capital it already has 
within the organisation and provide an opportunity for this to be recognised, rewarded 
and fulfilled. Phillips in the Barloworld Annual Report (2002:13) states, "We will 
achieve our goals through the commitment, passion, hard work and loyalty of the 
people who work for Barloworld. They are the true foundation on which we have 
built 100 years of success." 
The ability to create and sustain long-term relationships (B lOa) includes customer 
service. Phillips (22 March 2002) amplifies this core competency with the statement: 
"We have a proven record of forging long-term relationships with both our principals 
and our customers. We have an unbroken relationship with Caterpillar Inc that dates 
back to 1927 and a relationship with Nacco Industries Inc [the owners of Hyster) 
since 1929 ... On the customer front, we have relationships with major mining 
companies, such as De Beers, that date back to the fifties". 
The ability to innovate (B I Ob) is borne out by the company's history of adapting and 
changing over more than a century. W. Clewlow, Chairman, is quoted as saying that 
the company is always looking at ways of improving the business and has been better 
than most at reading the winds of change. (W. Clewlow, cited by Schneider 2002). 
Phillips (personal interview, Sandton, 22 October 2002) points out the company's 
ability to implement a value based management philosophy across the organisation 
within a two-year time period as a demonstration of the company' s unique 
organisational ability to function together and implement coherent strategies across 
the organisation (BlOc). 
The corporate governance core competence (B !Od) includes the requisite accounting 
systems, information technology and culture (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). According 
to A.J. Phillips (22 October 2002) the unique ability to operate under difficult 
circumstances (BIOe) is manifested by the operations of, inter alia, the Capital 
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Equipment Division, in countries and areas such as Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Bulgaria and Siberia. 
P.M. Drewell (9 May 2003) adds an additional perspective in that Barloworld has 
historically articulated its core competencies around three "D's": Doing things 
differently, taking on difficult challenges and leveraging its diversity (diversity of 
products, geographies, lines of business, ways ofthinking) 
The core competency relating to long term relationships is borne out by the length of 
service of the company's top management shown in Table 5.3 and the history of only 
five CEOs in a century. The value management culture was credited by P.M. Drewell 
(9 May 2003) with the improvement in the company's performance since 1999. It is 
noteworthy that Norsk Hydro, the largest company in Norway and one of the world 's 
leaders in oil energy and aluminium, stresses its use of the VBM philosophy on its 
website (Norsk Hydro 2006). 
6.3 SABMiller 
SABMiller core competencies are shown in Table 6.2. The seven are marketing, 
distribution, low cost quality production, purchasing, human capital/corporate culture, 
merger and acquisition capabilities, and "high-tech" . 
In the case of the human capital/corporate culture core competence, human resources 
management is classified as the predominant value chain activity and firm 
infrastructure (general management) as the secondary activity. 
Table 6.2 SABMilIer Core Competencies 
Code Core Competence 
AE2 Marketing 
AE3 Distribution •• 
AE4 Low-cost quality production 
AE5 Purchasing' 
AE6 Merger and acquisition capabilities 
(including post-merger and 
acquisition integration) 
AE7 Human capital! corporate culture 
Value Chain Activity or Location 
Marketing and sales. 
Outbound logistics 
Operations 
Procurement 
Technological development 
Procurement 
Inbound logistics 
Firm Infrastructure 
(general management. finance. legal. IT) 
Human resource management 
Human resource management 
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Firm infrastructure (general management) 
AE8 "Hi-Tech" Technological development 
• This includes sources of supply, purchasing methods and effectiveness, as well as global 
purchasing capability . 
•• This includes effective servicing of customers and minimising the cost of product 
movement. 
According to M.B. Hofmeyr, (personal interview, Knysna, 9 March 2002) the very 
diverse South African country and market meant that SAB learned to be quick on its 
feet and understand different cultures. E.A.O. Mackay (Annual Report 2003) adds 
that SABMiller has portfolios of strong national and regional brands principally based 
on mainstream segments of the market. This pertains especially to market 
segmentation, brand management, packaging and sales and distribution (R. van der 
Schyff, personal interview, Sandton, 10 June 2003). Marketplace understanding is 
based on in-depth qualitative and quantitative research of consumers and customers. 
Mackay (personal interview, London, 27 November 2001) points out that marketing 
and distribution skills are not always portable into foreign markets and conditions as 
these skills require an in-depth knowledge of the local environment and cultures. 
With regard to the core competency of low cost quality production, P.R. Savory 
(personal communication, 14 March 2002) proclaims that SABreweries is recognised 
as the world's most efficient-cost quality beer producer and distributor. H.F.O. 
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McCallum (personal interview, Johannesburg 10 May 2003) adds to this the 
observation that SABMiller is the most innovative and low cost global brewer when it 
comes to procurement. It pioneered the bulk handling and transportation of malt. 
"SABMiller' s capital cost of capacity in new ventures is 20 to 30 per cent below 
competition" (A. Miller Salzman, telephone interview, 12 March 2002). Figure 6.1 
illustrates the relative strength of this core competency compared to competition. 
McCallum's (2003) statement on procurement is again referred to when it comes to 
the core competence of purchasing, located in the procurement activity of the value 
chain. 
The merger and acquisition core competence is readily apparent from the number and 
speed of successful acquisitions and investments. "All the deals ... show that our 
acquisition process works. The process is very systematic and not ego driven. We 
like to have management control and turned our back on deals when we were not sure 
what control we would have" (A. Miller Salzman, personal interview, London, 3 
February 2003). 
Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2001) define human capital as the knowledge and skills 
of a firm's entire workforce. Mackay (27 November 2001) states that SAB's major 
resource is human capital. "The people of SABMilIer are what make us di fferent. We 
have many talented, creative and driven individuals who are dedicated to the 
business" (SABMiller Annual Report 2003:3). Van der Schyff (10 June 2003) notes 
that there is very much an excellence in delivery. 
Salzman (12 March 2002) explains that the "hi-tech" core competence supports the 
low-cost quality competence and several others. Turner (personal interview, Sandton, 
19 October 2004) observes that SA Breweries ' staff were generally well accepted in 
world brewing circles; even in the depths of the country's isolation. He attributes this 
to the company's reputation for general management and technical expertise. 
Figure 6.1 Comparative Retail Beer Price Excluding Tax 
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Source: SABreweries (2005, cited by Gilmour 2005:4). 
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Marketing, operations, a culture of innovation, merger and acquisition capabilities, 
systems and human capital are the six Sappi core competencies listed in Table 6.3. 
As in the cases of Barloworld and SABMiller human resource management is 
classified as the predominant value chain activity in core competencies relating to 
human capital and culture. 
Table 6.3 Sappi Core Competencies 
Code Core Competence 
52 Marketing 
54 Operations 
56 Merger and acquisition capabilities 
(including post-M&A integration) 
57 Human capital 
58 Culture of innovation in products, 
technology and business practices 
510f 5ystems 
Value Chain Activity or Location 
Marketing and sales 
Operations (manufacturing, scheduling) 
Firm infrastructure 
(general management, finance, legal , IT) 
Human resource management 
Human resource management 
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Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Technological development. Firm 
infrastructure (general management) 
Firm infrastructure (general management, 
finance, IT) 
R. Hope (13 June 2003) explains that Sappi probably knows its customers better than 
most because of its focus and marketing expertise. The company has developed 
strong, globally competitive brands (Sappi Quarterly Report June 2002). 
One of the foundations of the operations core competency is the unrelenting focus on 
efficiency and cost management (Sappi Annual Report 2001 :2). R. Hope expands on 
this, mentioning the Sappi system that allows use of a product carousel to make what 
each machine is ideally suited to make. 
The merger and acquisition capability core competency is illustrated by the fact that 
four of the five major acquisitions from 1990 to 2002 were at times when the pulp 
cycle was near its bottom (1. Job 2002). Prices paid were generally below 60 percent 
ofreplacement cost. Three major acquisitions - Hannover Papier (1992), S.D.Warren 
(1994), and KNP Leykam (1997) - showed significant increases in profitability after 
acquisition by Sappi. Returns on investment were notably in excess of US and 
European industry averages. 
R. Hope (13 June 2003) notes that Sappi has a good history of innovation in terms of 
technological innovations, different ways of doing things and financial systems. 
"Dynamic technology clusters that operate across our regions drive Sappi' s ability to 
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design and enhance value - adding products and services, bringing them to the market 
faster than ever. The companies that make up the Sappi Group today are the 
originators of almost all coated fine paper product innovations in the last century. 
This excellence is continued by our three research and development centres in 
Europe, North America and South Afiica" (Sappi Annual Report 2001 :6). 
The human capital core competency is quoted on the website (Sappi 2003c): 
"Our people make the difference: 
Rising to the challenge. 
Skills development 
Performance driven." 
R. Hope considers that Sappi people have a "can do" mentality. 
Systems has been set out as a distinct core competence. Hope amplifies this. He states 
that the financial systems have been a major factor in the company's success, in 
particular the costing system. The income statement is based on sales and not on 
production, so that Sappi is a marketing and selling type of organisation. Its unique 
advanced electronic-order planning system enables the company to optimise its 
manufacturing systems while guaranteeing customers immediate confim1ation of 
availability and delivery details (Sappi Annual Report 2001). 
6.5 Wolverine World Wide 
Wolverine World Wide has three "abilities" listed in its leading core competencies. 
These are the ability to build brands, the capability to operate globally (mindset, 
reach, scope, distribution) and the ability to recruit and retain a highly motivated 
management team. The others are marketing, global operations capability, merger, 
acquisition and business start-up capability, and innovative product design and 
development. Firm infrastructure (general management) is judged to be the 
predominant activity in the ability to build brands core competency. Marketing and 
sales and service are secondary activities for this core competency. The core 
competence of ability to recruit and retain a highly motivated management team is 
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most directly related to human resource management as the predominant activity with 
firm infrastructure as a secondary value chain activity. See Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Wolverine World Wide Core Competencies 
Code Core Competence 
W2 Marketing 
W4 Global operations capability 
Manufacturing I sourcing 
Warehousing I distribution 
Information technology services 
Service 
Procurement 
W6 Merger, acquisition, 
business start-up capability 
(including post-M&A integration) 
W7 Ability to recruit and retain a highly 
motivated management team. 
W8 Innovative product design & 
development 
W10g Ability to build brands 
W10h Ability to operate globally 
(mindset, reach, scope, distribution) 
Value Chain Activity or Location 
Marketing & sales 
Operations 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Outbound logistics 
Information technology (infrastructure) 
Service 
Procurement, inbound logistics 
Firm infrastructure 
(general management, finance, legal , IT) 
Human resource management 
Human resource management 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Technological development Marketing & 
Sales 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Marketing & Sales Service 
Firm infrastructure (general management) 
Indicative of Wolverine ' s marketing core competence is its stated goal, which it has 
achieved over the past few years, to grow sales at a rate of at least twice that of the 
industry (Gulis 2003). The brand building core competence discussed below is also 
illustrative of the marketing competency. 
Regarding the global operations capability, the company controls the sourcing and 
manufacture of approximately 75 percent of the pairs of footwear marketed under the 
company's brand names globally. Of the pairs controlled by the company, 
approximately 85 percent are purchased or sourced from third parties, with the 
remainder produced at company-owned and affiliated facilities located in Michigan, 
Arkansas, the Dominican Republic and Mexico (Wolverine World Wide Annual 
Report Form 10-K 2003). "GIS, the Global Information System, is helping our 
designers, merchandisers, and factories deliver products to market through web-
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enabled information sharing and across our global supply chain ... Many orders are 
fulfilled the same day they are received. The company aims to provide the best in 
class service to our customers" (J.C. Tegner, personal communication, 7 October 
2003). 
T. O'Donovan (personal interview, Rockford, 6 October 2003) observes that the 
company has learned a great deal about post-merger and post-start up integration. He 
notes that a newly acquired business or start-up can be integrated from day one as if it 
had been in the company for six months. 
The ability to recruit and retain a highly motivated management team is addressed by 
the creation of the necessary environment. O' Donovan (6 October 2003) gives the 
example of the presidents of each major brand being responsible for global 
performance of their brand. The Global Operations Group is responsible for 
manufacturing, sourcing, distribution, service, warehousing and customer support for 
the various brands. This organisational structure he says, could not work if it were 
not for the culture of constant informal and formal communication and cooperation at 
all levels in the company. 
The company has an association with Michigan State University biomechanics 
laboratories as part of its pursuit of its core competence of innovative product design 
and development. Wolverine has numerous patented and proprietary designs and 
comfort technologies (Wolverine World Wide Annual Report Form 10-K 2003). 
O'Donovan (6 October 2003) gives several examples of Wolverines ability to build 
brands. CAT and Harley-Davidson Footwear were established as leading US and 
global brands in their respective niches within a few years oflaunch and Merrell sales 
grew tenfold in the seven years since the acquisition of the brand. 
The ability to operate globally applies to marketing, distribution, sourcmg, 
procurement, and other activities and functions , which can be leveraged across the 
various businesses. Wolverine World Wide multi-brands are marketed in over 130 
countries. The company has 45 years of continuous international experience 
(O'Donovan, 6 October 2003). 
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The list of seven core competencies was provided by TJ. O'Donovan (6 October 
2003). 
6.6 Value Chains 
The tables that portray the core competencies in the prior four sections reflect the 
value chain activities associated with the core competencies or, alternatively, the parts 
of the value chain where the core competencies are located. As mentioned earlier, the 
activities or locations are classified into "predominant" and "secondary" . Table 6.5 
shows the predominant and secondary value chain activities derived from Tables 6.1 
to 6.4. X signifies a predominant value chain activity and Y signifies a secondary 
activity. 
Table 6.5 is included to demonstrate the complexity and inter-relatedness of core 
competencies and to give an idea of the configuration of core competencies in each of 
the companies. The corporations each have the number of Xs or "predominant" core 
competencies; 27 for the four in total. Three of the companies have seven core 
competencies and Sappi has six. The total number of secondary activities is 39, of 
which Wolverine World Wide accounts for 14, notably higher than the others. There 
is no statistical significance attributed to this. Wolverine was the only one of the four 
companies with an official list of core competencies. Table 6.6 is derived from Table 
6.5 and shows the companies' core competencies by value chain activity in terms of 
the predominant activity. This will be the basis for analysis. Mergers and acquisitions 
are shown as a separate value chain activity, splitting this out from the infrastructure: 
general management classification. All four companies have core competencies 
located in mergers and acquisitions (infrastructure) and human resource management. 
The three other than Barloworld have core competencies classified in the location in 
the value chain of marketing and sales, operations and technological development. 
The infrastructure: general management location encompasses five Barloworld core 
competencies, two Wolverine World Wide "global" core competencies and Sappi's 
core competence in systems. This location is broader and has more variety than the 
seven other value chain locations. Infrastructure: general management may be of 
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special interest as a case study in terms of the methods that Barloworld, and 
Wolverine use to develop and transfer their "corporate" and global core competencies. 
As discussed earlier SABMiller Africa and Asia and SABMiller Europe are separate 
entities for some research purposes. The numbers cited in the previous paragraph will 
all increase by one unit when this occurs. For example, the research "universe" 
comprises five entities, five core competencies of both mergers and acquisitions and 
human resource management and four of marketing and sales, operations and 
technological development. 
Table 6.5 Value Chain Activities Cited in Core Competencies 
Activity Barloworld SABMiIIer Sappi Wolverine 
Primary 
Service Y Y yy 
Marketing & sales X X XY 
Outbound logistics X Y 
Operations X X X 
Inbound logistics Y Y 
Support 
Infrastructure -
General management XXXXXXy Xy XXyyy XXXYYY 
Finance yy Y yy Y 
IT Y Y Y yy 
Legal Y Y Y Y 
HR management Xyy Xy Xy XY 
Technological XY X X 
Procurement Xy Y 
Total 7X8Y 7X8Y 6X9Y 7X 14Y 
Notes: X = "Predominant" value chain activity in a core competence. 
y = "Secondary" value chain activity included in core competency (but not a "predominant"). 
Infrastructure - General management will include M&A. 
Inbound logistics and procurement were combined in a core competency for SABMiller. 
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Total 
X Y 
4 
3 1 
1 1 
3 
2 
12 8 
6 
5 
4 
4 5 
3 1 
2 
27 39 
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Table 6.6 Core Competencies By Value Chain Activity 
Company 
"0 ~ CD 15 ~ c 
Primary Activities ;;: .- ·c :2 '5. CD 0 > OJ 
-.::: III c- o 
-ro « ro s: 0 III (fJ (fJ ~ 
1. Service 
2. Marketinq & sales X X X 3 
3. Outbound logistics X 1 
4. Operations X X X 3 
5. Inbound loqistics X 1 
Support Activities 
6. M & A (infrastructure) X X X X 4 
7. Human resource manaqement X X X X 4 
8. Technological development X X X 3 
9. Procurement 
Support 
10. Infrastructure 2 7 I 5 I 5 19 
a. Evolve/l nnovate X 1 
b. Execute & organise X 1 
c. Corporate qovernance X 1 
d. Difficult circumstances X 1 
e. Evolvellnnovate X 1 
f. Systems I X 1 
g. Brand building X 1 
h. Operatinq qlobally X 1 
Total 7 7 I 6 7 27 
Note: Procurement combined with Inbound logistics for SABMiller. 
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6.7 Competitive Importance and Performance 
Having formatted the corporations' core competencies and the related value chain 
activities, the issues of how important the different core competencies are for 
competitive purposes can now be addressed. Related to this are the questions of how 
well the core competencies are performed and what relationships there may be 
between the importance of a core competency for competitive purposes and how well 
it is performed. Chapters 7 and 8 explore further what relationships these factors may 
have with the development and transfer of core competencies. 
Questionnaire 2, Development and Transfer of Core Competencies, asked respondents 
to use their subjective judgement and rank their companies' core competencies in 
terms of: 
a) how important each competency is in being competitive in the markets in 
which the company competes 
b) how well each competency is performed by the company. 
The rankings are relative; that is, the most important would be I, second would be 2 
and so forth. Each of the respondents made the point that ranking a core competency 
relatively low in terms of both importance and/or performance did not mean that it 
was unimportant or had not performed well compared to competition. For example, 
Wolverine World Wide considers the ability to build brands the most important core 
competency in terms of being competitive, while it ranks it only sixth in terms of 
performance. Craig Sirois, in Value Line of 14 November 2003 , comments on 
Wolverine' s impressive portfolio of brands and its effect in driving Wolverine's sales 
performance. Chapter 9 includes other analysts' positive comments on Wolverine 
World Wide's brands. 
The rankings of competitive importance and performance using the codes are shown 
Table 6.7 below. 
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Table 6.7 Rankings oflmportance and Performance 
Barloworld A&A Europe Sappi WWW 
Imp Perf Imp Perf Imp Perf Imp Perf Imp Perf 
1 B7 B10a A4 A4 E7 E4 52 54 W10g W4 
2 B10a B10d A2 A6 E2 E3 5B 56 W7 W7 
3 B10b B7 A7 A7 E3 E6 56 52 W10h W10h 
4 B10c B10b A3 A2 E4 E7 54 5101 WB W6 
5 B6 B6 A6 A3 E5 E2 5101 5B W2 WB 
6 B10d B10c AB AB EB E5 W4 W10g 
7 B10e B10e A5 A5 E6 EB W6 W2 
The relative rankings of competitive importance and performance shown in Table 6.7 
are tabulated into Table 6.8 below for purposes of statistical procedures. 
Table 6.8 Competitive Importance and Performance 
Performance Ranking 
1m!:! rank Total Barlow A&A Eur. Sa!:!i WWW 
1 3.4 3 1 4 3 6 
2 3.4 1 4 5 5 2 
3 2.B 4 3 2 2 3 
4 3.6 6 5 1 1 5 
5 4.B 5 2 6 4 7 
6 4.0 2 6 7 1 
7 5.3 7 7 3 4 
r, 0.B5 0.54 0.75 0.1B -0.20 -0 .14 
P-value 0.016 0.215 0.052 0.702 0.747 0.760 
r, - 5pearman correlation coefficient 
The composite, or total, column shows a significant correlation between the relative 
rankings of importance and performance (Spearman correlation coefficient of r, = 
0.85, P-value 0.016). The different companies, however, diverge widely. 
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Figure 6.2 Ranking of Performance versus Ranking of Importance 
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Ranking of Importance for Competitiveness 
Barloworld ranks culture (value based management philosophy) as the most important 
core competency for competitiveness and rates this as third in performance. The 
second most important core competence is ability to create and sustain long-term 
relationships, ranking first in performance. Ability to evolve and innovate is rated 
third in importance and fourth in performance. The Barloworld Spearman correlation 
is 0.536 with a P-value of 0.215. 
SABMilier Africa and Asia has a Spearman correlation of 0.750 with a P-value of 
0.052. The company rates low-cost quality production first in both importance and 
performance. Marketing is rated second in importance and fourth in performance 
while human capitallcorporate culture rates third in both importance and 
performance. SABMiller Europe, in contrast, has a low Spearman correlation of 
0.179 with a P-value of 0.702. It ranks human capitallcorporate culture as first in 
importance, but fourth in performance. Like SABMiller Africa and Asia, it ranks 
marketing second in importance, but only fifth in performance. Distribution is rated 
third in importance and second in performance. 
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Sappi did not rate its core competence human capital. on the basis that human capital 
is a "sine qua non" (essential requirement) for all core competencies and therefore 
cannot be ranked on the same plane as the others. The company ranks marketing as 
the most important core competency and grades it third in performance. The second 
most important core competency is given as culture of innovation in products. 
technology and business practices. but .only fifth, out of five, in performance. In 
Chapter 9, "Review of Strategy", Sappi is shown to be the leader in certain 
technologies in its industry over the past century. Merger and acquisition capabilities 
were considered to be third in importance and second in performance. Sappi ranks 
operations fourth in importance and first in performance. The low performance 
grading of the second most important core competency causes Sappi to have a 
Spearman correlation of negative 0.200 with a P-value of 0.747. 
Wolverine World Wide' s most important core competency is the ability to build 
brands. The company rates it only sixth in terms of performance. One of the results 
of this is that the Spearman correlation is minus 0.143 with a P-value of 0.760. The 
second most important core competency is the ability to recruit and maintain a highly 
motivated management team. It, however, scores second place in performance and the 
third-rated core competency, in terms of importance, ability to operate globally, is 
also rated third in performance. Wolverine rates global operations as sixth in 
importance but first in performance. 
I followed up the issues of SABMiller Europe, Sappi and Wolverine World Wide 
where core competencies, that they considered the most, or second most, important, 
ranked relatively lowly in performance (N. Mogilnicki, telephone discussion, 21 
August and 22 October 2003; R. Hope, Questionnaire 2, The Development and 
Transfer of Core Competencies, 13 June 2003; J.C. Tegner, telephone discussion, 20 
October 2003). All three respondents emphasised the point made earlier that a lowly 
ranked performance may still be better than the competition's and that the core 
competency concerned is very important to the corporation. Mo gilnicki added that 
cultural factors impeded the performance of human resource core competencies in his 
region and Tegner suggested that the core competency of building global brands could 
be one of the most difficult to implement. 
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This section demonstrates that performance may not match the importance for 
competitive purposes even in well managed companies. 
Despite the widely varying correlations, there are patterns in the relationship between 
importance and performance. Four of the five (SABMiller Europe is the non-
conformer) have two of their three most important core competencies classified in the 
first three in terms of performance. Sappi did not rate human capitallcorporate 
culture as discussed earlier, but for the reason given I believe that it is safe to assume 
that it is amongst their most important core competencies. The other four companies 
each include core competencies relating to human resource management in their three 
most important competencies, and, with the exception of SABMiller Europe, rate this 
in the top three in terms of performance. 
6.8 Summary and Conclusion 
The following are the summaries of the most important aspects of this chapter and the 
conclusions related to them. 
Strategies can exist around many doctrines or concepts. All successful compames 
have core competencies but the ways in which they are articulated vary widely 
(Kaplan & Norton 2004). Barloworld bases its strategy on its value based 
management (VBM) philosophy and long-term relationships; SABMiller considers 
drivers and processes key components of its strategy; Sappi has leadership as a core 
element of its strategy based on six core leadership competencies and Wolverine 
World Wide follows a consumer-focused, fact-based and market-driven strategy. 
Wolverine World Wide was the only one of the four corporations that had a formal 
list of core competencies at the time of this research (SABMiller now uses formal and 
explicit core competencies). It was consequently necessary to discuss and agree on 
what the core competencies for the companies were. 
Barloworld' s core competencies comprise the ability to create and sustain long-term 
relationships, the ability to evolve and innovate, a unique organisational ability to 
function together and implement coherent strategies across the organisation, culture 
(value based management philosophies), corporate governance, merger and 
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acquisition capabilities (including post-merger and acquisition integration) and a 
unique ability to operate under difficult circumstances. SABMilier has human 
capital/corporate culture, low-cost quality production (the world leader), "hi-tech" 
marketing, merger and acquisition capabilities (including post-merger and acquisition 
integration), purchasing and distribution as its core competencies. 
Sappi lists marketing, operations, a culture of innovation in products, technology and 
business practices, merger and acquisition capability (including post-merger and 
acquisition integration), systems and human capital. Wolverine World Wide core 
competencies are the ability to build brands, the ability to operate globally, the ability 
to recruit and. maintain a highly motivated management team, merger and 
acquisition/start-up capabilities (including post-merger and acquisition integration) 
innovative product design and development and marketing. 
The core competencies above include the primary and support value chain locations 
or activities related to the core competencies. Several value chain activities may 
support or comprise a core competency. In these cases the most important, or directly 
related activity is classified as the "lead" value chain activity and the others as 
"supporting" activities. For example, Wolverine' s core competency of recruiting and 
maintaining a highly motivated management team is "placed" in the human resource 
management section of the value chain, although general management activity is also 
involved. 
The rankings of importance for being competitive and rankings for performance of the 
core competencies by the corporations do not always coincide. A composite of all the 
companies has a Pearson correlation of 0.700 with a P-value of 0.080. Different 
companies diverge widely. Sappi and Wolverine World Wide have negative 
correlations, because core competencies that they consider very important for 
competitive purposes rank near the bottom of their competencies in terms of 
performance. 
Four out of the five companies (SABMilier Europe is the non-conformer) have two of 
their three most important core competencies classified in the first three for 
performance. Each of the five regards a core competency relating to human resource 
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management as being in the three most important core competencies. All companies, 
with the exception of SABMiller Europe, have this core competency in the top three 
in terms of performance. 
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7. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
7.1 Introduction 
With each company' s core competencies and their locations in the value chain 
established in the previous chapter, this chapter goes on to study the development of 
these core competencies. The methods used to develop, or facilitate the development 
of, core competencies are covered by Table A in Questionnaire 2, The Development 
and Transfer of Core Competencies and the responses to the questions are analysed. 
Data from interviews are also included. Two other issues relating to development are 
also discussed: how core competencies are chosen and developed and whether new 
acquisitions contribute to the development of core competencies. 
The chapter commences by examining determinants of competitiveness. Porter's 
Diamond is applied to the South African corporations and Wolverine World Wide to 
provide an overview of the factors which influenced the development of core 
competencies and competitive advantages. 
The section Selection and Development describes how the corporations choose and 
develop their core competencies. The section Methods covers the methods used to 
develop core competencies by each of the five corporations (two of which are 
SABMiller regions) and a composite of the five. The methods are again analysed by 
value chain location so that the most effective methods for each location or activity 
can be determined. Acquisitions deals with the role of acquisitions in the 
development of the corporations' core competencies. The five corporations' 
experiences of developing core competencies are discussed in Practical Problems and 
Solutions. 
7.2 Determinants of Competitiveness 
Section 3.7 in the literature review examines Porter's Diamond, and Section 2.7 
outlines its application to South Africa. The Diamond is again applied here to 
illustrate how conditions in the country influenced the competitiveness, including the 
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development of core competencies, of the South African companies. This section also 
helps to explain the companies' global successes. Wolverine is analysed in outline 
only, as the thesis does not seek to explain its global success. 
7.2.1 Barloworld 
Barloworld is an industrial brand management company that has both its own brands 
and international franchises such as Caterpillar, Hyster and Avis. This should be kept 
in mind when applying the "Diamond" framework to the company, as certain core 
competencies would be embedded in the company's subsidiaries rather than corporate 
headquarters. 
Factor Conditions 
South Africa is considered to be the "mineral treasure house of the world", as seen in 
Subsection 2.7.1. The country's economical costs of electricity facilitated the 
development of the mining industry. The mining riches of South Africa helped in the 
development of what is now Barloworld's Capital Equipment Division, with the 
Caterpillar franchise for Southern Africa. The mining sector is the largest segment of 
the earthmoving-equipment market. The surface mining sector of coal and diamonds 
accounts for the majority of this (Harvey 1999). 
The South African experience, in tum, helped Barloworld acquire the Caterpillar 
distributor in Spain and Portugal (Finanzauto) and gain the Caterpillar franchise for 
Western Siberia. Barloworld believes that its experience in places like Angola (40 
years of civil war) have equipped it to operate in difficult geographic areas. Siberia 
rivals South Africa as one of the world's richest mineral depositories (Williams 
2002). Minerals are also a source of raw materials for the company's tube-making, 
coating and cement industries (Schneider 2002). 
As seen in Section 2.9, South Africa ranks 13th out of 30 countries for basic 
infrastructure in the 2003 World Competitiveness Yearbook. Barloworld, with its 
Caterpillar franchise and other infrastructure-related businesses such as cement and 
lime, benefited as investment was made in the country's infrastructure. The recently 
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resurgent South African tourist industry, stimulated partially by the country ' s natural 
beauty and wild-animal reserves, forms an important market for the car rental 
business in which Barloworld now controls 100 percent of the Avis franchise (Figure 
9.1 in Chapter 9). 
South Africa's substantial investment in telecommunications (ranked third as a 
percentage of GNP in the 2001 World Competitiveness Yearbook) facilitates the use 
of information technology (IT) and communication at Barloworld. "Whether in 
Johannesburg, Madrid, North Carolina or the UK, Information Services staff are seen 
as being part of Barloworld IS" (Schneider 2002:75). Information technology has 
played an important role in Barloworld' s globalisation, particularly in the world of 
communication. All chief information officers (CIOs) in the group hold virtual 
meetings via video conferencing once a month, reducing the need for foreign travel 
(Schneider 2002). 
The 2003 World Competitiveness Yearbook ranks South Africa poorly in education 
(26th), labour market (25th) and employment (29th). These relative disadvantages are 
even more accentuated in the 2001 Yearbook, with employment, skilled labour, 
science and education listed as 49th out of 49 countries. Harassment and violence, 
personal security and private property, and "brain drain" are all listed as 47th. 
Selective disadvantages in factors, although influencing strategy and innovation, often 
contribute to sustained economic success. This is because disadvantages in basic 
factors, such as labour shortages, lack of domestic raw materials, or a harsh climate, 
create pressures to innovate around them (Porter 1990). 
Barloworld has addressed certain of what would be regarded as Porter's Diamond 
factor disadvantages through training and development programmes. In 1999 
Barloworld established the "BU PrOb'famme" of executive education for its senior 
managers, operated in conjunction with the Gordon Institute of Business Science in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. This is linked to an MBA programme which ensures 
that the participants gain credit towards this qualification for the studies that they 
undertake (Barloworld Annual Report 2002). 
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Section 2.6 summarises the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa. This pandemic 
threatens South African companies in tenns of product sales, costs, human resource 
availability, medical aid and tax costs and an adverse social operating environment. 
Extensive Barloworld programmes to combat AIDS range from the increased intake 
of trainees to an extensive education programme and, where appropriate, the 
administration of anti-retroviral drugs as part of medical benefit programmes 
(Barloworld Annual Report 2002). 
Demand Conditions 
Barloworld serves a wide range of customers locally and internationally. Its greatest 
revenue has generally come from its capital equipment segment, to which South 
Africa is the second largest geographical contributor. The well-established mining 
sector, with competing companies, has sophisticated and demancling buyers 
pressuring the company to meet higher standards and continually improve. Most of 
Barloworld's business in South Africa depends on infrastructure spending, whether 
government or private (Williams 2002; Harvey 1999). 
Barloworld was restricted from providing statistical infonnation on the South African 
earth-moving-equipment (EME) market to me. This infonnation is shared only by the 
submitting members of the industry and cannot even be revealed to Barloworld 
shareholders (R. Goller, personal communication, 10 May 2006). My approaches to 
Caterpillar in the USA for this infonnation were not successful. I do know from my 
own experience (Harvey 1999) that the South African EME market is internationally 
important, because of the heavy equipment used in mining. Caterpillar is the 
dominant player in the market, and I recall it having a market share of about twice 
that of its nearest competitor. 
Porter (1990) observes that a frequent result of home market saturation is vigorous 
efforts by a nation's finns to penetrate foreign markets to sustain growth and even fill 
capacity. Phillips (presentation Wits Business School, 4 August 2005) stated that a 
major reason for his company's international expansion was the fact that it enjoyed 
high and leading market shares in its markets in South Africa. The growth potential, 
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he added was therefore very limited if the company were confined to South Africa 
alone. 
Related and Supporting Industries 
These vary by country and by division. T.he most common are those related to 
infrastructure. In South Africa the most important are the mining, construction and 
manufacturing industries, especially engineering, and government expenditure. 
Barloworld is in some ways its own related, and supporting, industry. In 2001 it 
formed Barloworld Logistics, by combining divisions previously embedded in its 
cement and motor business (Schneider 2002). 
Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
The company's overall objective is to achieve durability in business through the long-
. term creation of value for all stakeholders. Its strategies centre around long-term 
relationships and its value-based management (VBM) philosophy. More detailed 
discussions are in Subsection 5.3.6 and Chapter 9. 
Barloworld's Capital Equipment Division (Caterpillar) and Komatsu are the only full-
product-line competitors in the South African earthmoving-equipment market, 
although there are other specialised players. The intense global rivalry between 
Caterpillar and Komatsu manifests in South Africa, increasing pressure on Barloworld 
to continually improve the Caterpillar performance (Harvey 1999). The other 
Barloworld divisions and subsidiaries all have competitors in South Africa, which is a 
relatively small and segmented market by international standards. This again places 
pressure on them to perform. 
Government 
Barloworld has benefited, directly and indirectly, from government spending on 
infrastructure. However, on balance, the data presented in Chapter 2 shows that 
government affected the company very adversely from 1948 to 1993, because the 
334 
policies impacted negatively on both the South African environment and Barloworld's 
opportunities to do business globally. 
Chance 
Reference is made to Subsection 2.7.6 regarding the influence of "chance" on South 
Africa and Subsection 3.7.1 which gives Porter's (1990) definition of chance. Chance 
events, such as oil-price spikes, would have impacted Barloworld more than 
companies in most other industries. The circumstances that led to Barlow selling its 
first Caterpillar tractor in 1927 were pivotal if not chance events. 
7.2.2 SABMiller 
R. van der Schyff (personal interview, 10 June 2003) believes that the company has 
an ability to examine its operations using Porter's Diamond and where the analysis 
reveals problems turn the problems into opportunities. "Given our infrastructure, 
we've been fairly well placed, but at the bottom of it has been the people side of it. 
The ability to resource up, the ability to develop skills, hire skills, competitive skills, 
higher than has been the case of our competitors in South AtTIca and as good as 
anything in the United States or Britain, or certainly competitive in those countries". 
Factor Conditions 
The basic raw materials for the brewing of beer - water, hops, barley and sugar -
were and are available in South AtTIca (Haywood, Davidson, Berger and Bunneister 
2002). The road and railway infrastructure enabled SABMiller's products to be 
distributed widely, and, as with Barloworld, advanced telecommunications facilitated 
internal and global communication and the use of "high tech" (Section 2.7.and 6.3). 
To combat the country's human-resource drawback, the company invested heavily in 
human capital. Training amounts to an average of 3.2 days per person per year 
(SABMiller Corporate Accountability Report 2003). The company operates a 
training institute - a so-called corporate university - that has affiliations with local 
and international tertiary establishments (R. van der Schyff, 10 June 2003). 
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The then South African Breweries moved its legal domicile and head office to 
London in 1999 to improve its cost of capital and availability of finance (R. van der 
Schyff, 10 June 2003). The company's subsequent acquisitions using shares listed on 
the London Stock Exchange could not have been done with a Johannesburg listing 
only. The 2003 SABMiller Annual Report states that weighted average cost of capital 
declined from 11.0 percent in 2002 to 9 percent because of a lower average risk 
premium following the acquisition of Miller Brewing and a lower group risk profile 
from an increased geographical spread of businesses. 
The weather in South Africa is generally conducive to the beer industry. Countries in 
hot equatorial climates generally have very low per capita beer consumption figures 
(P .R. Savory, personal communication, 14 March 2002). 
Related and Supporting Industries 
The company controls the largest bottler and distributor of soft drinks (Coca-Cola 
and Schweppes) in South Africa and offi:uitjuices and bottled water marketed locally 
and internationally (Appletiser). Core competencies can be developed and cross-
fertilised in these related businesses. SABMiller also has investments in South 
Africa' s largest wine and spirits company (Distel) and in hotels and casinos 
(SABMiller Annual Report 2005). 
Mini-clusters of supporting industries have developed around the brewing centres in 
South Africa. Examples are the suppliers of cans, glass bottles, labels and packaging, 
allowing for symbiotic relationships and communication (Haywood et al. 2002). Van 
der Schyff (10 June 2003) believes that the supply chains are as good as any in other 
countries with the possible exception of Japan. The company engages its suppliers to 
achieve long-term, mutually beneficial relationships and has set up a global sourcing 
council to coordinate the purchase of key raw materials for brewing and packaging. It 
has outsourced distribution to independent contractors in South Africa and, 
consequently, contributed towards black economic empowerment as outlined in 
Section 2.6 (SABMiller Corporate Accountability Report 2002). 
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Demand Conditions 
"The first requirement for volume, per capita and growth in any beer market is a 
substantial, well-paid blue-collar class of mostly physical workers and high 
population densities" (P.R. Savory, 14 March 2002). These requirements have been 
met, particularly after 1962 (see Govenunent below). The culturally diverse and 
segmented market caused the company to learn rapidly how to understand different 
cultures and satisfy the needs of different consumers (M.B. Hofmeyr, personal 
interview, Knysna, 9 March 2002). 
All of the company's operations keep under continuous review the changing desires 
of their consumers, with a view to developing new products in accordance with a 
group-wide approach. This leads to continuous innovation and upgrading of products 
(SABMiller Corporate Accountability Report 2003). 
The company holds a 98 percent share of the beer market in South Africa (Grant and 
Wiggins 2005). In my experience, this share not only reflects the importance of 
economies of scale as a key success factor in the brewing industry but also suggests 
that the needs of the country 's diverse beer drinkers are being met. See Subsection 
5.4.1. The company has kept the price of beer as low as possible, even if that meant 
forcing efficiencies to the extreme, the result of which has been SA Breweries 
producing the cheapest beer in the world (Gilmore 2005). This is illustrated in Figure 
6.1 in Section 6.3. 
South Africa had the II th largest beer market in the world in 2004, surpassmg 
countries such as Australia and Canada. See Appendix 7.16. In 1996 the per capita 
consumption of beer in South Africa was 4.42 litres per adult. This compared to 
Australia with 6.07, the USA with 5.36 and Canada with 4.23 litres per adult. These 
three countries are generally regarded as more advanced economically and 
industrially than South Africa (Haywood et al. 2002). 
According to· Miller Salzman (personal interview, 3 February 2003), the overriding 
vision and mission in the early 1990s was that they wanted to expand. The company 
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knew that it would to stay the same size if it stayed in South Africa alone. "We got to 
the stage we were like a potted plant that had been root bound." 
Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
SABMilier's global strategy is discussed in Subsection 5.4.6 and 9.4.1. It is to drive 
volume and productivity, optimise and expand its existing positions and grow its 
brands in the premium beer market. Growth is envisaged from the recent big 
acquisitions - Miller in the United States and Peroni in Italy - while the developing 
markets of China and India make up the longer-term part of the strategy. 
The organisation structure has become flatter and "more lean" over the past decade 
(R. van der Schyff, 10 June 2003). E.A.G. Mackay (personal interview, London, 22 
November 200 I) reveals that productivity has improved by a factor of four to eight 
over two decades. The brewery in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, operates a full 
brewing shift with a maximum of 15 people (K. Russell, personal interview, Port 
Elizabeth, 3 March 2005). From my own experience a comparative figure in the 
1970s was between 100 and 200, depending on the brewery and the production mix. 
Subsection 5.4.3, on the history of the company, describes several beer "wars" in the 
latter half of the last century. These included two international groups investing in the 
South African beer industry. The resulting competitive engagements are seen as 
having sharpened the SA Breweries' marketing and other core competencies. The 
competition is now for "share of throat" and embraces opaque beer, wine and spirits 
and, in some cases, even soft drinks (K. Russell, 3 March 2005). The present 
chairman of SABMilier has denied that SA Breweries, in South Africa, is a monopoly 
and described it as a "temporary sole supplier" (J.M. Kahn, personal interview, 
Pretoria, circa 2000). 
Government 
Historically, governments favoured both South African Breweries' brewing 
competitors and the wine and spirits industry with regard to excise tax. " ". had to 
contend with a hostile government that imposed high excise duties" (J.M Kahn, 
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Corporate Report, Financial Mail, 12 August 2005:18). Another adverse effect of 
government was the legal restrictions on the availability of liquor to certain 
population groups prior to 1962 (see Subsection 5.4.3). 
Chance 
Reference is made to both government and chance in Subsections 2.7.5 and 2.7.6. 
Government and chance affected SA Breweries as they did Barlows and Sappi. 
Without a solution to the political problems of the country, the company would not 
have been able to expand globally. 
7.2.3~ 
The South African pulp and paper industry is based on raw materials planted and 
harvested in the country. Special attention is therefore paid to factor conditions and 
supporting and related industries in studying this company. 
Factor Conditions 
Apart from a small establishment in Swaziland, South Africa has the only pulp and 
paper industry in Africa (Sappi Annual Report 2002). South Africa does not have 
navigable rivers and abundant natural forests. Companies in the industry therefore 
had to innovate; the establishment of plantations is an example of this (R. Hope, 
personal interview, Johannesburg, 25 October 2002). A key factor advantage is the 
growing time of trees in South Africa versus that in the Northern Hemisphere. As an 
example: the rotation period for Sappi hardwoods is about eight years compared to 
more than forty years in Canada (R. Hope, personal cornmunication, 7 October 2003). 
South Africa has a further advantage in that both hardwood and softwood species are 
produced in equal quantities and as a result are of a more consistent quality than those 
harvested from natural forests (South African Forestry 2004, cited by Rohman 2005). 
The costs of land and labour were, and are, relatively low (R. Hope, 25 October 
2002). 
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Sappi owns and manages 545,000 hectares of pine and eucalyptus plantations in 
South Africa. This accounts for approximately 23 percent of the country 's timberlands 
(Sappi Annual Report 2002 on Form 20-F). Sappi's Saiccor mill is the lowest-cost 
producer and the world's largest producer of dissolving pulp (Chapman, Da Silva, 
Mackie and Stavrakis 2002). Fluctuating exchange rates could endanger the lowest-
cost status at times. 
According to Forestry South Africa (2004), the industry is faced with the challenge of 
its low skills level. It is developing learnerships specifically for pulp and paper 
manufacture through the Forest Industries Education and Training Programme. The 
learnerships are expected to upgrade the skills of present employees and raise skill 
levels in the future. 
South Africa recycles about 52 percent of its consumption of paper, which is 
equivalent to European levels of fibre recycling. The more fibre that is recycled, the 
more capacity the country has to produce paper, and the less that must be disposed of 
by municipalities in solid-waste disposal sites (Forestry South Africa 2004). 
Sappi has built a global information technology platform that is used across all its 
businesses (Sappi Annual Report 2003), similar to what Barlow and SA Breweries 
did. Sappi originated many of the industry' s major innovations of the 20th century. It 
implements best practice and continues to maintain focus on innovation throughout 
the group. There are research and development centres in Europe, North America and 
South Africa that have established multi-regional, multi-disciplinary teams to ensure 
that knowledge is transferred throughout the group (Sappi Annual Report 2002 on 
Form 20-F). 
The Sappi Forests subsidiary seeks to build on the natural advantage of tree growing 
cycles and has an extensive research operation which concentrates on programmes to 
improve the yield per hectare of forest land used. Significant progress has been made 
in developing faster-growing trees with enhanced fibre yields (Sappi Annual Report 
2002 on Form 20-F). 
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Principal supply requirements are wood, pulp and energy, and large amounts of water 
(Sappi Annual Report 2004 on Form 20-F). The company's energy requirements in 
Southern Africa are met principally by gas, electricity and coal, supplemented by 
purchases of oil and by the use of internally generated biomass and by-products. 
Escom, the state-owned electricity company, provides approximately 68 percent of 
the electricity requirements (see Section 2.9 for information on low-cost electricity). 
The balance is generated internally. 
Demand Factors 
The products in South Africa are sold to a large number of customers, including 
merchants, converters and other direct customers, many of whom have long-standing 
relations with Sappi (Sappi Annual Report 2004 on Form 20-F). Product ranges need 
to be developed speedily to service the needs of a diverse market that includes 
sophisticated and demanding customers (Chapman et al. 2002, Sappi Annual Report 
·2002 on Form 20-F). The growth in the industry is attributed to the industry' s long 
time competitiveness (Forestry South Africa 2004). 
South Africa ranked 24th in the world in both paper and paperboard production in 
2004. It ranked 15th in pulp production, illustrating the importance of exports of this 
product. See Appendix 7.15. 
Hope (25 October 2002) reports that Sappi decided to pursue international growth in 
1989 because the growth opportunities in South Africa were limited by their high 
market share and the sluggish local market. 
Related and Supporting Industries 
The industry is well integrated from seeding to final product, linking forestry, paper 
and board manufacturing to converting operations (Forestry South Africa 2004). 
Appendix 7.16 depicts the array of related and supporting industries of the forest 
industry. It shows the various products and final uses derived from forest plantations 
and sugar cane. 
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There are industry clusters in forestry and milling. Both Sappi and Mondi, Sappi's 
competitor, have plantations and mills in Mpumalanga Province and Kwa Zulu Natal. 
Sappi and Mondi plantations grow alongside mills that produce newsprint and kraft 
(Chapman et al. 2002). Sappi Forest Products produces bleached and unbleached 
paper pulp for itself and the world market (Sappi Annual Report 2004). 
Downstream packaging companies in South Africa - Nampak, Kohler and Consol -
control 80 percent of their market. Sappi and Mondi have had to maintain 
technological advantages and innovations to serve these strongly placed customers. 
There is considerable product information flow between the related industries 
(Chapman et al. 2002). This encourages close relationships, short communication 
lines and concurrency with respect to innovation. 
Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
Sappi's overall objective is to be the outstanding company in the global paper and 
pulp sector. The strategies to achieve this are discussed in Subsection 5.5.6 and 9.5.1. 
They include moving towards a more market-oriented practice and ensuring that 
adequate marketing, production and process technology competencies are in place. 
The company's chief competitor in South Africa is Mondi, a subsidiary of the Anglo 
American Corporation, Africa's largest company. Mondi, founded in 1967, is a 
producer of pulp, paper, packaging board, sawn timber and related products (Anglo 
American Annual Report 2002). It owns or leases 660,000 hectares of forest land in 
South Africa (Chapman et al. 2002). 
Sappi and Mondi have different global strategies and focus. Sappi concentrates on 
coated woodfree paper while Mondi focuses on uncoated woodfree, graphic paper and 
packaging (McNulty 2003). Sappi also produces uncoated woodfree paper, as well as 
newsprint in South Africa, and competes in the same markets as Mondi. Having to 
compete with such a strong rival has forced Sappi to continually improve and 
innovate. Imports, primarily from Europe, have gained an increased share of the 
Southern African paper markets since sanctions and boycotts against South Africa 
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ended with the demise of apartheid in the early 1990s (Sappi Annual Report 2004 on 
Form 20-F). 
Government 
There are no tariffs imposed on imports of pulp and newsprint into South Africa. 
Tariffs on most other paper products under the World Trade Organisation rules are 10 
percent, and will decline to five percent over time (Sappi Annual Report 2004 on 
Form 20-F). 
The primary South African laws affecting Sappi 's operations have been substantially 
revised since 1994 to reflect the environmental concerns of interested and affected 
parties. These include the National Water Act, the National Environment 
Management Act and expected revisions to the Air Pollution Prevention Act of 1965 
(Sappi Annual Report 2001 on Form 20-F). 
Chance 
The appointment of Eugene van As as the group managing director and CEO in 1978 
was undoubtedly pivotal and possibly also chance. He had joined the company as the 
managing director of a subsidiary in 1977. A firm of executive recruiters conducted a 
search for a new CEO of Sappi in 1978. It is difficult to envisage any of the outside 
candidates showing the same boldness as van As did in transforming Sappi from a 
South African player to a world leader in its markets (I was aware of the search). 
7.2.4 Wolverine World Wide 
The company' s headquarters is located in Rockford which is 20 miles from Grand 
Rapids, the largest town in western Michigan. 
Factor Conditions 
Industry in the area was originally based on lumber, and Grand Rapids became the 
furniture capital of the USA. The furniture industry declined as companies moved to 
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areas such as North Carolina, seeking lower cost structures. Office furniture replaced 
household furniture and the area now has three of the world ' s largest office furniture 
companies; Steeicase, Hayworth and Herman Miller (Lydens 1976). 
Wolverine had ready access to all of the resources listed in Figure 3.15 depicting 
Porter's Diamond. Located in the Midwest, it was close to supplies of pigskin from 
Ohio and other neighbouring states. Labour costs became relatively expensive for the 
shoe industry in Michigan and the company moved production to Arkansas, then to 
the Caribbean and now has China as the major supplier. 
The Huggins 2004 World Knowledge Competitiveness Index placed the Grand 
Rapids/Holland territory third in the world in knowledge intensive industry (the 
territory includes Muskegon where Sappi has a mill). It was beaten only by San 
Francisco, including Silicone Valley, and Boston, with Harvard and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Bauer 2004). The 2005 World Knowledge 
Competitive Rankings placed Grand Rapids sixth (Expansion Management 2006). 
There are four universities in the Grand Rapids area, regional campuses of several 
others and more leading universities within a two-hour drive of Grand Rapids. 
Wolverine has therefore had a local source of managerial and technical talent. 
"Grand Rapids is truly a research, innovative and entrepreneurial community" claims 
Jenny Shangraw, the city's information resource manager (2004, cited by Bauer 
2004). The area is served by the Gerald R. Ford International Airport and Alticor 
(formerly Amway), the worlds largest direct marketing organisation, is another 
multinational company located in the area. 
Demand Conditions 
The initial markets for Wolverine were lumber workers and farmers. Post-World War 
II affluence in America led to a rise in white-collar jobs, a move from the farms into 
the cities and a general increase in leisure time and leisure activities. Hush Puppies 
were the perfect leisure shoes - casual, comfortable - and uniquely "breathable" 
(Wolverine World Wide 1983). 
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In terms of Porter's Diamond the demand conditions of demanding local customers, 
needs that anticipated those elsewhere and unusual local demand in specialised 
segments that can be served locally were all fulfilled by Hush Puppies. The brand 
subsequently became one of the first global footwear brands. 
The USA is the largest footwear market in the world. Consumption in 2004 was 
2,150 million pairs, of which only 35 million pairs were produced in the country. 
Some estimates place the US at almost a quarter of the world's consumption ofleather 
shoes and leather products (Plunkett Research 2006). The Wolverine decision to go 
global was therefore not so much the result of the local saturated market but rather 
seeing opportunities elsewhere. The US market is highly competitive. (1. Whipple, 
personal interview, Grand Rapids, 8 June 2004). 
Related and Supporting Industries 
Wolverine benefited from the presence of capable, locally based suppliers and 
competitive related industries until the 1980s when the movement of footwear 
manufacturing offshore led to the decline of accessory leather and component 
suppliers. Wolverine had made some of its own materials and continues to do so for 
its military footwear and specialised products. 
Strategy, Structure and Rivalry 
As seen in Subsection 5.6.10 Wolverine has numerous direct competitors, not only in 
the USA but world-wide. The company has always had effective competitors, 
causing it to respond, innovate and upgrade its competencies. 
Government 
Besides legislation and government policy the government has influenced the success 
of Wolverine by its purchase of military footwear. The free trade policies of the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s led to a decline in duties on imported footwear 
and resulting increases in imports. The shoe manufacturing industry now supplies 
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less than 5 percent of the country' s market (1. Whipple, personal interview, Grand 
Rapids, 14 December 2005). 
Chance 
Some of the chance events affecting Wolverine World Wide are discussed in 
Subsection 5.6.3, History. The decline of the supply of horse-hides due to the 
emergence of automobiles together with the War Production Board request to 
Wolverine to produce pigskin gloves during World War II led to the company 
developing and patenting an effective pig-skinning machine (Wolverine 1983). 
The decision by Adolph Krause, President of Wolverine in 1957 to use the name 
"Hush Puppies" suggested by the company's sales manager instead of others 
recommended by an advertising agency is possibly a pivotal chance event in the 
company's history (Wolverine 1983). 
7.3 Selection and Development 
The questionnaire asks respondents to explain, in a few sentences, how core 
competencies are chosen and developed in their company. The answers are discussed 
below. Knowing how the company's select and develop core competencies enables 
one to compare the data with the literature review. Any advances in knowledge will 
be of benefit to both academia and practitioners. The knowledge can also assist other 
companies in their own selection and development of core competencies. 
7.3.1 Barloworld 
According to P.M. Drewell (9 May 2003) Barloworld has been opportunistic 10 
choosing and developing core competencies. He uses the analogy of a surfer to 
explain the situation, as they have always attempted, often unconsciously or 
subconsciously, to "pick the waves and ride them". This, therefore, included a degree 
of instinctive insight. He adds that the executives are very aware of whether or not 
the company can do something well. Core competencies are a constantly evolving 
Issue. 
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Barloworld now has a strategic planning process team that, at the time of the 
interview, was installing standard methodology through all their businesses. Value 
chains are utilised, including the examination of resources, capabilities and core 
competencies. The newly formed Barloworld Logistics is now a major supply chain 
management business, and Drewell expects this to further advance the use of value 
chains in determining the company's core competencies. 
7.3.2 SABMilier 
Van der Schyff(lO June 2003) states that the core competencies have not always been 
consciously chosen but often evolve from meeting the dictates of business 
imperatives. He gives as examples the areas of brewing and distribution. Because 
these are critical areas, there has been a focus on learning more about and developing 
them. "Good" people are assigned to the areas which facilitates the development 
process. There is also interaction between best practices and formal training 
programmes. Individuals build up their skill bases and this in turn affects the choice 
and development of core competencies as they are rotated around the company. 
Mackay (SABMilier 2004c) illustrates the importance of learning in the development 
of core competencies in his address to SABMilier distributors at a conference in New 
Orleans on 26 March 2004: 
Ten years ago we knew how to operate in South Africa very well. And in the 
ten years or more since we came out of South Africa, we have developed ways 
of doing things; ways of taking on new markets. That's very different from 
just knowing how to operate in an existing, in a "given" environment. We 
have - over these years - learned an enormous amount about what questions 
to ask, how to look at things, what' s required in a market, how to restructure a 
given market or business, what to aim for, what the key levers are to pull. 
And, very important, what rules you use when you assess all that. 
The above views are complemented by the regions, or companies, of SABMilier 
Africa and Asia and SABMilier Europe. The former observes that their core 
competencies are chosen through job analysis and structuring of competence guides. 
These vary depending on the individual businesses and their locations (F. Miller, 
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Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core Competencies, 22 August 
2003). 
Historically each country in the SABMiller Europe region has been different, says N. 
Mogilnicki (telephone interview 21 August 2003). There is limited integration across 
the different countries at present and each drives its own core competencies. Top 
management in all the countries is largely from South Africa, and these managers play 
a very influential role. Endeavours are now being made to consolidate and integrate 
operations and systems which will influence the selection and development of core 
competencies. SABMiller Europe has an audit system of capabilities standards in the 
various functions and divisions, which is most developed in the sales area. 
7.3.3 .s.mmi 
R. Hope (13 June 2003) states: "We don't really sit down and choose core 
competencies. It is more a matter of identifying competencies that we need to fulfil 
our goals and strategies" . The company reviews the situation each year and goes 
through the formality of using value chains. The degree of structure or formality 
varies by business but it is now standardising certain processes such as strategic 
planning. 
Around 2003 , Sappi' s human resources department was investigating leadership 
characteristics that will involve asking what core competencies are, what they need to 
be and where they are lacking in skills. This is expected to lead to a more structured 
approach (R. Hope, Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core 
Competencies, 29 September 2003). The 2004 Sappi Annual Report carries details of 
this approach, which is mentioned in Section 6.1. 
7.3.4 Wolverine World Wide 
Core competencies have evolved from experience, largely from the requirements of 
competitive markets . The company has a strategic business planning and 
development programme which has core competencies as one of the foundations of its 
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business model. Value chains and other methods of analysis are used at different 
times (J.C. Tegner, Questionnaire lA, Initial Questionnaire, 9 October 2003). 
7.3.5 Review 
One can see from the above that all five companies use some process to develop core 
competencies. However, none appears to go to the lengths of the rigorous analytical 
approaches advocated by Hamel and Prahalad (1998) and Hit!, Ireland and Hoskisson 
(2005). None of the companies uses the Hamel and Prahalad product matrix, or 
specifically asks the four questions advocated by Hitt et al. which relate to a core 
competency being valuable, rare, costly to imitate, and non-substitutable. While the 
core competencies in place may well meet these four criteria, the companies do not 
explicitly ask these four questions in the process of developing core competencies. 
Wolverine World Wide has core competencies as one of the foundations of its 
business model, while SABMiller Africa and Asia has a system that goes down to the 
core competencies of individuals. Barloworld, SABMiller Europe and Sappi all 
stated that they were moving toward more structured approaches in the development 
of core competencies at the time. 
All five corporations utilise value chains in one way or another when developing core 
competencies, as advocated by Porter (1985) and Hitt et al. (2005). 
The views of Hamel and Prahalad (1998) , Hit! et al. (2005) and Thompson and 
Strickland (2003) - that core competencies emerge over time and that learning and 
experience are crucial - are supported by the findings related to the corporations in 
the study. 
The corporations "choose" to develop certain core competencies because they are 
essential to the achievement of objectives, or to deal with competition, rather than 
through a rigorous checklist or analytical process. This relates somewhat to 
Drucker's (1995) suggested method of keeping careful track of one's own and 
competitors' performances, where successes demonstrate what the market values, and 
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non-successes suggest early indications that the market IS changing or that the 
company's competencies are weakening. 
7.4 Methods 
Table A in Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core Competencies 
asks the respondents to designate the four methods of the seventeen listed that they 
found to be most effective in developing, or facilitating the development of, each of 
their core competencies. It also suggests that they add and specify any other methods 
that are not covered in the questionnaire. 
The responses are analysed by examining totals, means and percentages. Totals are 
used to rank methods in the tables. Means and percentages are also discussed in the 
text. 
7.4.1 Companies 
The most-cited methods of developing core competency by company and value chain 
location in reply to Table A are shown in Appendices 7.1 to 7.5. Even a cursory 
glance at the five tables shows that the methods cited most vary not only between the 
companies but also by value chain location within each company. Three additional 
methods were specified by Sappi, bringing the total of methods listed to 20. The 
maximum number of times each method can be cited or mentioned is seven for four 
of the companies and six for Sappi, as the other companies each have seven core 
competencies and Sappi has six. Table 7.1 in Subsection 7.4.2 shows the methods 
cited by the five companies. 
Barloworld considers method 4, corporate culture that demands high performance 
standards, to be its most effective method to facilitate or develop core competencies. 
This method is mentioned the maximum of seven times. Method 13, investment in 
skills and knowledge, development of human resources, with four mentions is the 
second most effective, followed by method 11, allocation of key managers and 
experts to areas, mentioned three times. 
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SABMiller Africa and Asia rates method I, exposure to a demanding technical, 
operating or economic environment, and method 11, allocation of key managers and 
experts to areas, as its two most effective methods, with four mentions each. It also 
considers method 7, formation of special multi-disciplinary teams; method 8, use of 
international reach and size; and method nine, benchmarking, as effective methods, 
with three mentions each. The company mentions method 10, regular review of 
existing and nascent core competencies, twice (and is the only company to do so), and 
it is the only one to mention method IS, mergers and acquisitions and method 17, 
value chains as being in the four most effective methods for any of the value chain 
locations. 
SABMiller Europe, like Barloworld, cites method 4, corporate culture that demands 
high performance standards the full seven times. Method 11, allocation of key 
managers and experts to areas, is also cited seven times while method 13, investment 
in skills and knowledge, development of human resources, is cited four times. 
Sappi regards method 7, formation of special multi-disciplinary teams, as its most 
effective overall method, with four mentions. The second most effective method is 
method 4, corporate culture that demands high performance standards mentioned 
three times. Sappi mentions method 5, internal analysis that identifies activities that 
should be developed, twice and is the only company to do so. It also mentions three 
others twice: method 2, commit substantial resources to an area, method 6, inclusion 
in planning process (objectives, goals etc) and method 13, investment in skills and 
knowledge, development of human resources. 
Wolverine World Wide rates method I, exposure to a demanding technical, operating 
or economic environment as its most effective overall method. It mentions this the 
maximum of seven times. The company's second most effective method is method 2, 
commit substantial resources to an area, which receives five mentions, followed by 
method 8, use of international reach and size, with three mentions. The only other 
company to mention this method more than once is SABMiller Africa and Asia, 
which does so three times. Wolverine mentions five other methods twice. They are 
method 3, use of company-wide reward and incentive systems; method 4, corporate 
culture that demands high pelformance standards; method 6, inclusion in planning 
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process (objectives, goals etc) and method 9, benchmark core competencies against 
competitors and other firms. 
SABMiIler Europe's median score is the highest, followed by Wolverine World 
Wide, Barloworld and SABMiIler Africa and Asia. Sappi 's score is the lowest. 
However, the differences in scores are not significant at the 5% level of sihrnificance 
(Kruskal-Wallis ANOYA:H=1.95, (4, N=61)), P=O.7447). See Table7.1 , i.e. no 
significant difference between companies. There is no significant difference in 
median scores between the methods with n>2 (Kruskal-Wallis ANOYA: H=11.5, (11, 
N=53)). i.e. no method differences. 
The South African multinationals and Wolverine World Wide differ notably in the 
number of mentions accorded to the different methods. The South African companies 
as a group consider method 4, corporate culture (with the partial exception of 
SABMiller Africa and Asia); and method 11, allocation of key managers and experts 
to areas (Sappi is an exception) as the first and second most effective methods. 
Method 7,formation of special multidisciplinary teams, and method 13, investment in 
skills and knowledge, tie for third place with method 9, benchmark core competencies 
against competitors and other firms, in fifth place. The calculations for the South 
African companies are shown in Appendix 7.6. Wolverine World Wide, on the other 
hand, regards method I, exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic 
environment, method 12, commit substantial resources to an area, and method 8, use 
of international reach and size to be more effective for its purposes. 
Several partial explanations for the above suggest themselves. The South African 
corporate culture is less individualistic than that of corporations in the Urrited States 
(see Hofstede, Section 3.4). The South African comparries began their international 
ventures in the early to mid-1990s. This would have influenced their views on 
corporate culture in a multinational sense. Wolverine World Wide has been 
competing in global markets for several decades longer. The South African 
comparries, with their experience of the relative scarcity of skills and the need to train 
and upgrade have carried this mindset into the international field . I checked these 
explanations with my contacts in the different companies, and four of five replied that 
they agreed with the explanations in general (e-mails: F.Miller and N. Mogilnicki 31 
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July 2006, P.M. Drewell and L.Whipple 8 August 2006). F. Miller of SABMiller 
Africa and Asia expressed reservations about the sentences on corporate culture. As 
seen in Subsection 5.6.4, Wolverine has posted less than a dozen employees to foreign 
positions from the USA over the past eight years. The three South African companies 
have (to varying degrees) transferred numerous employees from South Africa to their 
affiliates in other countries. 
7.4.2 Company Composites 
As seen in Section 7.4.1 and Table 7.1, the maximum number of times a method can 
be cited is seven times for four ofthe companies and six for Sappi, that is, one citation 
for each of the companies' core competencies. The total maximum number of 
citations or score per method is therefore 34 (4 x 7 + 6). The total number of possible 
citations of all methods is consequently 136 (4 x 28 + 24). 
The overall perceived effectiveness of the 20 methods is considered before 
examining the relative effectiveness of each method in developing core competencies 
for the different value chain locations. 
The most-mentioned method is method 4, corporate culture that demands high 
pelformance standards. This receives 21 mentions out of a possible 34 and accounts 
for 15.4 percent of the total 136 possible mentions. Each of the companies mentions 
this method at least twice, and two of them, Barloworld and SABMiller Europe, 
accord it the maximum of seven mentions or points. 
The second most-effective method on an overall basis is method 11, allocation o/key 
managers and experts to areas. It scores 16 points. All companies mention it at least 
once, and SABMiller Europe mentions it seven times. This method accounts for 11.7 
percent of the total mentions. 
Method 1, exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment, 
receives 15 mentions, to be placed third. Each company mentions this method at least 
once, with Wolverine World Wide mentioning it the maximum of seven times. 
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Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment accounts for 
11.3 percent of the total points, or mentions. 
Method 7, formation of special multi-disciplinary teams, receives 13 mentions to be 
placed fourth. Each of the companies mentions it at least twice with Sappi doing so 
four times. Method 7 accounts for 9.8 percent ofthe total. 
Method 13, investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources, is 
placed fifth. All companies mention it, with SABMiller Europe doing so five times. 
Its 12 points account for 8.8 percent of the total. 
Figure 7.1 graphically illustrates the effectiveness ratings of the 20 methods. 
Rankings based on means result in the same order as those of totals for the top six 
methods. See Table 7.l. The percentages for the companies and the company 
composites are shown in Table 7.2. The top four methods account for 48.2 percent, 
and the top five methods account for 57 percent of the total. 
Table 7.1 Development of Core Competencies: Company Composites 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1. Exposure to demanding technical , operating, economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark core competencies aga inst competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment, skills & knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Sem inars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total 
Number 
Mean 
LXi 
n 
x 
BAR A&A 
2 4 
1 
1 
7 2 
1 1 
2 2 
2 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 2 
3 4 
2 1 
4 1 
1 
1 
28 28 
13 13 
2.2 2.2 
Note: Rank refers to LXi column. Methods 18 to 20 not ranked because from Sappi alone. 
EUR 
1 
1 
2 
7 
2 
1 
2 
7 
4 
1 
28 
10 
2.8 
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SAP WW LX n x Rank 
1 7 15 5 3.0 3 
2 5 9 4 2.2 7 
2 5 3 1.4 10 
3 2 21 5 4.2 1 
2 4 3 1.3 12 
2 2 8 4 2.0 9 
4 2 13 5 2.6 4 
1 3 9 5 1.5 7 
2 2 10 . 5 2.0 6 
3 2 1.5 13 
1 1 16 5 3.2 2 
1 1 5 4 1.3 10 
2 1 12 5 2.4 5 
17 
1 1 1.0 14 
1 1 1.0 14 
1 1 1.0 14 
1 1 1 1.0 
1 1 1 1.0 
1 1 1 1.0 
24 28 
1 136 1 61 1 2.3 14 11 
1.7 2.5 § 
Table 7.2 Development of Core Competencies: Company Composites (Percentages) 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1. Exposure to demanding technical , operating, economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10.Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment, skills & knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19 Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total 
Number 
Mean 
LXi 
n 
x 
BAR 
7.1 
3.6 
3.6 
25.0 
5.5 
7.1 
7.1 
3.3 
3.3 
3.3 
10.3 
3.6 
14.3 
100.0 
13 
Note: Rank refers to LXi column. M ethods 18 to 20 not ranked because from Sappi alone. 
1-
A&A EUR SAP 
14.3 3.6 4.2 
3.6 8.3 
7.1 
7.1 25.0 12.5 
2.6 8.3 
7.1 8.3 
10.3 7.1 16.7 
10.3 3.6 4.2 
10.3 7.1 8.5 
7.1 
14.3 25.0 4.2 
3.6 4.2 
3.6 14.3 8.3 
3.6 
3.6 
3.6 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
13 10 14 
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WW LX Rank 
25.0 11 .0 3 
17.9 6.6 7 
7.1 3.7 10 
7.1 18.4 1 
2.9 12 
7.1 5.9 9 
7.1 9.6 4 
10.7 6.6 7 
7.1 7.4 6 
2.2 13 
3.6 11 .8 2 
3.6 3.7 10 
3.6 8.8 5 
- 17 
.7 14 
.7 14 
.7 14 
.7 
.7 
.7 
100.0 E 11 § 
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The results of this study are not directly comparable with that of Mascarenhas, Baveja 
and Jamil (l998), which was covered in Subsection 3.7.1. Their study used three 
types of competence .- technical, reliable process and close external relationships -
while this study uses the primary and secondary locations or activities in the value 
chain. There are, however, certain similarities. The results of this study certainly 
support their conclusion that different approaches and multiple methods are needed to 
develop each type of competence. 
Corporations in Mascarenhas et al.'s {I 998) study mentioned exposure to a 
demanding technical environment with commit substantial resources to an area tied 
with two other methods for second place. The corporations researched in this thesis 
placed these two methods in reverse position to this with commit substantial 
resources in first position and exposure to a demanding environment second. The 
Mascarenhas et al. research regarded corporate culture followed by internal analysis 
as the two leading methods in the core competence of reliable processes. The 
companies in this study in the operations value chain, rated allocation of key 
managers and experts first and exposure to a demanding environment second. 
Other methods covered in the literature, such as method 10, regular competence 
review meetings (Hamel and Prahalad 1998); method 5, internal analysis; method 17, 
value chains (Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 2005); and method 12, path dependency 
(Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997; Lei, Hitt and Bentis 1996; Barney 1995), receive 
relatively few mentions. Internal analysis receives four mentions; value chains, one; 
regular review of existing and nascent core competencies, three. Commitment to 
long-term paths or trajectories of development is mentioned by four of the five 
companies but only one of them mentions it more than once. Method 10, 
benchmarking and method 8, use of international reach and size, are mentioned by all 
the corporations, scoring ten and nine mentions respectively. Method 14, 
seminars/conjerences, is not mentioned by any of the five companies as being in the 
four most effective methods for any of their core competencies. 
There appear to be some contradictions between the scores in Table 7.1 and the 
written or spoken answers to Question 4 of Section Three in Questionnaire 1: Initial 
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Questionnaire on the Development and Transfer of Core Competencies and 
Competitive Advantage - "Please explain, in a few sentences, how core competencies 
are chosen and developed in your company." All the companies mention value chains 
in their answers to this question, but only one lists it in Table A answers in 
Questionnaire 2. I raised this question with two of the companies (P.M. Drewell, 
email, 26 October 2003 and F. Miller, telephone interview, 25 October 2003), and the 
answer was that they certainly use value chains, but it did not rank in the four most 
effective methods for any of their core competencies. 
The following subsections analyse the effectiveness of the methods of developing 
core competencies by value chain location. 
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7.4.3 Yalue Chain 
Table 7.3 shows the same methods as Table 7.1 does but is presented by value chain 
location, not by company. The number of mentions per method and the total 
mentions are obviously the same. The information is presented in this way so that the 
effectiveness of the various methods can be assessed in the contexts of different value 
chain locations. A particular method, may, for example, be more effective in a 
marketing location than in an operational one. 
Eight value chain locations are used in the table and subsequent analysis. The 
infrastructure: general management location has special considerations that were 
discussed in Section 6.6. All five of the companies report on merger and acquisitions 
and human resource management, four on marketing, operations and technology; 
three on infrastructure: general management; and two on outbound logistics and 
inbound logistics/purchasing. 
There is a significant difference in median scores between the first 8 columns 
(marketing to infrastructure: general management) (Kruskal -Wallis ANOYA: 
H=20.5 , (7, N=73), P=0.0047). M&A, human resource management, and 
infrastructure are significantly different from outbound logistics and in inbound 
logistics (Mann-Whitney: M&A: U= 13.5, P + 0.0340; human resource management: 
U=13.0, P=0.0489; infrastructure: general management: U=] 0.0, P=0.0045). 
There is no significant difference in median scores between the methods with n> 3 
(Kruskal-Wallis ANOYA: H=9.2, (9, N=59), P = 0.4202). i.e. no methods differences. 
Three methods achieve the maximum of five mentions in a specific value chain 
activity. These are: method 4, corporate culture that demands high performance 
standards, in human resource management; method 7, formation of special multi-
disciplinary teams, under mergers and acquisitions; and method 13 , investment in 
skills and knowledge, development of human resources, once again in human resource 
management. 
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No methods receive four mentions in anyone value chain location. The methods that 
receive three mentions are method 2, commit substantial resources to an area, in 
technological development; method 3, use of company-wide reward and incentive 
systems, in human resource management; method 4, corporate culture that demands 
high peiformance standards, in mergers and acquisitions; method 8, use of 
international reach and size, in mergers and acquisitions;. and method 11, allocation 
of key managers and experts to areas, in operations .. 
Method 7,Jormation of multi-disciplinary teams, is rated the most effective method in 
the merger and acquisition location. Method 13, investment in skills and knowledge, 
development of human resources, receives the most mentions in human resource 
management together with method 4, corporate culture that demands high 
performance standards. The latter is rated as the most effective method in both human 
resource management and infrastructure. Method 2, commit substantial resources to 
an area, receives the most mentions in the technological development location. 
Method 11 , allocation of key managers and experts to areas, is ranked first In 
operations and "ties" for first place in marketing and sales. 
The suitability of the methods for different locations is discussed above. The same 
information on effectiveness will now be presented from the perspective of the value 
chain locations. What are the most effective methods to develop core competencies in 
each value chain location as determined by the companies? 
Marketing has four methods that receive two mentions each. They are method 1, 
exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment; method 3, 
use of company-wide reward and incentive systems; method 4, corporate culture that 
demands high performance standards; and method 11, allocation of key managers 
and experts to areas. Outbound logistics shows agreement of the two respondents 
only on method 9, benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms . 
Operations has five methods that receive two mentions each, but method 11, 
allocation of key managers and experts to areas, receives three mentions. Inbound 
logistics features method 8, use of international reach and size, as the leading method, 
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the only method on which both respondents agree. Mergers and acquisitions report 
method 7,formation ()f special multi-disciplinary teams, as the most effective method. 
All five companies cite it. The next most effective methods are 4, corporate culture 
that demands high peljormance standards, and 8, use of international reach and size. 
Three companies cite each of these methods. 
In the human resource management location all five companies mention method 4, 
corporate culture that demands high performance standards, and method 13, 
investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources. Four 
companies submitted data for the technology location, and three of them mention 
method 2, commit substantial resources to an area. Five other methods receive two 
mentions each. Infrastructure: general management shows method 4, corporate 
culture that demands high performance standards, as cited five times and there are 
two other methods (I and 2) that receive four mentions each. The maximum number 
of mentions for any method in this location is eight as opposed to four in the other 
locations. 
There are different answers as to what is the most effective method for each of the 
eight value chain locations. These results further support the conclusions of 
Mascarenhas et al. (1998) that different approaches and multiple methods are needed 
as mentioned in Subsection 7.4.2. Method 4, corporate culture that demands high 
performance standards, however, features in three of the eight, it "ties" with three 
others in marketing and with one other (method 13, investment in skills and 
knowledge, development of human resources) in human resource management and is 
cited more than any other method in infrastructure: general management. Method II, 
allocation of key managers and experts to areas is placed first in operations and "ties" 
for first position in marketing and sales. 
The tables showing value chain locations for marketing, outbound logistics, 
operations, inbound logistics and procurement, mergers and acquisitions, human 
resource management, technological development and infrastructure: general 
management are shown in Appendices 7.7 to 7.14. This information is the same as 
that shown in Appendices 7.1 to 7.5 but is presented by value chain locations. The 
eight value chain locations will now be discussed in more detail. 
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Table 7.3 Development of Core Competencies: Value Chain 
Times methods cited 
Methods 
" 
~ 
~ 0> ~ 0> C a c 0> g (5 2 ~ a ~ 0> « c ;; 
-i:' --' a :;; .c 
;3 ~ --' "" u g: ~ D- o:: i!' :;; 0 c :;; J: c 
] ~ c 
a ~ 0:: 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating, economic environment 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 4 15 3 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 1 1 3 4 9 7 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 2 3 5 10 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 2 1 2 1 3 5 2 5 21 1 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 1 1 1 1 4 12 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 1 1 2 2 2 8 9 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 1 2 1 5 2 2 13 4 
8. Use of international reach and size 2 3 2 2 9 7 
9. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 1 2 2 2 1 2 10 6 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 1 1 1 3 13 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 3 16 2 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 1 1 3 5 10 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 1 1 1 5 1 3 12 5 
14. Seminars/conferences 17 
15. Acquisitions 1 1 14 
16. Recruit outside talent 1 1 14 
17. Value chains 1 1 14 
18. Other: Identify Leadership Competencies 1 1 
19. Other: Performance Management 1 1 
20. Other: Focus and Scale 1 1 
Total ~Xi 16 8 16 8 20 20 16 32 136 
Number n 12 7 9 7 9 8 9 12 73 
Mean X 1.3 1.1 1.8 1.1 2.2 2.5 1.8 2.7 1.9 
Note: Rank refers to Total or LXi column. 18-20 not ranked. Sappi only. 
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7.4.4 Value Chain Locations 
Marketing 
See Appendix 7.7. There are widespread views on the most effective methods. Four 
methods are each cited twice but with different combinations of the companies. They 
are method 1, exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
(SABMiller Africa and Asia, Wolverine), method 3, use of company-wide reward and 
incentive systems (SABMiller Europe, Wolverine), method 4, corporate culture that 
demands high pelformance standards (SABMiller Europe, Sappi) and method 11 , 
allocation of key managers and experts to areas (SABMiller Africa and Asia, 
SABMiller Europe). 
Method 2, commit substantial resources to an area, and method 6, inclusion in 
planning process (objectives, goals etc) are cited by Wolverine World Wide. It 
should be recalled that Section 6.2 discusses this company's target of growing sales at 
twice the industry average with 50 percent of this derived from new business, whether 
geographic or brand. Method 5, internal analysis that identifies activities that should 
be developed; method 7, formation of special multi-disciplinary teams; and method 
12, commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development, are the other 
methods cited by Sappi. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia also mentions method 9, benchmark core competencies 
against competitors and other firms, and method 10, regular review of existing and 
nascent core competencies. The fourth method cited by SABMiller Europe is 13, 
investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources. 
Outbound Logistics 
The two companies reporting for this location are SABMiller Africa and Asia and 
SABMiller Europe. They agree on the effectiveness of one method which is method 
9, benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms. SABMiller 
Africa and Asia cites its other selections as method 1, exposure to a demanding 
technical, operating or economic environment; method 6, inclusion in planning 
364 
process (objectives goals etc); and method 10, regular review of existing and nascent 
core competencies. The additional three methods cited by SABMiller Europe are 
method 4, corporate culture that drives high performance standards; method II , 
allocation of key managers and experts to areas; and method 13, investment in skills 
and knowledge, development of human resources. See Appendix 7.8. 
Operations 
See Appendix 7.9. The three South African companies reporting on this location all 
cite method 11, allocation of key managers and experts to areas. There are five other 
methods that receive two mentions each, but once again with the companies in 
different combinations. SABMiller Europe and Wolverine World Wide cite method 
1, exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment and 
method 4, corporate culture that demands high performance standards. SABMiller 
and Sappi endorse method 6, inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc). 
SABMiller Africa and Asia and Wolverine World Wide cite method 7,formation of 
special multi-disciplinary teams, while Sappi and Wolverine World Wide cite method 
9, benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms. 
Inbound Logistics and Procurement 
See Appendix 7.10. Once again only SABMiller Africa and Asia and SABMiller 
Europe are included in this location, and the sole method that they agree on is method 
8, use of international reach and size (Subsection 7.2.2 refers to SABMiller's global 
purchasing capability). 
SABMiller Africa and Asia cites the three additional options of method 1, exposure to 
a demanding technical, operating or economic environment; method 5, internal 
analysis that identifies activities that should be developed; and method 17, value 
chains (I believe that logistics is one of the better areas in which to utilise value chain 
analysis). SABMiller Europe mentions method 4, corporate culture that demands 
high performance standards; method 7,formation of special multi-disciplinary teams; 
and method 11 , allocation of key managers and experts to areas. 
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Mergers and Acquisitions 
There is a degree of consensus on the effectiveness of methods here. See Appendix 
7.11. All five companies choose method 7, formation of special multi-disciplinary 
teams, as one of their four most effective methods of developing core competencies in 
this value chain location. Three South African companies - Barloworld, SABMiller 
Europe and Sappi - select method 3, corporate culture that demands high 
performance standards and Barloworld, SABMiller Africa and Asia and Sappi 
mention method 8, use of international reach and size. 
Two companies mention method six, inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals 
etc) (Barloworld and Wolverine); two mention method 8, benchmark core 
competencies against competitors and other firms (SABMiller Africa and Asia and 
SABMiller Europe), and method 11, allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
(SABMiller Europe and Wolverine). SABMiller Africa and Asia is the only 
respondent to cite method 15, acquisitions, as one of their top four methods in 
developing core competencies. 
Human Resource Management 
See Appendix 7.12. Human resource management is the sole value chain activity 
where the five companies agree fully on two of the methods. Those methods are 4, 
c01porate culture that demands high performance standards and 13, investment in 
skills and knowledge. development of human resources. 
Barloworld, SABMiller Europe and Wolverine World Wide all cite method 3, use of 
company-wide reward and incentive systems. SABMiller Africa and Asia and 
Wolverine World Wide both cite method 1, exposure to a demanding technical, 
operating or economic environment, while both SABMiller Africa and Asia and 
SABMiller Europe cite method 11, allocation of key managers and experts to areas. 
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Technological Development 
See Appendix 7.13. Three companies, SABMiller Europe, Sappi and Wolverine 
World Wide, agree on method 2, commit substantial resources to an area. Wolverine 
World Wide and Sappi both cite method 1, exposure to a demanding technical, 
operating or economic environment. SABMiller Europe and Wolverine World Wide 
agree on method 4, corporate culture that demands high peiformance standards. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia and Sappi both list method 7,formation of special multi-
disciplinary teams. SABMiller Africa and Asia and Wolverine World Wide both 
mention method 8, use of international reach and size, while the two SABMiller 
companies mention method 11 , allocation of key managers and experts to areas. 
Infrastructure: General Management 
This value chain activity comprises five Barloworld core competencies - the Sappi 
core competency relating to systems and the two Wolverine World Wide core 
competencies - the ability to operate globally and the ability to build brands. 
These core competencies sometimes are diverse, and direct comparisons between 
them are therefore questionable as discussed in Section 6.6. It is however, worth 
noting that method 2, commit substantial resources to an area, is regarded as 
effective for Barloworld corporate governance, Sappi systems and the two Wolverine 
World Wide core competencies of brand building and operating globally. Barloworld 
cites method 4, corporate culture that demands high performance standards, for all 
five of its core competencies under the value chain category of infrastructure: general 
management. Barloworid also cites method 1, exposure to a demanding technical, 
operating or economic environment, for two of its five core competencies and 
Wolverine World Wide lists that method for both of its core competencies. 
Barloworld mentions method 12, commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of 
development, for its two core competencies of long-tenn relationships and operating 
under difficult circumstances as does Wolverine World Wide for brand building. See 
Appendix 7.14. 
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7.5 Acquisitions 
Method 15, acquisitions, is included in the tables and discussions in Section 7.4. 
Question 6, in part 3 of Questionnaire I, Initial Questionnaire on the Development 
and Transfer of Core Competencies and Competitive Advantage, asks if new 
acquisitions have contributed to tbe development of core .competencies. 
P.M. Drewell (9 May 2003) agrees that Barloworld has developed core competencies 
through acquisitions. This has varied depending on tbe country and tbe company. A 
good example is information technology systems. Finanzauto, in Spain, assisted in 
the development of information technology systems in the wider group. 
F. Miller (22 August 2003) notes that acquisitions of companies made by SABMiller 
Africa and Asia have at times accentuated areas which had been neglected by tbat 
company. This has on occasion led to the identification and development of new 
competencies. 
N. Mogilnicki (21 August 2003) of SABMiller Europe states that its acquisitions in 
Europe have not "really" contributed to the development of core competencies in tbe 
wider SABMiller group. The reasons given for this are that the original South 
African Breweries was on significantly higher management standards, technically and 
business-wise, than the companies that were acquired. There were strong brewing 
traditions in the companies acquired, but business acumen and experience were 
lacking because of the absence of a free market economy in the past. 
Sappi has a positive view of tbe contribution that acquisitions have made to tbe 
development of core competencies in tbe company according to R. Hope (13 June 
2003). The original Sappi South African business was better at marketing and general 
business and had far better control systems tban the companies it acquired. On the 
otber hand, the companies that it acquired in Germany and Austria, Hannover Papier 
and KNP Leykham, had far better manufacturing skills than Sappi, while the US 
acquisition, S.D. Warren, refined the concept of relationship sales through 
distributors. The different skills were built on and transferred to otbers in the group 
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so that these acquisitions made very significant contributions to the development of 
core competencies (E. van As, personal communication, 9 November 2003). 
J .C. Tegner (10 October 2003) observes that Wolverine World Wide found different 
operational and strategic processes and management techniques and styles in the 
businesses it acquired. Wolverine evaluated these and, where it was clear that there 
were opportunities for improvement, integrated them into its existing businesses. 
Acquisitions have therefore made meaningful contributions to the development of 
core competencies in the company 
Having analysed the methods of developing core competencies and their effectiveness 
in different value chain locations, it is now appropriate to examine the experiences of 
the five companies in encountering and solving practical problems relating to the 
development of core competencies. 
7.6 Practical Problems and Solutions 
The examination of practical problems experienced by the companIes and the 
solutions contribute towards two aims of the thesis, namely, to advance the general 
body of knowledge relating to the development and transfer of core competencies and 
to have practical applicability for both management practitioners and academics. 
7.6.1 Barloworld 
According to Drewell (Questionnaire 4, Practical Problems, Solutions and Lessons 
Learned, 25 May 2004) the biggest practical problem encountered by Barloworld in 
developing core competencies is agreeing on what their core competencies are. He 
adds that while this may appear trite, reaching agreement is more than an academic 
exercise when there is a strong view that excellence across all relevant issues in its 
businesses cannot be reduced to a simple list of focus priorities. Once the core 
competencies are agreed upon, a further challenge is to make them "feel alive and 
relevant". 
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Strong training systems, leadership, the length of service of key employees and 
passion and commitment across management teams are included among the ways to 
resolve the problems. 
7.6.2 SABMiller 
The practical problems encountered by SABMiller in developing core competencies 
are those often experienced by expanding multinational corporations (G. Leibowitz, 
personal interview, London, 13 July 2004). These include the role of group functions 
and the need for some type of matrix management as expansion continues. Regional 
chief executives need to become more aware of the needs of a wider group. 
Leibowitz (13 July 2004) notes that there are certain practical problems common to 
both the development and the transfer of core competencies. One of the practical 
problems experienced by SABMiller was the lack of a standardised company wide 
agreement on the definitions of core competencies. He states that SABMiller has now 
set out four explicit core competencies to be formatted and used globally (see 
Annual Report 2004:6). These are: 
I. Brand portfolio positioning and shaping (clarify segments, premium market's 
importance, trading up) 
2. Sales and merchandising 
3. Cost/productivity leadership 
4. Human organisation and performance management. 
Figure 7.2 depicts the four SABMiller core competencies ill a matrix. This is 
contained in a communication from SABMiller (A. Miller Salzman) in response to 
questions from Rhodes Honours students. Further details of the communication are 
shown in Appendix 7.18. Leibowitz (personal communication, 1 September 2006) 
states that he is not using this format in his presentations. 
The information in Figure 7.2 is very similar to that in Table 6.2 in Section 6.3. The 
only one of the seven core competencies in Table 6.2 that is not specifically covered 
in Figure 7.2 is "merger and acquisition capabilities". This is covered implicitly by 
"organisation capability/structured to meet strategy". Table 6.2 was derived largely 
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from my personal interview with van der Schyff on 10 June 2003 when the company 
did not have a standardized core competency format. Figure 7.2 meets the theoretical 
requirements of Hit!, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003-2005) by combining resources and 
capabilities with core competencies in a comprehensive and concise description. 
The company expects to be able to more readily codify and monitor core 
competencies and, hence, facilitate their development and transfer, following the 
explicit definitions and formatting. There is to be more emphasis on being a "group" 
rather than a series of geographical areas. The company has established global 
councils chaired by individual regional managers. "Interconnectedness" is important 
and the company seeks a balance in developing, bringing on and sharing core 
competencies (Leibowitz, 13 July 2004). 
Leibowitz communicated further on 6 December 2005: "SABMiller is in the process 
of more explicitly identifying, highlighting, codifying and promulgating a set of core 
competencies (with value driver and KPI definitions) amongst a larger group of 
internal middle management than ever before. This will continue through 2006, and 
at some point will be made public as a set." 
F. Miller (telephone interview, 17 June 2004), notes that the practical problems 
encountered by SABMiller Africa and Asia include inadequate local education 
systems, some ex-colonial , which can result in a lack of initiative outside of routine 
operations. She sees this as more marked in certain countries with socialistic 
histories. Miller observes that the SABMiller approach to the development of core 
competencies has been serendipitous rather than systemic. There have been problems 
in discovering the best methodologies to use. A further problem has been that 
management has sometimes been "too busy getting things done to devote adequate 
time to reflecting on core competencies, their development and transfer." Miller 
advocates building local training competence and using patience rather than 
enforcement, together with training programmes targeted specifically to these ends, as 
practical ways of addressing the problems. 
The practical problems experienced by SABMiller Europe centred on different 
business models in South Africa (very dominant) versus Europe (competitive), a 
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highly decentralised model of SABMiller which IS not conducive to setting 
SABMiller standards, and different languages (N. Mogilnicki, personal 
communication, 9 June 2004). Mogilnicki believes that these practical problems are 
not yet resolved. The core competencies reside primarily in the top management and 
it will take some time before these are cascaded throughout the company. Some of 
the techniques being used to resolve the problems include creating standards for 
process procedures and systems using synergies in project management across the 
region; investments in education, development and language training; instituting a 
performance culture; auditing capabilities and competencies; working out plans for 
improvement; and the use of outside consultants in certain areas. 
Figure 7.2 SABMilIer Core Competencies Format Example 
Core competency Resources I Capabilities 
Brand-building and » Insight on consumer choice patterns 
portfolio shaping » Robust and well-structured brand portfolio, across 
segments but skewed towards higher value brands 
with stronger equity and margins 
» Nimble and innovative marketing strategy, balancing 
volume impact with ROI considerations 
Sales and distribution » Quanti ty and quality of sales force and 
merchandising at retail point-of-sale 
;.. Local market plans and analytical tools 
» Productive relationships with distributors 
Costs and productivity » Strong operational efficiency and control model, 
cutting costs to reinvest in brands, assets, people 
;.. World class manufacturing, driving productivity and 
flexibility 
;.. Procurement based on detailed supplier cost 
structure insight 
Organisation capability .,. Structured to match strategy 
;.. Performance management, new talent recruitment 
,- A vigorous, fact-based and meritocratic corporate 
culture 
Source: SABMiller (A. Miller Salzman 2003) cited by Goble, Muhlwa and Plaskitt 
(2003 :16). 
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7.6.3~ 
Sappi experienced problems similar to those of companies in other industries in 
developing core competencies (E. van As, personal interview, 22 July 2004). Finding 
the right skilled people to develop core competencies was certainly a practical 
problem. Another was trying to be clear on the definition of the company's core 
competencies. Other problems, related particularly to the nature of the industry, 
included excessive focus on relationship marketing and neglect of product and brand 
marketing. This was because a few large customers accounted for a disproportionate 
share of sales. 
Van As (22 July 2004) states that Sappi instituted a number of actions to resolve these 
practical problems. It imposed its accounting systems on the companies that it had 
acquired and provided information to those who needed it, thus enhancing both the 
reputation of Sappi and the morale of the people in the acquired companies. Several 
different efforts were made to strengthen the pride of employees in working for Sappi. 
The company sponsored an award for the European Printer-of-the-Year and then 
progressed to a Global Printer-of-the-Year event. The names of the acquired 
companies were changed to Sappi, to encourage a "family" of employees. The 
existing managements were largely retained so that their knowledge of the country 
and company was kept in place and facilitating the development and transfer of core 
competencies. A national of the country in question usually heads Sappi operations. 
Sappi management usually travel from South Africa to visit global operations rather 
than have worldwide employees "summoned" to head office. The practical problems 
of developing and transferring core competencies are often resolved by "going there" 
and trying to understand problems and operations. 
7.6.4 Wolverine World Wide 
Wolverine has been in international business since 1959, which is approximately 30 
years longer than the South African companies have been. It has, until recently, 
marketed its products predominantly through a world wide network of licensees and 
distributors. These two factors influence the practical problems experienced in the 
373 
development of core competencies. J.e Tegner (Questionnaire 4: Practical Problems, 
Solutions and Lessons Learned, 1 October 2004) explains that developing brand 
building as a core competency over the past decade has required the company to 
evolve from a manufacturing to a market-driven business. 
Wolverine needs to transfer core competencies to the distributors and licensees that 
are building its brands globally. Tegner (l October 2004) notes that licensees control 
product, positioning, placement and price within their markets for the Wolverine 
brands. A very practical problem, he continues, is that it is nearly impossible to know 
everything licensees are doing in their markets with "their" businesses and "our" 
brands. Wolverine therefore had to develop a competency to select excellent partners 
as licensees. To mitigate risks, Wolverine provides licensees with global products, or 
product standards, which include everything from manufacturing resources to global 
style, trend and colour information. The company also has approval processes and 
procedures that licensees should follow as they develop products for their markets 
under Wolverine brand names. 
The Wolverine product development teams and contract manufacturers have 
continuous access to the company's global information system. The system provides 
a common source for product development and commercialisation data that enable the 
company and its associates to identifY and anticipate problems timeously (Tegner I 
October 2004). 
L. Whipple (31 October 2005) states that a practical problem often experienced with 
core competencies is that they develop, or are developed, over lengthy periods. 
Management focus may be on short-term results to the detriment of the development 
of core competencies. He asserts that many core competencies are found by accident 
in a corporation's early days and believes that a resolution to this practical problem is 
to regularly review core competencies against what is required by changes in the 
environment. 
According to Whipple, codifying core competencies can have both practical 
advantages and disadvantages. An advantage is that codification makes it easier to 
describe and communicate. A disadvantage is that a core competency may become 
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entrenched long after it has lost its usefulness. He gIVes an example US shoe 
companies which had codified shoe manufacturing expertise as a core competency. 
Management and staff were consequently inflexible when the need arose to focus on 
marketing, reduce manufacturing operations in the US and source on a worldwide 
basis. 
7.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The attributes of Porter's Diamond of National Advantage - factor conditions, 
demand conditions, related and supporting industries, firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry, - plus chance and government, are applied to the South African companies 
and Wolverine World Wide to explain the emergence and development of core 
competencies and competitive advantages. 
While these differ from company to company, there are aspects which affect all of the 
South African entities. The mineral riches played a part, directly or indirectly in each 
company, as did the cheap electricity, investment in telecommunications and road and 
rail infrastructure. The tree growing cycle in South Africa versus that in the Northern 
Hemisphere is a specific advantage for Sappi . The companies have built on the factor 
and other advantages of South Africa and acted to counter the disadvantages to 
develop core competencies. For example, Barloworld, SABMiller and Sappi all 
responded to the potential human-capital weakness in the country through a variety of 
methods including technology and training. 
Wolverine World Wide had ready access to all the resources noted in Porter's 
Diamond. When labour costs became relatively expensive, the company moved 
production to the Caribbean but now has China as the major supplier. The demand 
conditions of the Diamond were all fulfilled, which enabled Hush Puppies to become 
one of the first global footwear brands. 
While all five companies use some process to arrive at core competencies, none go as 
far as the rigorous internal analytical approaches advocated by Hamel and Prahalad 
(1998) and Hilt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003). SABMiller Africa and Asia has a 
system that goes down to individual competencies. Core competencies evolve in 
r 
I 
375 
relation to competition or are "chosen" because they are essential to the achievement 
of objectives. All companies utilize value chains in some way or another when 
developing core competencies. 
The companles consider the following to be the five most effective methods to 
develop core competencies em an overall basis: 1) corporate culture that demands 
high performance standards, 2) allocation of key managers and experts to areas, 3) 
exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment, 4)formation 
of special multi-disciplinary teams and 5) investment in skills and knowledge, 
development of human resources. 
The effectiveness of methods varies by company and value chain location. Results of 
the research produce a different answer as to the most effective method for each of the 
eight value chain locations. All five companies agree on corporate culture that 
demands high peiformance standards and investment in skills and knowledge, 
development of human resources in the human resource management location. AJ1 
five again agree on the formation of special multi-disciplinary teams for developing 
core competencies in the merger and acquisition core competency. 
The results of this research support the conclusions of Mascarenhas et al (1998) that 
different approaches and multiple methods are needed to develop each type of 
competence. In their study, however, the most mentioned method in technology is 
exposure to a demanding technical, operating and economic environment while 
corporate culture was placed first in their equivalent of operations. The companies in 
this study regard commit substantial resources to an area as the most effective 
method in technological development while allocation of key managers and experts to 
areas headed the operations methods. 
Methods covered in the literature, such as method 10, regular competence review 
meetings (Hamel and Prahalad 1998); method 5, internal analysis; method 17, value 
chains (Hitt, et al 2005); and method 12, path dependency (Teece et al 1997; Lei et al 
1996; Barney 1995), receive relatively few mentions. Method 14, 
seminars/collferences, is not mentioned by any of the five companies as being in the 
four most effective methods for any of their core competencies. 
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A significant difference between the South African multinationals and Wolverine 
World Wide is the latter's relatively high ratings of exposure to a demanding 
technical, operating or economic environment, commit substantial resources to an 
area and use of international reach and size. The South African companies consider 
the methods relating to corporate culture, investment in skills and knowledge and 
allocation of key managers and experts to areas to be more effective. The differences 
are partly because the South African companies carried their mindsets on training and 
upgrading human resources into the international arena in the mid 1990s. 
Four of the five companies state that they have developed core competencies through 
acquisitions. SABMiller Europe says that the original South African Breweries had 
significantly higher management standards, technically and business-wise, than the 
companies it acquired in Europe. Sappi is positive - core competencies being 
transferred to and from the companies they acquired - in a very meaningful manner. 
The practical problems experienced by the companies in the development of core 
competencies centre around agreeing on and defining their core competencies. All 
five companies expressed similar views on this issue. The approach to the 
development of core competencies has often been serendipitous rather than 
systematic. There have been problems on finding and deciding on the best 
mythologies to use. A further problem has been that management has sometimes 
been "too busy getting things done to devote adequate time to reflecting on core 
competencies, their development and transfer." Other problems encountered include 
overconfidence, limited knowledge of local conditions and the time required to 
develop or build core competencies. The question of which methods to use has also 
been an issue. 
Practical actions to solve the problems include standardisation of definitions for 
global use so that they may be more readily codified and communicated, standardised 
information systems, retention of key staff and regular reviews of core competencies 
in relation to the environment. SABMiller provide an example of a format for core 
competencies in a matrix that encompasses resources and capabilities. The company 
is introducing value drivers and key performers indicators to improve the 
management of core competencies. 
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In a logical progressIOn from this discussion of the development of core 
competencies, the following chapter examines their transfer. 
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8. THE TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
8.1 Introduction 
The development of core competencies having been studied in the previous chapter, 
this one studies their transfer. The methods used to transfer core competencies are set 
out in Table B of Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core 
Competencies. The results are analysed and statistical analysis applied to certain 
aspects. Qualitative issues relating to the transfer of core competencies include 
challenges, means of measuring and assessing the success of transfer, ways to avoid 
pitfalls, how to improve transfer and the practical problems experienced by the five 
corporations and the actions they undertook to address the problems. 
The first section describes the challenges faced by the corporations and compares 
these with some of the theory from the literature review. The success of transfer is 
examined and compared with the rankings of importance for competitiveness and for 
performance. This is followed by an examination of the effectiveness of methods, 
done by company, or company composites, overall total , value chain overview, and 
different locations in the value chain. Reference is again made to leading theories 
from the literature review. 
The relationship between the effectiveness of methods and the ratings of success in 
transferring core competencies is explored. The methods companies use to measure 
and assess the transfer of core competencies are described. This is followed by a 
discussion of the approaches they take to avoid pitfalls and what actions they believe 
would improve the transfer of core competencies. The final section is a discussion 
not the practical problems and solutions experienced by the five companies. 
8.2 Challenges 
Question 4 of Section 4 of Questionnaire 1: Initial Questionnaire asked the companies 
what were the greatest challenges they faced in transferring core competencies. Their 
responses are discussed below. 
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Barloworld sees its greatest challenge as keeping track of where things are changing. 
Creating a desire to learn is a challenge. Installing effective training and development 
programmes is very important here (P.M. Drewell, personal interview, Sandton, 9 
May 2003). Phillips, the Barloworld CEO, has stated publicly that managing across 
time zones can be more challenging than managing their wide range of products (AJ. 
Phillips, presentation to GIBS, 2003). 
SABMiller Africa and Asia, regard their biggest challenges in transferring core 
competencies as language and context. Operating in developing environments, 
especially those that were previously socialist, add additional challenges (F. Miller, 
Questionnaire lA, abridged Initial Questionnaire, 22 August 2003). 
SABMiller Europe, regards the perception of certain local nationals as a formidable 
obstacle to the transfer of core competencies. Some of these individuals believe( d) 
they were doing well before SA Breweries bought the businesses. This is especially 
the case in Poland and the Czech Republic, where people are proud of their beer 
heritage and ways of working. Cultural differences brought about by the former 
communist system are very difficult to overcome. There is a need to convince people 
that they can still learn and improve, particularly in the management area. Culture, 
language and attitudes (national pride) are summarised as obstacles (N. Mogilnicki, 
Questionnaire lA, abridged Initial Questionnaire, telephone interview, 21 August 
2003). 
B. Smith (telephone interview, 12 February 2004) enlarges on the SABMiller Africa 
and Asia and SABMiller Europe experiences regarding environments that were 
previously communist. He bases this on his period as Managing Director of SAB' s 
Polish subsidiary. Some managers there had been appointed because of party 
affiliations, not competence. He states that most people who had grown up under 
communism had little concept of free markets and the necessary management skills to 
operate in competitive environments. It was often very difficult to get them to change 
and learn new ways. On the other hand, "younger people" in the Polish business 
were/are almost desperate to be part of the free market and Western values, and 
were/are very keen and willing to learn and adapt. 
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SABMiller found that one of the greatest challenges to effective management (and, 
hence, transfer of core competencies) of the Miller Brewing Company was the 
"passivity" and acceptance of decline by many managers and employees at the newly 
acquired company. Another challenge was the introduction of the SAB performance 
management system. SABMiller regarded the system as an overall method of 
managing a business, evaluating performance and developing people, that often 
entailed a frank two-way discussion and performance revIew. Many Miller 
employees tended to see the performance management system as just another 
incentive scheme (J. Nel, telephone interview, 30 January 2004). 
Smith (12 February 2004) maintains that there is a natural resistance to being acquired 
under almost any circumstances. Post-acquisition behaviour can therefore often affect 
the transfer of core competencies. 
Sappi regards getting a common language and NIH (not-invented-here) as their 
foremost challenges. Common language refers not only to vernacular or cultural 
differences, but to definitions and terminologies. An example given is that the word 
"customer" may mean different things in different divisions and different countries 
(R. Hope, personal interview, Johannesburg, 13 June 2003). 
Resistance to change, fear, stress and moving out of comfort zones are among the 
impediments to the transfer of core competencies as seen by Wolverine World Wide. 
Integrating changes into the corporate culture is another (J .C. Tegner, Questionnaire 
lA, abridged Initial Questionnaire, 9 October 2003). 
If a multinational controls the organisation, then it will not, under most circumstances, 
allow an individual to adversely affect transfer of sound practices (B.M. Musham, 
personal interview, New York, 14 December 2003). 
Kostova (1999) postulated that three sets of factors (social, organisational and 
relational) at three levels, (country, organisational and individual) affect the success 
of transfer of business practices. While there is nothing in my research that refutes 
this, it is very difficult for a multinational company to have a big influence on a 
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foreign country and, hence, implementation will often depend on individual 
relationships. 
The research findings are in line with the views of Minbaeva, Pedersen, 
Bjoerkrnan, Fey and Park (2001) that the absorptive capacity of subsidiaries 
facilitates· transfer. Bartlett and Ghoshal's (2000) contention that distance, 
time, language and culture, product, function and geographic diversity all add 
to the challenge of global business is supported by my research findings. 
8.3 Success in Transferring Core Competencies 
Questionnaire 2, Question 1 of The Development and Transfer of Core Competencies 
asked the companies to rank their core competencies in terms of: 
a) how important each core competency is in terms of the company being 
competitive 
b) how well the company performs in terms of the core competency. 
The rankings are relative; that is, the most important would be ranked one, the second 
two and so forth. 
Table B in Questionnaire 2 asks for the estimated degree or rating of success in 
transferring each of the companies' core competencies. A seven-point scale is used, 
where seven equals very effective and one equals not effective at all. The same scale 
is employed to rate the effectiveness of the 12 methods used for transferring core 
competencies. There was provision for companies to specifY and add other methods 
that they used to the list. 
The companies report estimated ratings of success in transferring core competencies 
from Barloworld as 5.9, followed by Sappi and Wolverine World Wide at 5.0 each, 
SABMiller Africa and Asia, 4.9, and SABMiller Europe, 4.0. Barloworld results are 
higher than those from the other companies, although the differences in degrees of 
success are not significant at the 5% level (Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA: H=6.58, (4, 
N=33), P=0.1 600). See Table 8.1. 
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The Barloworld results should be seen in the context of a holding company with 
subsidiaries in related industries (sometimes not directly) with different product lines. 
The results of SABMiller Europe are adversely affected by low scores in inbound 
logistics, human resource management and technological development. The company 
estimates a 2.0 rating of success in transferring human resource management 
activities. Barloworld rates this 7.0, with the other three companies each marking it 
5.0 points. This category would rate a 5.5 if SABMiller Europe were excluded as an 
outlier. 
Operations shows the highest degree of success. It averages 6.0 points with the two 
SABMiller companies each rating it at 6.0 points, Wolverine 7.0 and Sappi 5.0. 
Mergers and acquisitions has a 5.8 average with Barloworld at 7.0, Sappi 6.0 and 
SABMiller Europe and SABMiller Africa and Asia 5.0 points each. Wolverine did 
not participate in the mergers and acquisitions question. The eight core competencies 
comprising il?fi-astructure: general management are in third position with an average 
of 5.3 points. Barloworld gave an average rating of 5.4 to its five core competencies, 
Sappi. 6.0 points to systems and Wolverine World Wide an average of 4.5 to its two 
core competencies. Fourth is outbound logistics at 5.0 points, but with only the two 
brewing companies as participants. 
Human resource management, which is in fifth place, averages 4.8 points but, as 
discussed above, would be 5.5 without SABMiller Europe. Marketing and sales is in 
sixth place with 4.5 points, two companies scoring 5.0 and the other two 4.0. 
Technological development, in seventh place, is rated at 3.8 points, three respondents 
marking it as 4.0 points with SABMiller Europe at 3.0 points. 
Inbound logistics is in eighth place with 3.5 points, and once again covers only the 
two brewing companies. This category incorporates purchaSing/procurement. The 
SABMiller global purchasing programme has some challenges in being transferred to 
local operations (N.Mogilnicki, 21 August 2003). 
There are significant differences in median scores among the core competencies, viz. 
marketing & sales, operations, M&A, human resource management, technological 
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development and infrastructure: general management with n > 2 (Kruskal-Wallis 
ANOVA: H=12.5, (5, N=24), P=0.0284). There are significant difference at the 5 % 
level between the primary activities of operations and marketing & sales and with 
technological development (Mann-Whitney: marketing & sales: U=l.O, P=0.0433; 
technological development: U=O.O, P=0.0209) and between the support activities of 
M&A, and technological development (Mann-Whitney: U=O.O, P=0.00209). 
Certain of these results are in line, but others are at variance with the literature and 
research. 
Kogut and Zander (1993) refer to codifiability, teachability, complexity, system 
dependence and product observability. Kostova (1999 and 2002) refers to relational 
aspects, while Luo (2000) maintains that transferability is influenced by the nature of 
distinctive resources and capabilities. Flowing from these views it would seem that 
technological capabilities should be more transferable than organisational capabilities 
and financial capabilities more transferable than operational capabilities. 
This is not the case with operations and technological development in my study. 
Operations, with the rating of 6.0, is the highest of any value chain location, while 
technological development is marked as 3.8 points. Finance is not dealt with as a 
separate value chain location. The competencies most directly related to finance are 
M&A, rated at 5.8 and Sappi ' s systems, which has a rating of 6.0 points. 
Zander and Kogut (1995) state that the transferability of knowledge depends 
on codifiability, teachability, complexity, system dependence and product 
observability. Szulanski (1996) holds that the transfer is influenced by 
characteristics of the knowledge, source, recipient and context. 
Information technology has changed markedly since 1995 and 1996, and this must 
surely affect the characteristics of transfer of certain core competencies. Wolverine 
World Wide's operations, for example, are very complex, with over 85,000 SKUs 
(stock keeping units), 20,000 of these being sourced, manufactured and inventoried on 
a global basis. 
Table 8.1 Ratings of Success in Transferring Core Competencies 
Seven-Point Scale COMPANY 
Primary Activities BAR A&A EUR SAP WWW IXi n x Rank 
1. Service 
2. Marketing & Sales 5 4 4 5 18 4 4.5 6 
3. Outbound Logistics 5 5 10 2 5.0 4 
4. Operations 6 6 5 7 24 4 6.0 1 
5. Inbound Logistics 4 3 7 2 3.5 8 
Support Activities 
6. M &A 
7. Human Resource Management 
8. Technological Development I ;1 !I ~ I ~ I N/~ 4 4 23 4 5.8 2 24 5 4.8 5 15 4 3.8 7 
9. Procurement 
10. Infrastructure: General Management 27 1 6 1 9 1 42 1 8 1 5.3 1 3 1 
a. Long-term relationships 
b. Evolve/lnnovate 
c. Execution/Organisational 
d. Corporate governance 
e. Difficult circumstances 
f. Systems 
g. Brand building 
h. Operating globally 
Total 
Number 
Mean 
LX, 
n 
x 
6 
4 
5 
7 
5 
41 34 
7 7 
5.9 4.9 
6 1 6.0 
4 1 4.0 
5 1 5.0 
7 1 7.0 
5 1 5.0 
I 61 : I 
6 1 6.0 
4 1 4.0 
5 1 5.0 
28 30 30 
7 6 6 
4.0 5.0 5.0 1 1;~ I I 3:.~ II 
Notes: Figures are rounded in certain instances. Procurement is included in Inbound Logistics. Rank is based on mean. 
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In Section 7.6 I discuss the relationship between the rankings of how important the 
companies regard each core competency to be for competitive purposes and how well 
they perform each core competency. The statistical analysis of the composite for the 
five companies shows a Spearman correlation coefficient rs of 0.714 with a P-value of 
0.0713. The different companies diverge widely and only SABMiller Africa and 
Asia, with a Spearman correlation coefficient ofrs 0.750 and a P value 0[.0.052 shows 
a significant relationship between importance and performance. The relationships 
between performance and success in transferring core competencies and between 
importance and success of transfer are now examined. 
Table 8.2 presents the relationship between performance and success of transfer. 
There is a strong significant correlation between the ranking of how well the 
companies, as a composite, perform each core competency and the ratings of success 
in transferring these core competencies (Spearman correlation coefficient rs = 0.79 
with a P-value of 0.033). The companies vary from a low of rs = 0.32 for Sappi to a 
high ofrs = 0.76 for SABMiller Europe. 
Figure 8.1, Transfer of Core Competencies: Ranking of Performance and Rating of 
Success demonstrates the regression plot relationship between the two factors. 
Table 8.2 T ransfer of Core Competences: Ranking of Performance and 
Rating of Success 
Rating of Success 
Performance Total Barlow A&A Europe Sappi WWW 
1 6.0 6 6 6 5 7 
2 5.6 7 5 5 6 5 
3 5.2 7 5 5 4 5 
4 4.0 4 5 2 6 
5 4.4 7 5 4 4 4 
6 4.0 5 4 3 4 
7 4.3 5 5 3 5 
r, 0.79 0.43 0.67 0.76 0.32 0.62 
P-value 0.033 0.335 0.101 0.045 0.604 0.192 
rs = Spearman correlation coefficient 
Figure 8.1 Transfer of Core Competencies: Ranking of Performance and 
Rating of Success 
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Having examined the relationship between performance and success, attention is now 
turned to the relationship between importance and success of transfer. 
Table 8.3 shows the relationship between ranking of importance and the rating of 
success in transferring the core competencies. There is a negative correlation of 
Spearman rs = -0.40, though not significant. Sappi and Wolverine World Wide have 
fairly strong negative correlations but again the correlations are not significant at the 
5% level. SABMiller Africa and Asia has a significant positive correlation between 
rankjngs of importance and degrees of success in transferring core competencies (rs = 
0.81, P = 0.0271). See Figure 8.2 which illustrates the regression plot relationship 
between ranking of importance and rating of success in transferring core 
competencies. 
Table 8.3 Transfer of Core Competencies: Ranking of Importance and 
Rating of Success 
Rating of Success 
Iml!ortance Total Barlow A&A Eurol! Sal!l!i WWW 
1 4.6 7 6 2 4 4 
2 4.8 6 5 4 4 5 
3 5.0 4 5 5 6 5 
4 4.8 5 4 6 5 4 
5 5.2 7 5 3 6 5 
6 5.3 7 4 3 7 
7 4.7 5 4 5 
r, -0.40 0.06 0.8 -0.27 -0.7 -0.62 
P-value 0.379 0.905 0.02 0.554 0.11 0.192 
rs = Spearman correlation coefficient 
Figure 8.2 Transfer of Core Competencies: Ranking of Importance and 
Rating of Success 
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The above results strongly suggest that there is a tendency for the companies to 
transfer those competencies that they do well in some descending level of success, 
especially the three core competencies that they do best. 
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8.4 Methods 
Table B in Questionnaire 2, Development and Transfer of Core Competencies, 
provides a checklist of 12 methods that can be used to transfer, or facilitate the 
transfer, of core competencies. Respondents were asked to grade the methods on a 
scale of one to seven in terms of effectiveness for each of their core competencies. 
The respondents could add other methods to the list. 
The effectiveness of the methods used to transfer core competencies is examined by 
company, totals, value chain and the different value chain locations. The responses 
are analysed by totals, means and percentages, similar to the analysis in Section 7.4, 
Methods. The results of weighting the responses are discussed briefly. 
The measurement of the effectiveness of methods used to transfer core competencies 
differs from that used in development as the respondents assign numbers to their 
choices in contrast to the development of core competencies which tallied the number 
of mentions. The numeric responses can be analysed in a number of ways. Total, 
arithmetic average or mean, weighted total, weighted mean, percentage and the 
rankings achieved in different value chain locations. One way would be to look at all 
the measurements and determine how the methods rate on an overall basis. The 
various ways can produce different results in certain instances. 
As an analogy - one manager may prefer to follow a method based on how many 
companies (in this study five) - use a particular method. Another could be more 
influenced by how effective companies find a particular method, even though fewer 
companies may use that method. A third manager may look to see the methods used 
by a company which resembles his or her own operations more than the others do. A 
fourth manager might examine all three ofthese instances before making a decision. 
A further complication is that different ways would be used for different reasons. For 
example, totals would be of interest in looking at a particular value chain location but 
means or averages would be of more interest in examining a specific company. In the 
former case the interest would be in how many companies use the method and in the 
latter instance, how effective the company considers the method to be. 
389 
Attempting to use all the above ways simultaneously would lead to complexity and 
possibly confusion. I will therefore use non-weighted totals to rank methods but 
where pertinent include the means or averages relating to these at the same time. This 
method was chosen to give equal relevance to the different companies. Tables on 
percentages are also provided. The results of weighted totals and means will be 
mentioned briefly. Further details are available in Appendix 8.6 and Appendix 8.17 
for readers who prefer this type of measurement. 
While the companies as a composite are analysed in terms of the responses, it should 
be kept in mind that a major thrust of this study is the issue of which methods are 
likely to be effective under different circumstances. The results by individual 
company and by value chain location are therefore vital in examining this issue. 
8.4. I Companies 
The responses of the five companies to the questions relating to the transfer of core 
competencies are presented in Appendices 8.1 to 8.5. Table 8.4: Section 8.4.2 shows 
the company composites. The tables show the estimated degree (rating) of success in 
transferring core competencies and the effectiveness of the methods used to transfer 
them. For example, in Appendix 8.1 Barloworld reports an estimated degree of 
success of 5.9 on a seven-point scale. The results are discussed in Table 8.4 below. 
Barloworld's rating of the effectiveness of methods is 4.3 on average. Method 1, 
appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, is rated the most effective method of transfer with 7.0 points. Second is 
method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, 
with 6.6 points, followed by method 11, compensation incentives based on 
achievement of transfer, 6.3 points, and method 10, inclusion in management process 
(priority objectives etc.) 6.0 points. 
Barloworld has, in general, been successful in transferring strong fmancial and 
reporting disciplines, attention to detail and information systems, but less successful 
in certain of the "soft" issues (AJ. Phillips, Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, II 
November 2003). 
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SABMilier Africa and Asia, which lists mne methods, averages 3.8 points for 
effectiveness. Method 8, visits, with 6.0 points, is rated as the most effective method. 
Next come method 10, inclusion in management process, 5.0 points; method 1, 
appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, 4.9 points; and method 12, benchmark core competencies in other firms 
4.4 points. 
SABMiller Europe averages 3.1 points for the 12 methods it uses. Method 6, rotate 
managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, is considered the 
most effective overall method with 4.9 points, followed by method 2, post-M&A 
integration teams, 4.6 points. Third is method 1, appoint key people from within 
company to management positions in new acquisitions, 4.0 points. Method 10, 
inclusion in management process, averages 3.4 points. 
The South African base gave South African Breweries a sound base in the production, 
technical and financial functions. The marketing and distribution skills have not always 
been as portable into foreign markets and conditions (E.A.G. Mackay, personal 
interview, London, 27 November 2001). 
Sappi, which added two methods - method 13, multi-disciplinary/regional teams, and 
method 14, leadership - considers each of these worthy of the top effectiveness rating 
of 7.0 points. Method 8, visits, is rated at 6.0 points; method 6, rotate managers and 
key people from new acquisitions in wider company, 5.3 points; and method 4, short-
term secondments, 5.2 points. The company averages 4.6 points for effectiveness of 
the 14 methods that it uses. 
In evaluating the relative successes of transferring different core competencies, van 
As (Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, 17 November 2003) thinks that Sappi ' s 
success has been due to capitalising on both the expertise and core competencies it 
had and those of the businesses that it acquired. His view is that Sappi was a much 
better marketer, more commercial and with far better financial systems than any of the 
companies it acquired. The acquired companies had superior manufacturing skills 
and sales relationship concepts through distributors. Sappi built on the different core 
competencies and skills and transferred them from where they were to the rest of the 
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group. He considers that the most important skills transferred were those of 
demanding performance, setting targets, agreeing where they were and "developing a 
culture that was unfriendly not to meet targets". 
Wolverine World Wide averages 5.7 points for the eight methods marked. Method 4, 
short-term secondments, method 7, seminarslconferences, method 8, visits, and 
method 10, inclusion in management process, are all rated at 6.0 for effectiveness. 
Method 2, post-M&A integration teams, and method 3, experts deliver, install and 
return, are both rated at 5.7 points. Method I, appoint key people from within 
company to management positions in new acquisitions, and method 12, benchmark 
core competencies in other firms, are also considered to be relatively effective 
methods, with ratings of 5.8 and 4.7 respectively. 
Wolverine differs from the South Afiican companies in the level of effectiveness it 
ascribes to the methods it uses. The calculations for effectiveness of methods of the 
South Afiican companies as a group are shown in Appendix 8.8. Wolverine is the 
only one of the five companies with a high rating for method 3, experts deliver, install 
and return. It also considers method 7, seminars and conferences, as more effective 
than do the other companies. It has certain similarities with Sappi in the relatively 
high effectiveness ratings they both give to method 4, short term secondments. The 
main reasons for the differences are Wolverine World Wide's historic use of licensees 
and distributors, rather than foreign subsidiaries and its product line, which changes 
during a year because of the fashion nature of its business (1. Whipple, personal 
interview, Grand Rapids, 1 September 2006). 
Another way of examining the methods used is that of utilisation or "impact" of the 
methods. This is calculated by adding up the ratings of the effectiveness of the 
methods and then expressing each method as a percentage of the total for each 
company. This is shown in Table 8.5. For example the total points for Barloworld 
(Appendix 8.7) amount to 363. Method 1, appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions, totals 49 points. This is expressed as 13.4 
percent in the table. 
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The abovementioned method is the leader in the Barloworld utilisation. It is followed 
by method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider 
company, with 12.7 percent, and then method 12, benchmark core competencies 
against competitors and other firms, with 12.1 percent. 
The leading "impact" method for SABMiller Africa and Asia, is method 8, visits, with 
16.9 percent, followed by method 1, appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions, with 16 percent. Third is method 10, 
inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc), with 14.1 percent. 
Method 4, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, 
accounts for 13.1 percent of the impact at SABMiller Europe. Method 2, post-M&A 
integration teams, is second with 12.4 percent and third is method 10, inclusion in 
management process (priority objectives etc), with 9.3 percent. 
Sappi added two methods to Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core 
Competencies. These are method 13, multi-disciplinarylregional teams, and method 
14, leadership. Each account for 11.4 percent and method 8, visits, with 9.8 percent is 
in third place. 
Wolverine World Wide rates eight methods. Method 1, appoint key people from 
within company to management positions in new acquisitions, accounts for 18.4 
percent of the total impact or utilisation. Method 7, seminars and conferences, and 
method 10, inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc), each account 
for 14.4 percent. 
8.4.2 Company Composites 
Table 8.4 shows the effectiveness of methods for the individual companies and the 
totals and means by method for them as a group. The companies as a whole regard 
method 1, appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, with a total of 25.7 points and a mean of 5.1 , as the most effective 
method. The second most effective method is method 8, visits, with a total of 25.5 
and a mean of 5.1 points. Method 10, inclusion in management process (priority 
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objectives etc), is third with 24.4 points and a mean of 4.9. The next two are method 
2, post-M&A integration teams (21.0 points, mean 4.2) and method 12, benchmark 
core competencies against competitors in other firms (19.1 points, mean 3.8). 
Method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, 
receives the highest mean rating. It is rated by three companies, which limits its total 
points to 16.8, but with mean of 5.6 points. Sappi, which added method 13, multi-
disciplinary regional teams and method fourteen, leadership to the list of methods, 
rates each of these at 7.0 points, which is the highest level of effectiveness. These 
methods are not ranked because they are a universe of one. They are noted, however, 
as being highly effective for Sappi. 
The methods considered most effective by the companies based on the mean (by those 
who use them) are in order of perceived effectiveness: first, method 6, rotate 
managers and key people jrom new acquisitions in the wider company (5.6); second, 
method 8, visits (5.1); third, method 1, appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions (5.1); fourth, method 10, inclusion in 
management process (4.9); and fifth, method 2, post-M&A integration teams (4.2) . 
The major changes in rankings when using means instead of totals are therefore 
method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in the wider 
company, displacing method 8, visits, at the top of the list and method 12, benchmark 
core competencies against competitors and other firms, being excluded from the top 
five. 
Figure 8.3 depicts the effectiveness of methods graphically, while Figure 8.4 shows 
the same information but for the mean or users of the particular method only. 
There are no significant differences in median scores among the methods used with 
n > 2 (Kruskal-Wallis ANOYA: H=16.6, (11, N=53), P=0.1207). There are 
significant differences in median scores among the companies (KruskaJ-Wallis 
ANOYA: H= J6.0, (4, N=55), P=0.003J). Wolverine World Wide is significantly 
different from SABMiIler Europe and SABMiIler Africa and Asia (Mann-Whitney: 
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Europe: U=l.O, P=0.0003, Africa and Asia: U=8, P=0.0071) and SABMiller Europe 
and Sappi are significantly different (Mann-Whitney: U=32.5, P=0.0081). 
The results are generally in line with the literature revIew. Hitt, Ireland and 
Hoskisson (2003), move key people to facilitate transfer relates to method I, appoint 
key people from within company to management positions in new acquisitions. 
Govinderajan and Gupta (2000), "DNA carriers "; Bresman, Birkenshaw and Nobel 
(1991), visits; Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002), frequent travel; Hamel and Prahalad 
(1996), mobility facilitates transfer; are all examples relating to visits. Porter (1996) 
advocates that transfer be specifically included in a company' s objectives. Method 10, 
inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc), is rated third overall in the 
study. Ghoshal, Korine and Szulanski (1994) mention joint work in teams and task 
forces. Thompson and Strickland (2003) recommend benchmarking. Method 12, 
benchmarking is ranked fifth overall. The top rating of method 6, rotate managers 
and key people from new acquisitions in the wider company, by the three entities that 
use it, supports Garvin's (2000) contention that personnel rotation programmes are 
one of the most powerful methods of transferring knowledge. 
The above ratings are based on simple arithmetic totals and means or averages. If 
weighting is introduced as shown in Appendix 8.6, the ranking of methods in terms of 
effectiveness does change. This becomes: first, method 1, appoint key people from 
within company to management positions in new acquisitions; second, method 10, 
inclusion in management process; third, method 3, viSits; fourth, method 2, post-M&A 
integration teams; and fifth method 6, rotate managers and key people from new 
acquisitions in wider company. The results of the different methods of calculation are 
compared in Appendix 8.7. 
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Table 8.4 Transfer of Core Competencies: Company Composites 
Seven-Point Scale 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 
BAR A&A EUR SAP WWW 
5.9 4.9 4.0 5.0 5.0 
~Xi I n I x I Rank 
24.8 5 5.0 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 7.0 4.9 4.0 4.0 5.8 25.7 5 5.1 1 
2. Post-M&A integration teams 3.3 3.6 4.6 3.8 5.7 21.0 5 4.2 4 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 2.6 2.3 2.6 3.2 5.7 16.4 5 3.2 9 
4. Short-term secondments 2.6 1.0 3.3 5.2 6.0 18.1 5 3.6 7 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 3.6 - 2.9 4.0 10.5 3 3.5 12 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 6.6 - 4.9 5.3 - 16.8 3 5.6 8 
7. Seminars/conferences 2.9 3.8 1.9 4.0 6.0 18.6 5 3.7 6 
8. Visits 5.4 6.0 2.1 6.0 6.0 25.5 5 5.1 2 
9. Manuals and video material 2.9 3.7 2.0 3.0 - 11.6 4 2.9 10 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 6.0 5.0 3.4 4.0 6.0 24.4 5 4.9 3 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 6.3 - 2.3 3.0 - 11.6 3 3.9 10 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 2.9 4.4 3.1 4.0 4.7 19.1 5 3.8 5 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 7.0 7.0 1 7.0 
14. Other: Leadership 7.0 7.0 1 7.0 
Total ~Xi 52.1 34.7 37.1 63.5 45.9 1 233.3 1 1 63.5 1 
Number n 12 9 12 14 8 55 1 r ---:r4l 
Mean x 4.3 3.9 3.1 4.5 5.7 1 4.2 1 1 4.5 1 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. Rank is based on Total or LXi column. 
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Table 8.5 was used, in Subsection 8.4.1 , to examine the utilisation of methods by 
measuring percentages for the five companies individually. When all five companies 
are taken together as a composite, the method with the highest overall percentage is 
method 1, appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, with 13.0 percent. The next most effective methods are method 10, 
inclusion in management process, 11.2 percent; method 8, visits , 10.0 percent; method 
2, post-M&A integration teams, 10.0 percent; and method 7, seminars and 
conferences, 8.0 percent. 
Having analysed the effectiveness of methods by both individual company and the 
composite, or total, we now tum to value chain locations. 
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Table 8.5 Transfer of Core Competencies: Company Composites (Percentages) 
Seven Point Scale 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies I BAR I A&A I EUR I SAP I WWW 5.0 5.9 4.9 4.0 5.0 I ::~ I n5 1 X5 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
Total Percent 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 13.4 16.0 10.8 6.5 18.4 65.1 13.0 
2. Post-M&A integration teams 6.3 11.7 12.4 6.2 13.6 50.2 10.0 
3. Experts deliver, install and retum 5.0 6.6 6.9 5.1 13.6 37.2 7.4 
4. Short-term secondments 5.0 3.3 8.9 8.4 4.8 30.4 6.1 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 6.9 - 7.7 6.5 - 21.1 4.2 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 12.7 - 13.1 8.7 - 34.5 6.9 
7. Seminars/conferences 5.5 10.8 5.0 5.4 14.4 41 .1 8.2 
8. Visits 10.5 16.9 5.8 9.8 9.6 52.6 10.5 
9. Manuals and video material 5.5 10.3 5.4 4.9 - 26.1 5.2 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 11 .6 14.1 9.3 6.5 14.4 55.9 11 .2 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 12.1 - 6.2 4.9 - 23.2 4.6 
12. Benchmark core compelencies against competitors and other firms 5.5 10.3 8.5 4.3 11.2 39.8 8.0 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 11.4 11.4 2.3 
14. Other: Leadership 11.4 11.4 2.3 
Total LXi 
Number n 
Mean x 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
12 9 12 14 8 
8.5 11.1 8.5 7.1 12.5 
1
500 
1 1 1°:1~ 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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8.4.3 Value Chain 
As seen previously, the value chain locations are the means by which the core 
competencies of the different companies can be categorised and compared. Table 8.6 
and 8.7 present the effectiveness of methods by value chain location. Table 8.6 shows 
this by "total" for each of the eight value chain locations. The figures are only 
comparable within a location as the number of respondents per location varies. Table 
8.7 shows similar information by "mean". This information is shown in more detail 
for each of the value chain activities in Appendices 8.9 to 8.16. Weighted results are 
depicted in Appendix 8.17. 
Operations has the highest mean rating of effectiveness at 4.9, followed by 
infrastructure: general management at 4.6, marketing, mergers and acquisitions and 
human resource management, at 4.5 each, outbound logistics and technology with 3.7 
each, and inbound logistics in the bottom position with a mean rating of 2.6. 
There are significant differences in median scores among the methods (I to 12) used 
(Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA: H=32.8, (11 , N=96), P=0.0006). Method 6 is significantly 
different from methods 2 to 5, 7, 9, 11 and 12 (Mann-Whitney: P<0.0157). Also 
method 8 is significantly different from methods 3, 4, 7 and 9 (Mann-Whitney: 
P<0.0313) and method 1 is significantly different from methods 3, 4 and 9 (Mann-
Whitney: P<0.0357). There are significant differences in median scores among the 
columns (Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA: H=19.7, (7, N+l08), P=0.0063). Inbound 
logistics is significantly different from marketing, outbound logistics, operations, 
M&A, human resource management and infrastructure: general management (Mann-
Whitney: marketing: U=29.0, P=0.0047: outbound logistics: U=33.5, P=0.0262; 
operations: U=15.0, P=0.0004; M&A: U=30.0, P=0.0055; human resource 
management: U=23.5, P=0.OOI9; infrastructure: general management: U=34.5, 
P=0.0109); and operations is significantly different from outbound logistics and 
technology (Mann-Whitney: outbound logistics: U=41.0, P=0.0270; technology: 
U=48.0, P=0.0216). 
The mean numbers in Table 8.7 vary from those shown in Table 8.4, Transfer of Core 
Competencies: Company Composites, because of weighting and rounding as figures 
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previously shown in the five companies are instead reflected in the eight value chain 
locations. 
The most effective methods in marketing and sales are: Method 8, visits, which has a 
total of21 points and a mean of5.3; method 10, inclusion in management process (20 
and 5.0); and method 7, seminars and conferences (19 and 4.8). Method 6, rotate 
managers and key people from new acquisitions has a mean of 6.5 but it restricted to a 
total of 13 because only two of the four companies reporting use this method. While 
method 13, multi-disciplinary/regional teams and method 14, leadership, are each 
rated at 7.0, they apply to Sappi alone. 
The methods considered the most effective in outward logistics are: Method I, 
appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, and method 8, visits, each with a total of 9 and a mean of 4.5 points. 
Method 10, inclusion in management process, is in third place with a total of 8 and a 
mean of 4.0. Method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in 
wider company, has the highest means at 6.0 but is only reported by one company. 
The most effective methods in operations are: Method I, appoint key people from 
within company to management positions in new acquisitions, and method 10, 
inclusion in management process. They each have a total of 23 and a mean of 5.8. 
Method 2, post-M&A integration teams, method 8, visits, and method 12, benchmark 
core competencies, are considered the next most effective methods, with 5.3 points 
each. Methods 2 and 12 each have 21 points but method 8, visits, only 16 because 
three companies use this method. 
Method 2, post-M&A integrations teams has the highest total of 7 in inbound 
logistics, but a mean of 3.5. Method I , appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions and method 8, visits are next in line with 
totals of 6 and means of 3.0. Method 12, benchmark has 5 points and a mean of 5.0-
highest in this value chain location - but is only reported by SABMiller Europe. 
Method 10, inclusion and management process, and method 4, short-term 
secondments each register a total of 5 and a mean of 2.5. 
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The methods that are considered to be the most effective for transferring core 
competencies in the mergers and acquisitions value chain location are method 1, 
appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, and method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in 
wider company, which receive ratings of 6.0 each. Four companies report on the first 
methGld and three on the second so the respective totals are 24 and 18. Method 2,post-
M&A integration teams has the second highest total with 22 points and a mean of 5.5 . 
Method 5, models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) has 14 points and a 
mean of 4.7. The methods considered the next most effective are method 2, post-
M&A integration teams, and method 5, models or examples (other acquisitions or 
investments), with 5.5 and 4.7 ratings respectively. 
Method 1, appoint key people from within company to management positions and new 
acquisitions scores the highest total in the human resource management value chain 
location. It has 23 points and a mean of 4.6. The methods considered to be the most 
effective for human resource management are method 8, visits, and method 10, 
inclusion in management process. These two methods achieve totals of 21 and means 
of 5.3. Another effective method in this category is method 6, rotate managers and 
key people from new acquisitions in wider company (15 and 5.0). 
The most effective methods in technological development are method 8, visits (14 and 
4.7) and method 7, seminars and conferences (13 and 3.0) and method 12, benchmark 
core competencies against competitors and other.firms with 12 points and a mean of 
3.0. Method 10, inclusion in management process (priority objects, etc.) and method 
4, short-term secondments have totals of 11 points and means of 3.7. 
Infrastructure: general management comprises 8 diverse core competencies from three 
of the companies. Barloworld accounts for five of these. The methods considered to 
be the most effective for this location are method 1, appoint key people from within 
company to management positions in new acquisitions, with a total of 54 and a mean 
of6.8, method 8, visits (40 and 5.7) and method 10, inclusion in management process 
(40 and 5.7). Method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in 
wider company (38 and 6.3) and method 11 , (34 and 5.7) are other effective methods 
in this location. 
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There are several different answers to the issue of the effectiveness of the methods 
used for each of the eight value chain locations. Method 1, appoint key people from 
within the company to management positions in new acquisitions, is ranked first in 
three of the eight value chain locations: operations (jointly with method 10), mergers 
and acquisitions and infrastructure: general. Method 6, rotate managers and key 
people from new acquisitions in wider company, is ranked first in both marketing and 
outbound logistics and shares first position with method I, appoint key people from 
within company to management positions in new acquisitions, in the mergers and 
acquisition location. Method 8, visits, is marked first in both human resource 
management and technology. Method 12, benchmark core competencies against 
competitors and other firms, is rated the most effective method in inbound logistics. 
Appendix 8.17 shows the same infonnation but the calculations are on a weighted 
basis. 
Table 8.6 Transfer of Core Competencies: Value Chain (Totals) 
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A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 4.5 5.0 6.0 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management 12 9 23 
2. Post-M&A integration teams 16 7 21 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 12 6 18 
4. Short-term secondments 8 5 14 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 6 4 6 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 13 6 10 
7. Seminars/conferences 19 5 12 
8. Visits 21 9 16 
9. Manuals and video material 11 5 11 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 20 8 23 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 4 · 4 6 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and others 17 7 21 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 7 7 
14. Other: Leadership 7 7 
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Table 8.7 Transfer of Core Competencies: Value Chain (Mean) 
Seven Point Scale 
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A. Eslimated degree of success in transferring core competencies . 4.5 5.0 6.0 3.5 5.8 4.8 3.8 5.3 38.7 8 4.8 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management 4.0 4.5 5.8 3.0 6.0 4.6 2.3 6.8 37.0 8 4.6 
2. Post-M&A integration teams 4.0 3.5 5.3 3.5 5.5 3.8 3.0 3.3 31 .9 8 4.0 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 2.5 2.7 2.6 23.3 8 2.9 
4. Short-term secondments 2.7 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 2.3 24.2 8 3.3 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 3.0 ~O 3.0 2.0 ,--'lJ 4.3 3.0 '-- 3.0_ 27.0 
-
8 3.4 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 6.5 6.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 6.3 42.8 8 5.4 
7. Seminars/conferences 4.8 2.5 4.0 2.0 1.5 3.5 3.3 3.4 25.0 8 3.2 
8. Visits 5.3 4.5 5.3 3.0 3.3 5.3 4.7 5.7 37.1 8 4.6 
9. Manuals and video material 3.7 2.5 3.7 1.0 3.7 3.8 2.3 2.0 22.7 8 2.8 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 5.0 4.0 5.8 2.5 3.3 5.3 3.7 5.7 35.3 8 4.4 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 2.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 4.3 3.7 2.0 5.7 26.7 8 3.3 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and others 4.3 3.5 5.3 5.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 29.6 8 3.7 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 42.0 6 7.0 
14. Other: Leadership 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 42.0 6 7.0 
Total LXi 62.3 44.5 68.2 31.5 62.3 62.3 51.7 63.8 446.6 59.5 
Number n 14 12 14 12 14 14 14 14 108 14 
Mean x 4.5 3.7 4.9 2.6 4.5 4.5 3.7 4.6 4.1 4.3 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. Methods 13 and 14 not ranked. Sappi only. 
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8.4.4 Value Chain Locations 
Having covered value chains we now examine the different locations in more detail. 
The ratings key measurements are on the seven-point scale. 
Marketing and Sales 
See Appendix 8.9. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia regards method 8, visits, and method 10, inclusion in 
management process (priority objective, etc), as its two most effective methods, 
giving each a rating of 6.0. Next are method 1, appoint key people from within 
company to management positions in new acquisitions, method 7, 
seminars/conferences, method 9, manuals and video material, and method 12, 
benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms, rating each 5.0. 
SABMiller Europe considers method 2, post-M&A integration teams, and method 6, 
rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, as its most 
effective method with 7.0 points each. The third most effective method is method I, 
appoint key people from within the company to management positions, with a rating 
of5.0. 
The two most effective methods for Sappi are method 13, multi-disciplinQ/y/regional 
teams, and method 14, leadership. They each rate 7.0. Method 6, rotate managers 
and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, and method 8, visits, are 
next with scores of 6.0 each. 
Wolverine World Wide rates method 7, seminars/conjerences, as its most effective 
method with 7.0 points. Method 8, visits, and method 10, inclusion in management 
process, each rate 6.0 points, while method 2,post-M&A integration teams, method 3, 
experts deliver, install and return, method 4, short-term secondments, and method 12, 
benchmarking each score 5.0 points. 
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The method which scores the highest in the marketing and sales value chain location 
is method 8, visits, with 21.0, at an average of 5.3. SABMiller Europe rates this 
method as 3.0 but the other companies give it a rating of 6.0. The second most 
effective method is method 10, inclusion in management process. Its total score is 
20.0 with an average of 5.0. Method 7, seminarslconferences, although given only a 
2.0 rating by SABMiller Europe, achieves a total of 19.0 points with an average of 
4.8. Method 12, benchmarking core competencies against competitors, has an 
average rating of 4.5, with a total of 18.0 points. Method 2, post-M&A integration 
teams, is in fifth position with a total of 16.0 and average of 4.0 points. SABMiller 
Europe and Wolverine World Wide each rate this method highly (7.0 and 5.0 ratings 
respectively), but SABMiller Africa and Asia and Sappi both accord it a ranking of 
2.0 points. 
Method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, 
is utilised only by SABMiller Europe and Sappi, but they rate it highly with 
respective scores of 7.0 and 6.0. 
Outbound Logistics 
This is shown in Appendix 8.10. SABMiller Africa and Asia and SABMiller Europe 
are the only two respondents in this section. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia rates method 8, visits, 6.0 points, followed by method I, 
appoint key people ji-om within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, with a rating of 5.0 points. Method 2, post-M&A integration teams, and 
method 10, inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc), each receive a 
rating of 4.0 points. 
SABMiller Europe regards method 6, rotate managers and key people ji-om new 
acquisitions in wider company, as the most effective method with a rating of 6.0. 
Method I, appoint key people from within company to management positions, method 
2, post-M&A integration teams ,method 4, short-term secondments, method 5, models 
or examples, method 10, inclusion in management process, method 11 , compensation 
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incentives based on achievement of transfer, and method 12, benchmark core 
competencies against competitors and other firms, each receive ratings of 4.0 points. 
The two companies therefore agree approximately on method I, appoint key people, 
method two, post-M&A integration teams, and method 10, inclusion in management 
process, in terms ·of effectiveness. The marked differences between the two 
companies are their views on method 6, rotate managers and key people from new 
acquisitions in wider company, and method 8, visits. 
Operations 
Appendix 8.11 shows the rating of effectiveness in this value chain activity. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia considers method 10, inclusion in management process 
(priority objectives etc), and method 8, visits, as the most effective methods with 
ratings of 7.0 each. Another four methods each receive ratings of 6.0 points: method 
1, appoint key people, method 2" post-M&A integration teams, method 7, 
seminarslconferences, method 9, manuals and video material, and method 12, 
benchmarking. 
SABMiller Europe views method 2, post-M&A integration teams, and method 10, 
inclusion in management process, as its most effective methods. Each of these 
methods is rated at 6.0 points, while method 1, appoint key people from within 
company from management positions in new acquisitions, method 3, experts deliver, 
install and return, and method 6, rotate managers and key people, are accorded 
ratings of 5.0 points. 
Sappi rates method 13, multi-disciplinary/regional teams, and method 14, leadership, 
as its most effective method with 7.0 points each. These are followed by method 12, 
benchmarking, and method 8, visits, with 6.0 points each. 
The most effective methods for Wolverine World Wide, with 7.0 points each are 
method 1, appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, and method 3, experts deliver, install and return. Method 2, post-M&A 
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integration teams, method 4, short-term secondments, and method 10, inclusion in 
management process, are next with 6.0 points each. 
There is a high degree of consensus in this section. The methods considered the most 
effective are method 1, appoint key people from within company to management 
positions in new acquisitions, with a total of23.0 points (average 5.8), and method 10, 
inclusion in management process, with the same ratings. Tied for third position are 
method 2,post-M&A integration team, rated 6.0 by each company, with the exception 
of Sappi, which accords it a rating of 3.0 points, and method 12, benchmark core 
competencies. Both of these methods achieve 21.0 points with an average of 5.3. 
Method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, 
is mentioned only by SABMiller Europe and Sappi, but each rates it a 5.0. 
Inbound Logistics 
SABMiller Africa and Asia, and SABMiller Europe are the only two participants in 
this section. See Appendix 8.12. 
The first-mentioned of these brewing companies considers three methods to be the 
most effective, with 4.0 points each. These are: method I, appoint key people from 
within company to management positions in new acquisitions, method 2, post-M&A 
integration teams, and method 8, visits. 
The second, SABMiller Europe, gives method 12, benchmark core competencies 
against competitors and other firms, 5.0 points (Africa and Asia does not select this 
method at all), with method 4, short term secondments, method 6, rotate managers 
and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, and method 10, inclusion in 
management process (priority goals etc), each receiving 4.0 points. 
There is therefore little agreement on any of the methods. The ones on which they 
agree, with the highest points are method 2, post-M&A acquisition teams, method 1, 
appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, and method 8, visits. SABMiller Europe awards the last two ratings of 
only 2.0 points each. 
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Mergers and Acquisitions 
See Appendix 8.13 
Wolverine World Wide marked this section non-applicable as mergers and 
acquisitions and post-merger and acquisition integration processes have, until 
recently, been performed by headquarters and not transferred to any global 
subsidiaries or divisions. 
Barloworld rates method 1, appoint key people from within company to management 
positions in new acquisitions, as its most effective method with 7.0 points. It is 
followed by method 2, post-M&A integration teams, method 6ix, rotate managers 
and key people from new acquisitions in wider company, method 9, manuals and 
video material, and method 11, compensation incentives based on achievement of 
transfer with 6.0 points each. Four other methods score 5.0 points each. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia selects only three methods: method 1, appoint key people 
from within company to management positions in new acquisitions, with 5.0 points, 
method 2, post-M&A integration teams, rating 2.0 points and method 3, short-term 
secondments 1.0 point. 
SABMiller Europe grades three methods as being highly effective and worthy of 
seven point ratings. These are: method 1, appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions, method 2, post-M&A integration teams, 
and method 6, rotate key managers and key people. Method 5, models or examples of 
other acquisitions or investments, rates 5.0 points, as it does with Barloworld. 
Sappi endorses method 2, post-M&A integration teams, together with method 13, 
multi-disciplinary/regional teams, and method 14, leadership, as its most effective 
methods with 7.0 points each. Method 8, visits, is next most effective with a rating of 
6.0 points. 
The strongest areas of consensus, with all four companies participating are method 1, 
appoint key people from within company, (24.0 points in total, average 6.0) and 
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method 2, post-M&A integration teams (total 22.0, average 5.5). Three companies 
regard method 6, rotate managers and key people, as an effective method with an 
average rating of 6.0 points. Method 5, models and examples, records an average of 
4.7 points for the three companies using this method. 
Human Resource Management 
See Appendix 8.14 
Barloworld rates method 1, appoint key people from within company to management 
positions in wider company, alld method 10, inclusion in management process 
(priority objectives etc), as highly effective, with 7.0 points each. Six points are 
assigned to method 6, rotate managers and key people from acquisitions in wider 
company, and method 1 I, compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer. 
Method 8, visits, is given a rating of 0.5 points. 
SABMiIler Africa and Asia, regards method 8, visits as worthy of 7.0 points, method 
10, inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) , 6.0 points, with 5.0 
points being assigned to method 1, appoint key people from within company, method 
7, seminars/conferences, method 9, manuals and video material, and method 12, 
benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms. 
SABMiller Europe's most effective method is considered to be method 10, inclusion 
in management process (priority objectives etc) . The method is rated as 4.0 points, 
while the next most effective methods are awarded 3.0 points each. These are: 
method I, appoint key people, method 4, short term secondments, method 5, models 
or examples of other acquisitions or investments, and method 12, benchmark core 
competencies against competitors and other firms . Method 8, visits, is regarded as 
not effective at all, 1.0 point being assigned to this method. 
Sappi classifies method 13, multi-disciplinary teams, and method 14, leadership, as 
highly effective with rating of 7.0 points each. Method 4, short-term secondments, 
method 6, rotate managers and key people and method 8, visits, are also highly 
regarded, with 6.0 points each. 
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Wolverine World Wide ' s human resource management core competence is ability to 
recruit and maintain a highly motivated management team. The company selects 
only one method that they use to transfer this core competency. This is method I , 
appoint key people, which receives a rating of 4.0 points. 
The only method which all five respondents record is method 1, appoint key people 
from within company to management positions in new acquisitions. It totals 23.0 
points, with an average of 4.6. Method 10, inclusion in management process, with 
four participants, has a higher average of 5.3. Method 8, visits, is in third place with 
an average of 4.8, followed by method 6, rotate managers and key people with 4.7 
points. Both these methods would average 6.0 points if the results of SABMiller 
Europe were removed and regarded as outliers. 
Technological Development 
A table with details is shown in Appendix 8.15 
SABMiller Africa and Asia regards method 8, visits, and method 10, inclusion in 
management process (priority objective etc), as the most effective methods, rating 
them 6.0 points each. Four points each are assigned to method I, appoint key people, 
method 2,post-M&A integration teams, method 7, seminars/conferences, and method 
12, benchmark core competencies against competitors and otherfirms. 
SABMiller Europe classifies method 3, experts deliver, install and return, and method 
4, short term secondments, as five-point categories, with method 2, post-M&A 
integration teams, coming in third, with 4.0 points. 
Sappi rates method 13, multi-disciplinary teams, and method 14, leadership, as highly 
effective methods (7.0 points each). Method 8, visits, is graded as 6.0 points with 
method 4, short term secondments, and method 6, rotate managers and key people 
from new acquisitions in wider company, following with 5.0 points. 
Wolverine World Wide grades two methods only, method 7, seminars/conferences, 
5.0 points, and method 12, benchmarking, 4.0 points. 
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There is therefore a wide variety and spread of methods regarded as effective. Method 
7, seminars/conferences, and method 12, benchmark core competencies against 
competitors in other firms, are the only two methods selected by all four participants. 
The first averages 3.3 points and the second 3.0. Method 8, visits, averages 4.7 (three 
participants) but rises to 6.0 if SABMiller Europe is excluded as an outlier. This 
method nevertheless receives the highest mean rating, with method 6, rotate 
managers and key people from acquisitions in wider company (4.0 mean) , in second 
position. 
Infrastructure: General Management 
Appendix 8.16 shows the five core competencies from Barloworld, systems from 
Sappi and operate globally and brand building from Wolverine. 
Barloworld varies the ratings of the effectiveness of methods depending upon the 
relevant core competency. Method 1, appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions, method 6, rotate managers and key people 
from management positions in new acquisitions in wider company, method 10, 
inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc), and method II, 
compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer, are the methods that 
feature most across the spectrum of the core competencies. 
Sappi adds method 13, multi-disciplinary/regional teams, and method 14, leadership, 
and rates these both as the most effective possible with 7.0 points each. Other 
methods considered to be highly effective are method 1, appoint key people from 
within company to management positions in new acquisitions (7.0 points), and 
method 2, post-M&A integration teams, and method 8, visits, with 6.0 points each. 
Method 3, experts deliver, install and return, and method 4, short-term secondments, 
each merit 5.0 points. 
Wolverine World Wide rates two methods in the core competence of operating 
globally. These are method 1, appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions (6.0 points) and method 3, experts deliver, 
install and return (5.0 points). The company rates the effectiveness of five methods 
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in transferring the competencies of brand building. These are all rated as six-point 
methods and are: method I, appoint key people from within company to management 
positions in new acquisitions, method 2, post-M&A integration teams, method 7, 
seminars/coriferences, method 8, visits, and method 10, inclusion in management 
process (priority objectives etc). 
Having examined the success of transfer III Section 8.3 and methods and their 
effectiveness in Section 8.4, attention is now turned in the following section to the 
relationship between the two. 
8.5 Methods and Success of Transfer 
The relationship is shown in Table 8.8, which compares the effectiveness of methods 
with the ratings of success for the companies as a whole and individually by core 
competency. There is a very high degree of correlation rs = 0.93 ; P-value = 0.003. 
The individual companies have high degrees of correlation with the exception of 
Wolverine World Wide. This company's relatively low level of correlation rs = 0.31, 
is caused by its core competency related to branding (core competency 2) receiving a 
success rating of 4.0 although the methods have an effectiveness rating of 6.0. If this 
one factor is removed as an outlier, the correlation improves to rs = 0.67 with a P-
value of 0.215 . 
Table 8.8 also shows the eight value chain locations. The correlation for the total 
value chain is rs = 0.80 with a P-value of 0.018 when measured by value chain 
locations. The difference between this measurement and the company total is due to 
"rounding and weighting". 
Figure 8.5 depicts the correlation for the company total graphically. The significant 
high degree of correlation gives substantial credibility to the information provided by 
the companies and highlights the importance of selecting the appropriate methods 
when transferring core competencies. 
415 
TABLE 8.8 Transfer of Core Competencies: Effectiveness of Methods and Ratings of Success 
Core Total Barlow A&A Europe Sappi WWW Value Chain Comp 
Effect Success Effect Success Effect Success Effect Success Effect Success Effect Success .Effect Success 
1 5.3 6.4 5.8 7 5.4 6 3.8 6 5.1 6 6.2 7 4.9 6.0 
2 4.9 5.4 5.5 7 4 .2 5 3.8 5 4.9 6 6.0 4 4.6 5.3 
3 4.6 5.4 5.0 7 4.2 5 3.4 5 4 .7 5 5.7 5 4.5 5.8 
4 4.2 4.6 4.0 5 3.7 4 3.4 4 4 .6 5 5.5 5 4.5 4.8 
5 3.7 4.0 3.8 4 3.3 5 2.8 3 4 .3 4 4.5 4 4 .5 4.5 
6 3.2 4.6 3.3 6 2.7 5 2.3 3 3.9 4 4.0 5 3.7 5.0 
7 2.4 3.7 3.0 5 2.1 4 2.2 2 3.7 3.8 
VC 2.6 3.5 
r, 0.93 0.73 0.66 0.94 0 .96 0.31 0.80 
P-Value 0.003 0.063 0.104 0.001 0.003 0.552 0.018 
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Figure 8.5 Transfer of Core Competencies: Effectiveness of Methods and 
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Effectiveness of Methods 
8.6 Measurement and Assessment of Transfer 
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"How do you detennine the success or otherwise of transferring a core competence" 
asks question I of Section Four in Questionnaire I, Initial Questionnaire, leading to 
the responses summarized below. 
Barloworld does not think about this in exact detail. The methodology of core 
competencies is intuitive rather than structured (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
SABMiller Africa and Asia assesses the success, or otherwise, of transfer via an 
internal assessment process (which they call CAP), perfonnance management and 
annual financial results (F. Miller, 22 August 2003). Their counterpart in Europe 
reports that not much in this area is fonnalised as of now (N. Mogilnicki, 21 August 
2003). As seen in Section 7.6, SABMilIer is improving the measurement process by 
including value drivers and key perfonnance indications with the definitions of core 
competencies (Leibowitz, personal communication, 6 December 2006). 
1 
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Sappi uses performance indicators, or metrics, to assess and measure progress. 
Benchmarking is significant, both internally and externally. Common language and 
common definitions assist in this regard; and their technology clusters contribute 
significantly to this area CR. Hope, 13 June 2003). 
Wolverine World Wide reports using a variety of financial metrics, including ROA, 
ROE and ROIC evaluations, for each profit centre. Success, or the lack of it, is also 
measured through third-party research to evaluate key parameters of customer 
satisfaction across their customer base, as compared to their peer group (J .C. Tegner, 
9 October 2003). 
8.7 Ways to Avoid Pitfalls 
The respondents were asked to list the measures taken to avoid pitfalls in the transfer 
of core competencies C question 4 of Section 4 in Questionnaire I). The responses 
follow. 
Barloworld regards retention strategy to ensure committed long-term employees and 
substantial investment in training and development as key factors. This is reinforced 
by careful analysis of core competencies and effective action plans to ensure that they 
remain in place (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
SABMiller Africa and Asia offer "hub" or head-office support, and the use of 
expatriates, especially competent and experienced senior staff (F. Miller, 22 August 
2003). SABMiller Europe, relies on very precise standards in technical and financial 
areas. They examine the reasons for deviations from norms (N. Mogilnicki, 21 
August 2003). 
Sappi ensures good benchmarking, both internally and externally. Their cluster 
management systems identify what is happening in each area and endeavour to 
maintain the same disciplines related to core competencies across the group. They 
encourage managers and experts to "talk to each other" continually, using common 
language and terminology (R. Hope, 13 June 2003). 
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Wolverine World Wide uses change management, which is embraced and executed 
concurrent with changes. People are coached and trained repeatedly in new 
processes. Realistic time lines are built into business plans to allow for change (J .C. 
Tegner, 9 October 2003). 
8.8 Improvements 
"What do you believe you could do to improve the transfer of core competencies" is 
the fifth question in Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire, covering this section. 
Barloworld sees continually upgrading the methods and investing greater resources in 
their developing leadership pool as ways to improve the transfer of core competencies 
(P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
SABMiller Africa and Asia states that a better understanding of legislative 
frameworks of the countries within which new acquisitions occur would help to 
improve transfer. They also advocate a more thorough human resources component 
to due diligence studies (F. Miller, 22 August 2003). 
SABMiller Europe believes that a great deal can be done to improve matters. Most 
acquisitions have been made recently, and there has not been enough time to 
satisfactorily transfer appropriate core competencies. A study into this is being 
undertaken (N. Mogilnicki , 21 August 2003). The introduction of key performance 
indicators, discussed in Section 8.7, is expected to result in improvements. 
B. Smith (12 February 2004) states that there will be times, however regrettable, when 
the only way to improve transfer (and development and, obviously, other management 
issues) of core competencies is to change management. While this depends on the 
situation and people involved, his rule-of-thumb advice is to generally have nationals 
in the sales management and corporate affairs functions. The human resources 
positions need to be carefully evaluated. 
Sappi believes that further improvements can be made by "working at it" , practicing 
and better communications (R. Hope, 29 September 2003). 
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Wolverine World Wide sees improved communication and providing reward 
programmes, beyond normal compensation, as key to better transfer of core 
competencies (J.C. Tegner, 9 October 2003). 
Kogut and Zander (1993) stress the importance of learning in the transfer of 
information. Sutton (2002) advocates "forgive but don't forget" and "learn from 
mistakes". In discussions with Drewell (9 May 2003), van der Schyff (10 June 
2003) and Hope (13 June 2003), all three stated that their respective companies 
did allow a measure of mistakes and that these were generally regarded as 
learning experiences rather than opportunities for punishment. Wolverine 
World Wide states in its Management Values to "keep mistakes to a size the 
business can handle" (J.C. Tegner, 9 October 2003). 
8.9 Practical Problems and Solutions 
The questions leading to this section were added to the research in May 2004 
after it was decided that the corporations' practical experiences would improve 
the research findings. Certain of the practical problems experienced and the 
resolutions adopted are common to both the development and the transfer of 
core competencies. 
P.M. Drewell (personal communication, 9 June 2004) sees the biggest 
practical problem confronted by Barloworld in transferring core competencies 
as getting leaders "to live" the core competencies, maintain focus on them and 
develop training and succession systems to ensure that these are sustainable. 
His recommendations to solve these practical problems are the same as those 
for the development of core competencies: leadership training systems, 
retention of key employees and passion and commitment throughout the 
management teams. 
Section 7.6 discusses the practical problems and solutions encountered by 
SABMiller in the development of core competencies. Certain of these 
practical problems and solutions also manifest themselves in the transfer of 
core competencies. Problems were experienced in getting regions to properly 
transfer core competencies both to other regions and areas under the regions 
own management. The lack of a standardised company agreement on the 
definitions of its core competencies was a major reason for this. Leibowitz 
(13 July 2004) points out that this was particularly apparent in the Miller 
Brewing acquisition and integration. 
Problems encountered in other regions included overconfidence in the building 
brands, together with limited local knowledge in certain instances. This 
hindered the transfer of core competencies relating to marketing, sales and 
merchandising. As in the case of the development of core competencies, the 
explicit standardisation and formatting of core competencies should also 
enable the company to more readily codify and monitor the transfer of core 
competencies. 
Miller of SABMiller Africa and Asia (17 June 2004) experienced practical 
problems similar to those related to the development of core competencies. As 
discussed in Section 8.6, a further practical problem was how to identify the 
core competencies to be transferred (see previous paragraph: standardisation 
will help). She again advocates practical solutions of building local training 
competence, patience and not enforcement, and targeted training programmes. 
SABMiller Europe found the practical problems of transfening core 
competencies to include sufficient, competent, people as a proportion of the 
number of people that needed to be developed, different language and cultures 
which do not take constructive criticism particularly well (N. Mogilnicki, 
personal communication, 9 June 2004). The solutions to these problems, not 
yet fully resolved, are the same as those outlined for the development of core 
competencies in Section 7.6 
Van der Schyff (10 June 2003) advocates "practise, practise, practise" as a 
way to deal with the practical problems related to the transfer of core 
competencies. He uses the analogies of a tennis stroke or a golf swing. The 
stroke or swing might be reasonable or even excellent but one has to keep 
working at it, searching for continuous improvement, sometimes looking at 
420 
new ways of things but essentially to keep trying, trying and trying again. He 
believes that SABMilier has a great advantage in the transfer of core 
competencies. This is because of the ability to transfer or second experienced 
people to foreign operations and particularly new acquisitions. These people 
have the core competencies within themselves and set out to instil them in the 
people in the foreign operations. A person from another company would not 
have the same set of competencies and so there might be a conflict in terms of 
transference, culture and so forth. 
Sappi (E. van As, personal interview, Johannesburg, 22 July 2004) has a 
similar approach to the practical problems and solutions in the transfer of core 
competencies as it does the development of core competencies. Additional 
information is that Sappi managed to transfer core competencies better than 
most companies because of its reputation for retaining most of the local 
management. It normally changes systems and things but not people. Only a 
limited number of South Africans were transferred overseas, sufficient to 
facilitate the transfer of core competencies but not so many as to be 
threatening to the nationals of acquired companies (according to van As). He 
counsels focus - do not try more than five things - at a time. Specific targets 
are set and companies are often shown where other parts of the group had 
achieved better results by cross-business benchmarking. 
The practical problems encountered by Wolverine World Wide (L. Whipple, 
personal communication, 8 June 2004, 30 October 2005) in the transfer of core 
competencies incorporate the difficulty of translating a corporate core 
competency to a specific brand/product in some other part of the world. What, 
for example, are the distribution channels available? Will the name translate 
well, or should a secondary name in the local language be used? In these 
particular instances small teams were used to search for solutions. Whipple 
advises patience in trying to solve practical problems, together with a 
realisation that all desired core competencies may not be transferred at the rate 
or level desired. 
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8.10 Summary aud Conclusion 
The biggest challenges to transferring core competencies are gIven as culture, 
language, attitude, getting a "common language" NIH (not invented here), time zones, 
and resistance to change. These are in line with the research findings of Kostova 
(1999), Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) and Minbaeva et al. (2001). Referring back to 
the research of Palich and Gomez-Mejia (1997) and the fact that there are cultural 
conditions not favourable to operations, challenges to the transfer of core 
competencies do not necessarily mean that performance is affected. 
The companies reported estimated degrees of success in transferring core 
competencies on a seven-point scale. The results varied from Barloworld, 5.9, Sappi 
and Wolverine World Wide, 5.0 each, SABMiller Africa and Asia, 4.9, to SABMiller 
Europe, 4.0. There are no significant differences in median scores among the 
companies (Kruskal-Wallis ANOYA: H=6.6, (4, N=33), P=0.1600). The Barloworld 
results should be seen in the context of a holding company with subsidiaries in related 
but different industries. The results of SABMiller Europe are adversely affected by 
the low scores in inbound logistics and human resource management. 
The value chain location or activity results of transfer are as follows: operations 
shows the highest degree of success, with 6.0 points, followed by mergers and 
acquisitions at 5.8; infrastructure: general management at 5.3; outbound logistics at 
5.0 and human resource management at 4.8 (5.5 if SABMiller Europe is eliminated as 
an outlier). Marketing and sales is sixth with 4.5, followed by technological 
development, 3.8, and inbound logistics 3.5. There are significant differences in 
median scores among the core competencies with n >2 (Kruskal-Wallis ANOYA: 
H=12.5, (5 , N=24), P=0.0284). Statements from Barloworld and SABMiller indicate 
that there is a higher success rate of transferring those core competencies that are 
more readily measured and codified than is the case with the "soft ones" dealing with 
markets and values. 
While certain of the results are in line with the literature and research, parts of it are 
not. Kogut and Zander (1993) refer to codifiability, teachability, complexity, system 
dependence and product observability. Kostova (1999 and 2002) refers to relational 
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aspects, while Luo (2000) maintains that technological capabilities are more 
transferable than organizational capabilities and that financial capabilities are more 
transferable than operational capabilities. This is certainly not the case with 
operations and technological development in my study. Information technology has 
changed substantially since certain of the research was conducted in the mid-1990s. 
There is a very strong correlation between the rankings of how well the companies as 
a group perform each core competency and the ratings of success in transferring these 
core competencies. The Spearman coefficient is 0.79 with a P-value of 0.033. The 
results strongly suggest that the companies transfer those core competencies that they 
do well - in descending level of success, especially the three core competencies that 
they do best. There is a negative correlation (Spearman - 0.40 with a P-value of 
0.3 79) between the rankings in terms of importance to competitiveness and the ratings 
of success of transfer. In other words, companies may transfer what they do well, 
rather than what is important for competitive purposes. 
The companIes conclude that on an overall basis the most effective method for 
transferring core competencies is: appoint key people from within company to 
management positions in new acquisitions. This method has a total of 25.7 points out 
of a maximum of 35 and a mean of 5.1 out of a possible 7.0. The second most 
effective method is visits, which has a total of 25.5 points and a mean of 5.1. 
Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) is third, with a total of 24.4 
points and a mean of 4.8. The next two most effective methods are post-merger and 
acquisition integration teams (21.0 and 4.2) and benchmark core competencies 
against competitors and other firms (19.1 and 3.8). Rotate managers and key people 
from new acquisitions in wider company is considered the most effective method 
(16.8 and 5.7) by the three companies that use it. Sappi added multi-
disciplinary/regional teams and leadership and rated each as highly effective with the 
maximum of7.0 points. 
The research results are generally in line with the literature review. This relates to 
Hitt et al. (2003) who advocate moving key people to facilitate transfer and to 
Bresman et al. (1991), Bartlett and Ghosal (2002), and Hamel and Prahl ad (1996) who 
stress the importance of travel and visits. Porter (1996), include in objectives, 
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Govindarajan (2000) "DNA carriers", Ghosal, Korine and Szulanski (1994), joint 
work in teams and task forces and Thompson and Strickland (2003), benchmarking 
are other works verified by the research. The top rating of method 6, rotate managers 
and key people from new acquisitions in the wider company by the three companies 
that use it supports Garvin' s (2000) view that personnel rotation programmes are one 
of the most powerful methods of transferring knowledge. 
The effectiveness of the methods varies by company and by location in the value 
chain. Appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions, is rated first in five of the eight value chain locations, two ofthe five tied 
with other methods. Visits is in the top position in two locations, tying with appoint 
key people in one of them. Post-M&A integration teams are rated first in inbound 
logistics. 
The most effective methods for marketing and sales are visits and inclusion in 
management process. Seminarslconferences are considered relatively effective in 
marketing and operations, but not in any of the other value chain activities. 
Operations has appoint key people, inclusion in management process, post-M&A 
integration teams, rotate managers and key people, visits, and benchmarking as the 
most effective methods. 
Human resource management has appoint key people, inclusion in management 
process and visits, as its most effective methods. Appoint key people is considered 
most effective in operations and M&A, and less effective in marketing and sales and 
technology. Visits are considered to be relatively effective in all value chain activities 
with the exception of M&A and operations. Benchmarking is held to be more 
effective in marketing and sales, operations and inbound logistics. Post-M&A 
integration teams are believed to be more effective in marketing and sales, operations 
andM&A. 
The biggest difference between South African companies and Wolverine World Wide 
is Wolverine ' s relative emphasis on seminarslconferences. Wolverine rates the latter 
at 6.0 effectiveness. It has been hosting international licensees and distributors 
seminars and conferences for almost half a century. Seminarslconferences are 
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considered relatively effective in marketing and operations in general, but not in any 
of the other value chain locations. 
There is a high degree of correlation (Spearman 0.93 with a P-value of 0.003) 
between the effectiveness of the methods used to transfer core competencies and the 
ratings of success achieved in transferring the core competencies. This gives 
credibility to the information provided by the companies in this context and highlights 
the importance of selecting the appropriate methods of transfer. 
The methods used by the companies to measure and assess the success or otherwise of 
the transfer of core competencies include performance indicators and metrics, bench 
marking, both internal and external, performance management and, in the case of 
Wolverine World Wide, third-party research to evaluate key parameters of customer 
satisfaction. 
The measures taken to avoid pitfalls in transfer encompass head-office support, the 
use of experienced senior staff and expatriates, precise standards of measurement 
where possible, "common language and terminology" and change management. 
The ways in which the transfer of core competencies can be improved are: better 
understanding of legislative frameworks of the countries where new acquisitions are 
made (Kostova 1999), a more thorough human relations component to due diligence 
study, better communications, "practicing" (see Kogut and Zander 1993 on 
experience and learning), change of management and reward programs beyond 
normal compensation. There is evidence that all the corporations have a measure of 
learning from mistakes in line with the recommendations of Sutton (2000) to "forgive 
but don ' t forget". 
Certain of the practical problems experienced and the solutions devised are common 
to both the development and the transfer of core competencies. One practical problem 
is getting leaders "to live" the core competencies. Leadership training systems, 
retention of key employees and passion and commitment are among the solutions. 
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Over confidence on brand building together with limited local knowledge has caused 
problems for SABMiller in marketing and sales. The solutions embrace the explicit 
standardisation and formatting of core competencies so that they can be codified and 
monitored. SABMiller provides an example of a core competence matrix depicting 
definitions and the supporting resources and capabilities. A further problem is how to 
identify the core competencies to be transferred. The solutions advocated are building 
local training competence, targeted training programmes and patience rather than 
enforcement. Continual practice and the transfer of experienced people to foreign 
positions are other solutions. 
Sappi advocates changing systems but retaining most of the local management and 
counsels focus - do not try to do more than five things at a time. Set specific targets 
and demonstrate to companies the success of their peers. 
Wolverine has encountered difficulties in translating a corporate core competency into 
a specific brand or product in some other part of the world and, like SABMiller, 
proposes patience among the solutions. 
The findings support the Bresman, Birkinshaw and Nobel (1999) research on foreign 
acquisitions, which conclude that problems associated with transfer increase with 
geographical and cultural distance. 
Having examined the results of the research with both the development and transfer of 
core competencies, we review in the next chapter the strategies of the four companies. 
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9. REVIEW OF THE CORPORATIONS' STRATEGIES 
9.1 Introduction 
Core competencies are not an end in themselves but an inherent part of strategies. 
The review of the strategies in this chapter aims to give a better understanding of the 
corporations and their core competencies. The chapter also explores aspects of the 
third aim or question of the thesis, which is how the three corporations, originating in 
South Africa, with limited international experience, became global leaders in their 
fields within a decade. 
The strategies of the four corporations are reviewed against the model proposed by 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003). Special attention is paid to strategy, leadership, 
mergers and acquisitions, and post-merger and acquisition integration while referring 
to the literature framework in these areas. The works of Collins (2001), Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (2000), Drucker (1986, 1995), Lajoux (1998), Ashkenas, Demonaco and 
Francis (2001), and Pritchett, Robinson and Clarkson (1997) are included in the 
framework. The global expansion of the three South African companies has been 
predominantly by acquisition. The success of mergers and acquisitions and post-
merger and acquisition integration influences the development and transfer of core 
competencies. 
Nohria et al. (2003) examine more than two hundred well-established management 
techniques as they were employed, over a 10 year period, by 160 companies. The 
results show that to sustain superior performance, corporations have to excel at four 
primwy management practices - strategy, execution, culture and structure - and any 
two of four secondary practices: talent, leadership, innovation and mergers and 
partnerships. The authors state that the key to this 4+2 formula is not which technique 
is chosen within each practice, but how well and how consistently corporations stick 
with it. It did not seem to matter which of the two secondary practices the companies 
excelled at, and excelling at more than two of the four practices made no significant 
difference either. 
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The eight management practices are examined in the six subsections numbered one to 
six for each of the four companies; culture, structure and talent are discussed under a 
common heading. Post-merger integration is added as a further practice in a seventh 
subsection. Section 9.2 begins with a summary of the Nohria et al. (2003) guidelines 
relating to the practice concerned. The strategies of the four corporations are 
reviewed against these guidelines. The different sources discussed in Chapter 4, 
"Research Design and Methodology", are introduced by referring to relevant media 
and analysts reports on the companies. I add my own direct observations, based on 
experiences and anecdotes or mini-case studies. The different sources, including 
interviews, questionnaires and direct observations contribute to the process of 
triangulation referred to in Chapter 4. 
9.2 The Nohria, Joyce and Roberson 4+2 Formula 
Nohria et al. (2003) advise companies to build strategy on deep knowledge of target 
customers and the company's capabilities. The strategy must be clearly and 
consistently communicated to employees, customers and shareholders. The strategy 
should be refined only in response to marketplace changes, new technologies or 
government regulations, for example. 
Collins (2001:118) raises the strategic issues of "what you are deeply passionate 
about, what you can be the best in the world at and what drives your economic 
engine". Everyone I interviewed in the four companies was, or seemed, passionate 
about their business so that issue does not need to be discussed. Being the best in the 
world and what drives economic engines are reviewed under the Strategy subsections. 
I have also taken the opportunity to include analyst and media perceptions of the four 
companies and their strategies in these subsections. The criterion for inclusion is 
whether the articles or relevant reports support or question the companies' strategies. 
"As with strategy, it is not what you execute that matters but how" (Nohria et al. 
2003 :6). A company must develop and maintain flawless operational execution and 
streamline operational processes essential to consistently meeting customer 
expectations. The authors advocate that a company increase its productivity over time 
by about twice the industry average to be a steady winner. 
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Nohria et aI. (2003) recommend that compames should develop and maintain a 
performance-orientated culture. This requires holding managers and employees, 
individuals and teams to unyielding performance expectations. Company values 
should be stated clearly and forcefully. 
Nohria et al. (2003) point out that winning companies build and maintain a fast, 
flexible and flat organisation. The organisational structure should simplifY the work 
to be done. The authors conclude that it makes little difference whether the companies 
are organised by function, geography or product. What does matter is whether the 
organisational structure simplifies the work 
Nohria et al. (2003) advise companies to hold on to talented employees and find more. 
They point out that it is cheaper and more reliable to develop stars than to buy them. 
"Find leaders who are committed to the business and its people. Successful leaders 
reach out to front lines, forging connections with people at all levels. They seize 
opportunities before competitors do and tackle problems early" . (Nohria et al. 
2003:10). 
In Lessons from Late Movers, reviewed in Section 3.3.2, Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) 
point out that in each of the 12 merging multinational corporations they studied, there 
were leaders who drove the corporation relentlessly up the value curve. These leaders 
showed two characteristics: unshakable belief that their corporation would succeed 
internationally and a remarkable openness to new ideas that would faci litate 
internationalism, even when the ideas challenged established practice and core 
capabilities. 
"Level 5" leaders are ambitious but, first and foremost, ambitious for their companies 
(Collins 2001). This applies in the four companies reviewed when one considers the 
length of service of the CEOs involved as one criterion. This particular issue of 
leadership is consequently not discussed for the individual companies. The 
characteristic of Level 5 leaders embodying a paradoxical mix of personal humility 
and professional will is reviewed. It is not appropriate for me to be personally and 
subjectively judgemental about this leadership characteristic of the four CEOs. I 
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therefore provide information and anecdotes (mini-case studies) so that clear 
inferences can be drawn. I did send drafts to the CEOs as mentioned in Section 4.9. 
Making industry-transforming innovations is advocated by Nohria et al. (2003). 
Companies are advised to lead their industries with breakthrough innovations, even if 
that means cannibal ising existing products. New technologies should enhance all 
operations, not just product development processes. As noted in the literature review 
(Section 3.5), Drucker (1995) regards innovation as the one core competency that 
every organisation needs. 
Nohria et al. (2003) include seeking growth through mergers and partnerships as one 
of the four secondary practices. Their advice is to enter only new businesses that 
leverage existing customer relationships and complement core strengths and to forge 
partnerships that best use both companies' talents. Companies should develop a 
systematic way of identifying, screening and closing such deals. 
Section 3.9 in the literature review noted how the majority of mergers and 
acquisitions are generally unsuccessful according to the numerous studies and 
examples quoted by Lajoux (1998). In examining the company strategies and 
performance in this practice, the success rate criteria for acquisition, reasons for 
success and setbacks and challenges will be discussed. 
Lajoux (1998), in Section 3.10, cites post-merger integration as often being the reason 
for failures of acquisitions. She points out the additional complications of 
international business: law, accounting, culture, language and technology. Ashkenas 
et al. (200 I), using GE as a model advocate early planning, restructuring sooner rather 
than later, having a person responsible full-time for integration, integrating operations 
and cultures. Pritchett et al. (1997) and others stress the importance of 
communication and oflimiting and keeping promises. 
The corporations were also asked to list the five most important actions in regard to 
post-M&A integration (Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire). The lists provided are 
the basis for the subsections and examine post-M&A integration. 
431 
9.3 Barloworld 
9.3.1 Strategy 
Barloworld includes the ability to create and sustain long-term relationships as one of 
its leading core competencies. It has deep knowledge of its target . customers, 
especially in its founding businesses, such as capital equipment and motor vehicle 
retailing (Section 5.3.8). The company's strategy or philosophy ofVBM (value based 
management) is stated in its annual reports from 2000 to 2005 and on its website. The 
statement of strategy in the 2003 annual report includes the guidelines that it would 
use to expand within existing activities and also develop grassroots opportunities 
within its own core competencies. 
In terms of Collins 's (2001) advice for companies to search for the one denominator 
that has the single greatest impact, Barloworld utilises two key metrics to measure 
financial performance in its VBM philosophy (see Section 5.3.6). 
The first metric is cash flow return on investment (CFROI). CFROI measures the 
cash flow return on inflation-adjusted assets. The company creates sustainable value 
by growing assets that are producing returns in excess of its real cost of capital. For 
management purposes Barloworld has set a hurdle of achieving an 8 percent real 
CFROI on average through the economic cycle for every part of its business. This 
rate is used not only to assess the performance of existing businesses but also for 
capital expenditure projects and acquisitions. The second metric is cash value added 
(CV A). The key to creating value is to achieve positive cash value added every year 
(Barloworld Annual Report 2005). 
According to Philips ( presentation, Wits Business School, Johannesburg, 4 August 
2005), "Barloworld is as good as anybody in managing a Caterpillar franchise". As 
the company is the world' s largest distributor of Hyster it is conceivably as good as 
anybody in managing a forklift business. Barloworld would also be a candidate as 
one of the world' s best in having the unique ability to operate under difficult 
circumstances (Angola, Siberia, Mozambique), as seen in Section 6.2. There are, 
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however, companies from countries such as China, Taiwan and Korea who also have 
this type of ability. 
Although expressing concern for certain of Barloworld's smaller and offshore 
operations, Kershaw (2004), of Investec Securities, and an unnamed analyst from 
Andisa Securities (2005a), comment favourably on the overall company and its 
outlook. 
9.3.2 Execution 
A unique organisational ability to function together and implement coherent strategies 
across the organisation is among Barloworld' s core competencies. A unique ability to 
operate under difficult circumstances is another core competence (Section 5.3.8). 
McNulty (2002) commends Barloworld's VBM programme for placing a greater 
emphasis on operational execution and less tolerance for laggards. 
9.3.3 Culture, Structure and Talent 
Referring back to the previous section, the unique organisational ability of Barloworld 
to function (or work) together, and implement coherent strategies across the 
organisation is again relevant here. The corporate culture, together with the value 
based management philosophy, is another strength. While there had been an historic 
willingness to tolerate non-perfonnance because of the importance of long-term 
relationships, VBM cash flow return targets are now non-negotiable. There is now a 
high level of management-team accountability (P.M. Drewell, personal interview, 
Sandton, 9 May 2003). 
The Barloworld structure is flat with all 10 of the divisions reporting to the CEO 
(please see Section 5.3.7 above and P.M. Drewell, personal communication, 3 May 
2004). 
Barloworld has very deep management and continuity; 20 to 30 years service is not at 
all unusual (A.J. Phillips, personal communication, 22 May 2002). Details of 
management are given in Table 5.3 in Subsection 5.3.4. "Building a dynanlic, 
innovative and forward looking organisation that allows us to attract people of the 
I 
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highest calibre ... " (Barloworld 2003). The CEO points out, in both the 2002 and 
2003 annual reports, that they did not lose a single member of their global leadership 
team to competitors in those years. 
9.3.4 Leadership 
Tony Phillips, who was appointed CEO of Barloworld in 1999, introduced the value 
based management (VBM) system. The investment returns for the last four years 
have shown significant improvements (see Subsection 5.3.9). McNulty (2004) credits 
Phillips with adopting new thinking in the form of value based management of 
industrial brands as a unifying theme across its diverse businesses in more than 30 
countries 
I first met Tony Phillips in 1992, shortly before he left for Spain to take up the 
position of CEO of Finanzauto. Since then I have interviewed and communicated 
with him on the thesis as detailed in Appendix 4.2, Data Collection and Fieldwork 
Record. Included in this appendix are Phillips 's 2003 to 2006 attendances at the Wits 
Business School Managing a Turnaround programme. Finanzauto was used as a case 
study and Philips responded to the different team presentations and led in judging 
them. Each year several delegates remarked on "how down-to-earth" Phillips is for 
someone heading such a prominent company. 
In 2001, I decided that a written strategy assignment paper at Rhodes University 
would be a practical exercise covering leading South African multinational 
companies. The idea was that a team of students studying a particular company would 
submit three questions to the company concerned and incorporate the replies in the 
assignment. I approached several companies to see if they would participate. 
When Phillips agreed that Barloworld would assist, I asked him to whom the 
questions should be sent. He replied that he would handle the questions himself. I 
responded that this was not what I expected of his valuable time. He rejoined that it 
was good for CEOs in their fifties to occasionally check what twenty-one-year-olds 
thought of the world in general and his company in particular. Besides, he added, 
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some of the students might even become Barloworld customers or employees because 
of this exercise. 
A few days after the questions had been sent out by students to all the companies, his 
assistant, Bonny Raby, telephoned to explain that her CEO would be in hospital for a 
back operation around the time that his replies would be expected. "But don't worry" 
she added, "Tony has taken his laptop with him and will reply from the hospital". 
Which he did. 
9.3.5 Innovation 
The Barloworld statements of strategy include "We encourage best practice to create 
value through new, different and better ways of doing things", while the core 
competencies include the ability to evolve and innovate (see Subsections 5.3.6 and 
5.3.8). Phillips's "new thinking" on the nature of Barloworld is discussed in Section 
6.6 (McNulty 2004). There are limits on product innovation for the reason that the 
capital equipment and motor businesses have products designed and produced by the 
licensors and not by Barloworld. This does not apply to the company's own 
businesses such as PP Cement and Lime and the Scientific Division. 
9.3.6 Mergers and Partnerships 
Success Rate 
Figure 9.1 lists the major acquisitions and disposals of Barloworld over the past five 
years. Since value based management was introduced in 1999, the overall view is that 
all acquisitions completed since then are expected to achieve the financial target 
requirements. Evidence for this is that no acquisition made, since then, has been sold 
or shut down (P.M. Drewell, personal communication, 26 October 2003). 
Analysts from Andisa Securities (25 May 2005) note that "the real sticky wickets" in 
Barloworld are Coatings, Australia and the Industrial Distribution and Scientific 
divisions. The Barloworld Interim Report, for the six months ending 31 March 2005, 
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refers to difficult market conditions for the Coatings Division and provisions for site 
rationalisations for the Scientific Division that negatively affect current financial 
results but will benefit future ones. 
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Figure 9.1 Barloworld Incremental Acquisitions (and Disposals) 2000-2005 
Acquisitions R4.0 billion including: - Avis Southern Africa 
- PPC shares 
- Freightliner dealerships 
Equipment Motor 
• Finaltair • Avis Southern Africa 
• Energyst • SA retail dealerships 
• Circon 
Coatings 
Industrial Distribution • ICC 
• Barton, Texarkana & North West • White Knight (Australia) 
Arkansas Freightliner • Sonnex Paints (Namibia) 
• Sterling dealership (Tennessee) • Hamilton Brush 
• Netherlands Hyster 
• N Ireland Hyster Scientific 
• Protean Laboratory Group (UK) 
Cement & Lime • LPM Lasers 
• Mooiplaas Dolomite 
• Porthold (Zimbabwe) Logistics 
• PPC shares • Optimus 
• Kgale Quarries (Botswana) • Supply Chain Solutions 
• Readymix (Botswana) • ZA Trans 
Disposals R6.6 billion including: - 12 million Dimension Data 
shares 
- Comparex shareholding 
- Motor leasing book 
- Equipment leasing book 
Source: Adapted from Barloworld: Deutsche Bank Conference (September 2005). 
Criteria 
According to Drewell (9 May 2003) there is a long checklist of criteria, but the key 
questions are: 
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1. Will it achieve our CFROI hurdle rate (8 percent real) over the business cycle? 
This generally means that it would be queried if the answer were more than 
three years. 
2. Can we manage it? 
3. Do the people in the business feel like the type we can work with? 
Barloworld prefer to have control of acquisitions unless there are very strong reasons 
for not doing so. Phillips (personal interview, 22 October 2002) states that they also 
prefer to appoint the number one or number two executive to a new acquisition ii'om 
within the broad Barloworld Group and not necessarily only from South Afiica. 
Reasons for Success 
Phillips (personal communication, 11 November 2003) states that Barlow' s success is 
due to a great deal of practice. Their philosophy is to start small and build 
incrementally and select businesses where Barloworld has core competencies. 
Setbacks and Challenges 
In 1992, Barloworld, through its subsidiary, Bibby, in the UK, acquired Finanzauto 
the Caterpillar distributor in Spain and Portugal that was listed on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange. This was the second-ever contested corporate takeover in Spanish history. 
The condition of the company was far worse than expected and there were severe 
losses in 1992 and 1993. Tony Phillips, then CEO of the South Afiican Caterpillar 
business, was sent to Spain to rectify the situation. Finanzauto subsequently became 
the single biggest business in Barloworld (Miller and Velamuri 1998). The coatings 
business in Australia went through four very difficult years but is now producing 
acceptable results (P.M. Drewell, personal interview, 9 May 2003). 
9.3.7 Post-Merger Integration 
Drewell (9 May 2003) lists the following five most important points in post- M&A 
integration: 
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1. Obtaining control of administration and financial controls. 
2. Integrating people into Barloworld. 
3. Appointing one of the top executives from the wider Barloworld Group. 
4. In acquisitions often allowing senior people up to two years to decide if for 
themselves whether wish to stay with Barloworld. 
5. Introducing and installing the value based management philosophy . . 
Drewell (9 May 2003) points out that while this approach may take longer, with 
certain inherent disadvantages, it has clear advantages in the long term. Building and 
maintaining long-term relationships is a key core competency of the group. 
The case of Finanzauto demonstrated the company's ability to provide management to 
new acquisitions (Drucker's 1986 fourth rule on acquisitions) when Phillips and 
Wilson were sent to turnaround this Spanish acquisition. Five of the seven present 
chief executives of Barloworld divisions have prior management experience in other 
divisions within the company which supports a view that the company can provide 
management to new acquisitions. Relating to Drucker's fifth rule, it is possible for 
someone from an acquired company to be promoted within Barloworld as exemplified 
by Ramon Fernandez-Urrutia, who succeeded Phillips as CEO ofFinanzauto and was 
subsequently promoted to an executive director position in Barloworld. 
9.4 SABMiller 
9.4.1 Strategy 
SABMiller states its strategies clearly in its annual reports (2000 to 2005) and on its 
website. Its business is very customer-focused. Miller Salzman (personal interview, 
London, 3 February 2003) stresses that SABMiller' s knowledge of North American 
consumers at that time had not reached the level achieved in South Africa, where 
there is substantial in-depth knowledge. 
As mentioned in Subsection 10.3.4, SABMiller measures performance wherever 
possible. Two of the most prominent areas (SABMiller Annual Reports 2000-2005) 
are volume ("keep building brands that consumers love and market them superbly") 
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and "relentless focus on operational perfonnance" (SABMiller Annual Report 
2005:9). 
The perfonnance indicators mentioned most in reviews of operations in the annual 
reports from 2000 to 2005 are volumes and EBITA (earnings before interest, tax and 
amortization) percentage margin which cover the two· areas discussed in the previous 
paragraph. A third perfonnance indicator is TSR (total shareholder return) compared 
to the FTSE 100 Index which is covered in Subsection 5.4.10. 
As seen in Section 6.3 and Figure 6.2 SABMiller is the lowest cost producer and 
distributor of quality beer in the world. I refer also to Mackay's relentless focus on 
operating efficiencies, mentioned two paragraphs before. A case could also be argued 
that SABMilIer is the best in the global beer industry or even the liquor industry in 
tenns of the perfonnance of their home country employees when deployed around the 
world. See Sections 6.3, 9.4.3 and 10.3.4 in this regard 
In their special reports on SABMilIer, Andisa Securities (2005b) and Geard of 
Investec Securities in the UK (2005) comment favourably on SABMiller ' s balanced 
business model. According to McKinsey, the consultancy, half of the top 100 global 
companies, by market capitalisation, could be companies from emerging markets or 
developing economies in the next 10 to 15 years, compared with only two now; 
Samsung and LG, the South Korean consumer product manufacturers (Mumbai 
2005). McKinsey also identified 54 companies from developing economies as 
trendsetters ranking "high on competitiveness and global-ness". They include 
Hyundai, the South Korean car maker and engineering group; SABMilIer, the 
"beverages group from South Africa"; Cemex, a Mexican cement producer; and 
Infosys, an Indian software group. Other media reports on SABMilIer appear later in 
this chapter. 
Sams and Szabat (2005) note that SABMiller was one of more than 500 local brewers, 
and a growing number of local competitors, when it entered China in the mid-90s. It 
quickly discovered that there was a limited market for its premium-priced brand. It 
commenced acquiring leading low-price regional and local brewers, building a 
diversified portfolio of low, medium and high-priced brands. The company's 
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acquisition strategy focused a few clear targets: low-cost providers, deep local 
management expertise and strong ties to local governments to ease licensing and red 
tape. "As other brewers faltered and exited China, SABMiller' s business there has 
flourished including growing market share for a leading regional brand from 7.5 
percent to 41 percent in a single year" (Sams and Szabat 2005: 17). Leibowitz 
(personal communication, 1 September 2006) reports that SABMilIer now has the 
leading beer brand in China (Snow). 
9.4.2 Execution 
Van der Schyff (personal interview, 10 June 2003) regards SABMilIer as being 
"outstanding" in delivery. The annual reports give significant details of achievements 
in quality, productivity and profitability, often by country (SABMiller Annual Reports 
2003 to 2005). Eisenberg, Thigpen and Robinson, in Time of 12 July 2004, remark 
on Miller Brewing CEO Norman Adami's talent in execution. 
9.4.3 Culture, Structure and Talent 
Corporate culture and human capital is a critical SABMiller core competency. There 
are numerous statements by Mackay, Adami and others on the performance-oriented 
culture. Two, for example, from Adami (2002:5): "In their expansion strategies 
most of our international competitors emphasise their brand or capital resources; we 
emphasise our people." And "Our culture and our people are characterised by their 
optimism and passion about our brands and about the company. The people are 
energised, proud, innovative and committed and continuously strive to achieve 
excellence. " 
Mackay (Jones 2002) is cited as blunt in his assessment of Miller Brewing four 
months after taking control of the company. He states that it is not a finely tuned, 
focused, effective organisation and describes the Miller way of getting things done as 
inadequate. Analyst Geard, of Investec Securities in London, expresses the view of 
his company that SABMilIer has the strongest management and most robust operating 
culture in the sector, which in this case refers to global liquor and brewing companies. 
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Miller Salzman (personal interview, 7 November 2002) and van der Schyff (personal 
interview, 10 June 2003) stress that SABMiller has very flat organisational structures. 
Human resources, or human capital, are regarded as SABMiller's greatest strength by 
its management. By 2001 , 140 managers and technical experts had been "exported" 
from the South Afiican operations to other parts of the world (E.A.G. Mackay, 
personal interview, London, 27 November 2001). 
9.4.4 Leadership 
Graham Mackay, who was appointed as CEO of SA Breweries in 1999, has led the 
disposal of non-core, or diversified, businesses and the transformation from a regional 
brewer (albeit dominant) to the second largest brewer by volume in the world. His 
performance will ultimately be judged on the success of the Miller Brewing Company 
and the other acquisitions, such as Bavaria, and the return on equity of the group once 
there has been sufficient time to absorb acquisitions. The share price, financial 
results and company announcements all indicate that these are well on track at the 
present time. 
I have contact with SABMiller via the thesis research and the annual visits of one of 
my Rhodes classes to the lbhayi Brewery in Port Elizabeth. I also have fiiends among 
the SABMiller retirees. I am therefore very aware of how Mackay is regarded by 
SABMiller employees and retirees. 
I first met Graham Mackay in the late 1980s and saw him at a few SA Breweries-
related functions and events in the 1990s before the interview with him in London on 
27th November 2001. He served on a panel on Global Leadership: The Business 
Imperative at the London Business School's Global Leadership Summit on 7 and 8 
July 2003. I attended this programme as a delegate. The chair of the panel praised 
Mackay's achievements when introducing the members to the delegates present. 
Mackay replied in words to the effect that his achievements were due to "those who 
had preceded him and those with whom he worked at SABMiller". 
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Both the media and analysts report favourably on the performance of SABMiller. 
Analysts at Morgan Stanley, cited by Wiggins (2005), state that the acquisition of 
South America's second largest brewer leaves SABMiller as the clear leader in terms 
of geographic platform. The Lex Column, in the Financial Times of 21 May 2004, 
categorised the SABMiller results for the year ended 2004 as "all the more 
intoxicating" and as finally proving that its recent success owes more to operating 
improvements than to the strength of the South African rand. 
9.4.5 Irmovation 
All of the SABMiller worldwide operations are expected to continuously review the 
changing desires of their consumers, with a view to developing new products in 
accordance with a group-wide approach. Many group corporations in addition have 
formal systems to encourage creativity and continuous improvement among their 
employees. The aforementioned are reported on yearly in SABMiller corporate 
accountability reports (SABMiller Corporate Accountability Report 2003). "Hi-tech" 
is listed as one of SABMiller's core competencies. It is widely regarded as the lowest 
cost manufacturer and distributor of quality beer globally. Its brewery in Port 
Elizabeth, South Africa, is said to be the most technologically advanced in the world 
(K. Russell, personal interview, Port Elizabeth, 22 May 2003). Further details on 
low-cost brewing are found in Section 6.3. 
9.4.6 Mergers and Partnerships 
Success Rate 
SABMiller does not have a prescriptive list for the performance of acquisitions. On 
the whole, none of the acquisitions since 1999 have failed or are expected to fail to 
reach their target of achieving the weighted average cost of capital (W ACC) by the 
fourth year. The Central America results are below initial expectations, but there is 
still some time in hand. There are certain small breweries in China that, on an 
individual basis, may not be clearing W ACC but these are small in relation to the total 
operation in that country (A. Miller Salzman, personal interview, 7 November 2002). 
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"All the deals show that our acquisition process works. The process is very 
systematic and not ego-driven. We like to have management control and turned our 
back on deals when we were not sure what control we would have" (A. Miller 
Salzman, personal interview, 3 February 2003). 
The media and share analysts have recently commented favourably on SABMiller' s 
acquisition ability. These include Geard of Investec (2005) and the Lex Column 
(2005). Theobald (2005) comments that SABMiller alone of the South Afiican 
companies that expanded internationally has managed, as far as can be seen, to 
consistently make value-enhancing acquisitions. 
Criteria 
Miller Salzman (telephone interview, 10 September 2003) lists the following; 
1. Acquisitions are expected to reach an ROI that is at least equal to SABMiIler' s 
W ACC within four years. 
2. SABMiIler uses sophisticated models utilising discounted cash flow (DCF), net 
present value (NPV) 
3. SABMiIler pays particular attention to whether or not they understand the 
markets that they will be entering or could learn to do so very quickly. 
4. What core competencies can they bring to bear to improve the performances of 
acquired companies? (This part of the acquisition programme is highly 
confidential.) 
5. SABMiIler strongly prefers to have control. They will deviate from this only 
when required by law, as in China, or where joint ventures or strategic alliances 
are in their interest. 
As an example of adherence to criterion I above, SABMiIler withdrew its bid for 
China' s Harbin Brewery group when Anheuser-Busch made a higher offer. Parker, 
SABMiller's Africa and Asia CEO, said that he regretted not gaining control of 
Harbin but added that there is a price and a ceiling to every deal , and not every deal 
has to be done (Baglole and Bilefsky 2005). 
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Leibowitz (personal interview, London, 13 July 2004) reports that W ACC targets 
have been refined for acquisitions. These are now two to four years for mature 
markets and four to six years for emerging markets. 
Reasons for Success 
SABMiller was able to supply management and technical staff to most of the 
acquisitions they made. At the same time, the South Afiican operation went through 
great technological change and productivity improvements so that staff who would 
have faced early retirement were given new opportunities to work globally. 
Productivity in the South Afiican operation improved by approximately a factor of 
five over a period of 15 years (E.A.G. Mackay, 27 November 2001). 
B. Smith (telephone interview, II February 2004), who transferred to Miller Brewing 
from Johannesburg, believes that one of the reasons for SABMiller's international 
success is that the company has a decentralized operating philosophy in South Afiica. 
Managers therefore receive general manager experience at a relatively younger age 
and learn to operate across different departments and functions . This he states leads 
to greater flexibility and adaptability together with a greater knowledge of operations. 
In contrast he says, many of the acquisitions made by SABMiller showed tendencies 
of a silo mentality, where employees were not that conversant with the operations 
outside of their own. The article by Sams and Szabat (2005) referred to in Subsection 
9.4.1 support Smith's view on adaptability and flexibility. 
Setbacks and Challenges 
SAB acquired a brewery in the middle of Budapest, Hungary, in 1993. The 
competing breweries were all located outside the city and SAB experienced problems 
in attracting staff, having materials delivered and so forth. SAB also put up prices 
(because of low margins) expecting that the competitors would follow, as they 
certainly would have done in South Afiica. The competitors in Hungary did not (A. 
Miller Salzman, personal interview, 7 November 2002). 
\ 
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Significant progress has been made with the Miller Brewing Company. I, 
nevertheless, regard this as a challenge because of the strength of Anheuser-Busch, 
with a market share of 49.6 percent (Eisenberg et al. 2004) and a return on equity 
exceeding 60 percent in the last four years (Nugent 2005). John (2005) commends 
SABMiller for the "splendid job" it did in capitalizing on the low carbohydrate fad to 
restore Miller Lite. It cautions that the company will require discipline to sustain its 
success as Anheuser-Bush applies pricing pressure. A turnaround should be judged to 
be successful only after several years of acceptable financial results (Harvey 2001). 
SABMiller have "system templates" in the areas of production, technical, finance, 
marketing and a very strong HR function. These are installed in all acquisitions as 
soon as possible, although there is managerial discretion relating to operations in each 
country and market. The systems ensure a "common language" (A. Miller Salzman, 
10 September 2003). Post acquisition integration teams are used (SABMiller Interim 
Report, 30 September 2002). 
Cole (2005) states that SABMiller has a thoroughly impressive record for making 
acquisitions work. 
9.4.7 Post-Merger Integration 
F. Miller of SAB Miller Africa and Asia (Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire, 22 
August 2003) provides the following five key points. 
I. Structures 
2. People 
3. Processes 
4. Competencies 
5. Measures 
The five most important issues according to SABMiller Europe's Mogilinicki 
(Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire, 8 August 2003) are: 
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I. Address cultural issues. 
2. Change management, getting people to adopt new ways. 
3. Communication, especially regarding 1 and 2. 
4. Integrate specific areas. 
5. Training and development. 
The company has demonstrated its ability to provide management to new acquisitions 
as seen in Subsection 9.4.3 above. The vast majority of the 55 breweries around the 
world are headed by management teams from South Africa (Subsection 5.4.4). This 
ability was manifested notably in the transfer of Adami from the position of CEO of 
SABreweries in South Africa to President and CEO of Miller Brewing in the USA. 
Regarding Drucker's fifth rule, I consider that it would be highly impractical to 
attempt to promote several managers out of each new acquisition to other parts of the 
world within a world of acquisition. Referring to the interview with Mackay (27 
November 2001) he did state that it was the intention of the company to create an 
"international beer culture". 
9.5 Sappi 
9.5.1 Strategy 
Sappi ' s strategies are clearly spelt out in the different annual reports (2000 to 2005) 
and the website. Acquisitions have been a crucial part of their success. Hope 
(personal interviews, Johannesburg, 25 October 2002 and 13 June 2003) refers to 
"clear goals" and "clear ideas" several times and emphasises that the company knows 
as much about its customers as anyone in the industry. 
Strategy 
Sappi provided detailed financial objectives and financial performance indicators in 
its 2000 to 2005 annual reports. As mentioned in Subsection 5.5.10, however, it did 
not provide TSR (total shareholder return) information about itself and its 
competitors. I am somewhat constrained by this in searching for Collins's (2001) 
economic driver or denominator. The impression I have of the industry is that 
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demand and supply are especially important and that, consequently, pricing and the 
utilization of capacity are major drivers of profitability. The timing of major capital 
expenditures would also be an important determinant. Operating profit to sales and 
return on net assets (RONA) are among the few most important measurements used 
by the company. 
Sappi is the largest manufacturer of fine coated paper in the world, but I have not seen 
any benchmark on how they perform relative to competitors in this field. There is a 
history of technological innovation and it is conceivable that they led the world in this 
area for a period of time, or may do so today. 
The Financial Times/PricewaterhouseCoopers World's Most Respected Companies 
Survey 2004 ranked Sappi seventh in the consumer goods category. The companies 
ahead of it were Sony Ericsson, 3M, Nike, Kimberly-Clark, L' Oreal and Hitachi. It is 
difficult to envisage Sappi achieving such a significant international standing without 
having a successful strategy. McNulty (2003) however questions aspects of Sappi ' s 
strategies. Sappi ' s primary focus is on pulp and fine paper, while Anglo American ' s 
Mondi, a competitor, has built integrated European operations in areas such as 
corrugated packaging and uncoated wood-free paper. The latter markets have been 
more stable during the recent downturn and McNulty notes that recent financials show 
Mondi delivering larger and more stable profits than Sappi. 
Both Investec Securities (Rasmussen 2005) and Andisa Securities (2005c) comment 
that the Sappi turnaround is coming later than they had anticipated earlier. 
Rasmussen, of Investec, stresses that he has little doubt that it will be forthcoming but 
Benway (2005), of Standard and Poor' s, believes that it will be years before Sappi 
again reaches its peak in profits. 
9.5.2 Execution 
The various statements by van As (personal communication, 19 November 2003) and 
Hope (25 October 2002, 13 June 2003), the presentation by Job (personal interview, 
Johannesburg, 31 October 2002) at the Wits Business School, together with the 
annual reports (2000 to 2004) all indicate a high level of ability to execute. 
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9.5.3 Culture, Structure and Talent 
Van As (19 November 2003) cites corporate culture as one of the reasons for Sappi's 
success. He explains that the company kept the same value system while 
transforming from a South African company into a global leader. "The most 
important one was demanding performance, setting targets, agreeing what they were 
and developing a culture that it was unfriendly not to meet targets". 
The Sappi organisational structure is shown in Figure 5.4 in Subsection 5.5.8. The 
flatness of the structure was reinforced by Hope (13 June 2003). 
The Sappi philosophy with regard to mergers and acquisitions is to choose the best 
people out of Sappi and the business being acquired or merged (R. Hope, 13 June 
2003). This should improve the calibre and depth of talent available to the company. 
Sappi, more than the other companies in this study seems to have recruited top-level 
managers from the outside. These are limited, but notably include the new CEO, 
Jonathan Leslie; David Wilson, who joined Sappi from Barloworld in 1999; and 
Ronee Hagen, who came from Alcoa in 2004 (see Subsection 5.5.4). Hope (13 June 
2003) stresses that Sappi has not inundated foreign acquisitions with people from their 
South African operations. 
9.5.4 Leadership 
Eugene van As led Sappi from 1978 to 2003. During this quarter of a century, the 
company went from a South African operation with some exports to the global leader 
in fine coated paper with manufacturing operations on three continents. Hope (13 
June 2003) stresses the positive effects of leadership and clear goals on Sappi's 
performance. I consider that Sappi took the greatest risk of the three South African-
originated corporations in going global when the debt equity ratios mentioned in 
Chapter 5 are taken into account. 
The only time that [ met Eugene van As personally was the interview on 22 July, 
2004. I have no contact with Sappi other than as a shareholder and via this thesis. I 
therefore do not have the amount of information or personal knowledge of the 
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leadership of van As that I have about the other three CEOs in the research. In my 
interview I found van As to be courteous, helpful and forthright. He answered 
Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO comprehensively and promptly. 
I sent van As a fax in 200 I, asking if Sappi would assist with the strategy paper 
referred to in Section 9.3, Barloworld. The following voicemail message was on my 
cell phone the following morning. "Good morning, Professor. This is Sigrid Oliver, 
Mr. van As's secretary. We have received your request. Mr. van As is away overseas 
at present. The person to contact on this matter is Robert Hope, Director of Strategic 
Development. He is also away at the moment. I have however spoken to Karen 
Cousins, Robert Hope 's secretary. We will be delighted to help you and Karen will 
set this up with Mr. Hope when he returns. Karen's telephone number is [ -]. She 
will telephone you if she has not heard from you in two days" . 
After this service I sent an email to van As thanking Sappi and complimenting the two 
secretaries on their initiative and responsiveness. He replied - a letter of several 
paragraphs - thanking me and stating that while he knew how good they were, it was 
nevertheless always pleasant to receive commendations from outsiders. 
9.5.5 Innovation 
A culture of innovation in products, technology and businesses is one of Sap pi's core 
competencies. The 2002 annual report mentions that the companies that make up 
Sappi are the originators of almost all the fine-paper product innovations in the 20th 
century. There are three research and development (R&D) centres, situated in 
Europe, North America and South Africa. The history section on Sappi (Subsection 
5.5.3) records how Sappi applied for the world patents on the Sapoxyl bleaching 
process in 1968 and commercialised these in 1970. The culture and ability to 
innovate therefore goes back several decades. 
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9.5.6 Mergers and Partnerships 
Success Rate 
Sappi's major acquisitions are shown in Table 9.1 and Figure 9.2. 
Table 9.1 Sappi Acquisition Performance 1994 to 2001 
RONA RONA RONA 
Acguisition Then 2000 2001 
SD Warren (1994) 4.0% 14.6% 2.1 % 
US [ndust!J'. Average 10.3% 11.8% 1.7% 
Hannover Papier (1992) 3.5% } 19.5% 13.4% 
KNP Levkam (1997) 2.4% 
European Industry Average 1992: 5.3% 13.8% 11.0% 
1997: 8.8% 
Source: Adapted from Job (31 October 2002:5). 
Table 9.1 summarises the return on net assets before and after acquisition, comparing 
these to industry averages. Results improve significantly with the exception of the 
2001 downturn in the US when Sappi was still above the industry average. 
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Figure 9.2 Sappi Acquisition History 
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Criteria 
Acquisitions must beat the weighted average cost of capital (W ACC) or generate a 
return at least equal to that of Sappi buying back its own shares. The company prefers 
100 percent acquisitions (J. Job, presentation, Wits Business School, 31 October 
2002). 
Reasons for Success 
One of the reasons for Sappi's success in acquiring businesses is the price paid. Table 
9.2 compares the purchase prices with book values and replacement costs. Eight out 
of nine acquisitions were below 67 percent of replacement cost. Figure 9.2 which 
follows immediately after Table 9.2 suggests that Sappi was able to purchase the 
acquisitions at attractive prices because of the timing of the transactions relative to the 
pulp cycle at the time. 
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Table 9.2 Sappi Purchase Price versus Book Value and Replacement Cost. 
Aggregate Cost Purchase %of 
Date Acquirer / Target Value Per Ton Price / Book Replacement 
{$MM) {$) Value Cost 
Oct-94 SaEEi / SD Warren 1,485 877 l.4x 52% 
Jul-97 Consolidated / ReEaE 742 1,194 n/a 64% 
SeE-97 SaEEi / KNP Leykam 1,400 762 1.6x 51% 
SeE-97 CVC / Condat 318 978 n/a 65% 
Oc-97 UPM-Kymmene / Blandin 650 1,208 n/a 65% 
AEr-99 Modo FP / SCA FP 1,122 1,198 l.4x 67% 
Feb-DO Stora-Enso / Consolidated 4,952 2,015 2.2x 113% 
Ma~-OO IP / ChamEion 9,785 1,010 1.6x 63% 
Ma):'-OO Metsa Serta / Modo PaEer 2,133 776 1.9x 46% 
Ma~-02 SaEEi / Potlatch 480 980' 0.7x 60% 
140,000 Brainerd tons nil 
Source: Job (2002:19) . 
Figure 9.3 Pulp Cycle 
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Van As (Questions for a CEO, 19 November 2003) stresses that it is very important to 
not pay too much for the future potential of the business, to evaluate the future 
potential and make the potential come true, and to insist that an owned business has to 
perform to standards, financial , governance and so forth. 
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He adds that Sappi has managed to keep the vast majority of the original employees 
and senior managers. Rather than changing everybody in an acquisition, they tried to 
"infect" the acquired management team with Sappi's philosophy and enthusiasm. 
Setbacks and Challenges 
The first acquisition in the UK was not successful in the early years. It was 
subsequently turned around. Eugene van As, although the CEO of the entire group, 
moved to the US to manage Warren for a year when that company was acquired in 
1994 (J. Job, 31 October 2002). 
9.5.7 Post-Merger Integration 
Hope, (Initial Questionnaire, 13 June 2003) provides the following post-merger 
integration criteria for Sappi's integration practices. 
1. Clear idea of integration strategy even before closing the deal. 
2. Act fast. 
3. Strong financial systems, so that they know what is going on from the 
beginning. They also insist on Sappi brands being used and a variation of 
their HR policies. 
4. Strong measuring systems to ensure that synergies are realised. 
5. Choose the best people, out of both the acquired business and Sappi. 
I fmd it more difficult to assess Sappi ' s capacity to provide management to new 
acquisitions than I do for the other companies. Its policy is to have companies headed 
by foreign nationals where possible and, as seen above, choose the best people out of 
both the acquired businesses and Sappi. The company normally has about 40 
employees on assignment between countries of which more than 20 would be from 
South Africa (R. Hope, personal communication, I December 2005). As seen in 
Section 9.5.6, van As, while CEO of the entire Sappi Group, acted as the CEO of 
Warren for 12 months when it was acquired. An example of employees from 
acquisitions being promoted is Executive Director Wolfgang pfarl, CEO of Sappi 
Fine Papers Europe, following the acquisition of KNP Leykam in Austria. There are 
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several other examples of people from other countries being promoted within Sappi 
(direct observation, Sappi annual reports) . 
9.6 Wolverine Worldwide 
9.6.1 Strategy 
Wolverine's mission, vision and strategies are set out very clearly in their annual 
reports and on their website . O'Donovan and Gulis become even more specific in an 
address to analysts in October 2003. They set out a target of growing sales by at least 
twice the rate of the footwear industry in general. This is to be done both 
geographically and by strengthening the brand portfolio. Sales growth should include 
at least 50 percent from new business, whether geographic or brand. The strategies 
include "ensure the entire organisation is following a market driven and consumer 
focused operating philosophy" (Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2002:5). 
The performance drivers or performance indicators mentioned most often in the 
annual reports of the last few years are revenue growth (target mid- to upper single 
digit), growth in earnings per share (1.5 times the rate of revenue growth) and TSR 
compared with competition and other stock market indices (Wolverine World Wide 
Annual Reports 2000 to 2004). 
Wolverine is widely regarded as the best global marketer of non-athletic branded 
footwear. From 1990 to 2005 the company's brand portfolio grew from three to eight 
and revenue grew threefold (Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2005). It is also 
conceivable that the company is the best at customer service in the industry. It aims 
to provide "best in class" service to its customers (Wolverine World Wide Annual 
Report 2002). See also Sections 6.5 and 9.6.2. 
Driscoll , of Standard & Poor's (2005), comments favourably on Wolverine World 
Wide' s diversified business model, brand portfolio and strong balance sheet and 
Sirios, of Value Line (2005), commends the company for its re-engineering of the 
product line and brand image of the newly acquired Sebago business. Shanley and 
Svezia, of the Susquehanna Financial Group (2005), highlight the company's ability 
455 
to achieve consistent sales growth, the continued strong consumer demand for the 
company's footwear styles, the strong potential for new products and proven fmancial 
management. The Prudential Equity Group's Dunn and Wong (2005), state that 
Wolverine World Wide has a proven track record of strategic development and brand 
management. 
9.6.2 Execution 
The Wolverine strategies incorporate the target of providing "best in class" service to 
customers. Some orders are shipped on the day that they are placed although the 
sourcing/operations/warehousing process is very complex (Wolverine World Wide 
2003). This indicates a very strong ability to execute. Tegner (telephone interview, 2 
February 2004) states that the ability to execute is not listed as a core competency for 
the simple reason that "getting things done is regarded as a matter of course at 
Wolverine World Wide". As seen in Section 6.2 above, Wolverine aims at sales 
growth of twice the industry average, and has achieved this over the past five years. 
I cannot recall any company anywhere demonstrating the standard of response to 
emails, telephone calls and requests that I experienced with Wolverine. The other 
companies in the study were very helpful and responsive, but Wolverine was truly 
outstanding in these aspects. Emails sent to employees at Wolverine were always 
answered within 24 hours. If the recipient was not available, the automatic reply 
stated when that person was expected to return and reply to my email. There were also 
suggestions as to who else to contact if I did not want to wait for the person addressed 
to return. I had similar experiences with Wolverine' s voicemail services. I enquired 
whether this responsiveness was because of a written company policy. I was told that 
there was not a written policy, but that this was the way that employees behaved 
generally, and that people sometimes checked their incoming emails several times a 
day. 
9.6.3 Culture, Structure, and Talent 
O'Donovan (personal interview, 6 October 2003) believes that the Wolverine 
organisational structure would not work if it were not for the culture of constant 
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informal and formal communication and cooperation at all levels in the company. 
The Wolverine World Wide human resource philosophies include the statement 
"create a culture which respects and encourages objectivity, composure, fairness , 
performance, accountability and a sense of humour" (1. Tegner, personal 
communication, 13 October 2003). 
The Wolverine structure of Operating Board and Office of the Chairman is outlined 
in Section 5.6.8. This leads to a "flat" platform for decisions and action (1. Tegner, 
telephone interview, 2 February 2004). 
Recruiting and retaining a highly motivated management team and the best people is 
both a Wolverine strategy and core competency. The financial performances and 
continuity of management show that there is depth of talent in the company (see 
Subsections 5.6.4 and 5.6.7). 
9.6.4 Leadership 
Geoff Bloom, who was recruited as President and COO in 1987, is widely credited 
for the Wolverine World Wide turnaround in the 1990s and with establishing the 
company as a top- class marketing organisation by the standards of any industry (T. 
Moore, personal interview, Grand Rapids, 4 June 2002). Bloom, who had been the 
Company' s Chief Operating Officer from 1987 to 1993, Chief Executive Officer from 
1993 to 2000 and Chairman of the Board from 1996 to April 2005, retired from the 
Wolverine Board in July 2005. "Under Geoffs leadership, the Company's portfolio 
grew from three to eight major consumer brands; revenue grew threefold and 
shareholders benefited from a tenfold increase in the Company' s market value" 
(Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2005:5). Tim O' Donovan, who succeeded 
Bloom in 2000, has led the company through the six subsequent years with earnings 
per share compounding at a rate in excess of 15 percent (see Subsection 5.6.9). 
I first met Tim O' Donovan in 1977 when representing the South African Breweries 
footwear interests at a Wolverine World Wide global conference of Hush Puppy 
licencees. We were colleagues when I worked at Wolverine from 1979 to 1986. I 
have seen him at annual general meetings of the company or while visiting the 
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company over the years. I do know other employees at Wolverine besides my 
daughter and I associate with a number of Wolverine retirees and ex-employees. 
In 2004, Sandy Habel, a marketing specialist, (several rungs below O'Donovan) was 
discussing a transfer of a friend of hers at Wolverine with a fellow employee. She 
complained that her friend had been badly treated after 27 years service and 
(sarcastically) suggested that she herself should probably apply for a 30-year contract 
if that is how people with 27 years service were treated. She then noticed that 
O'Donovan, coming around a comer behind her, had heard most of what she had said. 
He came to her office several hours later, knocked on the door and communicated 
more or less as follows: "I have checked out the case of [- ] that you referred to this 
morning. She was transferred at the same salary with a similar level of responsibility. 
I hope that this puts your mind at ease" (Habel, personal interview, 10 January 2005). 
9.6.5 Innovation 
Wolverine's core competencies include innovative product design and development 
(see Subsection 5.6.8). In my judgement (coming from 12 years ' management 
experience in the shoe industry) the company is certainly one of the mainstream non-
athletic shoe leaders in product innovation, if not the leader in commercialising and 
marketing the innovative product features. The company has been an industry leader 
in information technology and systems for over two decades. Its central services 
operating model, using a SAP global operating system, gains a cost advantage and 
enables their brands to focus on brand building activities. This operating model also 
allows the company to add new businesses by leveraging the infrastructure 
(Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2004) . Dunn and Wong (2005) mention this 
strength in a recent report. 
9.6.6 Mergers and Partnerships 
Success Rate 
Table 9.3 lists the acquisitions and license agreements concluded by Wolverine from 
1958 to 2005. The major movements began with the Caterpillar licence in 1994. 
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Table 9.3 Wolverine World Wide: Acquisitions and Licence Agreements 
Brand Year Price 
Hush Puppies 1958 NA 
Bates 1969 NA 
Caterpillar 1994 NA 
HyTest 1996 $24.5 
Merrell 1997 $16.3 
Harley Davidson License 1998 NA 
Stanley License 2000 NA 
Track 'N Trail trade name 2001 NA 
Sebago 2003 $16.9 
Patagonia license 2005 NA 
Source: Wolverine World Wide, cited by Dunn, L. and Wong, H. (2005). 
Merrell sales grew sevenfold in the five .years following the acquisition of that 
company by Wolverine World Wide. CAT and Harley Davidson were established as 
leading US and global footwear brands in their respective niches within a few years 
of launch. Wolverine World Wide acquired the European CAT and Merrell 
distributors in 2002 a move that is already beginning to pay dividends (T. 
O'Donovan, personal interview, Rockford, 6 October 2003). 
Criteria 
Wolverine World Wide uses computer modelling to evaluate projected returns on 
proposed acquisitions. It also pays particular attention to due diligence studies. The 
basic and most important consideration is, however, whether application of the 
Wolverine World Wide business model to the proposed acquisition would enable it to 
grow faster than the established Wolverine World Wide core businesses (T. 
O'Donovan, 6 October 2003). 
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Reasons for Success 
O'Donovan (6 October 2003) states that Wolverine World Wide has been very 
selective in making acquisitions and provided confidential examples of opportunities 
that they had not pursued. He considers Wolverine' s post-merger integration to be of 
a very high standard and points to "great people" and 120 years of experience. The 
company has been able to provide management for new acquisitions when required. 
Its "bolt-on" model has enabled it to absorb acquisitions rapidly and successfully. 
Setbacks and Challenges 
In 2000, there was a $14 million realignment charge to exit the Wolverine World 
Wide Russian wholesale footwear operation. This operation was established in 
September 1998 (Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2002). 
9.6.7 Post-Merger Intewation 
J. Tegner, (abridged Initial Questionnaire, 10 October 2003) puts forward the 
following five points: 
1. Establish a common vision. 
2. Integrate people to establish a sense of trust and team spirit. 
3. Set realistic performance goals, short- and long-term, for the new team. 
4. Provide sufficient resources to execute plans. 
5. Engage in exhaustive planning prior to closing of acquisitions. 
Financial system templates are not listed above but the way in which acquisitions are 
integrated into Wolverine ensures that they are used (J. Tegner, 2 February 2004). 
Until recently the company did not purchase businesses headquartered outside the 
United Sates, although it acquired companies in the USA that sometimes had global 
interests and markets. Tegner, (personal interview, 20 January 2006) notes that fewer 
than a dozen Wolverine employees have been sent from the United States to posts 
abroad. The company's operating, marketing and other infrastructures have enabled 
it to integrate acquisitions without having to appoint additional key people to 
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management positions (T. O'Donovan, 6 October 2003). There are instances of 
persons from acquired companies being promoted within Wolverine. For example a 
manager acquired with Merrell has been promoted within Wolverine and now leads a 
division that is several times the size it was when acquired (direct observation). 
9.7 Summary and Conclusion 
A review of the corporations' strategies against the Nohria et al. (2003) primary 
practices -strategy, execution, culture and structure - indicates that all four of the 
corporations excel in the four primary practices. This judgement is based on available 
information, the financial results and performances compared with peer groups as 
discussed in Chapter 5. Certain analysts and media reports have questioned aspects of 
Sappi's strategy. I have taken the view that Sappi's strategy is being assessed over a 
decade and not only in the present industry downturn, although there are indications 
that its position relative to competition has declined over the past two years. 
The information also strongly suggests that all four corporations succeed or excel in 
more than two of the four secondary management practices - talent, leadership, 
innovate, mergers and partnerships - although the levels of excellence may vary 
among the practices for each corporation. I believe that, based on the available 
evidence, all four corporations excel in the leadership and merger and partnership 
practices. In addition they all have strong records in innovation, and Barloworld, 
SABMiller and Wolverine World Wide rate highly in talent when the top 
management teams are considered. Three of Sappi's top six managers were recruited 
from outside the company which is contrary to the Nohria et al. (2003) talent 
requirements. 
Each of the companies emphasises two (although Barloworld focuses on one of the 
two metrics it uses) or three performance indicators. Collins (2001) advises 
companies to look for one denominator to measure what drives company economic 
engines. Sappi, unlike the other three companies, has not compared financial 
performance with peer groups or stock exchange indices in its annual reports. 
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Collins's (2001) other mantra of "What you can be the best in the world at" goes 
beyond the concept of a core competence. SABMiller and Wolverine World Wide, 
on the information available, are conceivably the best in the world in their industries 
at two, or perhaps even more, core competencies. Barloworld is as good as anyone at 
managing Caterpillar and Hyster franchises and certainly among the few best in the 
world, if not the best, at managing in difficult environments. Sappi has been a 
technological leader, and still may be. 
The leadership practices of all four companies appear to meet the Nohria et al. (2003) 
requirements while Barloworld, SABMiller and Sappi do the same for the Lessons 
from Late Movers requirements of Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) for companies from 
developing or fringe countries. All four CEOs meet Collins' s (2001) criteria of being 
ambitious but, first and foremost, ambitious for their companies. I am convinced 
that three of them (based on my direct observations, experiences and anecdotal 
evidence) show the traits of a paradoxical mix of personal humility and professional 
will. I do not have sufficient experience or information to draw conclusions about the 
fourth (Sappi) without being subjectively judgemental. My limited experience and 
anecdotes, however, point in the same direction. 
The corporations studied in this thesis have generally been very successful in their 
acquisitions. Each of the South African corporations experienced some early 
setbacks or challenges, but they were able to resolve the situations and learned from 
the experiences. Each of the four corporations has a system of identifying, screening 
and closing deals, as advocated by Nohria et al. (2003). There are safeguards to avoid 
overpaying, as recommended by Eccles et al. (1998) and Hit! et al. (2003). Due 
diligence is a crucial criterion for all ofthe corporations. 
The four corporations demonstrate a high degree of success in post-merger acquisition 
integration and consequently in dealing with the complication and challenges set out 
by Lajoux (1998). The corporations certainly match and sometimes even exceed the 
post-merger and acquisition requirements set out in Section 3.10 of the Literature 
Review. The installation of financial and other systems and the integration of people 
are two common factors in the post-acquisition programmes of all four companies. 
Barloworld and Sappi add somewhat iconoclastic philosophies, Barloworld 
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sometimes allowing people in acquired corporations up to two years in which to 
decide whether they wish to stay with the corporation as this is in keeping with their 
core competency of long-term relationships (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). Sappi 
chooses the best people from its own and the acquired corporation when making key 
appointments (R. Hope, 13 June 2003). 
SABMiller (especially) and Barloworld have proven ability to provide management to 
new acquisitions. Wolverine has generally dealt with this issue by absorbing 
acquisitions into the company's infrastructure, and also providing management. 
Sappi's ability to provide management to new acquisitions is more difficult to assess. 
Barloworld, Sappi and Wolverine all have examples of executives from acquired 
companies being promoted within the larger group. 
The conclusion is that the international success of the three South African 
corporations is largely due to the formulation and execution of successful strategies. 
The reasons for success within the strategies varies by corporation, but there are some 
broad similarities. Leadership, innovation, acquisitions and post-merger and 
acquisition integration are critical components of the success of all three of them. 
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10. GOING GLOBAL 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter rounds off the thesis pnor to the final chapter, "Conclusions and 
Recommendations". It addresses two main themes: firstly, why the South African 
companies achieved global success, and secondly, utilising the lessons they (and 
Wolverine World Wide) learned and their advice for others contemplating or 
undertaking international expansion. 
The chapter also deals with three issues which influence both the development and the 
transfer of core competencies. These are how favourable different countries are to the 
companies' operations, the learning processes employed by the companies and the 
ways in which they prepare their people to deal with the challenges of international 
business, such as culture, language, geography, time and distance. 
The four companies are covered in separate sections which follow a similar fonnat. 
The sections begin with a discussion of the company's home base and the defining 
event or times in its transfonnation from a local company to a global one, followed by 
its experiences in different countries. The next subsection examines the reasons for 
the company's success, followed by a subsection covering the learning processes and 
methods that it uses, together with what it does to prepare managers, technical experts 
and others for the challenges of international business. A further subsection 'reviews 
the experience and views of other companies and executives on going global. The 
final subsection sets out the global lessons that the company learned and its resulting 
advice to others. 
The questions that were originally asked of the respondents follow. 
Defining Events or Times. "What do you consider to be the defining events or times 
in your transfonnation to a global company?" (question 8, Questionnaire 3, Questions 
for a CEO, 2 November 2003). 
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Home Base. "What are the advantages and disadvantages of South Africa as a home 
base?" (question 1, Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, 2 November 2003). 
Country Experiences. "In which countries have the cultures been most favourable to 
your operations? In which countries have the cultural differences been the least 
favourable to your operations?" (questions 3 and 4, Section 2, Questionnaire 1, Initial 
Questionnaire, 28 January 2003). 
Reasons for Success. "What do you consider to be the three most important reasons 
for your success?" (question 9, Section 1, Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire, 28 
January 2003). "What are the key reasons for your success in expanding globally?" 
(question 7, Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, 2 November 2003). 
Learning and Preparation. "Please explain in a few sentences or key words how you 
initiate and maintain a learning process. What specifically do you do to assist 
management and key employees in dealing with the challenges of geography, 
language and culture?" (question 8, Section 3, Questionnaire 1, Initial Questionnaire, 
31 January 2003). "What is the first thing (or things) that you expect an executive to 
do when transferred to a foreign country?" (Questionnaire 5: Foreign Appointments, 
25 August 2005). 
Lessons Learned - Advice. "What lessons did you learn in going global? What 
advice would you give to a company about to embark on global expansion?" 
(questions 3 and 4, Questionnaire 4, Practical Problems, Solutions and Lessons 
Learned, 24 May 2004). 
Questionnaire 6, South Aji-ica 
A. The size of the South African economy, together with the country' s diversity, 
resulted in relatively small and differentiated market segments in many 
industries. This situation provided managers with opportunities to learn how 
to be profitable in small markets by targeting segments, controlling costs and 
managing with limited resources. 
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B. The 1980s and 1990s were periods of great change and uncertainty in South 
Africa, challenging companies and their management to learn how to cope in 
such conditions. The divestments by foreign companies, the acquisitions by 
domestic companies and the subsequent restructuring taught many managers 
about disposals, mergers and acquisitions and consequences of investing 
outside their core competencies. 
Experiences and Views o/Other Corporations 
This section was included to examme different expenences and perspectives on 
international business. The interviews and discussions generally centred on the 
demands of international business. Two of the persons involved submitted written 
reports specifically relating to core competencies. 
10.2 Barloworld 
I consider the subsection on lessons leamed particularly cogent with regard to this 
company. 
10.2.1 Home Base 
AJ. Phillips (Questions for a CEO, 11 November 2003) states that the advantages of 
having South Africa as the home base include cost, access to skills, climate, and 
"being a big fish in a small pond". The big-fish advantage assists in recruiting 
management and staff and access to banks and finance, for example. He sees the 
disadvantages as being distance from major markets and world centres, the reputation· 
of South Africa, the high cost of capital, the country risk and emerging market status. 
P.M. Drewell (personal interview, Sandton, 9 May 2003), in evaluating South Africa 
as a country of origin sees a strength in South Africans' not having any kind of global 
arrogance. He thinks that the South African culture is very open to learning from 
whoever has and wherever there is a good idea. 
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The advantages above, plus "muscle and size" and the comparative cost In the 
European Union or the United States of America are some of the reasons for the 
company retaining South Africa for its primary listing and head office. 
10.2.2 Defining Event or Times 
Phillips (11 November 2003) considers the defining event in the transformation of 
Barloworld from a regional to a global company to be the acquisition of Finanzauto, 
the Caterpillar distributor in Spain and Portugal. He bases this judgement on 
Finanzauto' s size and complexity. 
10.2.3 Country Experiences 
Barloworld considers the national cultures most favourable to its operations to be the 
United Kingdom, South Africa, the USA and now Australia. The countries regarded 
as being the least favourable are Spain and parts of Africa, particularly Angola until 
very recently. The Barloworld operation in Spain performs very well and is possibly 
the most important business in the group. There are, nevertheless, challenges in 
operating in that country because of the culture and language (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 
2003). 
The clash of culture and language caused problems for Phillips at Finanzauto in 
Spain. His visit to the banks to give an honest assessment of the situation and a 
request for assistance during a difficult period only resulted in Fananzauto's overdraft 
facilities being withdrawn immediately. Barlows/Barloworld is a household name in 
South Africa and a visit to the local bank to ensure overdraft facilities would be a 
formality provided the management could justify them. In Spain banking is a social 
activity involving contacts, networks and established relationships (Miller, personal 
communication,S May 2003). 
10.2.4 Reasons for Success 
Phillips (11 November 2003) believes that Barloworld has been successful because of 
"lots of practice". The company prefers to start small, work incrementally and choose 
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businesses where it has core competences. He rates culture as a major reason for its 
success (personal interview, Sandton, 22 October 2002). 
Drewell (9 May 2003) sees the three most important reasons for the company's 
success as culture, a deep sense of what they think they can do and the ability to 
evolve. He amplifies the evolution aspect by quoting the Shell Company scenario 
(that played in the seventies) which concluded that the average life of a company was 
35 years. He notes that Barloworld is not trying to manage or balance a portfolio but 
is searching for a series of businesses which they understand and which will deliver 
satisfactory returns. Drewell credits the introduction of value based management 
(VBM) in 1999 and the policy of buying only businesses that Barloworld can manage 
for the improved results since 2000. 
10.2.5 Learning and Preparation 
Barloworld addresses learning through a series of executive planning programmes, 
cross-functional task teams and shared interest groups and there are intranets across 
the entire group. Knowledge is therefore continually being transferred among people. 
The company believes that the length of service of most of their management and key 
people make an important difference to learning. Learning is also seen as a cultural 
philosophy: the idea that one does not have or know all the answers and therefore 
needs to be constantly searching (P.M. Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
The company has not moved many people around the world outside of Africa and has 
no formal process for preparing employees for foreign assignments. "Anyone who 
needs to go and learn something can and does." While employees do go to two or 
three-week language courses, the practical application begins only when the 
employees and their families arrive in the foreign country and begin interacting with 
people there. The company operates mainly in English-speaking countries 
(P.M.Drewell, 9 May 2003). 
Phillips (Questionnaire 5, Foreign Appointments, 30 August 2005) believes that one 
of the first things an executive appointed to a foreign post should do, if the language 
there is not English, is take a full immersion course to produce almost instant fluency 
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as well as a cultural programme to incorporate politics, sport, food and drink, 
recreation, manners and culture. This should enable the "new" recruit to fit into his or 
her new role without becoming an object of curiosity or ridicule. 
10.2.6 Lessons Learned - Advice 
Phillips (presentation to Gordon Institute of Business Science, Sandton, 30 July 2003) 
recommends the following 10 guidelines or lessons learned in going global: 
I. The timing is always wrong. 
2. Time zones are tougher than product diversity. 
3. If you are going to buy it, make sure you know who will run it. 
4. Local really is lekker (meaning great). 
5. Size absolutely does count. 
6. Culture and values are the most important (but toughest) things to understand and 
manage. 
7. Really understand your strengths and weaknesses. 
8. Due diligence does not mean counting the stock. 
9. Pride comes before the fall. 
10. If you don' t like travel, don't try it. 
P.M. Drewell (personal communication, 9 June 2004) believes that effectively 
inculcating values and competencies in global subsidiaries depends on the placement 
of people in key leadership positions. He counsels companies about to embark on 
international expansion to make sure that they have the people to move into the new 
businesses, to avoid arrogance, and to allow double the time initially anticipated to 
implement plans. 
10.3 SABMiller 
The term "home base" has a somewhat different connotation for SABMiller than it 
does for Barloworld and Sappi. SABMiller has its primary listing and head office in 
the UK. In its case "home base" refers to "origin", although there are views that the 
South African operation, SAB, is the "heart and soul" of the SABMiller group. "SAB 
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has given us the profits, the cash, the credentials, expertise and the people to be able 
to build the SABMiller empire", states J.M. Kahn, the current chairman of the 
company (cited by Gilmour 2005: 11). 
10.3.1 Home Base 
E.A.G. Mackay (personal interview, London, 27 November 2001) sees more 
advantages than disadvantages in South Africa as the company's original home base. 
A major advantage, he contends, is that the people tend to be more flexible and, 
perhaps, humble. They are experienced in managing with limited resources and are 
prepared to go into less clear and comfortable situations than, say, competitors from 
first world industrial nations. In a 2003 interview (A. Crotty 2003) he mentions that 
SABMiller management adapted more easily because South Africans are inclined 
towards cultural flexibility. That flexibility, Mackay adds, has been influenced by the 
fact that the country is not a great power that has been involved in cultural domination 
and, furthermore, has a troubled history. 
A disadvantage is the effects of the isolation experienced by South Africa in the 
1980s. The beer business of South African Breweries, however, ensured that it was 
continually up-to-date with technology and other aspects ofthe world industry. 
A. Miller Salzman (personal interview, London, 3 February 2003) remarks that there 
was a fairly negative reception of South African companies in general in the late 
nineties and the early 21 st century. When South African Breweries listed on the 
London Stock Exchange in 1999, "certain fund managers were disgruntled that a 
South African company with no business in the UK was listed on their exchange . .. 
when South African Breweries acquired Miller Brewing, the perception was put 
across by a number of Miller employees that they were worried about racism, which 
they associated with South Africa' s history. The world hasn't fully realized that 
we've moved on". 
The Economist (2004c) in its article 'The battle of big beer" used the phrase "Mr. 
Mckay had better watch out". The article refers to the competition between 
470 
Anheuser-Bush and SABMiller to acquire the Harbin Brewery III China and the 
former company' s export of its Budwiser Brand to South Africa. 
The moving of the company's primary listing and head office to London was to 
improve access to finance and reduce the cost of capital (R. van der Schyff, personal 
interview, Sandton, 10 June 2003). One of the disadvantages of locating a 
multinational head office and domicile in South Africa is therefore the cost of capital 
and relative amount of finance available. See also AJ. Phillips (11 November 2003) 
in Section 10.2. 
10.3.2 Defining Event or Times 
There are a number of milestones in SABMiller's transformation from a regional 
brewer to a world leader. These include the listing on the London Stock Exchange, 
the investment in Hungary, the purchase of Pilsner Urquell, and the acquisition of 
Miller Brewing in the USA. While it may not be the one defining moment or event, 
the milestone which attracted the widest attention and changed perceptions of The 
South African Breweries was the acquisition of Miller. Grant and Wiggins (2005) 
argue that SABMiller's turnaround of Miller is the most significant test of a foreign 
company's ability to change the fortunes of an American corporate icon since 
Daimler-Benz's ultimately successful transformation of Chrysler. 
10.3.3 Country Experiences 
As of 30 November 2004, SABMiller had 168 employees on transfer or secondment 
from South Africa to 24 countries (M. Van Eyk, personal communication, 21 October 
2005). These numbers indicate an in-depth perspective of experiences in the different 
countries. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia regard the countries with cultures most favourable to their 
operations as Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. The countries where culture and other factors make it most difficult to 
operate are Angola and China. The operation in Angola is a Coca-Cola plant, not a 
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brewery; the language IS Portuguese (F. Miller, Initial Questionnaire, 29 August 
2003). 
SABMilier Europe views the operations in the countries in their region as more or less 
equally favourable, depending on the length of time they have owned those 
businesses. Poland is probably the best-integrated into the SABMiller systems and 
management practices. It was one of the first breweries to be acquired. No country 
stands out as unfavourable (N. Mogilnicki, telephone interview, 21 August 2003). 
Mogilnicki comments that its operations in all the countries that were communist have 
had problems in the sense of people not understanding businesses practices. A 
previous managing director of SABMiller in Poland narrates how difficult it was to 
get some otherwise intelligent people to understand the concept of a market. These 
people simply did not have the concept in their background or traditions (B. Smith, 
personal interview, Sandton, circa 2000). Changes in management and skilled 
employees were sometimes made because of this obstacle. 
Mackay (Crotty 2003) states that some of the difficulties encountered in Russia, 
China and India are not found in South Africa. Russia is in a roller-coaster process of 
change which creates difficulties in doing business. They have, however, high levels 
of education, and the country is trying to move quickly towards a market-type 
economy. India, he says, is quite a difficult environment. The government is 
extraordinarily complex and, unfortunately, open to special pleading. In China, he 
continues, the government, unlike that of Russia, has tried to keep a lid on political 
freedom and the educational levels are not as high. This obviously creates issues 
when doing business there. 
While the development challenges in Africa are daunting, the business opportunities 
remain real and considerable. "If there were more of Africa, we would be investing in 
it" (E.A.G. Mackay 2005). 
10.3.4 Reasons for Success 
A. Miller Salzman (personal interview, London, 3 February 2003 and telephone 
interview, 10 September 2003) states that the main reasons for the SABMiller success 
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are management, corporate culture and hwnan resources, and the ability to export the 
core competencies of producing and marketing low-cost quality beer around the 
world. She also stresses the ability of the company to make and integrate 
acquisitions. 
The company's international expansIOn was partly an exerCIse In exporting core 
competencies and expertise from a South African base. Mackay (27 November 200 I) 
sees this as very much an issue of providing and improving human capital. He points 
out that the company has a strong tradition of developing human capital, dating, in 
part, to the sixties when a "strong" personnel director (Dr. Simon Biesheuvel) was 
appointed to the board. N. Adami, then the Chief Executive of SAB in South Africa, 
in a public speech in 2002, continues this theme, stating that the HR function has 
enjoyed prominence in SAB since the early 1960s, long before it became fashionable 
(Adami 2002). Hofrneyr (personal interview, Knysna, 9 March 2002) adds that South 
African Breweries has an excellent track record of developing and choosing 
management and possesses technical expertise which is recognised worldwide. 
The SAB "South African Beer Culture" provided a "wonderful springboard", but the 
company carmot really expect to spread it worldwide. SABMiller is placing great 
emphasis on developing an international culture and as part of this several new board 
members bring diversity and international experience to the company (E.A.G. 
Mackay, 27 November 2001). 
Kalm (Gilmore 2005:12) explains that SAB always set itself world- class standards. 
He postulates that South Africa's unique culture has provided the finest training 
ground in the world. 
At SAB, we lived through high inflation rates, had to contend with 
a hostile government that imposed high excise duties, we endured 
political violence, labour unrest, and political sanctions. It's not 
stretching the point to say that we lived through the 10 biblical 
plagues in SA during the apartheid era. We became self-sufficient 
by employing high standards. 
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Both Kahn (Gilmour 2005) and Smith (telephone interview, II February 2004) note 
the company's predilection to measure and benchmark as a reason for its success. 
Kahn says that if something caMot be measured, then it is not worth doing. 
G. Leibowitz (personal interview, London, 13 July 2004) sees the distinguishing 
characteristics of the South African managers in SABMiller as analytical rigour and 
self-confidence. He adds that they are very adaptable, with the self-confidence born 
out of adversity experienced in South Africa. He has come across perceptions, both 
inside SABMiller and outside, that SABMiller' s South African management is from a 
very cohesive culture, which can at times have a risk (perceived or otherwise) of 
being exclusive. Smith (II February 2004), who has held top positions with the 
company in South Africa, Poland and the USA and is now CEO of the South 
American operations, observes that the South African managers, in general, and SA 
Breweries in particular, receive true general management responsibilities earlier than 
their European and US counterparts. South African companies are generally more 
centralised, there is less of a "silo" mentality and managers are consequently more 
capable of managing across different divisions and functions with an appreciation of 
how the whole organisation works. 
10.3.5 Learning and Preparation 
In learning and training, SABMiller Africa and Asia follows the Brinkerhoff Six-
Stage Model, with appropriate modifications (F. Miller, 29 August 2003). 
SABMiller Europe runs programmes and training courses in leadership, marketing 
and other areas, aimed at creating capabilities (N. Mogilnicki, 21 August 2003). 
SABMiller Africa and Asia utilises "look-see-decide" visits (where employees visit a 
country before deciding to accept appointments), spouse interviews and language and 
culture orientation classes (F. Miller, 29 August 2003). SABMiIler Europe has no 
specific programme to deal with international challenges. The business in each 
country is relatively autonomous, and there is a fairly widespread reluctance of people 
to move outside their country. Proficiency in English is a prerequisite for a senior 
management position in SABMiller Europe. There is also an unwritten code that 
anyone who wants to transfer between countries to senior positions must first work in 
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the head office (or hub) and/or prove themselves with other countries before being 
transferred (N. Mogilnicki, 21 August 2003). 
F. Miller (personal interview, Johannesburg, 20 October 2004) believes that the first 
priority of an executive transferred to a foreign post should be to "build relationships" 
with fellow employees and community members. To illustrate the principle of 
acceptance by a community, she gives the example of the South African Breweries 
chief executive in the region who was given the keys to the city of Plzen in the Czech 
Republic. 
Mogilnicki (Questionnaire 5, Foreign Appointments, 26 August 2005) sees the initial 
priorities as depending on individual circumstances, at least to a limited extent. He 
agrees that time should be devoted to building relationships and understanding 
culture. He ventures that most of the people seconded from South Africa spend time 
understanding a business in greater detail. "They listen a lot and say very little - after 
a while quick visible changes follow". 
10.3.6 Lessons Learned - Advice 
One of the biggest lessons that SABMiller learned in going global was the importance 
of studying each country and how to approach it. It is crucial in the beer business to 
get the right mix of local and international brands in each country and to push 
merchandising no matter how many distribution layers there may be (G. Leibowitz, 
13 July 2004). A. Parker gave an example of this in his address to the Wits Business 
School on 20 October 2004. The company initially "assumed" that Uganda, Tanzania 
and Kenya made up the "East African Market". The company learned through 
experience that the markets in the three countries were very different and needed to 
be managed as such. Makanjee (2006) advises people to maintain humility and to 
remember that there is not only one way of doing things. 
Leibowitz (13 July 2004) advises companies about to embark on global expansion to 
be very aware of the changing role of group functions and the need for some type of 
matrix management. He once again stresses the need to research each country. 
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Miller of SABMiller Africa and Asia (telephone interview, 17 June 2004) sets out the 
lessons that she and her colleagues learned in going global as the competence and 
adaptability of South African Breweries expatriates, the adaptability and 
transferability of the company's systems, the importance of regional brands and, 
extremely important, the need to respect other cultures. She advises companies 
beginning global expansion to understand the context of what they are getting into, to 
do adequate due diligence on new countries and acquisitions (especially human 
resources and legal aspects), to avoid arrogance and to choose the correct local 
partners. 
As seen in Subsection 5.4.3 , SABMiller " learned the hard way" in Hungary, 
according to A. Miller Salzman (3 February 2003). It acted like the market leader (as 
it clearly was in South Africa) and was initially surprised when competitors did not 
follow its actions. 
Mogilnicki of SABMilier Europe (personal communication, 9 June 2004) sets out the 
lessons learned in going global in Europe as realising that each market is different and 
requires different approaches. He recommends that companies play to their strengths 
and not fight wars that cannot be won - for exarnple - to attack suitable market niches 
and develop them instead of fighting large barriers to entry or competing with 
powerful entrenched interests. He counsels companies to be very sensitive to local 
cultures and allow for local differences, but to nevertheless enforce the standards that 
are important. He stresses the need to listen, understand, listen, check the 
understanding and then listen again. Mogilnicki emphasises the need for adequate 
due diligence before acquiring businesses and entering new markets. 
10.4 Sappi 
Sappi, like Barloworld, has its primary listing and head office in South Africa. 
10.4.1 Home Base 
The first advantage of having South Africa as a home base is that it is home for the 
company, the people and the skill base that built the group, according to E. van As 
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(Questions for a CEO, 17 November 2003). In the same time zone as Europe the 
country is well placed from that perspective for both East and West. It is not in the 
centre of any of the major markets, and therefore local management is perhaps more 
focused on what people do elsewhere than on what they do at home. Van As muses 
that as they know they are not the centre of the world, they are perhaps less arrogant 
and more inclined to learn. 
Van As (Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, 17 November 2003) states that 
Johannesburg is a dynamic city with a very diverse cultural base, which he believes is 
one reasons that South Africans are good integrators of businesses. They are 
accustomed to working with many cultures in their home market. 
Sappi, as a global company that can attract the best talent in the local market, is an 
attractive employer in South Africa. Sappi, based, let us say, in New York, would be 
an unattractive employer relative to the major multinational corporations, banking and 
the information technology industry. The disadvantage is that South Africa is 10 
hours or more away from each of Sappi ' s major markets. It is, therefore, easy to get 
out of touch if the company does not consciously work at maintaining 
communications. A great deal of travel is required. In some cases it is more difficult 
to recruit to South Africa than it would be to the United States or Europe (van As, 17 
November 2003). 
Hope (personal interviews, Johannesburg, 25 October 2002, 13 June 2003) does not 
remark on any meaningful anti South Africanism in Sappi' s international expansion. 
He does, however, mention incidents where management of acquired companies in 
the United States were "incredulous" that experts were coming from South Africa to 
help install programs and systems better than the ones in the acquired companies. 
The decision to retain South Africa as a primary listing and head office location was 
because it was home, and therefore moving elsewhere made sense only if it created 
shareholder value. Sappi did a great deal of research on different locations and 
concluded that the same business located in another part of the world was unlikely to 
be more valuable and that they would have had to disrupt the entire management to 
accomplish that end. Van As (17 November 2003) points out that historical evidence 
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on the companies that did migrate from Johannesburg to London indicates that the 
move created no shareholder value by itself. The recent SABMiller results seem to 
indicate otherwise in the case of at least that company. 
10.4.2 Defining Event or Times 
The defining event or time in the transformation of Sappi from a local to a global 
company was the realisation that if it were to be efficient and grow it had to grow 
internationally. Allied to this realisation are the major steps to the building of Sappi 
as it is now: the first offshore acquisition in the United Kingdom, acquiring the 
leading coated paper manufacturer in Germany, acquiring the top coated paper 
manufacturer in the United States, and then buying the number one manufacturer in 
Europe (E. van As, 17 November 2003). 
10.4.3 Country Experiences 
Sappi's first acquisition outside South Africa was a company in the United Kingdom. 
Of any investment Sappi has made in any country, this proved to be the most difficult 
to integrate. Sappi management discovered that the actions that they thought had 
been agreed to had not been implemented. The next acquisition, which was in 
Germany, was a very different experience. Strategic and operational issues were 
debated vigorously by the South African and German management, but once agreed 
upon, implementation was excellent. Today, Sappi states that it probably finds it as 
easy to establish a "common language" with its German interests as it does with those 
in the USA (R. Hope, 13 June 2003). 
10.4.4 Reasons for Success 
Hope (25 October 2002) puts forward leadership, clear goals and strong systems as 
three reasons for the international success of the company. 
E. van As (17 November 2003) regards corporate culture as one of the reasons for 
Sappi's success and points out that it has been difficult to retain the same culture as 
the company has expanded. He doubts whether it has kept exactly the same culture 
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but does think that it has kept the same value system. The head office people travel to 
the subsidiaries rather than forcing the subsidiary people to come to the head office. 
This has helped Sappi inculcate its culture and values into the companies it acquired. 
Maintaining a firm home base with intrinsic focus on teamwork, integrity and 
financial performance helped imbue its values into the acquired companies. 
Van As (personal interview, Johannesburg, South Africa, 22 July 2004) regards South 
African managers as good integrators who work easily with many other cultures. 
They are generally very adaptable and sometimes naively confident - or sometimes 
the opposite, too easily impressed. 
10.4.5 Learning and Preparation 
One of the most important leaming processes Sappi employs is that of rotating people 
between countries and businesses. Sappi is rotating people between countries and 
businesses at an increasing rate. The average assignment is from two to three years. 
Technology clusters, which are cross-country and cross-functional, playa vital role in 
learning and transfer. Sappi prefers managers to work on more than one continent 
before they are promoted into semor executive roles. The company will assist with 
transfers where promising people are given roles on another continent. This enables 
the managers to learn about different cultures and also to absorb and share best 
practices and core competencies (R. Hope, Questionnaire 5, Foreign Assignments, 13 
June 2003). 
R. Hope (11 October 2005) expects a person transferring to a foreign post to learn the 
business, develop and agree on objectives and settle the family (which may include 
cultural and language familiarisation) as his or her priorities. 
10.4.6 Lessons Learned - Advice 
An essential lesson learned by Sappi in going global is that culture is crucial. Van As 
(22 July 2004) stresses that one should listen to what people mean and not to what 
they say. Another lesson is that a company should understand what it has to offer and 
focus on its core competencies and capabilities. One must understand the markets 
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that one is gomg into; as van As emphasises, "Do your homework, do your 
homework, do your homework". 
Van As (22 July 2004) advocates using both local and global expertise when 
appropriate. An example of this would be using a lawyer with an advantage in his or 
her territory because of local knowledge but supplementing with a lawyer who has a 
global or head office view. Van As advises companies to go out and investigate 
opportunities; available good deals may not always be readily apparent. A lesson he 
learned is that one should have the courage to walk away from questionable deals. 
Van As 's advice to a company about to embark on global expansion is to be cautious 
about everything. "Ask why you are doing it. What can you add to the businesses 
you acquire? What core competencies do you have which could be transferred? Can 
you adapt to the culture?" (E. van As, 22 July 2004). 
10.5 · Wolverine World Wide 
Wolverine is not accorded the same in-depth treatment as its South African 
counterparts in this chapter, because one of the themes addressed is why the South 
African companies have enjoyed global success. The focus in this section is therefore 
on lessons learned in going global and advice for others. 
10.5.1 Home Base 
The Wolverine headquarters are located in an area close to where the original 
business was founded in Michigan 122 years ago. As the history shows (Subsection 
5.6.3), the location was initially advantageous for raw material supplies, labour and 
distribution. The company now has an infrastructure of skilled people in the area. If 
it was starting afresh from day one, with no employees and history to be taken into 
account, a better location, at least for the warehouse and distribution facilities, might 
be the West Coast of the United States, because of the scale of imports from China. 
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10.5.2 Country Experiences 
Wolverine World Wide regards the countries where culture is most favourable to their 
operations as Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan. The last-mentioned may seem 
surprising. Its licensee in Japan, appointed in 1961, was one of the first Hush Puppies 
licensees (J.C. Tegner, abridged Initial Questionnaire, 9 October 2003). Russia is 
regarded as the country where they have experienced the most problems. The closure 
of Wolverine's Russian wholesale footwear business involved a $14 million write-off 
(T. O'Donovan, personal interview, Rockford, 6 October 2003). 
Tegner (personal interview, Rockford, 20 January 2006) explains the reasons for the 
success in Japan and the failure in Russia. The licensee appointed in Japan proved to 
be an excellent partner with great affinity for the Hush Puppies brand, and managed 
his business well with controlled distribution. The Japanese licensee often sends three 
delegates to annual Hush Puppies conferences. Most other licensees send one 
representative. Hush Puppies tried to enter the Russian market in the middle-to-late 
1990s, which Tegner feels was premature, as the commercial infrastructure was 
underdeveloped and unstable, and there was an absence of the rule of law as 
envisaged by Wolverine. 
10.5.3 Reasons for Success 
The perspective here is also different from that of the South African companies, 
because Wolverine has been in international business since 1956. A key reason for 
success over the entire period must be the ability to adapt and innovate. The company 
also developed an international mind-set long before most of its conventional 
footwear competitors. The reasons for success over the past decade are found in the 
annual reports. These encompass strategy, implementation, brand building, innovative 
product design, operational systems, service and retention, and motivation of key 
employees (Wolverine World Wide annual reports 1995 - 2004). 
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10.5.4 Learning and Preparation 
Wolverine World Wide's executive tearn has a process of sharing and exchanging 
information that runs up and down the organisation. The Office of the Chairman 
(OTC) consists of the five senior executives. The Operating Board (OB) consists of 
the general managers of each of the brands, the heads of the primary business 
functions and the senior executives. The OTC and OB meet regularly to share and 
exchange business information, strategic direction, plans and results. Members are 
tasked with sharing the critical elements of the meetings with the people who report 
directly to them and soliciting responses to current and previous topics. This creates a 
cycle of information flow, exchange and improvement (J.C. Tegner, 9 October 2003). 
Management and skills training programmes at Wolverine World Wide cover the US, 
Canadian, Caribbean and European operations. Seven hundred associates in western 
Michigan alone participated in this programme in 2003 (Wolverine World Wide 
Annual Report 2003). 
Wolverine assists its managers in dealing with international management challenges 
through a combination of technology and local market experts. It utilises its 
employees in factories in foreign lands and licensees in each country to provide the 
necessary local knowledge and expertise. The company's technology provides 
management and key employees with global access to Wolverine' s extensive online, 
enterprise-wide software solution resources. Real-time data and reports regarding 
critical products under development, through design to delivery, financial information 
and general business data are available across the value chain. The use of local 
expertise and information technology on a global basis therefore assists Wolverine 
employees in dealing with the challenges of geography, language and culture (J .C. 
Tegner, 9 October 2003). 
10.5.5 Lessons Learned - Advice 
One of the key lessons that Wolverine learned is the necessity to continually monitor 
a changing global environment so that strategies can be altered and core competencies 
adjusted or changed. The United States imported less than 50 percent of its footwear 
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requirements in 1980. It imports more than 95 percent at present. The core 
competencies related to manufacturing in the USA were rendered obsolete over this 
period, and it became essential to replace them with core competencies such as global 
sourcing and logistics (L.H. Whipple personal communication and interview, 8 June 
2004, telephone interview 31 October 2005). 
Another major lesson learned is that markets and cultures in other countries should be 
studied thoroughly before entering the markets. Countries and cultures - even 
adjacent ones or those with a similar language - can differ markedly. The importance 
of selecting the appropriate acquisition, partner, distributor or licensee is a further 
lesson that has been learned in nearly 50 years of international business. While this is 
obviously also important in domestic markets, it is even more so in global markets 
because of the added complexity of international business such as distance, culture 
and language (L.H. Whipple, 8 June 2004, 31 October 2005). 
The advice to companies contemplating international expansion is to study markets 
and cultures in advance, and to be very clear about their own ideas, products and 
goals. There should be clear and strong "product positioning" definitions that can be 
explained to and understood by foreign partners, licensees and distributors. 
Companies should continually scan the global environments in which they operate 
(L.H. Whipple, 8 June 2004, 31 October 2005). 
10.6 Experiences and Views of Other Corporations 
Boart Longyear is a company headquartered in South Africa with operations in 32 
countries. Its primary business is drilling: exploration drilling for precious and base 
metals, water, energy (except oil and gas), environmental monitoring and 
remediation, and percussive drilling for underground hard rock mining. It is both the 
leading global drilling contractor and the leading supplier of drilling products in the 
exploration segment. BL was selected as South Africa's most global company in a 
contest sponsored by Barloworld and Deloitte and Touche in 1997 (M. Moore 2004). 
M. Moore, the Chairman of Boart Longyear in 2004, supports the attractions of 
Johannesburg as an international head quarter as set out by Phillips and van As in 
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Questions for a CEO (J 1 and 17 November 2003, respectively). He adds the points 
that it has an outstanding climate, excellent sports and leisure facilities and activities, 
English as the commercial language and world-class education in the private system. 
The only significant negative that he sees in attracting expatriates to South Africa is 
personal safety. He also notes the advantage of being in the same time zone as 
continental Europe. 
According to Moore (28 July 2004), apartheid was a significant negative for a South 
African company trying to grow abroad prior to 1994, but this was somewhat 
lessened by respect for South Africa's mining expertise. Following the change of 
power in 1994, being a South African company became an advantage, as South 
Africa is regarded as neutral in various world tension spots. He observes that there are 
many examples of people educated in South Africa who have been very successful in 
business and other fields in other countries. BL has sent many South African 
employees to its operations elsewhere, and they have risen up the ranks on merit and 
performed well. 
One of the practical problems he mentions is that of fostering integrity in new 
operations in certain countries. This can encompass bureaucratic problems such as 
import duties, customs, licences, taxes and so forth. "How one responds sets the tone 
to all your employees and the world at large. Open the door an inch and the floodgate 
opens. The problem is that this can delay your start-up until the various officials 
realise that nothing is forthcoming. So, one needs time and patience with new 
operations. The integrity message has to be continually enforced by leadership and 
example". Only one other respondent raised this type of problem during all my 
discussions with the companies. This was in a casual conversation rather than an 
interview so I prefer to keep the respondent anonymous. The company concerned 
encountered requests for bribes on a few occasions in countries that it was investing 
in for the first time. The situation was handled effectively by informing the people 
concerned that it was totally forbidden by policy. After this, there were no further 
approaches. 
Another problem encountered frequently by BL was the NIH (not-invented-here) 
factor. An example of this is the cost of imported tools compared to locally made 
484 
tools which could be a factor of two to five or more, mainly because of import duties. 
Here the experience was that demonstrating on a small scale that the productivity 
gains far offset the higher cost is an effective method of dealing with the NIH factor. 
Moore notes that forcing change has often met with resistance, even sabotage. After 
successful trials, the changes were normally adopted with enthusiasm. 
Moore (2004) states that companies should make it known in the organisation that the 
people who are prepared to go and make it happen are well rewarded. He believes 
that it should be a requirement for promotion to top jobs that people take on 
assignments away from home. Moore advocates the top management team visiting 
new operations frequently, to send the signal to employees (both in the home country 
and the new country), customers, partners and government that the foreign operation 
is important to the company and to demonstrate support for the expatriate managers. 
He continues that it is important to spend time with a new management team in a new 
country so that the values that are behind the core competencies of a company can be 
transferred. He suggests frequent visits for reinforcement. 
Gear Holdings is a multinational corporation III the marketing, manufacturing, 
sourcing, design and licensing of home furnishings. The US is their largest market 
but there are other important operations in Japan, China, Indonesia and several 
countries in South America. B.M. Musham (personal interview, New York, 14 
December 2003), the CEO, insists that there is very little success in international 
business without frequent travel. She considers culture to be crucial and stresses the 
importance of personal relationships. When you telephone and ask for something, 
she says, your chances of success are a great deal better if you speak to somebody 
with whom you have a relationship, and not a stranger. 
K-Swiss is a multinational corporation in the general sport and tennis footwear and 
apparel business. P. Reddy, an ex-president of K-Swiss International (personal 
interview, Grand Rapids, 27 February 2004), considers culture and personal 
relationships very important in international business. He believes that the fact that 
he was born and grew up in India was an advantage in his business dealing in Japan, 
China and other parts of South east Asia. 
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Inview Television is the largest independent manager of television channels in 
Europe. Chairman G. Pitman (personal interview, London, 14 July 2004), advises 
people in international business not to be seduced by their own success and ideas. He 
recommends that people do not talk around issues but be clear and concise. He points 
out that many people do not listen or do not want to listen. It is important to try and 
understand the people one is dealing with, he sums up: "Keep your feet 0n the ground 
and listen carefully." 
10.7 South Africa 
Three of the five respondents to Questionnaire 6 agreed with the statement that the 
South African economy and diversity provided managers with opportunities to learn 
how to be profitable in small markets by targeting segments, controlling costs and 
managing with limited resources. One respondent was neutral while the fifth 
disagreed. The "agree" is supported by the views of Mackay (22 November 2001) and 
Kahn (Gilmour 2005) on the use of limited resources. Drewell (26 June 2005) points 
out that South Africa has been a great training ground for international managers. He 
provides examples of the Daimler Chrysler and BMW CEOs of their South African 
subsidiaries going on to greater roles. 
Only one of five participants agreed that the uncertain 1980s and 1990s taught many 
South African managers about disposals, mergers and acquisitions, restructuring and 
the consequences of investing outside their core competencies. Two were neutral and 
two disagreed. Mogilnicki (26 October 2005) notes that people in South Africa are 
taught independence and responsibility for their own destinies at an early age and 
sees this as strong driver of managerial behaviour. Kahn (Gilmour 2005) has 
somewhat different views from the majority of the participants on this issue, listing 
the obstacles and challenges facing SAB as the finest training ground in the world 
(see Subsection 10.3.4). 
Figure 10.1 summarises the advice to others undertaking or contemplating international 
expansIOn. 
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Figure 10.1 Summary: Advice on Going Global 
BARLOWORLD 
Phillips (2003) . Ten Guidelines. Know who will manage proposed acquisitions. Culture and 
values are most important but most difficult to manage. "Pride comes before the fall" . Due 
diligence. 
Drewell (2004) . Key manager appointments crucial. Avoid arrogance. Double anticipated 
time. 
SABMILLER 
Leibowitz (2004). Research each country. Awareness of changing role of group functions. 
Miller (2004). Understand context. Due diligence (especially HR, legal). Avoid arrogance. 
Choose correct local partners. Respect other cultures . 
Mogilnicki (2004). Play to strength. Be sensitive to cultures. Listen . Due diligence. 
Makanjee (2006) . Humility. "Not only one way". 
Parker (2004). Every market is different. 
SAPPI 
Van As (2003, 2004). "Perhaps South Africans less arrogant more inclined to learn". Use both 
global and local expertise. Investigate opportunities. Exercise caution. Core competencies 
contribution? Culture. 
Hope (2003) . Ensure future leadership. Understand cost situation. 
WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE 
Whipple (2004, 2005). Study markets and cultures. Select appropriate partner. Clear market 
positioning. Scan global environment. 
Tegner (2004). Select right partners. Product and brands crucial. 
Management Values. "The sun doesn 't shine on the same dog all the time". 
OTHER 
Moore (2004). Frequent visits. Demonstrate, rather than instruct. 
Musham (2003) . Frequent travel. Culture, personal relationships. 
Reddy (2004). Culture, personal relationships. 
Pitman (2004) . Don 't be seduced by own ideas and success. (Non-arrogance?) 
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10.8 Summary and Conclusion 
The advantages of South Africa as a home base include cost, access to skills and 
services and climate. The infrastructures and people that enabled the South African 
companies to go global are located in the country. Two of the companies consider 
that, being global companies, they can attract the best talent in the local market, 
whereas they might be unattractive employers relative to other multinationals, banks 
or information technology companies if they were located in one of the other major 
centres of the world, such as New York or London. 
All three of the South African companies, while uSing different phraseology, 
comment on the adaptability, humility or non-arrogance, openness to learning and 
ability of South African managers to interact with other cultures. 
The disadvantages of South Africa as a home base are the cost of capital, the limited 
availability of finance for global expansion, the distance from major centres and 
markets, and (sometimes) the reputation of the country as an emerging market. It is 
difficult to recruit from overseas at times. 
The English-speaking countries, including those located in Africa, are regarded by the 
South African companies, as having cultures generally more favourable to operations 
and, hence, transfer of core competencies. On the other hand, Sappi experienced 
problems with its first overseas acquisitions in the United Kingdom, while Wolverine 
considers Japan to be a favourable market. Russia, China and India are cited as being 
relatively difficult in terms of culture and other considerations. 
All three of the South African companies specify a major acquisition(s) as the 
defining point in their transformation from local to global players. While each 
company puts forward different reasons for its success, there is consensus on certain 
factors. These factors are management or leadership, and culture and human 
resources. While most companies might say something like this, in these three 
particular cases the companies have become world leaders in their fields and 
outperform their peers. This, together with the service records of their managements, 
gives credibility to their views. 
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The corporations use vanous and favoured learning methods. Barloworld uses 
executive planning programmes, cross-functional task teams, shared interest groups 
and intranets across the entire group. SABMiller Africa and Asia follows the 
Brinkerhoff Six-Stage model. SABMiller Europe runs programmes and training 
courses in leadership, marketing and other practices. Sappi rotates people between 
countries and businesses. It makes extensive use of technology clusters, which are 
both cross-country and cross-functional. Wolverine World Wide relies on its 
interlocking Office of the Chainnan and Operating Board. 
Barloworld has no fonnal processes for preparing employees for the challenges of 
international business, but this does get accomplished individually and infonnally. 
SABMiller Africa and Asia utilises "look - see - decide" visits, spouse interviews and 
language and culture orientation classes. SABMiller Europe has no specific 
programme at present. Sappi rotates staff and Wolverine World Wide uses a 
combination of technology and local market experts. 
Barloworld lists 10 lessons leamed or guidelines on "going global". Especially 
pertinent are that if a company is going to buy something it should know who will 
manage it; that cultures and values are the most important (but toughest) things to 
understand and manage; and that one must really understand strengths and 
weaknesses and the importance of thorough due diligences. Wolverine stresses the 
importance of monitoring global trends. All four of the companies stress the 
importance of studying countries before investing or entering, and they agree on the 
critical importance of culture. 
Executives from other corporations explained the importance of travel, culture and 
personal relationships. 
The advice given by the companies relates to the lessons they have learned. The need 
for humility, or the absence of arrogance, re constant themes among the executives 
contributing to this chapter. Each market is different, and homework should be 
thoroughly done before entering markets or acquiring business. Companies should be 
very aware of the cruciality of cultural differences and respect other cultures. Further 
advice is to focus on what core competencies they can bring to bear on their 
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expansion and acquisitions and be prepared to travel. Key management should be 
available for transfer to new acquisitions, and companies should know in advance 
who will manage prospective acquisitions. 
The companies view their South African managers as adaptable, willing to learn and 
able to relate to many different cultures. Confidence, stemming from adversity, is 
mentioned more than once. 
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11. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1 Introduction 
This final chapter begins with Section 11.2, Review of Findings which covers Chapter 
2 and Chapters 5 through Chapter 10. Concentration centres on Chapter 7, "The 
Development of Core Competencies" and Chapter 8, "The Transfer of Core 
Competencies". These two chapters include responses to Questionnaire I, Initial 
Questionnaire, and Questionnaire 2, The Development of Core Competencies. 
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with five rather than four companies because two SABMiller 
regions are covered as separate entities. Chapter 9 reviews the companies' strategies 
while Chapter 10, Going Global, is largely based on interviews and answers to 
Questionnaire I, Initial Questionnaire, Questionnaire 3, Questions for a CEO, 
Questionnaire 4, Practical Problems, Solutions and Lessons Learned, Questionnaire 5, 
Foreign Appointments and Questionnaire 6, South Africa. 
Section 11.3 next interprets these findings in terms of the literature review and 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3 and is followed by Section 11.4 which discusses 
the limitations of the research. The conclusions of the thesis, based on the earlier 
findings, are set out in Section 11.5. The next section, 11 .6, explores the significance 
of the findings and conclusions. These are followed by Section 11.7 on 
recommendations. Finally in Section 11.8, findings and conclusions are reviewed 
against the four aims and objectives of the thesis. 
11.2 Review of Findings 
In reviewing the findings we should keep in mind that, while four corporations were 
studied, two regions of SABMiller were regarded as individual entities for certain 
research purposes. 
The salient points from Chapter 2, "South Africa", include the country's mineral 
wealth and other natural assets such as wildlife, game reserves and scenic landscapes, 
its location and its diversity (for example, II official languages). The election of a 
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democratic government in 1994, and its subsequent following of a free market 
philosophy, opened up the way for South African companies to expand globally. 
The Institute of Management Development (lMD) rankings - placing South Africa 
ninth out of 30 of countries with populations of over 30 million in the management 
function, ahead of France, Italy, Japan and the UK - are significant. The lMD rates 
cheap electricity and investment in telecommunications as the leading strengths of the 
country with human development, "brain drain", personal security and unemployment 
as the major weaknesses. 
Chapter 5, "Corporations Studied", demonstrated that the corporations in the study 
were very long established and had performed better than their peer groups in recent 
history, with a caveat relating to Sappi's performance relative to its competitors in 
2004 and 2005. Each of them showed exceptional stability and continuity of 
management, especially with regard to the CEO' s length of service. 
Core competencies are covered in Chapter 6. Wolverine World Wide was the only 
one of the four corporations that had a formal list of core competencies at the time 
that this research began. It was, therefore, necessary to discuss and agree on what the 
core competencies for the companies were. Barloworld's core competencies 
comprise the ability to create and sustain long-term relationships, the ability to evolve 
and innovate, a unique organisational ability to function together and implement 
coherent strategies across the organisation, culture (value based management 
philosophies), corporate governance, merger and acquisition capabilities (including 
post-merger and acquisition integration) and a unique ability to operate under difficult 
circumstances. 
SABMilier has human capital/corporate culture, low-cost quality production (the 
world leader), "high-tech", marketing, merger and acquisition capabilities (including 
post-merger and acquisition integration), purchasing and distribution as its core 
competencies. Sappi lists marketing, operations, a culture of innovation in products, 
technology and business practices, merger and acquisition capability (including post-
merger and acquisition integration), systems and human capital. Wolverine World 
Wide's core competencies are the ability to build brands, the ability to operate 
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globally, the ability to recruit and maintain a highly motivated management team, 
merger and acquisition/start-up capabilities (including post-merger and acquisition 
integration), innovative product design and development, and marketing. 
Chapter 6 also examines core competencies in terms of location in the value chain. 
The companies' rankings of the core competencies in terms of importance for being 
competitive, and rankings of performance in the core competencies, do not always 
coincide. Each of the five regards a core competency relating to human resource 
management as being in the three most important of their competencies, four of them 
ranking this in their top three core competencies in terms of performance. 
Chapter 7, "Development of Core Competencies", examines the South Africa-specific 
determinants of competitiveness for each company. These differed by company, but 
all were affected by cheap electricity, investment in telecommunications, road, rail 
and air infrastructure and government and chance. All three corporations responded 
to human capital weakness in the country through a variety of methods. 
All companies use some process (including value chains) to choose their core 
competencies. The core competencies evolve, or emerge, in response to competition, 
or are chosen because they are necessary to meet competition, or are essential to the 
achievement of objectives. 
The results of Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core Competencies, 
show that the effectiveness of methods used to develop core competencies varies by 
company and by location in the value chain. 
The most effective method for development on a seven-point scale is corporate 
culture that demands high performance standards with 21 total points and a mean of 
4.2. Second is allocation of key managers and experts to areas (16 and 3.2); third 
exposure to a demanding technical. operating or economic environment (15 and 3.0); 
fourth forma tion of special multi-disciplinary teams (13 and 2.6); and fifth 
investment in skills and knowledge and development of human resources (12 and 2.4). 
Other methods covered in the literature, such as regular competence review meetings, 
internal analysis, value chains and path dependency, received relatively few 
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mentions. All companies mention benchmarking and use of international reach and 
size, but none mentions seminarslconferences. 
The South African companies consider the methods relating to corporate culture, 
investments in skills and knowledge and allocation of key managers and experts to 
areas as the most effective methods. Wolverine World Wide highly rates exposure to 
a demanding technical, operating or economic environment, commit substantial 
resources to an area and use of international reach and size. The South African 
companies began their international ventures in the early to mid-1990s which 
influenced their views on corporate culture in a multinational sense. They also carried 
their mind-sets, based on their experiences of the relative scarcity of skills and the 
need to train and upgrade, into the international field. 
Different methods are considered to be the most effective for each of the eight 
different value chain locations. Corporate culture that demands high peiformance 
standards is placed first in infrastructure: general management and joint first in 
marketing and sales and human resources management. Allocation of key managers 
and experts to areas is placed first on its own in operations and joint first with three 
others in marketing and sales. See Table 11.1. The rankings are depicted from left to 
right. Rankings are also reflected individually for each value chain location when tied 
positions cause differences from the columnar rankings, as in marketing and sales. 
There is a four-way tie for first place so "1 st" is shown in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
columns. The numbers in bold to the left of each method in the blocks are those 
allocated to the methods in the original research. 
Four of the five companies report that acquisitions have helped them develop core 
competencies. The practical problems encountered by the companies largely centre 
around how to agree on and define core competencies. The solutions include 
standardization of definitions and format, and regular review of core competencies in 
relation to the environment. An example of a SABMiller core competency matrix is 
provided. 
494 
Table 11.1 Development of Core Competencies: Most Effective Methods by Value Chain Location 
Rank 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Notes 
Location 
Market ing & 4 Corporate culture 11 Allocation of key 1 Exposure to a 3 Reward and incentive The four shown afe cited 
Sales managers and experts demanding environment systems equally 
1" 1" 1" 
Outbound 9 Benchmark 4 Corporate culture 11 Allocation of key 1 Exposure to a 10 Regular review Two SABMi lier regions. 
Logistics managers and experts demanding environment 13 Investment in skills Only agree on 9. Others 6 Inclusion in planning and knowledge receive equal mention 
:r process :r :r 
Operations 11 Allocation of key 1 Exposure to a 4 Corporate culture 7 Mufti-disciplinary teams 6 Inclusion in planning Methods other than 11 
managers and experts demanding environment process receive equal mention 
9 Benchmark 
:r :r :r 
Inbound 8 Use of international 4 Corporate culture 11 Allocation of key 1 Exposure to a 5 Internal analysis Same as Outbound 
Logistics reach and size managers and experts demanding environment 17 Value chains logistics. Agree on 6 
7 Multi-disciplinary teams :r :r :r 
Mergers & 7 Multi-disciplinary teams 4 Corporate culture 8 Use of international 11 Allocation of key 6 Inclusion in planning All five choose 7. Three 
Acquisitions reach and size managers and experts 9 Benchmark choose 4 and 8 
:r 
Human 4 Corporate culture 13 Investment in skills 3 Reward and incentive 1 Exposure to a 11 Allocation of key All five agree on 4 and 13 
Resources and knowledges systems demanding environment managers and experts 
Management 1" 
Technological 2 Commit substantial 4 Corporate culture 11 Allocation of key 1 Exposure to a 8 I nlemational reach and Three choose 2 
Development resources managers and experts demanding environment size 7 Multi-disciplinary 
teams 
:r :r :r 
Infrastructure: 4 Corporate Culture 1 Exposure to a 2 Commit substantial 3 Allocate key managers 12 Commit to long term Five of eight core 
General demanding environment resources and experts paths 13 Investment in competencies Barloworld 
Management skills, knowledge :r 4" 
Overall 4 Corporate culture 11 Allocation of key 1 Exposure to a 7 Multi-disciplinary teams 13 Investment in skills 
managers and experts demanding environment and knowledge 
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Chapter 8, "Transfer of Core Competencies", has the most salient findings. The 
biggest challenges in transferring core competencies are regarded as culture, 
language, attitude, establishing a "common language", NIH (not invented here) , time 
zones and resistance to change. Two companies cited certain employees that had 
grown up under communist regimes as major obstacles. 
The ratings of success in transferring core competencies on a seven-point scale are: 
Barloworld, 5.9; Sappi and Wolverine World Wide, 5.0 each; SABMiller Africa and 
Asia, 4.9; and SABMiller Europe, 4.0. The differences in ratings of success are not 
significant at the 5 percent level (Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA: H = 6.58 [4, N = 33] P = 
0.1600). 
The ratings of success vary by location in the value chain and are as follows: 
Operations 6.0; mergers and acquisitions, 5.8; infrastructure: general management, 
5.3; outbound logistics, 5.0; human resource management, 4.8; marketing 4.5; 
technological development, 3.8; and inbound logistics, 3.5. The human resource 
management rating improves to 5.5 if SABMiller Europe is eliminated as an outlier 
because of its low rating in this category. There are significant differences in median 
scores between the core competencies, viz: marketing and sales, operations, M&A, 
human resource management and technological development with n > 2 (Kruskal-
Wallis ANOVA: H = 12.5 [5, N = 24] P = 0.0284). 
The findings on the overall effectiveness of methods are shown in Table 11.2. 
Appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions is considered the most effective method with 25.7 points and an average 
of 5.1 points for the five companies. 
Second is visits (25.5 and 5. 1); third, inclusion in management process (24.4 and 4.9). 
The next two are post-merger and acquisition integration teams (21.0 and 4.2) and 
benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms (19.1 and 3.8). 
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Table 11.2 Transfer of Core Competencies: Most Effective Methods by Value Chain Location 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 Notes , 
Location 
I 
Marketing & 8 Visits 10 Inclusion in 7 Seminars I 12 Benchmark 1 Appoint key people 6 Rotate managers and 
Sales management process conferences 2 Post-M & A teams key people has highest mean 
Outbound 1 Appoint key people e Visits 10 Inclusion in 2 Post·M & A integration 7 Seminars I Two participants, 
Logistics management process teams conferences both SABMilier 12 Benchmark regions 
I" ff" 
Operations 1 Appoint key people. 10 Inclusion in 2 Post -M & A teams 12 Benchmark 3 Experts deliver, install 8 Visits has high mean 
management process but WWW does not rate 
1" 3'" 
Inbound 2 Post-M & A teams 1 Appoint key people e Visils 12 Benchmark 4 Short-term As for Outbound 
Logistics secondments Logistics 10 Inclusion in 
Z'" management process '" 
Mergers & 1 Appoint key people 2 Post-M & A teams 6 Rotate managers and 5 Models or examples 11 Compensation 
Acquisitions key people 4 Short-term incentives I 
secondments 
6'" I 
Human 1 Appoint key people 10 Inclusion in e Visits 6 Rotate managers and 4 Short-term 
Resources management process key people secondments , 
Management 7 Seminars/conferences I Z'" 9 Manuals, etc. I 
Technological e Visits 7 Seminars I 12 Benchmark 10 Inclusion in 4 Short-term Wide variation of views I 
Development conferences management process secondments 
4th I 
Infrastructure 1 Appoint key people e Visits 10 Inclusion in 6 Rotate managers and 11 Compensation Five of eight core I 
General management process key people incentives competencies Barloworld I 
Management Z'" I 
Overall 1 Appoint key people e Visits 10 Inclusion in 2 Post-M & A teams 9 Benchmark Three companies using I 
management process. 6 = highest mean 
I 
-- - - - ---- ----- ----
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Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company is used by 
only three companies which limits its total to 16.8 points but the average is 5.6. 
Sappi, which added multi-disciplinary regional teams and leadership to the list of 
methods, rates each at 7.0 points. 
The effectiveness of methods varies by company and by location in the value chain. 
Appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions is regarded as the most effective method for five out of the eight value 
chain activities, two of them tied for first position. The biggest difference between 
Wolverine World Wide and the South African-originated companies is Wolverine' s 
relative emphasis on short-teml secondments and seminarslconferences. Wolverine, 
which has been hosting international licensees and distributors seminars and 
conferences for almost half a century, rates the latter at 6.0 effectiveness. 
There is a strong significant correlation between the ranking of how well the 
companies, as a composite, perform each core competency and the ratings of success 
in transferring these core competencies (Spearman correlation coefficient rs = 0.79 
with a P-value of 0.033). The companies vary from a low of rs = 0.32 for Sappi and a 
high of rs = 0.76 for SABMiller Europe. There is a negative correlation, though not 
significant, between the rankings of the importance for competitiveness of each core 
competency and the rating of success in transferring these core competencies 
(Spearman correlation coefficient rs = -0.04 with a P-value of 0.379). These results 
suggest that there is a tendency for the companies to transfer the competencies that 
they do well in some descending line of success. 
There is a very high degree of correlation, rs = 0.93 P-value =0.033, between the 
effecti veness of methods and the ratings of the success of transfer. The individual 
companies have high degrees of correlation, with the exception of Wolverine World 
Wide. This company's relatively low level of correlation, rs = 0.31, is caused by its 
core competency relating to branding receiving a success rating of 4.0, although the 
methods have an effectiveness rating of 6.0. If this one factor is removed as an 
outlier, the correlation improves to rs = 0.67 with a P-value of 0.215. 
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The correlation for the total chain is rs =0.80 with a P-value of 0.018 when measured 
by value chain locations. The difference between this measurement and the company 
total is due to "rounding and weighting". The high degree of correlation gives 
substantial credibility to the information supplied by the companies and highlights the 
importance of selecting the appropriate methods when transferring core competencies. 
The methods used by the companies to measure and assess the success or otherwise of 
the transfer of core competencies include performance indicators and metrics, 
benchmarking, performance management and third-party research to evaluate key 
parameters of customer satisfaction. 
The measures taken to avoid pitfalls in transfer encompass head-office support, the 
use of experienced senior staff and expatriates, precise standards of measurement 
where possible, "common language" and terminology, change management and, 
sometimes, when unavoidable, changes in management and key staff. The ways in 
which the transfer of core competencies can be improved are stated by the companies 
as: better understanding of legislative frameworks of the countries where new 
acquisitions are made, a more thorough human relations component to due diligence 
studies, better communications, "practicing" and reward programmes beyond normal 
compensation. 
Certain of the practical problems and solutions are common to both the development 
and transfer of core competencies. This includes how to select the appropriate core 
competencies for transfer and how to get leaders "to live the core competencies". The 
solutions include the definition, standardisation and formatting of core competencies 
so that they can be monitored. Training and retention of key employees is also 
important. 
Chapter 9, "Review of Strategies", concludes that all of the companies excelled in the 
primary business practices - strategy, execution, culture and structure - advocated by 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003). The information available also strongly suggests 
that they all excel in more than two of the four secondary management practices: 
talent, leadership, innovate, mergers and partnerships. Special attention was paid to 
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strategy, leadership, and mergers and acquisitions and post-merger and acquisition 
integration. These practices are discussed further in Section 11.3. 
There are numerous explanations and reasons as to how the three South African 
originated companies became global leaders in their fields within a decade. All three 
were well established and longstanding. There was exceptional management stability 
and continuity, although these did not always meet the standards of heterogeneity 
advocated by Govindarajan and Gupta (2003). All were experienced in mergers and 
acquisitions and post-M&A integration and knew the risks of investing outside their 
core competencies before they embarked on international expansion. 
Factor conditions in South Africa certainly played a part: the English language, 
trading ties to other nations, infrastructure, cheap electricity and information 
technology. The election of a democratic government in 1994 and its subsequent 
adoption of free market policies paved the way for the companies to expand 
internationally. 
The companies took action to deal with their potentially weak human resource 
situations. They had leadership that believed in their ability to become global 
players. Added to the above reasons are the views of the CEOs themselves, which 
encompassed multicultural experience, flexibility, adaptability, "humbleness " and 
willingness to learn. All the companies had become adept at marketing to small 
segments or niches in competitive local markets. 
Each of the three experienced initial setbacks in the early stages of their international 
expansion programmes: Barloworld with its acquisition of Finanzauto in Spain in 
1992, SA Breweries with its first European acquisition in Hungary in 1992 and Sappi 
with its purchase of paper mills in the UK in 1990. Each of the setbacks related in 
some way to assumptions that South African conditions or values would apply in the 
foreign situations. All three ultimately resolved these situations and learned from the 
expenences. 
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Chapter 10, "Going Global", examines the issues of the home base, experiences in 
different countries, reasons for success, methods of learning and preparation, lessons 
learned and advice to others. 
South Africa's advantages as a home base include cost, access to skills and services 
and climate. The infrastructures and people that enable the South African companies 
to go global are located in the country. All the South African companies' 
spokespersons comment on the ability of South African managers to interact with 
other cultures, adaptability, humility or non-arrogance and openness to learning. 
Confidence, stemming from adversity, is also mentioned. 
The disadvantages of South Africa as a home base are the cost of capital, the limited 
availability of finance for global expansion, the distance from major centres and 
markets and the reputation of the country as an emerging market (at times). It is 
sometimes difficult to recruit from overseas. 
The South African corporations view the English-speaking countries, including those 
located in Africa, as having cultures generally more favourable to operations and 
hence transfer of core competencies. Sappi initially experienced problems in the 
United Kingdom, while Wolverine considers Japan to be a favourable market. The 
countries cited as least favourable in terms of culture are Russia, China and India. 
The South African companies all regard a major acquisition(s) as the defining point in 
their transformation from local to global players. The companies provide different 
reasons for their successes but form a consensus on the factors of management or 
leadership, culture and human resources. 
The companies use varied and favoured learning methods. Barloworld has no formal 
processes for preparing employees for the challenge of international business, but this 
does get accomplished individually and informally. SABMiller Africa and Asia 
utilises "look - see - decide" visits, spouse interviews and language and culture 
orientation classes. SABMiller Europe has no specific programme at present. Sappi 
rotates staff and Wolverine World Wide uses a combination of technology and local 
market experts. 
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Barloworld lists 10 guidelines on "going global". Especially pertinent is that a 
company should know who will manage acquisitions in advance; that cultures and 
values are the most important (but toughest) things to understand and manage; that 
"pride comes before the fall" and that one must really understand one' s strengths and 
weaknesses. All four of the companies, including Wolverine, stress the importance of 
studying countries before entering or investing, the importance of thorough due 
diligence and the critical importance of culture. Wolverine notes the importance of 
monitoring global trends. 
The advice from the companies is that each market is different and that thorough 
research is essential before entering new markets or acquiring businesses. Companies 
should be very aware of how crucial cultural differences are and respect other 
cultures. Persuasion, rather than instruction, is favoured in dealings with foreign 
affiliates. Pilot demonstrations and peer success models can be effective in dealing 
with NllI (not invented here). Further advice is to focus on what core competencies 
can contribute to acquisitions and to be prepared to travel. Key managers should be 
available for transfer to new acquisitions, and companies should know in advance 
who will manage prospective acquisitions. The South African companies underline 
the importance of humility in several places in this chapter. 
A majority of the respondents to Questionnaire 6, South Africa, agreed that the 
diverse and relatively small South African economy provided managers with 
opportunities to learn how to be profitable in small markets by targeting segments, 
controlling costs and managing with limited resources. A majority disagreed with the 
proposition that the turbulent 1980s and 1990s in South Africa, with foreign 
disinvestment, taught managers about mergers and acquisitions, restructuring and the 
consequences of investing outside their core competencies. 
11.3 Interpretation of the Findings in Light of the Literature Framework 
Before finalising this section, I did reflect on whether there were other possible 
interpretations of some of my findings. I concluded that any other plausible 
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interpretations would be a question of degree or emphasis and not markedly different 
from my own. 
Areas of possible different emphasis might be those of "leadership" and "strategy". 
There were companies in other English-speaking countries that had some of the 
advantages and fewer disadvantages than the three South African companies did. 
Theoretically, these companies were better positioned to take advantage of global 
expansion opportunities (the brewing industry, especially, comes to mind). And yet it 
was Barloworld, South African Breweries and Sappi that became the world leaders in 
their fields . The question here is whether I placed sufficient emphasis on the 
importance of leadership and strategy in their successes. 
Trompenaars's (1993) philosophy that there is no one best way to conduct 
international business is supported by my research. Makanjee (2006) used almost 
identical words in commenting on the reasons for SABMiller's success. There are 
numerous references to culture and the need for adaptability in the research. 
The IMD ranking of South Africa as ninth in management out of 30 countries is, I 
suggest, probably surprising to many outside observers. There is really no available 
literature that can be used to evaluate the views of the CEOs as to the advantages and 
disadvantages of South Africa as a country of origin and world headquarters location. 
Porter (1990) believes that a home base is particularly relevant to the creation of 
competitiveness. It is the nation in which the essential competitive advantages of the 
enterprise are created and sustained. It is also where a company's strategy is set and 
the core product and process technology (broadly defined) are created and maintained. 
He also notes that sophisticated production often takes place in the home base. 
The views of Porter (1990) on home base are complemented by Tallmann and 
Fladmoe-Lindquest (2002). They point out that even in a globalizing market, firms 
move initially into foreign markets on the strengths of competitive advantages based 
on capabilities from the home market. These remarks apply to the three South African 
companies and Wolverine. All of them used the competitiveness forged in their home 
countries to expand globally. SABMiller is an interesting situation in this regard. Its 
head office and domicile are in London but the staff and processes that are used to 
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manage foreign affiliates come from South Africa. According to Kahn (Gilmour 
2005), SA Breweries is the heart and soul of SABMiller. 
In terms of Sachs's (2005) differential diagnosis, physical geography, (location and 
ports) , history and geo-politics help explain South Africa's emergence as the most 
industrialised country on the African continent despite the apartheid era. He also 
raises the issues of culture barriers to economic development which in this case was 
apartheid. 
Hamel and Prahalad (1996) stress the importance of management stability and 
cumulative learning in the development of core competencies. Chapter 5 details the 
exceptional management stability and continuity in the corporations studied. The 
management tearns may not be as diverse as recommended by Bossidy and Charan 
(2002) and Govindajaran and Gupta (2003). Partial explanations for this are that the 
South African companies have been "multinationals" for less than a decade, while 
Wolverine World Wide has, until recently, relied on worldwide distributors and 
licensees to market its product. As seen in the literature of Palich and Gomez-Mejia 
(1997, 1999) there are advantages to both homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
management tearns. Heterogeneity supposedly facilitates creativity while 
homogeneity favours execution rather than creativity. 
There are different views on how many core competencies a company should have or 
focus on. In the literature review in Subsection 2.3.6 Hamel and Prahalad (1990) 
advocate five or six, and Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (2003) quote McKinsey as 
limiting this to three or four, while Thompson and Strickland (1998) believe that a 
corporation cannot be a world leader in more than two or three competencies. 
Barloworld, SABMiller and Wolverine World Wide each identified seven core 
competencies for the study. Sappi listed six. The companies are therefore closer to 
the views of Hamel and Prahalad on this issue. While the companies may not be the 
world leader in each and everyone of their core competencies, they conceivably are 
in at least one or several. It is more difficult to compartmentalise core competencies 
in practice than it is in theory. They are closely interrelated and intertwined. For 
example, how effective would Wolverine World Wide be at building brands if it did 
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not excel in the other core competencies such as operations' best of class (in service) 
and motivating and retaining key management? 
Manning's (1997) contention that there is no recognized rigorous skill for identifying 
competencies is substantiated by the practical problems experienced by the companies 
in both the development and transfer of core competencies. The major problems are 
those of identifying, agreeing on and defining core competencies. 
The use of Porter's (1990) Diamond to examine the determinants of competitiveness 
for South Africa in Chapter 2 and for the South African companies in Chapter 7, "The 
Development of Core Competencies", illustrates its usefulness as a framework for 
analysis. The Diamond's four attributes of factor input conditions, firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry, demand conditions and the two additional variables of chance 
and government provide a standardised format that was employed to examine the 
factors which influence the competitiveness of South Africa, the three South African 
companies and Wolverine World Wide. 
Examples cited in Section 7.2 of the thesis include natural resources and sophisticated 
and demanding local customers for the products and services of the three South 
African companies. Mineral riches facilitated the use of Caterpillar equipment from 
Barloworld, and having shorter tree-growing cycles than those in the Northern 
Hemisphere advanced Sappi 's cost competitiveness, while the South African climate 
(not tropical) is conducive to the drinking of beer. Porter' s (1990) statement that 
vigorous efforts by a nation' s firms to penetrate foreign markets to sustain growth and 
even full capacity are frequently the result of the saturation of home markets, is also 
supported by my research. Representatives from Barloworld, SABMiller and Sappi 
stated that a primary reason for expanding internationally was the need to grow. as 
they were already leaders in the South African markets. 
Hamel and Prahalad (1996), Hitt et al. (2003) and Thompson and Strickland (1998) 
all stress that core competencies take time to develop, emerge over time and require 
experience in cumulative learning. The information from all respondent companies 
concurs with these views. Where there is a difference, however, is in some of the key 
questions advocated by the three sources mentioned. While the companies may end 
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up with core competencies that are "valuable, rare, costly to imitate and non-
substitutable" (Hitt et al. 2003) or "transferable, benefiting consumers and inimitable" 
(Hamel and Prahalad 1996), they do not arrive at these by specifically asking these 
questions. The core competencies evolve, or emerge, in response to competition, or 
are chosen because they are necessary to meet competition, or are essential to the 
achievement of objectives. 
The results of Questionnaire 2, The Development and Transfer of Core Competencies, 
generally support the conclusions of Mascarenhas, Baveja and Jamil (1998) that 
different and multiple approaches are needed to develop core competencies. I was 
surprised at the extent of the results; that is different methods were considered to be 
the most effective for each of the eight different value chain locations. Corporate 
culture is in first place in infrastructure: general management and shares this place 
with other methods in marketing and sales and human resource management. 
Allocation of key managers and experts to key areas is ranked first in operations and 
ties for this position in marketing and sales. See Table 11 .1. 
In the Mascarenhas et al. (1998) study, the most mentioned method in technology is 
exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment while 
corporate culture was placed first in their equivalent of operations. The companies in 
this study regard commit substantial resources to an area as the most effective 
method in technological development and allocation of key managers and experts to 
areas as the most effective in operations. 
The results also support the other references relating to methods used to develop core 
competencies. Here I refer to Hamel and Prahalad (1996), Hitt et al. (2003), 
Thompson and Strickland (1998), Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), Hitt, Keats and de 
Marie (1998) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002). There is some deviation between the 
results and the literature in that methods such as regular competence review meetings, 
internal analysis, value chains and path dependency receive relatively few mentions 
by the companies. None of the companies mentioned seminars/conferences as being 
in the four most effective methods. All did, however, mention benchmarking and use 
of international reach and size. 
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Four of the five companies reported that acquisitions helped them develop core 
competencies. This is in line with Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) Learning through 
Acquisitions; Lei and Hitt (1995), The Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Building 
Firm's Skills and Capabilities; and Birkinshaw, Hood and Jonssen (1998), Subsidiary 
Initiative. SABMiller Europe felt that the companies that it acquired had a minimal 
effect on the development of core competencies. This was attributed to the levels of 
management expertise and technology of the original South African Breweries being 
significantly superior to those of the companies they acquired in Europe. 
Luo (2000) states that transferability is influenced by the nature of distinctive 
resources and capabilities. Flowing from this, technological capabilities should be 
more transferable than organisational capabilities and financial capabilities more 
transferable than operational capabilities. Zander and Kogut (1995) state that the 
transferability of knowledge depends on codifiability, teachability, complexity, 
system dependence and product observability. 
Mackay, of SABMiller (personal interview, London, 27 November 2001), expresses 
the view that his company had a wonderful base in production, technical and financial 
functions but that the marketing and distribution skills have not always been as 
portable into foreign markets and conditions. Phillips, at Barloworld (Questions for a 
CEO, 11 November 2003), writes that Barloworld has successfully "exported" core 
competencies relating to financial and reporting disciplines, attention to detail and IT 
and IS competences but that export of "soft" issues has been less successful. The 
statements by the two CEOs appear to support the views of Luo (2000) and Zander 
and Kogut (1995). 
The comparties ' ratings of success in transferring core competencies by value chain 
location are however somewhat different from the views of Luo (2000). Operations 
shows the highest success with a 6.0 rating, followed by mergers and acquisitions 
with 5.8, infrastructure: general management with 5.3, outbound logistics with 5.0, 
human resource management with 4.8, marketing and sales with 4.5, technological 
development with 3.8 and inbound logistics with 3.5. As previously noted human 
resource management would be 5.5 if SABMiller Europe was eliminated as an outlier. 
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The function , or core competency, of operations can be very complex, requiring both 
organisational and operating capabilities. The complexity of Wolverine 's operations 
was discussed in Section 9.6. The manufacture and processing of beer and paper are 
also complex and go well beyond the transfer of technical formulations . The top 
rating of success in operations cannot therefore be attributed to simplicity or ease of 
transfer. 
The ratings of success in transferring human resource management core 
competencies, a "soft" issue, are relatively high, especially high if SABMiller Europe, 
is excluded. As in the case of operations, the high rating cannot be attributed to ease 
of transfer or simplicity. 
I suggest that part of the explanation for the differences between Luo (2000), Zander 
and Kogut (1995) and the research results lies in the strong correlation between core 
competency performance and degrees of success in transferring the competencies. 
There is almost a sliding scale of success based on performance - especially in the 
first three core competencies' rank in terms of performance. Four of the five 
companies regard human resource management core competencies as being in their 
top three performers. Szulanski (1996) holds that transfer of knowledge is influenced 
by the characteristics of the knowledge, source, recipient and context of the transfer. 
He states that prior success facilitates transfer. 
The results relating to the methods used to transfer core competencies, shown in Table 
11.2, are generally in line with the literature review. Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 
(2003), move key people to facilitate transfer; Govinderajan and Gupta (2000), "DNA 
carriers; Bresman, Birkenshaw and Nobel (1991), visits; Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002), 
frequent travel; Hamel and Prahalad (1996) , mobility facilitates transfer; are all 
examples relating to the methods of the appointment of key management and visits. 
Porter (1996) advocates that development be specifically included in a company's 
objectives. Ghoshal, Korine and Szulanski (1994) mention joint work in teams and 
task forces . Thompson and Strickland (2003) recommend benchmarking. 
The top rating of method 6, rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in 
the wider company, by the three entities that use it, supports Garvin's (2000) 
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contention that personnel rotation programmes are one of the most powerful methods 
of transferring knowledge. 
I found very little in the literature that relates to methods used by companies to 
measure and assess the success or otherwise of the transfer of core competencies, 
measures taken to avoid pitfalls in transfer, ways in which the transfer of core 
competencies can be improved and practical problems and solutions. Kostova (1999 
and 2002) covers some of these aspects in a macro sense. In this regard my research 
makes a contribution to the body of knowledge concerning the transfer of core 
competencies. The aforementioned issues were discussed earlier in Section 11.2. For 
example, performance indicators and metrics, benchmarking, performance 
management and third-party research are among the methods used to measure the 
success of the transfer of core competencies. 
Chapter 9 reviewed strategies of the corporations. All companies III the study 
performed exceptionally well against the primary and secondary factors advocated by 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003). Collins's (2001) "What you can be the best at" 
relates to strategy. SABMiller and Wolverine World Wide are conceivably the 
world's best in their respective industries at two, or perhaps even more, core 
competencies. Barloworld is as "good as anyone" in managing Caterpillar and Hyster 
franchises and certainly among the few best at managing in difficult environments. 
Sappi has been a technological leader and still may be. I am convinced that three of 
the CEOs demonstrate the leadership traits of a paradoxical mix of personal humility 
and professional will extolled by Collins (2001), but I lack the experience and 
information about Sappi's leadership to draw conclusions without being subjectively 
judgemental. 
Collins (2001) also advises companies to look for one denominator to measure what 
drives company economic engines. Each of the companies emphasises two or three 
performance indicators, with Barloworld's concentration on CFRI coming closest to 
Collins's (2001) requirements. Sappi has not compared financial performance with 
peer groups or stock exchange indices in its annual reports. 
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Chapter 9 also concentrated on the issues of mergers and acquisitions and post-merger 
and acquisition integration. The research by Lajoux (1998) shows that the majority of 
mergers and acquisitions are generally not successful. This is certainly not the case 
with the corporations studied. All demonstrated a high degree of success in both 
acquisition and post-acquisition integration, as discussed below. 
Nohria, Joyce and Roberson (2003) advocate that corporations have a system of 
identifying, screening and closing deals; Eccles, Lanes and Wilson (1998) recommend 
safeguards to prevent overpaying for acquisitions; and Hitt et al. (2003) propose 
critical due diligence studies. The first three of Drucker's (1986) five simple rules for 
successful acquisitions relate to a company contemplating what it can contribute to 
acquisitions it makes, the need for a common core of unity and "temperamental fit", 
where respect is shown for the products, markets and customers of the companies it 
acquires. The corporations studied again show practices well in keeping with these 
rules. 
There are several key references relating to post-acquisition and merger integration. 
A critical factor is that poor post-acquisition and merger integration is repeatedly cited 
as the leading reason for unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions. Ashkenas, 
DeMonaco and Francis (2001) recommend early planning, restructuring sooner rather 
than later, integrating cultures as well as operations and having a full-time person 
responsible for integration. Pritchett, Robinson and Clarkson (1997) present a 
"coaching list" that urges companies to "limit but keep promises". Drucker's (1986) 
final two rules about acquisitions are a company's ability to provide top management 
for the company it acquires and promotional opportunities for managers from one of 
the companies to the other. 
The corporations again meet the standards proposed by the literature reviews. The 
lists they provide as to the five most important actions to facilitate post-acquisition 
and merger integration, are at the "cutting edge" of theory in this regard. There are 
two iconoclastic philosophies on integration: Barloworld allows managers in newly 
acquired companies up to two years to decide whether they want to stay with the 
company; and Sappi chooses the best people from both acquired companies and Sappi 
itself when forming management teanlS in merged and acquired operations. 
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Drucker's (1986) fourth rule is the ability to provide top management to new 
acquisitions. SABMiller has seconded employees from South Africa to manage its 
breweries and operations spread across 60 countries in five continents, including the 
appointment of President of Miller Brewing in the USA. Barloworld provided top 
management for its acquisition in Spain, and its top management in South Africa has 
demonstrated versatility in managing different divisions. Wolverine World Wide has 
an ability to absorb acquisitions into their operations infrastructure and provide 
management where desirable. Sappi prefers to appoint nationals of a country to its 
global operations, and its ability to provide top management is therefore less clear. 
I consider Drucker's (1986) fifth rule, promotions of managers from acquirer and 
acquired to each other's companies, to be complex and difficult in today's global 
business environment. Barloworld, Sappi and Wolverine, nevertheless, each have 
examples of managers from acquisitions being promoted within the larger group. 
The responses of the companies regarding challenges in operating 111 different 
countries (including transferring core competencies) are very much in line with the 
literature review. Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002) point out the complications caused by 
distance, time, language and culture. They also stress the exacerbations of product, 
functional and geographic diversity. All of these conditions are mentioned in the 
responses. Culture is apparently the leading "complicator", and here the literature of 
Hofstede (1999), Trompenaars (1993) and Schneider and Barsoux (1997) is very 
pertinent. Both the SABMiller regions cited employees who had grown up under 
communist regimes as major obstacles to the transfer of core competencies. Landers 
(1998) specifically states that 75 years of anti-market, anti-profit schooling and 
insider privilege in the former Soviet Union have planted and frozen anti-
entrepreneurial attitudes. 
While not specifically covered in any of the literature that I reviewed, I believe it 
accurate to state that Sappi, initially experiencing difficulties in the United Kingdom 
with its first foreign acquisition, and Wolverine World Wide, stating that the culture 
in Japan (and of their long-established licensee) is very favourable to their operations, 
are contrary to conventional wisdom. "Conventional wisdom" would expect 
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companies from English-speaking countries to generally have less difficulty in the 
UK markets than they would have in Japan, which has a very different language, 
culture and customs. 
The literature review on learning and knowledge (Subsection 2.3.4) is supplemented 
by other works, such as Hamel and Prabalad (1996) with cumulative learning, 
Thompson and Strickland (1998) and Lei, Hitt and Bettis (1996) with meta learning. 
The companies in the study use a wide variety of 1eaming methods and processes for 
preparing employees for the challenges of intemational business. The companies all 
show evidence of being willing to learn from mistakes rather than punish them. This 
is in line with the advice of Sutton (2002) to "forgive but don't forget". SABMiller 
Africa and Asia specifically follows the Brinkerhoff Six Stage Model (1998), which 
was reviewed in the literature. 
I do not regard any of the advice given by the companies in Chapter 10, "Going 
Global", to be contrary to any prevailing literature on the subject that I am aware of, 
or to that discussed in the literature review. What was not in the literature review, 
however, was the importance of "humbleness" or humility, as perceived by 
representatives of the South African multinationals. The finding that South African 
managers are perceived to be well able to interact with other cultures, are adaptable, 
"humble" and open to learning, are key factors. Barney, Wright and Ketchen (2001) 
regard the ability to learn and the ability to change as being among the most important 
capabilities that a firm can possess. 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000b: 132), state that contrary to popular wisdom, companies 
from the fringes of the world economy can become global players. "What they need 
is organisational confidence, a clear strategy, a passion for learning and the leadership 
to bring these factors together". The three South African companies have become 
global players. They have demonstrated the attributes specified by Bartlett and 
Ghoshal. As discussed in Chapter 5, Barloworld is the world's largest distributor of 
Hyster lift trucks and one of the leading Caterpillar franchise holders. SABMiller is 
the second largest brewer in the world and the leader in emerging markets. Sappi's 
performance, relative to competitors', may have declined over the past two years, but 
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it is, nevertheless, the world's leading producer of coated fine paper and chemical 
cellulose (dissolving pulp). 
There have been significant changes in the operations of the companies since I began 
the first steps toward a doctorate when I interviewed Graham Mackay in London on 
27 November 2001. Sales of the company he leads were $3,624 million in the 
financial year ended March 2001. Sales for the 2005 financial year were $12,901 
million following three very substantial acquisitions and other meaningful ones. 
Return on equity declined from the 18.5 percent achieved in 2001, because of the cost 
of the acquisitions but improved to 16.3 percent in 2005 (SABMilier Annual Report 
2005). The South African brewing interests (Beer South Africa) accounted for 32.6 
percent of group sales and 49 percent of operating profit in 2001. The respective 
figures in 2005 were 17.3 percent and 35.4 percent (SABMiller Annual Report 2005). 
Barloworld's sales increased from R27,945 million in the 2001 financial year ended 
September to R39,401 million in 2005 . The company's return on equity improved 
from 10.4 percent to 16 percent over this period. Southern Africa now accounts for 
almost 60 percent of its sales following the acquisition of additional share holdings in 
Avis South Africa and Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC). In 2001, 44 percent of sales 
and 37 percent of operating profit were accounted for by South African interests. By 
contrast, in 2005, southern African interests made up 58.4 percent of sales and 82.8 
percent of operating profit. PPC accounted for 53.3 percent of the southern African 
operating profit and 44.1 percent of the group operating profit (Barloworld Annual 
Report 2001 , 2005). 
Sappi's sales were $4,184 million in the year to September 2001. Sales increased to 
$5,018 million in 2005 but net profit fell from $132 million to a loss of $224 million. 
South Africa accounted for 15 percent of sales in 2005, compared to 13 percent in 
2001 (Sappi Annual Report 2001 , 2005). 
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11.4 Limitations of the Research 
The limitations of the research were discussed in Chapter 4. One of the factors was 
the number of participants. The implementation of the research accentuated this 
factor, as Barloworld did not participate in the primary value chain locations such as 
marketing and sales and operations because of its nature as a holding company or 
corporate headquarters with divisions and subsidiaries in different industries. The two 
SABMiller regions were the only participants in the value chain locations of outbound 
logistics and inbound logistics - again reducing the size of the universe. 
Chapter 10 covered countries where it was shown that cultures were favourably, or 
unfavourably, inclined to affect the operations and hence the development and 
transfer of core competencies. There were, however, no questions specifically linking 
countries to the core competencies, their development and transfer, and degrees of 
success in transfer. It is apparent that the degrees of success and the effectiveness of 
methods to both develop and transfer core competencies, would differ by country as 
pointed out by Luo (2000) and Kostova (1999). There were certain differences in the 
ratings of success and the effectiveness of methods between the two SABMiller 
regIOns. 
The quality of the thesis would have been higher had it been possible to gather data 
separately for each country that constitutes a major market. This would be an 
undertaking suitable for a separate study. 
Sappi included additional methods for both the development and the transfer of core 
competencies. If these - performance management and multi-disciplinary/regional 
teams and leadership - had been included in the data gathering, this may have 
influenced the other companies' selections. 
Core competencies are not an end in themselves but an inherent part of strategy. I 
would have been able to better evaluate certain issues relating 10 core competencies if 
1'd had access to the strategic plans of the corporations. It would be completely 
unrealistic to expect to have access to these confidential documents. As it was, the 
companies were extremely helpful. One of the companies showed me a strategic plan 
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that was three years old and it did help my understanding of the role of core 
competencies in that company's strategy. 
The research does not take into account the time element involved in developing and 
transferring core competencies. Several sources in the literature review (Porter 1990; 
Hamel and Prahalad 1996) believe that the development of core competencies can 
take a decade or even more. There was no literature reviewed on the time taken to 
transfer core competencies. Luo (2000) states that transferability varies by capability 
and country, Zander and Kogut (1995) specify codifiability, teachability, complexity, 
system independence and product observability, Kostova (1999) stipulates social, 
organisational and relationship factors that affect the transfer of core competencies. 
In adclition to the aforementioned factors presumably priority, resources allocated and 
intensity would all affect transfer and the time taken. I did not consider it practical to 
include the time element in my study. The time taken to transfer different core 
competencies under varying conditions could be an area for further research. 
My own experience and informal research agree with the views of the South African 
companies CEOs on the advantages and disadvantage of South Africa as a country of 
origin and location for world headquarters (Chapter 10). Their views strongly 
influenced the explanations I advanced for the international success of the companies. 
The quality of this section would be better if views of competitors and people from 
the companies they acquired could have been included in the research. I could, for 
example, have sought interviews or clistributed questionnaires to such parties. While 
the responses may have added other perspectives to the issues examined ill my 
research this would have entailed significant time and effort in pursuit of data that I 
do not regard as being central to the thesis. 
Three employees in two of the companies, who were not South African, and other 
senior managers in all the corporations expressed similar views on flexibility, 
adaptability and resourcefulness of managers from South Africa. All mentioned 
multicultural backgrounds. 
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11.5 Conclusions. 
The conclusions flow from the findings summarised in Sections 11.2 and 11.3. The 
findings were also discussed earlier in Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
1. The most important issues and practical problems relating to the management, 
development and transfer of core competencies centre on how to define (or 
describe) select, agree and format core competencies. This conclusion is based 
not only on the various questionnaires and interviews, but also on the fact that 
only Wolverine World Wide of the four multinational companies presented a 
formal list of core competencies when the research began. 
2. Core competencies are as likely to evolve over time and result from strategies 
and actions to be competitive as they are to be chosen by a process of rigorous 
intemal analysis. All the companies did, however, have such a process and use 
value chains to some extent. 
3. Different and multiple methods are needed to develop core competencies. This 
is the same conclusion as the one reached by Mascarenhas et al. (1998), based 
on a study of 12 multinational corporations. 
4. The effectiveness of methods to develop core competencies varies by company 
and value chain location. All five companies, did however, agree very 
substantially on the most effective methods in the merger and acquisition and 
human resource development value chain locations. 
5. The high degree of correlation (Spearman rs =0.93with a P-value of 0.003) 
between the effectiveness of the methods used to transfer core competencies and 
the ratings of success achieved in transferring the same core competencies 
highlights the importance of selecting the appropriate methods of transfer. 
There is also a strong tendency for companies to be more succes4ul at 
transferring core competencies that they perform exceptionally well. There is 
almost a sliding scale, with some exceptions, correlating how well a core 
competency is performed and how successfully it is transferred. This tendency 
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can at times transcend the traditional views of "hard versus soft" core 
competencies, value chain location and other literature views relating to 
codifiability, context and so forth. 
6. Different and multiple methods are needed to transfer core competencies. 
7. The effectiveness of methods to transfer core competencies varies by company 
and value chain location. 
8. There are notable differences between the South African compallles and 
Wolverine World Wide on the effectiveness of methods used both to develop and 
to transfer core competencies. The differences are explained largely by the 
different modes of operation (WWW's. historic use of licensees and 
distributors), certain cultural aspects, the South African companies ' relative 
newness to the international arena and their taking of their mind-sets relating to 
the development and training of people to their foreign affiliates. There are, 
nevertheless, many similarities. 
9. The success of the South African-originated multinationals can be satisfactorily 
explained by a combination of historical, competitive factor conditions, 
leadership and strategies. Multicultural experience, use of English, flexibility, 
adaptability, "humbleness" and willingness to learn are extremely important. 
The companies excelled at acquisitions and post-merger integration. 
10. Each international market is different and thorough research is essential before 
entering new markets or acquiring businesses. Cultural differences can be 
critical, and one should respect other cultures. Other advice from the 
companies to those undertaking or contemplating foreign expansion is to focus 
on what core competencies can contribute to acquisitions, know in advance who 
will manage prospective acquisitions and favour persuasion rather than 
instruction in dealing with foreign affiliates. Pilot demonstrations and peer 
success models can be effective in dealing with NIH (not invented here). The 
importance of humility or humbleness is stressed. 
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11.6 Significance of Findings and Conclusions 
The subject matter of the thesis is relevant to the current and crucial issues of 
globalisation and multinational corporations. 
The findings and conclusions as expressed in "roadmaps" for assessing the likelihood 
of the effectiveness of methods for developing and transferring core competencies, 
based in different locations in a value chain, are highly significant for both practicing 
managers and academics. This information will increase the chances of success, 
lessen the risk of error and reduce the cost of experimentation. It will provide 
academics with more information to teach on the management, development and 
transfer of core competencies. For example they will be able to list the different 
methods available to transfer, explain which methods would be more likely to be 
effective in different value chain locations and, consequently, describe "how" core 
competencies can be transferred. 
The finding of the strong relationship between performance in core competencies and 
the degrees of success in transferring core competencies should alert managers to the 
likelihood of success in transference. It should also caution against the risks of not 
paying enough attention to core competencies that are very important for competitive 
reasons but more difficult to transfer. 
The examples of the companies' actions in acquisitions, post-acquisition integration, 
experiences in different countries, challenges, methods used to measure and assess the 
success, or otherwise, of transfer, measures taken to avoid pitfalls, ways in which the 
transfer of core competencies can be improved, the examples of problems and 
solutions and their advice on going global all have practical and academic 
applications. 
I consider the fact that this is the first PhD thesis relating to South African 
multinational companies to be of some significance on its own. 
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11.7 Recommendations 
The recommendations, or model, for the development and transfer of core 
competencies includes the following: 
1. Core competencies should be defined (or described) in a formalised format and 
be committed to writing . There should be procedures for selection of, and 
agreement on, core competencies. See the recommendation under 9 below. I 
refer to SABMiller with its new process of explicitly identifying, highlighting, 
codifying and promulgating a set of core competencies with value drivers and 
key performance indicators. The company's core competence matrix in Figure 
7.2 is a good example to follow. 
2. The development and transfer of core competencies should be an integral part 
of strategy and be included in the management process (priority goals). 
3. Continuity and stability of management and those tasked with the development 
and transfer of core competencies is important. 
4. A learning climate should be fostered. 
5. Companies and managers should be aware of the likely effectiveness of 
alternative methods of development and transfer in different value chain 
activities. See Table 11.1 and Table 11.2 which depict the experiences of the 
companies in this study as to the effectiveness of methods in different value 
chain locations. 
6. It is crucial to select for transfer core competencies that are in the best interests 
of the particular situation and avoid the trap of transferring core competencies 
because the company happens to do them exceptionally well. 
7. Regularly measure and assess core competencies, their development and 
transferability. Both internal and external benchmarking is important. 
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8. Good communications will include people continually talking to each other with 
"common language" and terminology. I refer also to the Wolverine World 
Wide model of rapid response (see Section 10.5) to incoming communications 
such as emails, telephone calls and letters. Adopting some of its processes 
would improve both external and internal communications in many 
organisations. 
9. Devote sufficient time and resources to the development and transfer of core 
competencies. This would include review-type meetings and analytical 
forethought as advocated by Prahalad and Hamel (1996). 
10. The advice of the companies related 10 going global is recommended to those 
undertaking or contemplating global expansion. This relates specifically to the 
differences in markets , the need for research, the cruciality of cultural 
differences, knowing who will manage prospective acquisitions and the great 
importance of humility. 
11.8 Performance against Aims and Objectives. 
The thesis achieves the four aims set out in the Introduction. 
The thesis contributes to the advancement of the general body of knowledge relating 
to core competencies and international business. 
It is (to the best of my knowledge) the first doctoral thesis to examine South African 
originated multinational corporations. New and useful information is provided that 
can also serve as a foundation for further research. 
Secondly, it opens up a new perspective by evaluating different methods for 
developing and transferring core competencies and relating these to different activities 
in the value chain. 
Thirdly, the conclusion that there is a strong correlation between the effectiveness of 
the methods used to transfer core competencies and the ratings of success in 
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transferring the core competencies give credibility to the information provided by the 
companies. It also demonstrates the importance of choosing the appropriate methods 
to transfer core competencies. 
Fourthly, the conclusion that companies have strong tendencies to successfully 
transfer those core competencies that they perform exceptionally well is very 
significant. These tendencies can at times transcend other well-established factors, 
such as "hard" and "soft" core competencies and knowledge, codifiabilty, context of 
transfer, teachability and other factors. 
The thesis has significant practical applicability. It provides practical examples of 
the effect of culture in different countries on company operations and transfer of core 
competencies, the challenges that companies face in transferring core competencies, 
the methods used to develop and transfer core competencies, ways to measure 
successful transfer, and how to avoid pitfalls and improve transferability. 
The model provides "roadmaps" or guidelines to which methods are more likely to be 
successful in developing and transferring core competencies located in different 
positions in the value chain. Companies will have a better chance of success in both 
the development and transfer of core competencies once they become aware of the 
likely effectiveness of the various methods of development and transfer by value 
chain location. 
The methods used by the three South African-originated companies and Wolverine 
World Wide to successfully acquire, and subsequently integrate, other companies are 
described and examined. 
The thesis, in my judgement, satisfactorily explains how the three South African 
companies became global leaders in their respective fields within a decade. The 
lessons learned by the companies in going global, and their advice to others 
contemplating or implementing international expansion, are, I believe, effectively 
recorded, analysed and communicated. 
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apartheid. This advantage identifies the area of technology and managerial 
skill transfer in which the countries of SSA can realistically benefit from SA. 
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Competitiveness Simulations help policy makers focus on and prioritize the key competitiveness issues 
facing their countries. We replace the country's 20 weakest criteria values with the 49-country average 
value to compute a simulated overall competitiveness ranking, however, this is a theoretical exercise 
and should not be perceived as policy advice. Consideration must be given to each country's 
development level, political constraints and social value system. 
Source: IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2003. 
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APPENDIX 2.3 WORLD COMPETITIVENESS YEARBOOK 2001: 
SOUTH AFRICA'S TWENTY STRONGEST CRITERA OVERALL 
The section highlights the country's 20 strongest criteria that is those with the highest standardized values (STD 
Values)' 
Number Name 
4.2.01 INVESTMENT IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Percentage of GDP 
4.1.18 ELECTRlCITY COSTS FOR INDUSTRlAL CLIENTS 
USDperkwh 
2.2.02 EFFECTIVE PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATE 
Percentage of GDP per capita 
2.5.01 TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
Percentage of GNP 
1.5.02 COST-OF-LIVING INDEX 
Cost index of basket of goods in maj09r cities, excluding housing 
2 .2.09 EMPLOYER'S SOCIAL SECURlTY CONTRIBUTION RATE 
Compulsory contribution as a percentage of GDP per capita 
2.2.04 EMPLOYER'S SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRlBUTION RATE 
Compulsory contribution as a percentage of GDP per capita 
2.4.05 PARALLEL (BLACK-MARKET, BARTER, UNRECORDED) ECOMY 
(Survey) Parallel (Black-market, barter, unrecorded) economy does not impair economic 
development in your country 
2.4.12 UNEMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION 
(Survey) Unemployment legislation provides an incentive to look for work 
3.2.13 FEMALE LABOR FORCE 
Percentage of total labour force 
3.1.03 OVERALL PRODUCTIVITY - REAL GROWTH 
Estimates: Percentage change of real GDP per person employed 
3.1.08 PRODUCTIVITY IN INDUSTRY (PPP) 
Estimates: Related GDP (PPP) per person employed in Industry, US$ 
2.4.14 LEGAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(Survey) Legal regulation of financial institutions is adequate for financial stability 
2.1.06 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOREIGN DEBT 
Percentage of GDP 
2.4.15 RlGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SHAREHOLDERS 
(Survey) Rights and responsibilities of shareholders are well-defined 
3.4.10 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(Survey) Business leaders do not neglect their responsibility towards society 
3.4.04 CORPORATE BOARDS 
(Survey) Corporate boards prevent improper business practices in corporate affairs 
3.4.05 SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
(Survey) Shareholder value is effectively managed 
2.09 EXPORT OF GOODS - REAL GROWTH 
Percentage change, based on national currency in constant prices 
3.3.06 STOCK MARKETS 
(Survey) Stock markets provide adequate financing to companies 
*STD Values = [(country's value) - (49 country average)] I (standard deviation) 
Source: The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001. 
49 
Country Country Country 
Value Rank Ave. 
1.659 3 0.648 
0.020 0.055 
1.51 3 17.45 
8.0 5 4.9 
72.32 2 96.80 
.78 3 17.69 
0.00 9.38 
5.56 4 4.40 
6.36 7 4.87 
47.14 5 40.58 
6.78 9 2.95 
63 ,257 10 45,446 
7.77 16 6.63 
2.516 11 13.687 
7.71 I S 6.92 
6.37 15 5.83 
6.52 14 5.93 
6.18 IS 5.58 
21.03 12 14.99 
6.23 19 5.27 
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APPENDIX 2.4 WORLD COMPETITIVENESS YEARBOOK 2001: 
SOUTH AFRICA'S 20 WEAKEST CRITERIA 
20 Weakest Criteria Overall 49 
Country Country Country 
Number Name Value Rank Ave. 
l.4.07 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 36.20 49 8.45 
Percentage oflabour force 
l.4.02 EMPLOYMENT 2l.l0 49 33. 12 
Percentage of population 
3.2.08 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 72.01 44 1l.77 
Working days lost per 1,000 inhabitants per year 
3.2.14 SKILLED LABOR 3.84 49 6.41 
(Survey) Skilled labour is not available in your country's labor market 
2.5.03 PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO (SECONDARY EDUCATION) 3l.40 43 15.34 
Number of pupils per teacher 
4.5.03 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 3.87 49 6.32 
(Survey) Discrimination poses a handicap in society 
4.3.16 SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY AND YOUTH 4.11 48 6.08 
(Survey) Science & technology does not interest the youth of your country 
2.5.10 ECONOMIC LITERACY l.92 49 3. 15 
(Survey) Economic literacy is generally low among the population 
l.4.03 EMPLOYMENT-GROWTH 4.54 49 l.94 
Percentage change 
4.5.04 HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE 4.55 47 7.34 
(Survey) Harassment and violence do seriously destabilize the workplace 
3.2.16 BRAIN DRAIN 2.08 47 5.26 
(Survey) Well-educated people emigrate abroad 
2.3.19 PERSONAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1.56 47 5.99 
(Survey) Personal security and private property are not adequately protected 
4.3.15 SCIENCE AND EDUCATION 2.84 49 5.16 
(Survey) Science is not adequately taught in compulsory schools 
3.2.06 LABOR RELATIONS 4.03 48 6.20 
(Survey) Labour relations are generally hostile 
2.4.13 IMMIGRATION LAWS 3.77 47 5.58 
(Survey) Immigration laws prevent your company from employing foreign labour 
2.5.11 EDUCATION IN FINANCE 2.92 48 3.37 
(Survey) Education in finance is not sufficient in your country 
2.5 .02 PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO (PRIMARY EDUCATION) 35.00 42 18.17 
Number of pupils per teacher 
3.2.15 AVAILABILITY OF FINANCE SKILLS 4.66 47 6.56 
(Survey) Skills in finance are not available in your country' s labour market 
4.4.09 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX 0.697 46 0.843 
Combines economic-socia I-educational indicators I 
Source: Human Development Report 
2.5.04 SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 59.0 42 82.9 
Percentage of relevant age group receiving full-time education 
Source: The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001. 
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APPENDIX 2.5 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM: GROWTH 
COMPETITIVENESS RANKINGS 2005 
GCI GCI GCI 
2005 2005 2004 Changes Changes 
iCountry Rank Score Rank 2004-2005 2004-2005 
Finland 1 5.94 1 -7 0 
United States 2 5.81 2 -7 0 
r 
-7 0 Sweden 3 5.65 3 
IOenmark 4 5.65 
Taiwan 5 5.58 
Singapore 6 5.48 
Iceland I 7 5.48 
r is· .----, Switzerland 5.46 8 -7 0 
iNorway 9 5.4 6 -3 
, 
iAustralia 10 5.21 14 4 
Netherlands 11 5.21 12 1 
Japan 12 5.18 9 -3 
United Kingdom 13 5.11 11 -2 
Canada 14 5.1 15 1 
Germany 15 5.1 13 -2 
INew Zealand 16 5.09 18 2 
r 12 Korea, Rep. 17 5.07 29 
United Arab Emirates 18 4.99 16 -2 
Qatar 19 4.97 n/a n/a 
Estonia 20 4.95 20 0 
, 
IAustria 21 4.95 17 -4 
Portugal 22 4.91 24 2 
Chile 23 4.91 22 -1 
r--
Malaysia 24 4.9 31 7 
.Luxembourg 25 4.9 26 1 
Ireland 26 4.86 30 4 
.~--
Israel 27 4.84 19 -8 
Hong Kong SAR 28 4.83 21 -7 
---
Spain 29 4.8 23 -6 
France 30 4.78 27 -3 
552 
IBelgium 31 4.63 25 -6 
[Slovenia 32 4.59 33 1 
iKuwait 33 4.58 n/a n/a 
ICyprus 34 4.54 4 
, 
IMalta 35 4.54 -3 
Thailand 36 4.5 -2 
Bahrain 37 4.48 -9 
Czech Republic 138- 1 4.42 2 
Hungary 39 4.38 39 0 
[ 
ITunisia 40 4.32 2 
[ 
ISlovak Republic 41 4.31 2 
ISouth Africa 42 4.31 -1 
[Lithuania 43 4.3 -7 
44 4 .29 0 
45 4.28 -10 
Greece 46 4 .26 -9 
Iitaly 47 4.21 0 
r-" ~ 
IBotswana 48 4.21 -3 
China 49 4 .07 -3 
ilndia 50 4.04 5 
IPoland 51 4 9 
IMauritius 
~" 
-3 52 4 
Egypt 53 3.96 9 
, 
-7 0 IUruguay 54 3.93 54 
, 
IMexico 55 3.92 48 -7 
lEI Salvador 56 3.86 53 -3 
Colombia 57 3.84 64 7 
IBulgaria 58 3.83 59 1 
~ Ghana 59 3.82 68 9 
ITrinidad and Tobago 60 3.81 51 -9 
, 
I Kazakhstan 61 3.77 n/a 
Croatia 62 3.74 61 -1 
[ , 
'Namibia 63 3.72 52 -11 
,-
Costa Rica 64 3.72 50 -14 
553 
IBrazil 65 3.69 57 -8 
ITurkey I 66 3.68 66 0 
IRomania I 67 3.67 63 -4 
r--
168 IPeru 3.66 67 -1 
, 1 n/a !Azerbaijan 69 3.64 n/a 
,Jamaica 70 3.64 65 -5 
, 
ITanzania 71 3.57 82 11 
IArgentina 72 r 3.56 74 2 
Ipanama 
r--- ~ 
73 3.55 I 58 -15 
Iindonesia 74 3.53 69 -5 
I 
-5 IRussian Federation 75 3.53 70 
IMOrocco 76 3.49 56 -20 
IPhiliPPines 77 3.47 1 76 -1 
IAlgeria 78 3.46 I 71 -7 
IArmenia 79 3.44 n/a 
ISerbia and Montenegro 
.-
80 3.38 89 9 
~tnam 81 3.37 77 -4 
IMoldova 82 3.37 n/a I n/a 
I --, - , r-a--IPakistan 83 3.33 91 
IUkraine I I 84 3.3 2 
IMacedonia, FYR 3.26 -1 
3.25 8 
3.24 -8 
3.23 5 
IVenezuela 3.22 85 -4 
IMaii 90 3.22 88 -2 
bique 3.19 92 1 
IKenya 92 3.19 78 -14 
IHonduras 93 3.18 r 97 4 
IGambia 94 3.18 75 -19 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 95 3.17 81 -14 
IMongolia 96 3.16 n/a n/a 
~ .. 
Guatemala 97 3.12 80 -17 
Sri Lanka 98 3.1 73 -25 
554 
, 
INicaragua 99 3.08 95 -4 r-----, 
n/a n/a Albania 100 3.07 
Bolivia 101 3.06 98 
-
-3 
r---
Dominican Republic 102 3.05 72 -30 
IEcuador 103 3.01 90 -13 
ITajikistan 104 3.01 n/a n/a 
I 
IMalawi 105 3 87 -18 
Ethiopia 106 3 101 -5 
'r 
Madagascar 107 2.95 96 -11 
lEast Timor 108 2.93 n/a n/a 
, 
IZimbabwe 109 2.89 99 -10 
Bangladesh 110 2.86 102 -8 
Icameroon 
" 
11 1 2.84 n/a 
ICambodia 112 2.82 n/a I n/a 
IParaguay 113 2.8 100 1 -13 
~'---, 
n/a Benin 114 2.74 n/a ' 
I 
n/a I n/a IGuyana 115 2.73 
Kyrgyz Republic 116 2.62 n/a n/a 
~---
Chad 117 2.37 104 -13 
Source: World Economic Forum 2005, 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
Environmental 
Conditions 
and Trends 
Economic 
Technical 
Physical 
Social 
Community 
Nation 
World 
Opportunities 
and Risks 
Identification 
Inquiry 
Assessment of 
risk 
ANDREW'S STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
Consideration of 
all combinations 
I 
Evaluation to determine 
best match of 
opportunity and resources 
I 
Choice of Products 
and Markets 
Economic strategy 
Source: Adapted from Andrews (1971 , cited by Ghemawat 2001 :6). 
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Distinctive 
Competence 
Capabilities: 
Financial 
Managerial 
Functional 
Organizational 
Reputation 
History 
Corporate 
Resources 
As extending or 
constraining 
opportunity 
Identification of 
strengths and 
weaknesses 
Programs for 
increasing 
capability 
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APPENDIX 4.2 DATA COLLECTION AND FIELDWORK RECORD 
Name 
1. Barloworld 
1.1 Personal Interviews 
Phillips, A.J. (Tony) 
Drewell. P.M. (Mark) 
1.2 Telephone Interviews 
Drewell , P.M. 
1.3 Questionnaires 
Phillips, A.J. 
Drewell , P.M. 
Title or Subject 
Chief Executive Officer 
Introduction 
Head Corporate Communication 
Q1 Initial Questionnaire 
Core Competencies Follow-up 
Q3 Questions for a CEO 
Q5 Foreign Appointments 
Q2 Development and Transfer 
Q4 Practical Problems . .. Lessons Learned 
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Place Date 
Sandton 22 October 2002 
Sandton 9 May 2003 
7 June 2003 
e-mail 11 November 2003 
e-mail 30 August 2005 
e-mail 7 June 2003 
e-mail 9 June 2004 
06 South Africa 
1.4 Personal Communications 
Phillips , A.J. Core Competencies 
Chapter 9 (leadership) 
Drewell, P.M. Q2 Follow-up 
SA companies & WWW differences 
Coller, R. Market Information 
1.5 Wits Business School Managing a Turnaround Executive Programme. 
Phillips, A.J. 
2. SABMilier 
1.1 Personal Interviews 
Mackay, E.A.G. (Graham) 
Finanzauto SA 
Chief Executive 
Introduction/General 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
Johannesburg 
London 
26 October 2005 
22 March 2002 
14 August 2006 
26 October 2003 
8 August 2006 
10 May 2006 
24 June 2003 
21 October 2004 
4 August 2005 
18 May 2006 
27 November 2001 
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Hofmeyr, M.B. (Murray) Retired Chairman 
General Knysna 9 March 2002 
Salzman, Miller A. (Anna) Head of Investor Relations 
Introduction London 7 November 2002 
Q1 Initial Questionnaire London 3 February 2003 
McCallum, H.F.J. (Jack) Retired Commercial Director 
Purchasing/General Johannesburg 10 May2003 
Van der Schyff, R (Rob) HR Development Manager, SA Breweries 
Q1 Initial Questionnaire Sandton 10 June 2003 
Leibowitz, G (Gary) Sen ior Vice President, Investor Relations 
Q4 Practical Problems .. Lessons Learned London 13 July 2004 
Parker, A (Andre) Managing Director, Africa and Asia 
General Johannesburg 20 October 2004 
Miller, F (Felicitie) HR Development Manager, Africa and Asia 
Foreign assignments. Development and transfer Johannesburg 20 October 2004 
Turner, E.M. (Ted) Several Senior Positions e.g. MD Appletiser 
Technical, General Management Sandton 19 October 2004 
2.2 Telephone Interviews 
Saltzman, Miller, A. 
Mogilnicki, N (Mikolaj or Nick) 
Saltzman, Miller, A. 
Miller, F. 
Nel, J (Johan) 
Smith, B (Barry) 
2.3 Questionnaires 
Mogilnicki, N. 
General 
Q 1 A abridged Initial Questionnaire 
Acquisition of Miller Brewing 
Q 1 A and Q2 Follow-up 
Q4 Practical Problems . .. Lessons 
HR Director SABMilier 
Miller Brewing Integration 
Senior Vice President Corporate Strategy, Miller Brewing 
General 
Q 1 A abridged Initial Questionnaire 
Q2 Development and Transfer 
Q4 Practical Problems . .. Lessons Learned 
Q5 Foreign Appointments 
Q6 South Africa 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
12 March 2002 
22 August 2003 
10 September 2003 
25 October 2003 
17 June 2004 
30 January 2004 
12 February 2004 
21 August 2003 
22 August 2003 
9 June 2003 
29 August 2005 
26 October 2005 
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563 
Miller, F. 01 A abridged Initial Questionnaire e-mail 22 August 2003 
02 Development and Transfer e-mail 22 August 2003 
04 Practical Problems . . . Lessons Learned e-mail 15 September 2003 
05 Foreign Appointments e-mail 9 Septem ber 2005 
Parker, A. 06 South Africa e-mail 26 October 2005 
2.4 Personal Communications 
Savory, P.R. (Peter) Retired Marketing Director 
Reasons for Success Letter 14 March 2002 
Mogilnicki, N. 01 A abridged Initial Questionnaire Queries e-mail 13 August 2003 
SA Companies & WWW Differences e-mail 31 July 2006 
Miller, F. SA Companies & WWW Differences e-mail 31 July 2006 
Leibowitz, G. Thesis Review e-mail 6 December 2005 
Thesis Review e-mail 1 September 2006 
Godbeer, A. Assistant to Chief Executive 
Ch. 9 (Leadership) e-mail 29 September 2006 
2.5 Wits Business School Managing a Turnaround Executive Programme 
Parker, A. SABMiller Experiences in Africa and Asia Johannesburg 20 October 2004 
Makanjee, M. (Maya) Corporate Affairs Director Africa and Asia 
SABMiller Africa and Asia: Poised for Growth 
2.6 SA Breweries Ebhayi Rhodes Honors Class Visit 
Russell , K. 
3. Sappi 
3.1 Personal Interviews 
Hope, R. (Robert) 
Van As, E. (Eugene) 
3.2 Telephone Interviews 
Bredenhaan, K. (Karen) 
Brewmaster 
Director Strategic Development 
Introduction 
01 Initial Questionnaire 
Chairman 
04 Practical Problems . .. Lessons Learned 
Assistant to Director Strategic Development 
Port Elizabeth 
Johannesburg 
Johannesburg 
Johannesburg 
19 May 2006 
22 May 2003 
19 August 2004 
3 March2005 
9 March 2005 
25 October 2002 
13 June 2003 
22 July 2004 
Various 
564 
3.3 Questionnaires 
Hope, R. 
Van As, E. 
3.4 Personal Communications 
Hope, R. 
Maree, J. (Jenny) 
Q2 Development and Transfer of Core Competencies 
Q5 Foreign Appointments 
Q6 South Africa 
Q3 Questions for a CEO 
Q6 South Africa 
Reasons for Sappi's Success 
Tree Growing Cycles 
Ch. 9 (Leadership) 
3.5 Wits Business School Managing a Turnaround Executive Programme 
Job, J. (John) Chairman, SA Businesses 
Managing Global Expansion 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
Johannesburg 
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29 September 2003 
19 November 2003 
26 October 2005 
14 April 2002 
7 October 2003 
14 September 2006 
31 October 2002 
4. Wolverine World Wide 
4.1 Personal Interviews 
O'Donovan T.J . (Tim) 
Tegner, J.C. (John) 
4.2 Telephone Interviews 
Tegner, J.C. 
Tegner, J.C. 
4.3 Questionnaires 
Tegner, J I O'Donovan, T 
Tegner, J. 
President and CEO 
Introduction, Q1A abridged Initial Questionnaire 
Annual General Meeting 
Corporate Communications 
General 
Q5 Foreign Appointments, General 
Q1A and Q2 Questionnaire 
Various 
Q1A abridged Initial Questionnaire 
Q2 Development and Transfer of Core Competencies 
Q4 Practical Problems . .. Lessons Learned 
Rockford , MI 
Rockford, MI 
Grand Rapids, MI 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
6 October 2003 
22 April 2004 
2 May 2004 
20 January 2006 
10 October 2003 
2 February 2004 
9 October 2003 
13 October 2003 
1 October 2004 
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4.4 Personal Communications 
LaBarge, S. (Susan) 
Tegner, J.C. 
O'Donovan, T. 
4 .5 Presentations 
O'Donovan, T. 
Gulis, S.L. (Steve) 
5. Other 
5.1 Personal Interviews 
Moore, T. (Tim) 
Mushum, B.M. (Bettye) 
Reddy, P (Prasad) 
Executive Assistant to the President 
Background Documents 
Background Materials, Thesis 
Ch. 9 (Leadership) 
A Company Overview 
Executive Vice President and CFO 
A Financial Overview 
Managing Director, Baird & Company 
President and CEO, Gear Holdings 
Previous President, K-Swiss International 
e-mail 
e-mail 
e-mail 
To Analysts 
To Analysts 
Grand Rapids , MI 
New York 
Grand Rapids , MI 
7 October 2003 
7 October 2003 
24 August 2006 
15 August 2003 
15 August 2003 
4 June 2002 
14 December 2003 
27 February 2004 
567 
Whipple, L. (Larry) 
Pitman, G. (Graham) 
5.2 Questionnaire and Report 
Whipple, L. 
Moore, M. (Mike) 
5.3 Personal Communications 
Whipple, L. 
President, Whipple Associates 
Chairman, Inview Television Ltd . 
Chairman, Professional Pacific Ltd. 
Transfer of Core Competencies in Multinational Corporations 
Chairman, Boar! Longyeaij International 
Development and Transfer of Core Competencies 
SA Companies and WWW Differences 
568 
Grand Rapids, MI 8 June 2004 
14 December 2005 
1 September 2006 
London 14 July 2004 
8 June 2004 
28 July 2004 
e-mail 8 August 2006 
APPENDIX 4.3 INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF CORE 
COMPETENCIES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES IN 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
NEIL M. HARVEY 
28 JANUARY 2003 
569 
NOTE: The original Initial Questionnaire is shown in the following 
pages. "Competitive Advantages" was later dropped from the thesis. 
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- 1 -
SECTION ONE. GENERAL 
I. What was the overriding vision / objective / mission that led ... to achieve the 
global position that it has today? 
2. What was the strategy that led to the success? (Please summaris'e in a few 
sentences). 
3. What were the major obstacles and challenges encountered? 
4. What significant setbacks (if any) were experienced? 
5. What are the key success factors in your industry? 
6. What have been your practices regarding percentage share holding, control 
and appointment of top management in entities in which you invest? 
7. What do you consider to be your major strengths and weaknesses as a global 
company? 
8. Who are your three most important competitors? 
9. What would you consider to be the THREE most important reasons for your 
success? 
573 
-2-
SECTION TWO. HUMAN RESOURCES AND CULTURE 
1. Describe your management philosophies / culture / style in a few sentences or 
keywords. 
2. What do you see as significant differences (if any) between what you describe 
in I and what you perceive as those of your major competitors in: 
a) the USA b) the United Kingdom c) Europe (excluding the UK)? 
Please deal with European countries individually if you feel it is merited. 
3. In which countries have the cultures been most favourable to your operations? 
4. In which countries have the cultural differences been the least favourable to 
your operations? 
5. Describe your human resource philosophies and strategies in a few sentences 
or key words. 
6. How long has the company been established? 
7. How many CEOs have there been in that time? 
8. What are the age, years of service and years in position of the present CEO? 
9. What were the years of service and years in position of the CEO's 
predecessor? 
10. What are the ages, years of service and years in positions of the executive 
directors? If any came as the result of an acquisition please include pre-
acquisition experience but specify this as such. 
- 3 -
SECTION THREE. DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
(AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES) 
574 
1. "A nation's competitIveness depends on the capacity of its industry to 
innovate and upgrade. Companies gain advantage against the world's best 
competitors because of pressure and challenge. They benefit from having 
strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-based suppliers, and demanding local 
customers." Michael R. Porter. The Competitive Advantage o/Nations 1990. 
Given this statement, the definition of Porter' s Diamond together with the two 
diagrams - please list what you consider to be the FIVE most important 
factors or issues illustrated in the Diamond which led to your company 
becoming the competitive force that it is today. 
2. Do you explicitly use 
a) A Value Chain 
b) Internal Analysis (Please see diagram) in deciding upon and developing 
Core Competencies? 
3. What are your core competencies? Where possible please link each core 
competency to an activity in the value chain. 
4. Please explain in a few sentences how core competencies are chosen and 
developed in your company. 
5. For each of your core competencies please list what you have found to be the 
most effective methods used (up to three) to develop or facilitate the 
development of each core competency. Table A: provides a check list of 
some methods. If there are methods that you use that are not on the check list, 
could you please add theme. 
6. Have new acquisitions contributed to the development of core competencies? 
7. Please explain in a few sentences how you instigate and maintain a learning 
process. 
8. What specifically do you do to assist managers and key employees in dealing 
with the challenges of geography, language and culture? 
9. What competitive advantages do you have that would not be core 
competencies as defined in this document? 
-4-
TABLE A. METHODS USED TO DEVELOP OR FACILITATE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment. 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area. 
575 
3. Use of company-wide rewards and incentive system to develop core 
competencies. 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards. 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed. 
6. Commit resources early. 
7. Inclusion in company goals or objectives. 
8. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams. 
9. Use of international reach and size. 
10. Benchmark corporate competencies against competitors and other firms. 
11. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies. 
12. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas. 
13. Commitment to long term paths or trajectories of development. 
14. Investment in skills and knowledge development of human resources . 
15. Seminars / conferences. 
16. Acquisitions. 
17. Recruit outside talent. 
18. Value chains. 
19. Others (please specify). 
- 5 -
SECTION FOUR. TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
I. How do you determine the success or otherwise of transferring a core 
competency? 
576 
2. What were the greatest challenges your company faced in transferring core 
competencies? 
3. Please list (key words) what you consider to be the problems and Issues 
involved in the process of transferring core competencies. 
4. List the measures taken to avoid pitfalls in the transfer of core competencies. 
5. What do you believe you could do to improve the transfer of core 
competencies? 
6. Table B: relates to the transfer of core competencies. Using your subjective 
judgement first estimate the percentage success you believe has been 
achieved in transferring each of your core competencies. 
Then, using a scale of I to 7 - where: 
I = not effective at all and 7 = very effective 
grade the methods listed for transferring, in terms of effectiveness, (in your 
judgement) for each of the core competencies in your company. 
If you use methods of transfer which are not listed - please add them to the list 
and assign grades. 
7. With all the successful acqUIsItIons that you have made - list what you 
consider to be the five most important points in post M&A integration. 
577 
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TABLE B. TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES 
CORE COMPETENCY ABC D E 
Percentage success in transferring 
Effectiveness of transfer method (1 - 7) 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions in new 
acquisitions. 
2. Post M&A integration teams. 
3. Experts deliver, install and return. 
4. Short term secondments. 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments). 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company. 
7. Seminars / conferences. 
8. Visits. 
9. Manuals and video material. 
10. Company priority objectives. 
II. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer. 
12. Others (please specify). 
- 7-
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INTERNAL ANALYSIS & VALUE CHAIN 
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DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
A Capability is the capacity for 'a set of resources to integratively perform a task or 
an activity. (Hilt, Ireland and Hoskisson 200 I). 
"As the glue that binds an organisation together, capabilities emerge over time 
through complex interactions among tangible and intangible resources." 
Capabilities are often based on developing, carrying, and exchanging information and 
knowledge through the firm's human capital. The foundation of many capabilities 
lies in the skills and knowledge of a firm' s employees and, often, their functional 
expertise. The value of human capital in the development and use of capabilities and, 
ultimately, core competencies is crucial. 
Competitive Advantage - the ability of a firm to outperform its rivals. (Hit!, Ireand 
and Hoskisson 2001). 
A Sustained or Sustainable Competitive Advantage occurs when a firm 
implements a value-creating strategy of which other companies are unable to 
duplicate the befits or find it too costly to imitate. (Hit!, Ireland and Hoskisson 200 I). 
Core Competencies are resources and capabilities that serve as a source of 
competitive advantage for a firm over its rivals. (Hilt, Ireland and Hoskisson 2001). 
Core Competencies emerge over time through an organisational process of 
accumulating and learning how to deploy different resources and capabilities. As the 
capacity to take action, core competencies are the activities that the company 
performs especially well compared to competitors and through which the firm adds 
unique value to its goods or service over a long period of time. 
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The strategic value of resources is indicated by the degree to which they can 
contribute to the development of capabilities, core competencies, and ultimately a 
competitive advantage. 
Firms use two tools to identify and build core competencies. The first consists of four 
specific criteria that determine which of their resources and capabilities are core 
competencies. Capabilities that are valuable, rare, costly to imitate and non-
substitutable are strategic capabilities - also known as Core Competencies. 
The second tool is Value Chain analysis - used to select the value-creating 
competencies that should be maintained, upgraded, or developed and those that 
should be outsourced. 
Core Competencies are those competencies that define a firm's fundamental business 
as core. Core competencies must accordingly be derived by looking across the range 
of a firm's (and its competitors) products and services. (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
1997). 
A Core Competence is a bundle of skills and technologies that enable a company to 
provide a particular benefit to customers. (Hamel and Prahalad 1996). 
At Sony that benefit is 'pocketability' and the core competence is miniaturization. At 
Federal Express the benefit is on time delivery and the core competence, at a very 
high level, is logistics management. 
A core competence represents the sum of learning across individual skill sets and 
individual organisational units. 
"A core competence, as articulated by Prahalad and Hamel, has three traits; it makes a 
contribution to perceived customer benefits, it is difficult for competitors to imitate, 
and it can be leveraged to a wide variety of markets." (Mascarenhas, Baveja and 
Jamil 1998). 
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Intellectual Capital is the full spectrum of a companies intangibles, including for 
example, its data bases, software, manuals, trademarks, organisational structure and 
the expertise and abilities of its employees. (Lajoux 1998). 
An industry's Key Success Factors concern the product attributes, competencies, 
competitive capabilities, and market achievements with the greatest direct bearing on 
company profitability. (Thompson and Strickland 1998). 
Knowledge is information that is laden with experience, judgement, intuition and 
values. (Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 2001). 
Knowledge Management is the management of a firm's intellectual capital. (Lajoux 
1998). 
Knowledge Management is concerned with identifying the valuable knowledge 
residing within a firm so that it can be catalogued for continuous and effective 
dissemination and use throughout the company. (Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson 2001). 
The MNC (Multinational Corporation) has substantial direct investment in foreign 
countries and actively manages those operations and regards them as integral parts of 
the company, both strategically and organisationally. (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000). 
Porter's Diamond is a model that examines four broad attributes of a nation, that 
individually, and as a system, together with Government and Chance, form the 
playing field that each nation establishes and operates for its industries: 
Factor Conditions 
Demand Conditions 
Related and Supporting Industries 
Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry (Porter 1998). 
Resources are inputs into a firm's production process, such as capital equipment, 
skills of individual employees, patents, finance, and talented managers. (Hitt, Ireland 
and Hoskisson 2001). 
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Resources can be divided into tangible resources , which are assets that can be seen 
and quantified, and intangible resources, which include assets that are rooted deeply 
in the firm's history and that accumulated over time. 
The four types of tangible resources and the three types of intangible resources are 
shown below: 
Tangible Resources 
Financial Resources 
Organisational Resources 
Physical Resources 
Technological Resources 
Intangible Resources 
Human Resources 
Innovation Resources 
The firm's ability to generate internal funds 
The firm's borrowing capacity. 
The firm 's formal reporting structure and its 
formal planning, controlling and coordinating 
systems 
Sophistication and location of a firm ' s plant 
and equipment 
Access to raw materials 
Stock of technology, such as patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and 
formulae. 
Knowledge 
Trust 
Managerial capabilities 
Organisational routines 
Ideas 
Scientific capabilities 
Capacity to innovate 
Reputational Resources Reputation with customers 
Brand name 
Perceptions of product quality, durability 
and reliability 
Reputation with suppliers. 
For efficient, effective, supportive and 
mutually beneficial interactions and 
relationships. 
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The strategic value of resources is indicated by the degree to which they can 
contribute to the development of capabilities, core competencies, and, ultimately a 
competitive advantage. 
Resources are the source of a firm's capabilities and capabilities, in tum, are the 
source of a firm's core competencies which are the basis of competitive advantages. 
Compared to tangible resources, intangible resources are generally a superior and 
more potent source of core competencies. 
Strategic Intent is the leveraging of a firms internal resources, capabilities, and core 
competencies to accomplish the firms goals in the competitive environment. (Hit!, 
Ireland and Hoskisson 2001). 
Strategic Mission is the statement of a firms unique purpose and the scope of its 
operations in product and market terms. (Hit!, Ireland and Hoskisson 2001). 
A Strategy IS an integrated and co-ordinated set of commitments and actions 
designed to exploit core competencies and gain a competitive advantage. (Hilt, 
Ireland and Hoskisson 200 I). 
Strategy - the word is derived from Greek strategia - meaning generalship which 
itself is compounded from two words meaning army and to lead. 'Your company 
strategy, therefore, defines how you will win.' (Pietersen 2002). 
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Value Chain. "Every firm is a collection of activities that are performed to design, 
market, deliver and support its product. All these activities can be represented using 
a value chain. A firm's value chain, and the way it performs individual activities, are 
a reflection of its history, its strategy, its approach to implementing its strategy and 
the underlying economies of the activities themselves." (Porter 1985). 
APPENDIX 4.4 TRANSCRIPTS AND REPORTS 
Barloworld: 
Drewell , P.M. Interview. 01 Initial Questionnaire. 9 May 2003 
Phillips, A.J . Report. Going Global. 30 July 2003 
Phill ips, A.J . 03. Questions for a CEO. 11 November 2003 
SABMiller: 
Mackay, E.A.G. Interview. 27 November 2001 
Hofmeyr, M.B. Interview. 9 March 2002 
Savory, P.R. Personal Communication. Reasons for Success. 14 March 2002 
Miller Salzman, A. Interview. 12 March 2002 
Miller Salzman, A. Interview. 01 Initial Questionnaire . 3 February 2003 
Miller Salzman, A. Telephone Interview. Miller Acquisition. 10 September 2003 
Van der Schyff, R. Interview. 01 Initial Questionnaire . 10 June 2003 
Mogilnicki, N. Telephone Interview. 01A abridged Initial Questionnaire . 22 August 2003 
Smith B. Telephone Interview. General, Miller, Poland. 11 February 2004 
Nel, J. Telephone Interview. Miller. 30 January 2004 
Miller, F. Telephone Interview. Questionnaire 1A and 2 Follow-up. 25 October 2003 
Miller, F. Telephone Interview. 04 Practical Problems . .. Lessons. 17 June 2004 
Sappi: 
Hope, R. Interview. 01 Initial Questionnaire. 13 June 2003 
van As, E. 04 Questions for a CEO. 19 November 2003 
van As , E. Personal Interview. 04 Practical Problems . .. Lessons. 22 July 2004 
Wolverine: 
Tegner, J .C. Notes on Meeting. 20 January 202006 
O'Donovan, T. Interview. 01A abridged Initial Questionnaire. 6 October 2003 
Others: 
Whipple, L. Transfer of Core Competencies in Multinationals. Report. 8 June 2004 
Inview Television, Pitman, G. Interview. International Business. 14 July 2004 
Boart Longyear International, Moore, M. Transfer of Core Competencies. Report. 
28 July 2004 
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Notes: Other completed questionnaires and the rough notes on interviews not listed 
above are available. 
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APPENDIX 5,1 BARLOWORLD: SEVEN YEAR SUMMARY 1999 
'1.\~~M1RY 
BARLOW LIMITED AND SUBSIDIARIES AT 30 SEPTEMBER 1999 
0<XXlle Stateme Is Balance Sh~b C3$f' FlOW Statemen Value Added 
Statement Seven,year So"."..,')' Segmenli11 and GeographicaJ AnalysJ! 
1999 1998 1997 1996 995 1994 1993 
Rm Rm Rm Rm R, Rm R m 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE 
SHEET 
Share caPltlll and prelTllum 749 742 539 449 294 28: 251 
Re erves and retained su ptu5 5 721 4431 3835 3506 3204 2807 2505 
Intcrest of shareholders of 
Barlow Limited 6 470 5173 43"4 3 95 3498 3 088 2 766 
Interest of outside sh.reholde~ 
In subsld nes 520 555 510 680 570 496 478 
Interest of . 11 shareholders 6990 5728 4884 4635 4 068 3584 3244 
Deferred taxaltOn haDIIIlIes 282 371 319 260 218 235 266 
_ ng~term hablhues 2123 1681 1485 1644 1 123 638 903 
Current liabilities 4690 6759 5468 4540 4173 3370 3801 
Total funds and liabilities 14085 14539 12156 11 079 9582 7827 8214 
Propeny plant and equ,oment 4257 4364 3234 2801 2280 1981 2008 
Non-current assets and 
Invesunent TO aSsoCiates 1669 1697 1623 1413 1 116 720 749 
Deferred taxatIOn a selS 163 221 117 
Current assets 7996 8237 7182 6865 6206 5126 5457 
Total assets 14085 14 539 12156 11079 9582 7827 8214 
CONSOLIDATED INCOME 
STATEMENT 
Revenue 20835 20883 19368 17 S'11 15522 12874 11763 
Operaung profit 908 1113 1067 969 643 583 468 
Net ,nterest (pa,dYrecelVed (23) (190) (1 6) 47 68 34 (45) 
I CO! \e from Investments 37 52 40 40 32 19 28 
Profit before exceptional items 922 975 1091 1056 943 636 449 
Excepbonal rte'ns 875 96 140 (14) (24) 14 (104 ) 
Profit before taxation 1797 1 071 1 231 1042 919 650 345 
TaxalJOn 209 19S 327 260 301 219 150 
Profit after taxation 1 588 873 904 782 618 431 195 
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Seven Year Summary 1999 (continued) 
Stlare of aSSoCIate ccmpanle 
retained pro lIs 61 39 29 10 4 1 20 
Attributable net prollt 1 649 912 933 792 622 ~32 215 
- outSIde and prefe ence 
Shareholders 73 94 124 125 ~4 60 30 
- ordinary sharcho!ders in 
Barlow Limited 1 576 818 609 667 528 372 185 
Attributable net profit 
excluding exceplton.1 items 585 655 685 648 519 338 247 
CONSOLIDA TED CASH FLOW' 
Cash avallabl from operations 1452 • 220 957 564 938 369 
DIVidends paid (Including outside (331) (120) (20" ) (210) (149) (341 shareholders) 
Net cash from operating 
activities 1121 1 100 756 354 789 28 
Nel cash from/(used in) Invesb 9 
nctJVrue 350 (1 314) (1 60 l) (1 408) (783) (106) 
Nel cash (used In)/from inanClng 
activities (1 017) (10) 993 769 172 (597) 
Nel increase/(doc",,,.e) in cash 
and cash equivalents 454 (224) 148 (285) 178 (675) 
'ComparalJve frgures pnor 10 1993 are nor meanmgfu/ due 10 lhe tlnbundtmg oflhe Barlow Rand group 
wnh effect from 1 Oclooor 1993 
Back to Too 
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 
R'm Rm Rm R R'm Rm Rm 
ORDINARY SHARE 
PERFORMANCE 
Welg led average numDer of 
ordinary hares 
In Issue du " 9 the penod (000) 214234 211 497 206557 202231 200071 198571 196 243 
Net profit per share (cents) 735.6 386,8 391.7 329.8 263.9 187.3 94.3 
Eamln s per shar: excluding 
excepuonalilems (cents) 319.7 309,7 331.7 320.3 259.6 170.4 125.9 
DIVidends per share (cenlS) 141,0 124.0 124.0 105.0 84.0 56.0 
0, dend cover ( mes 2,3 2.5 2.7 3.1 3,1 3.0 
et asset value per share (cents) 3463 3 453 2932 2493 1 913 1706 1416 
PRDFITABllIlY AND ASSET 
MANAGEMENT 
Operabng margin ('Yo) 4,4 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.4 4 - 4.0 
Nel asset tum (hmes) 2,1 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.1 
Relum on net a sets ('Yo) 12.2 17,6 19.3 20.2 20.9 15.6 13.2 
Retum on total assets (%) 8,5 12.2 13.3 13.1 13.2 10.2 8.5 
Return on ondrnary h reholders 
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Seven Year Summary 1999 (continued) 
funds ( ) 27,1 17,1 19.4 179 lG.O ~ 2 7 6,7 
Replacement CClpeX t 
depreCIation (%) 56.6 77,8 861 98.9 92.3 98 .6 
EffectIVe rate of 1axatlon -
mdudmg exceplJonals (%) 12,5 21 ,2 27 4 28 3 34,4 36.9 45,6 
Average rate of taxation -
excludIng exceptJonaJs (~tJ) 24,1 27.2 284 27.6 34 .5 35,2 37.9 
LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE 
r otaillablhties to total 
stlareho:ders funas (0/0) 
T alai borrowIngs to total 97,5 1017.3 142.4 133 4 130,2 111,8 1450 
shareholders' funds 
gross. mdudmg leasing 
operahons (%) 41,1 68,? 729 541 42.7 33,1 5 ,6 
- 9ro5s excludmg leasing 
operations (%). 16,4 32,9 41 .0 22 4 20.0 20.0 
Current ratio 1,7 1,/ 1.3 1,5 1 b 1,5 1 4 
QuICk ratio 1,1 07 0.8 0.9 0,9 1,0 1.0 
Interest co\'er - Indudl leaSing 
oper. bons (urnes) 3,3 2.9 3.9 4,9 5 .6 4.6 2.9 
Interest cover - exdudlng leasing 
operahons (nmesf 5,0 3.5 5 ,7 8,4 7 .8 4 .9 3.0 
Number of years to repay 
IOterest.bE?anng debt - gross 2,0 3,2 3,7 4.5 1,9 3.2 
Cash flow avatlable from 
operauons to total liabilities 21,3 145 13,8 9.-1 17.7 92 
VALUE-ADDEO 
r~umber of employees 22 148 27804 29681 30 740 30660 30351 32880 
Revenue per employee iROODs) 834,2 726.6 641.8 580,2 508.8 407,2 
Wealth created per employee 
(ROOD 5) 247.5 182 2 168.9 145.2 127.0 102 . 
Emptayrnent cost per employee 
ROODs 137.1 112,1 7 .8 87.9 757 048 
INFLA n ON-ADJUSTED 
INFORMATION 
South Afncan CPllndex {case 
1993: 100) 152,1 149,7 137.3 127,1 1172 110.1 100 0 
D.nabon factor (base 199 = 66,8 12,8 853 90.8 100.0 100 ) 65,7 78 7 
Earnings per share exd udlng 
exceptJonalltems (cents) 
- Hlstoncal 31 9.7 309.7 33 1,7 320.3 259.6 170A 125,9 
- Deflated 210,2 206,9 241 6 252.1 221.5 154,7 1259 
DlVld nds per share 
- Histo ca l 141 ,0 124,0 124.0 105.0 84.0 58.0 
- Deftated 92,7 82 8 90.3 52.6 71.7 SO.9 
Tobl assels 
- Hlslon",,) 13 922 14 318 l ' 036 11 107 95 2 7826 82 14 
- Den led 9 150 9564 8 76 8742 81 7 7108 8 214 
• incJudmg iflvestments at I DIke' value 
Source: Barloworld (2006c). 
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APPENDIX 5.2 BARLOWORLD 2005 
GROUP SUMMARY IN OTHER CURRENCIES 
lur tOO 'jOOf ",Jtd;:<d i!l30 SsptMloor 2.005 
U$.oollaf Po""d s(®dh'lg 
2I>1l5 2.I,l!)4' 2003" 2001> 2111)4. 2U\l5" 2005 
$Ill $m $m Em £Ill Em lim 
SAUNCE SHEETS 
Assam 
PmMrty, pIa'lt,,"d equip",e"t 1246 11$0 &46 1M IlliS SG" 1 034 
GoooWiUlll!lti inWfi!lill!G_\$ 432 413 Z!5 2M ;!;!8 134 3SG 
!!lV<)$\lnenl if) aaooe_s and iOin! 
_ we athe, 1lOfHOUfrOO(_1m 449 471 400 264 200 2.00 372 
Deferred _fum asllets as so 67 4S 44 'It) n 
Ni>"_ant"",,,,,m 2213 2154 17U 12111 11\10 11130 11136 
CUrrent_IS 2:<lll1 214$ '! 642 1 Z!I2 1166 !Ill1 189!) 
-Yolal,,_ 4489 4880 337S 2543 2378 2319 3732 
Equity .... d lialillifu15 
CapllS! and rese"'ss 
snare eapi!lll an<! premium :m 187 1116 124 103 54 1a2 
l:reserves an<! retained income 1 $l)5 1313 '1081 851 725 546 1:249 
NooxflSl!1l:>iMllla rose,,,,,,$-
!ereign ~ lra!'lslnlio" 175 215 100 99 119 114 145 
rum"",! c! stmreooldar,. c! 
Bark>world iJmit&<! 1!1ll0 '1715 '1371 1674 943 824 1516 
MinortlyillWllMt 1M 111 11.111 151 61 00 a4 
l!llO(_ ill au $Im,,,lloldll"'" 20M 1 lJ:Nl 1411 1'131 1009 1l1l4 11100 
N"fW: ....... "\lhWIil!I .. S '1111 1 011 489 002 !592 417 921 
--,--,~,~~~-,----......,,<,," 
Dofarre<l gat",,,, ""bilia 
NoIN>Uf,"llt IislllJia 
Current liabllllies 1331 
Tc!allIqUlty and 1 ... _ 448& 
15 
s 
IM":_""""_t_~i_) 
1M oj>ere:m~p."'" 
;SH~£?5 
Ill! 
G11 
1403 1202 
4300 3378 
II'! Ill! 52 iiI; 
551 824 355 allll 
71'A1 775 715 1145 
2543 23715 2019 31a2 
Eurc 
201M' 200;;" 
till lim 
lISG 003 
$33 192 
379 42& 
&4 67 
1734 '14!!3 
1721> 148$ 
S4lI2 11001; 
150 91 
11!67 923 
173 1$;1 
't33l) 117ll 
SO as 
1489 1282 
SlI3 597 
___ ~,,"""","-'<~~"""_.~,if< 
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764 522 
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APPENDIX 5.2 continued ... 
Group Summary In Other Currencies Barloworld 2005 
OpetalillU profit before 
l,l'Xldwlll emQrlisatiQIl 
GlXIdwll! amortisation 
OperulllllJllmflt 
!""ir vmue oojUStment!l on 
financial instruments 
Finnm:e W!lts 
looome from ;n_enl$ 
Pro£lt before excepfionallroms 
E.~cepoonal items 
Profitb;!fmll taxation 
TaxatiOf1 
Pmfi! afW twtatlon 
!!loom" from _::iams ,,00 joint ''''''"''''is 
N!ll profit a!lrlhu!!lll!ll to: 
Minority sil<lrottok\e<ls 
ll<1r!<w.'Orld Ltmitet! OOa«rlrolclem 
Mtfilmtabla n!ll profit 
m(elorlin:u_eoptlon!i!lltmn" 
Nat prom pet "ham (canta) 
HeadlJll .. eatnlO{}a pet share {CMts) 
Ol'dlnllry divldtmaa pet snare (_)'!:s) 
CASH FlOWSTAiEMEmS 
Gash 'f!ow from npemooas 
l)lvlcancts jli!\iQ (irn:!mJi'lg 
mtOOril<! shSrehoklats) 
NilI_h How from opemtiog s;;IMthltl 
Nat ro&t used ill investing aclwIDas 
N<!I! cash fi&n lfomf{!l$W in) 
noonclrtg acIWlIjes 
N"I {da",,,,,,sajfill<l""''''' In _h 
am! cas!) oquwairults 
mb,.0G" ""tea u,..,q: 
Balanoo aha!ll- Closing f'ill<} im>d} 
lnlltlme srotemeflt and cash fiow 
stat_tint - werage rats (mild) 
USdoUar 
2004" ::lOllS" 
511l $m 
4$2 3!!1i 
(1li1) {134} 
(42) 
(6IlJ 
34 
217 
if! 
;>0000 sterling 
::lOllS 20M" 21l1l3' 
£In :am £m 
3S9 2112 
3M 
(S) 
(4O) 
16 
1110 
($) (.<Ill) {T) (13) 
{31l) {41) (53) !S9l 
22 21 24 32 
215 140 
175) (411) 
310 
5 
(19) (13) 
{JS) 
{51) 
32 
331 252 152 illS 140 94 211 2f!5 141 
1:1 16 14 5 " 9 ,,14 13 
140.0 114.11 
131M 129.2 
71.0 51.5 
(1l!1) (132) 
94 (33) 
('15) 
6.3ll ll.41 
6.41 &.&1 
71.2 
732 
38.1 
(11iJ 
&1 
:<11 21l) 
41 32 
231i ill? 
149 iUS 
00 
7lU S:U 44.3 114.11 93.7 
76.0 71.7 45.$ 1 14.4 1ft5:, 
39.1 31.922.5 5U 47.1 
312 
fi3) (73) 
114 305 
ma) (140) 
(22) 36 
(1J) 12 
11.72 11.77 
1i1 
171 
{2li2} 
(32) 
(1a) 
1m {W4 
8.M 11.46 
154 
1114 
111 
lU7 
# 7/w$e 1iClloouies are ptr.'f!Iified for fXJflWlfUtmOO p1JfpOSllftl only. T1w tepa/tmg ClIlTfmcy used for tlui 1immclai slat$~ am) 11(11)$ 's Sau'/JI 
Afticsn mtld. 
• RIISlEred - relEr ntlIlJ 30. 
Source: Barloworld Annual Report 2005:122 - 123. 
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APPENDIX 5.3 SEVEN YEAR FINANCIAL REVIEW: SABMILLER 1998 
7 year 
compound 
growth 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 
Group statistics %pa 
I Ordinary share performance (cents per share) 
Attributable earnings 347,5 633,7 566,2 465,1 362,5 303,7 290,4 
Fully diluted earnings 352,5 605,3 540,8 438,8 347,6 295,2 286,3 
Headline earnings 
fully diluted 14,2 655,7 595,1 524,8 429,6 359,9 293,5 284,7 
~ 
fully diluted inflation adjusted 13,1 601,2 539,1 482,3 405,5 331,8 285,8 280,6 
Cash equivalent earnings 11,7 912,3 892,0 838,2 688,6 596,9 497,6 473,0 
Attributable cash flow 12,7 871,8 753,7 793,4 647,2 452,5 507,1 323,0 
Dividends 15,8 330,0 287,0 250,0 200,0 155,0 137,0 130,0 
Net equity 10,0 2273 2598 1881 1616 1552 1650 1371 
~ 
Returns and productivity 
Return on equity (%) Ave. 24,6 28,6 23,2 28,9 27,8 24,2 18,2 21,1 
Inflation adjusted return on 
equity (%) Ave. 17,3 17,5 14,0 16,9 17,7 19,0 16,6 19,6 
Taxed operating return (%) Ave. 17,4 19,5 19,4 21,0 18,5 15,7 13,8 14,1 
Taxed operating profit to sales 
income (%) 9,0 8,1 8,4 7,7 7,0 6,7 7,4 
Net asset turn (times) Ave. 2,2 2,0 2,4 2,6 2,5 2,2 2,1 1,9 
Turnover per employee (ROOO) 12,8 399,8 351,8 305,0 253,4 219,8 209,0 194,5 
Cash value added per 
employee (ROOO) 17,8 177,8 129,7 111,9 93,1 79,0 78,2 66,4 
* 
Solvency and liquidity 
Taxed net financing costs 
cover (times) Ave. 7,7 14,5 10,5 6,4 6,7 6,1 5,0 4,8 
l 
Dividend cover (times) 
Financed gearing ratio 
Total liabilities to total 
shareholders' funds 
Interest free liabilities to 
total assets 
Coverage of net debt by cash 
flows 
Cash realisation rate (%) 
Other statistics (thousands) 
Number of employees 
Number of ordinary 
shareholders 
Ave. 2,2 
Ave. 0,45 
Ave. 0,94 
Ave. 88 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange performance 
Market prices (cents per ordinary share) 
Closing (last sale) 
High 
Low 
Weighted average 18,8 
Market capitalisation (Rm) 21,8 
SAB share price index 17,9 
JSE actuaries' industrial index 14,6 
Closing price earnings 
ratio (times) Ave. 21,6 
Closing price cash-earnings 
ratio (times) Ave. 14,1 
Closing price/net equity per 
share (times) Ave. 5,4 
Closing dividend yield (%) 
Number of ordinary shares in 
issue (million) 
Volume of shares 
2,0 
0,27 
1,13 
0,35 
1,40 
96 
81,0 
14,7 
14940 
15200 
10720 
13193 
52141 
396 
307 
22,9 
16,4 
6,6 
2,2 
349,0 
594 
2,2 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,2 2,2 
0,12 0,39 0,55 ,065 0,54 0,65 
0,92 1,46 1,58 1,60 1,34 1,39 
0,38 0,41 . 0,38 0,35 0,33 0,31 
2,36 0,91 0,62 0,40 0,56 0,31 
85 95 94 76 102 68 
105,0 106,9 110,1 109,8 104,2 89,5 
15,4 15,2 14,5 14,2 15,1 15,5 
14000 12600 10000 8100 5925 5650 
14150 14500 10600 9750 6350 6075 
10600 9600 7900 5400 5000 4600 
12438 11 876 9224 7532 5596 5459 
48173 40866 31654 25309 18376 16538 
371 334 265 215 157 150 
289 288 231 196 154 156 
22,5 23,0 22,2 21,5 19,6 19,6 
15,7 15,0 14,5 13,6 11,9 11,9 
5,4 6,7 6,2 5,2 3,6 4,1 
2,1 2,0 2,0 1,9 2,3 2,3 
317,0 296,4 280,9 273,9 272,7 268,1 
595 
traded (million) 67,6 52,9 17,7 21,1 18,7 10,3 7,2 
Number of transactions 
(thousand) 38,8 36,9 12,7 10,7 9,6 7,4 6,9 
Volume traded to number 
in issue (%) 19,4 16,7 6,0 7,5 6,8 3,8 2,7 
Value of shares traded (Rm) 8919,8 6578,0 2093,1 1408,9 1 408,9 574,4 392,6 
Source: SABMiller (2006c). 
APPENDIX 5.4 SABMILLER: FIVE YEAR FINANCIAL REVIEW 2001 
1997 1_ 191)8 ,1000 
USSm US$m US$m USSm 
tn(;Q~m $talen'l(""f1ts 
1m",'"... iiflClOO"J <l=eia,es' ~I""") ,,244 5,871 &.1$4 5.424 
TU'OOvef l""du<1lng a$~it""> share) 4.543 5.028 4.923 4,390 
Opq"'ling prclll (mdll<1lng """",-"'iol%' sh8rej 701 107 717 844 
N<;t inl!arsst payable (70) (5~ (111) l.eOj 
T~xa1i"" (100) (211) (1"5) (186) 
Mioorrues (ill) (59) !S5) (\14) 
Profit tor tho year 363 378 320 4&1 
Adj""''''' earllill(!' 3€O 410 394 428 
Bal<>n""_ts 
Fi.e<la$.."<!ts 2.164 2,204 2,51lO 3,510 
Currer It os-set lnvkooh at bilnk. and In hond 547 
€O2 749 316 
Other ~UIT~nt 3S'$6ltS 1,041> 1,005 913 558 
l~I.a-s~tS 3,1;7 3.a12 4.262 4L384 
11'11<$,,"$1 00.."9 Mbt (75'1) (1.052) (!iS3) (602) 
Other Cfe<lilCr> an(J p'C",IOOn$ 1'1.(99) (1.004) (1.445) ("1.223) 
l<>talllablli_ \1.850) (2,656) !2.JOO) (1.825) 
Net~:SMts 1.907 1,lW 1,8\\4 2,559 
SIro'elloltler.;· IUllds 1.5$3 1.008 1.703 2.161 
EqUl'j mirnfiW illtsr"<lt$ 314 58 16'1 392 
CilJlilai emplt'J"O 1,907 t,lS6 1,864 2.559 
CwAl tkwJ statetlV.Hlt5 
€l3!TOA 819 007 933 917 
WoJ1<lngcapltn! movsrmmts (25) 14 (45) {53) 
Net eMil OlfiOW from o",*,ung acn_ ;iN 921 
-
8M 
Nat int~'-est and (jv!f.J&1'lS (101 (55) (119) (82) 
TaXdtiOn (126) (100) (166) (175) 
592 700 S03 007 
Net capllOl .. ,pendltun; (21!l) (374) (H4) (401; 
~inv~fteflts (2) (21) i'Il (569) 
N<;t acqulsiti<ln ct s<<lYliOiafl<& and ~tes (173) (251) (213) 30 
/Jet ""sh su,ptusi(shortlall) '133 00 (215) (333) 
M"I1Il9"Il16flt 01 "qUId ""Wuf""" 1'8) (152) 1419) 503 
N<;tcash ,1Ilowfiom f>wOO!>_ 15S 57 255 72 
Dividends p<lid wa nt, n/a (50) 
Incrf!'a.%!{oo1;:ttmie) itt cash jn tt~ YfM.jf 283 1.35) 
Pmfcrnmnce per ordmf!1 sima 
(IJSiSi\ ""nts per more) 
Boskqao~,'9" 4g.£~ 52.1 43,9 64,3 
Ol!ute<l ~eamj,'kJ.; n10 !lin 43,S M.l 
A<!jUsI\>d W:siC "'8",1,'9" 49,5 5M 54,0 5$,6 
NAt.aSS&.{ v£'Jt~ 219.1 151,0 ;;20:1 279.1 
Sha~ s:tatisttc.s. 
~ Tot.1 n"moo' 01 shaiW 1jnr.90f1) 727,0 72.7.0 773" 774,3 Weight€<! .-ag" runl:lEr of SIlO"", In"lil}n; 727,0 727.0 7~,9 752,$ 
i \>\'ilIgi1tW """"'9<> runl:lEr of SIler", 
.ll l.dilU8d)&-J n10 !li~ 731.3 154.8 
1 RelUJ'm t,,)(j p,ool«'U'Jily 
~ Re\,wn on "'luty (%) 22,;> 37.3 23,1 hi.7 
;; Operating ma'gin (%) 13.5 13,0 13.2 14,6 
l:i C .. h op;;roting """gin fM) 19.0 19,0 19,9 20,9 j Op~xating ""urn !%) 335 47.7 45,1 41,1 
cash operoting f<rum {%} 25,1 26£ 24,7 25.$ 
.~ GlWp till'1l(M!f !)<'r emplo)le$ (!JS:WOO'S) 94,8 lOl,j 100,3 91.3 
~ 
"" 
Averog<& nlOl1!l11y "umb", Of 611lplo)'$% 41,902 49,431 49,%1) 4e.o19 
~
_,,,,,"" aM !iquWlly 
.i Net intare.st OOJer (t!.mas) 10,1 13.» 1.4 :9J9 
lotalborrowlr.g<l to ~"" os'5S!s (%) 20.0 21,. 22.4 13,; 
cash fli>w to l»tal !)''''''''1flg$ {%; 105" 87.5 93.2: 143.5 
126 
Source: SABMiller Annual Report 2001 :126. 
flVE·YEAR FINANCIAL REVIEW 
for the year;, ended 31 March 
lO,H 11)87 '1- 191)8 2000 200'1 
USsm Rm Rm Pm Rm 11m 
4.1M 23,731 28,205 36,364 33.355 3ll.039 
3.524 20,559 24,130 2S.9i50 27,007 26.034 
700 3,170 3.394 4,213 5,196 S~132: 
{541 (315) (284) (003) (492) nO$) 
I1SE) (800) (1.010) !'I.l45j \1.145) {1.3GSl 
11M) (353) \284) (51)'1) (500) 113Gl 
3S1l H542 1.816 1.8034 2,979 2.$15 
379 1,&2B 1,£173 2Yl6 2,613 2,11B 
3.$(;1 9,584 11,11(1 16,1'18 22.924 29.3% 
ll~ 2,419 3.031 4.641.) 2.013.1 lJ<IS 
514 4.621 5.071 5.6$2 3.644 4.1~ 
19.212 ;W.420 .s.l1m 35.19'1 
(5.300) (5,_1 (3-.933) {lIA29) 
({)))64j [$,954) (8.0M) (J,$2$) 
(13.384) (14.863) ('11,957) (15.051) 
16.844 19.1.34 
5,536 10.556 14,042 1ll.001 
~2 1.001 2.€o2 2,~n 
5.828 1'1.5$7 16.844 '19.134 
4,362 5.499 5,M$ ll.Ul 
00 i2Q9) (336) 37 
4.422 5.2.20 5,310 6.~1l 
(2671 iW5j (505) 1_ 
(762) (91S) fI.01;;) {j.31l)) 
.87 3,393 3.5S0 3,730 4.300 
r:fJ1) (1.195) !3.100j 12.400) !2A%1 
1 (00) (4) (3,500) 51 
tJillll pa1, (1,.05) (1.~) 100 ~~.n4i 
{4371 00'1 293 ('1.210) (2.055) 1,3,195) 
$4 (38) (32) (2.466) 3.102 411 
491 713 283 1.371 441 3.<301 
11m fila 01. nit, (309) !1.3001 
51,5 225.9 249,Y 258:1 395,6 31!W 
51.4 ft.<a flia 251,& liN" 31£.$ 
54,4 223,9 271.4 315,9 341M 399,2 
nl.1) ~,3 761,5 1.264.4 1.814,9 2.161,9 
175.{) 
Ml,,1 
%1),4 
UP) 
1-£.1 
23,~ 
4O.' 
222 
115,7 
31,321 
235 
!ll,~ 
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APPENDIX 5.4 (CONTINUED) 
SUSillC$'S 5e9tnent .1natY'Sls 
Boor SOUth Alt>::a 
OU-mf £%M~foge: lnterests 
110t&l; and Gaming 
C.entratadmln1SUaUon 
Ctmlinulng t.)UfjneS$~Bo «< ~l)tt:rut1~} 
a~oopti(Jj'mJ items 
PGSI 
Ex-C*Plk~J\<lllhml'5 
SAS InWfnatlonal 
PGSI 
BUSnWfS$ segment aoollsi'$ 
Boor SOUth Afro::. 
SAil jnt~rnotlorml 
Other 6e¥SfBge Interesti> 
HotelS and G,mirbJ 
Osntrt'l oominlstratlOn 
C:t>A1tinuing b\A'5:iJ~(f$$(j"g. - e~f;luding 
ax¢epUon~j num'S 
PGSI 
1997 
USlm 
'1.753 
'1998 19&9 21)00 2001 
USlm USlm US$m USSm 
S9B 1258 ·1.3i52 1 474 1,191 
833 920 967 9M 111£ 
279 282 276 263 lOl> 
3.1<13 4,264 4.204 4,29& 4,184 
'IAl.l1 1.;;13 1,751 1,125 
19<;17 
Rm 
229 
1999 
Rm 
ZOCO 2001 
Rm Rm 
7,933 a65S • .459 9·_ 10,014 
4064 6m.!) $,021 9,081 U,130 
3,771 4,412 5,<388 5.872 ;,98); 
1,262 1.353 1,624 'LIlla 1,5%1 
17.(130 20.461 24,792 26.479 W._ 
Group - ezoelux:nng excepUQywJ Jtmn~ 23 131 2~U!05 $,C€.c 23.355 "3o.e.arJ: 
ElU'';:*Jntonat ,\~tt 
SAG jnt~rnatlorml 
HOIeIS ~nd 0."'019 
PGSI 
1.276 
Source: SABMiller Annual Report 2001:127. 
1997 
US$ln 
378 
112 
82 
51); 
113 
7eil 
7Cfl 
1997 
Rm 
500 
370 
164 
Operating profit 
1999 1999 2000 
USSln US$m USlnl 
401 
155 
98 
34 
!13} 
81 
,59! 
707 
11m 
199 
12Q 
42 40 
(lai 
71'1 731 
15 
700 
{n) 
(1()i In) 
717 me 
Rm 
2001 
USSm 
343 
2SI) 
lUS 
,GO 
791 '1.0<..'9 1,225 1,_ 
473 fiOO 735 TN 
163 24> 243 180 
(55i fl04i (217) (251) 
2,6~2 3,298 4,164 4.498 5,132 
509 376 
3,201 3..6ie 4.600 4.874 S.132 
(31) 1282} 
(281) 
150) 
(80) 
597 
127 
! , 
'I 
i 
1 
I 
J 
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,APPENDIX 5.5 SABMILLER: BUSINESS SEGMENT ANALYSIS 2005: 
10~--3TI~' 
2,420 2,909' 130 19 
09;-1']551-1;g-37·m_·_:f30~ 162; 21. 631 
,275'1,96412:522-~343 '--287T-'338--s22r~"'7'D8' 
rage Interest~ 1171;-"1,473-. -1-06 95 i 120 l 186: -~250', 
i~~~~~:T~~~~~~~:~~~"'" "T·~§~r--~~t····~.?~t·:!~~~:·~=:~~~T--:·~~F~·~;i~r--m~~m~~~~: 
IGrl:)_~-=...!xclud~m ... 4,184;_ 4,364; __ 8,984112,64511±,'?~~_JOO· 712,' 9991 1,538.- 2,0431 
exceptional items • ! 
Exceptional items ---. -~-.- : 
I North America ~ i... t, _,., ... ~~~""""~ __ ~ i rCentraIAme;'iCam .. -~-.:~ _ .. m_l_mm._~.mm.m.'m_ ... , .. _ .. _m: __ m.' .. ;;;:. "--__ (--. -61- i 
f Europe-' (3aITIinom--'T-:-mm-~:-+~:-- m"'~T1' li=lotefsand Gaming I -4: 
~~ouP-includ~~g--~.~----.----~----~----~----------~----~----------~--~ 
"-exce ptional ite rrls'-'1-4:i1fir 929-1']12;1;995 
i#'2003~urnmo;;e;f~~f~;it to reffecftheaaoption Jf FRS' 5 Rep'orting'the s ~6sfaiictonraiisacffoiis~m.m._; 
lapplication note G. Earlier years have not been restated. 
__________ .-i---m ES}TA Net operating assets-~--~ 
i 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 I 2001 2002 I 2003#: 2004 I 2005 
'" -.-.. _m_._-.. m" __ ·r-_m'·r-- Restated . .!~.m. Restated·· m .... m Restated··mm--i--m •• ; 
i US$m i US$m I US$m I US$m 'i'US$mTDS$m I US$m n]S$m I US$m lUS$m .. ~ 
IGroup .. including ,! ' ; 
-"exes ptiona I ite-m-s---rnor---yg-S! 1,204: 1 ,93~"2:727i'-2-:S09L3,681T9,312h-o:QQgim1o,499' 
,._. _______ m<_ .. __ ~I_ .. _~. __ ........ ~,~_J ' I"..:..~_~i __ w... ! _ ..... _w~._ww"_.,, .. _ ... 
l# Restated to reflect the adoption of UrrF 38. Earlier years have not been restated. ---r I 
'm-=~~·==:.·:=-"-"---=:-:===l·m __ -=:=~ r-w.=.:,,·"~-:-=:=[r-_:_·""-" i,,""_m -=r~-==I 
'Source: SABM!11~E AIl!l~al ~~E.~.~ 20g5:1??: ' .. ~~_ .... _ ........ "m""""'. ___ mm.".w ... .J 
APPENDIX 5.6 SAPPI: TEN YEAR REVIEW 1999 
r: revlevv 
Incoll%' statE?fIlIU!t 
Nots~. 
Operating iocomll 
rJ0liil12l1ce CtlSts, fbl?fore repitab'3ed intl?resll 
Deproclation. amortisation and f91§ll9s 
bv::omo b~forl? ~ 
r~tion 
AttribUlZibie to mlllOl'ny !I'llere$lS 
Net incomll 
Extnlordirnwy it9l1lS 
Ca~1l ~\ed by opl?ra!Jons 
BalanCE? 5l19i!?i! 
Noo-currorn tIS~ts 
Curre llt asSi1ts. 
T olal 3$'OOt$ 
Current llabmtles 
T,jlal c.tlpirol empioyoo 
Statistics 
Averngo ftlJmbi:>r (fi/ shows in issw {milions} 
OralO1ill)l shams 
Share {X'lft:ffmiMlt.:'e: per "hero (in (Wilts) 
Earnings - Basic" 
- Dlh.J!ed''' 
Oldirn:lry divjct;md 
Net asset vtJIoo'" 
- Basic'" 
.- Dilllt£>d'" 
Oraina!"') dividend covor !times) 
iWtlIms{%) 
Opt-rating inccm0 to net ~ 
Opt-rating !ncoom to a\lwrat;)9 not OSS91S 
Net incoroo to _~ artlinal'Y 
shamholders' interest 
Ratios 
DebtitotaJ capitali sation 
DootieqUit'j ratio 
Cumll1t a$~t mlio 
Gali,h inte~ cover 
ill rn~$iP_'" m$p,,-~Oi1~r, 12mooms . 
11) yoor annual 
26.590 
-ri.4% 
12"39~ 
19.4% 
Sl1ptmnber 
1900 
Rmiffion~" 
• :\ fH'p1~i% J M<' 'W? W>i3 1m .mlf'$· fi!ilTii':! il'U riiltW fU'il'L't''''' ro_iiIIW SiX",,", Terrm c"""P"''''"C;;CUrtl''9 ~I@ 
r~$il!'cr_p'lM!1:\ '$>9t1mW1llI~ .. ~5t 
599 
Sl1pll11ntel' 
'1£<£>7 
Rmillinn'·· 
,:;; RiJllW fif f!1'iYtJ¥;i )9fl5 "~!W!1 S1;CI)' ~ Pap..- flO'i">"dn_~ IIX'!Jm>'l\;)<;;lf'f/t>',,_ iWt~ .. _1l9U'QULZt1 ' .. _sr; rM<', 
141 Sas'c 1i''''''''fW <l"I>"W<ll'M' "u""Y> p..-""""''''''''''' i!lf rWQ 19'97, f9W"""lilii@""'I)'*",,,mcm?JtociotxO'<iI'YWfoC J<UI"i' .... fl.!(!, 
fS Oilitt¥6.oo«.'"J9$ .(Jttr~$4Pa ~feJ' ~eern~~If$I~ ~~ fer NMht iI'~"'. 1@il8l1nei l~-Ot1~y&'fi< t'.@C!$;l~~a:-OQ1g to Ae 104 f~i5'iJO> 
J-WS£fl!1 fi#fj1'<mnoa'S'~i~ p¥ '!iISM~&'i ~~~J.Q)sc:Omttd. fJ'#.J1' ;blh9f~~"¥?f~CTrm?~.ftC ~i)4. FCI'tns ~'11? v*' 
i?~~mmUf'()'f~mw~pnt'f ro ~tlm£f~ (j#G!"ro(j 1lqttf('.t 
Ie; mr"'''''tq"",,,,,,,.niU, 
600 
flptsmber ~ptell1ber Fflbruary FObn.ulI'j fOOru3ry Fsbruary february 
100& 1005 "IS'S>5 1994 1£'93 1992 19£1'1 
RmDlioll'" Rmillion"' RmlUioll'" Rmillion Rmillion Rmillion Rmillioll 
13,945.1 12.301.5 7248.2 5.0SS.0 4.313.1 3.447.0 3216.2 
134S.S 2.257.2 812.2 '165.5 443.7 500.f~ 57S.5 
1043.£ 773.0 400.S '194.0 202.7 28£1.& 344.& 
905.7 726.1 57S.S 44'1.4 391.9 331.& lOft3 
577.1 u;a:u 62&.0 147.2 3fJ!)A . 33112 39&.£, 
1'17.4 192.3 35.7 5.0 20.3 10.2- B.G 
'144.3 135.7 2SJ:'> {S.O} 7.7 B.1 13.5 
315,4 'L355:1 551.7 145.2 .352.4 .:mtB 376.5 
444.4 50.1 19,1 5.3 237.1 
2.401.5 3226.7 US4.2 560.0 775.0 232.4 819.2 
-.---.--.... -~~-.. --"."' .. '" 
_. _______ .~u __ ~ __ ~" 
19.5%.7 13.873.3 13.395.2 7.405.4 6.9BB.O 5.464.1 54SBA 
4,994.9 5.13&.0 4.19117 2,3a5.& 1,£150.4 2210.S "LI71l£' 
23.59'1.6 '19.009.3 Tl.593.9 9,791.0 8.931$.4 7)374.9 6,667.0 
4.065.2 3.595.9 3.023.0 1.1:145.1 1.920.1 ).33&,2 1.20Q.B 
'19.52&,4 15.413.4 14.570.9 7.945.9 7..018.3 $,33&.1 5A60.2 
157.3 100.7 159.8 1&2:1 141.4 102.7 93.2 
201 
201 24& 352 00 24& 312 393 
17'1 
17'1 B72 3M 43 292 31& 3£4 
140 '120 100 100 200 200 
4.567 4.079 ,3.575 3.517 3.407 3.1B5 3,344 
1.4 7.5 3.7 1.5 1.& 2.0 
_¥ ... _._ ... _-
9.7 laS 11.2 3.3 10.3 14.5 17 " 
7.7 14.1 7~2 2.2 0.7 2.5 '11,& 
10.7 21.2 9.5 2.7 7.B 0.3 12.9 
0.50 0,45 Ct.51 0.23 0.33 O.OB 0,2& 
1.43 0.97 1.1S 0.4" 0.47 0040 eU!!) 
1.23 1.43 "1.39 1.29 1.02 1.S5 !J.BS 
2.3 4.2 3,4 :W 3.2 2,,9 2,4 
~3.452 23.051$ 23.013 19.13.23 20.727 '19.324 21,470 
Source: Sappi Annual Report 1999. Supplied by Sappi Head Office 2003. 
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APPENDIX 5.7 SAPPI: FIVE-YEAR REVIEW 2005 
MflU,1; September S8pt8mb(:;~ S:JDiernbSf Ssp~Brnh8r S(~pternh 
:ornpound 20DS 2004 r.<"">-;"'1': <"'>-),)"'w- 27J2 20( 
qrov~'"th {(?c) US$miHion JSS fTliErJn US!) rn{l!ion USSrnimon USs rnl~i~' 
Income 
SElies 4,6 5,DHl 4,728 4,299 3,729 4)1, 
Operating (loss) orofit li''' {i37j 188 272 402 2. 
Net finance costs 
(excluding capitalised interes1j (8.7) 137 110 111 102 1 
Depreciation, amortisation and fellings R7 4S0 465 395 338 3 
., (Loss) proil! balere taxali01'1 *', (224) 78 161 300 1 Net taxati01'1 n (11} (17) 18 83 
Nat (loss) prolit tor the year n '<) (213) 95 143 217 
" Headline earnings r; {SO. i) 18 98 i57 230 2 j Gash generated by operations 17.9) 554 601 845 722 7 EBlTDA ml!ll {iZ.i) 353 eS3 667 740 5 
~---~""-"-'~"'~-
Ba.la.nce sheet 
¥.-~-~.-,,»-<,-~~---. 
Non'OUfffint assets fTl 6.4 4,332 4,584 4,280 3,668 3,3 
Current assets 3.1 1,376 i,5S0 1,575 1,004 1.2 
Total assets in 5.6 5,7013 8,144 5,855 4,752 4,5 
Current liabilities 0,6 1,4S5 1,524 1,361 1,050 1,4 
Total capilal employed 7,6 41-223 4,02D 4,494 3.702 3.1 
Nat dab! 10.2 1,662 1,584 1,491 1,419 1,1 
-'~"'--_'_'~_" __ v.w~~_.-< ••• _~ _____ , 
Statistics 
Number of ordinary shares (millions) 
in issue at year-end "i (OA) 225.9 226.5 226,9 230.2 221 
Weighted average number of shares 
in issue during lha year J:li (0.8) 225.& 226,3 229,1 230,2 ;C' 0' ---.--~.~"--.-.-.~,,-.,,-,,~--~-.,, 
--1----.- "~~ •. ,~--~¥ Share performance: 
per share US cents) 
Basic Qoss) earnings PI ip (94) 42 62 94 
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APPENDIX 5.7 (CONTINUED) 
September SeoU.::nlbc Seplf)r11bm 3{_~r)tnrnUc: 
2005 2::0·< ;(003 
US$ rnmion US:;; n-"<;,tY\ USS US .. S rrdhrY"'l 
Returns ('Yo) 
Operaung Voss) proflt to saies '" 4.0 6.3 10,3 
Operating (10&<;" profit \0 avera..J8 f~ 
net asoots mONA} n 4.1 0.6 11.7 
Net ~oss) profit to average {J{oioory 
shareholders' equity {ROE) ,n (!oJ', (1i 4,6 1.9 1~,.7 
Ratios 
Net deblitotal capita!isato~ '" C.3" 0.32 0,31 O~3t) 
Net debt/equity nato '" O.SS 0.73 0.75 0.87 
Asset turnover (tlme$; a.as 0.77 0.73 0.78 
Currer.l asset ratio OSS 1.04 1.16 1.04 
Trade acoounlS <",::<livable days oc.1stamtng 
( .... dud0g receivables sec.~,rhised) GU 56 52 54 
inventory tt..IT'uy·/er (tjmf~SJ 63 5.4 5.3 5.8 
Cash imeres! cover (times) 6.4 5.5 5.8 7.1 
u ••• <~<._ •••• ~ __ um_ 
.. -----------,~.~"'. 
Number ot emplOyees 15,£18 t6,OlD 16.939 17,572 
Sales oer employee (US$'OOO) 321 295 254 2'12 
Exchange rates 
us.'!> por one ElitO !?J<Cfkwge rate - clOS,ng 1.20S0 '1.;:(;\..')9 1,1475 O,g/OO 
uS$ per 0110 &;ro (lXC'1&"1go ,,,Ie ... 8v"r~ge (12 month) 1¥2559 1.2152 1,0804 0,9188 
ZAP to ()I1e U,.<>S excharJ"Jo r«te .. dt)$"I) £ .. 3135$ 6,4290 7.'1288 1O,540D 
ZAP. to one US$ exchange rute .... aW3rfltJ" n 2 month) 6,2418 6,6624 6.3300 10.5393 
Net 0(55) profa to EBmJA(2) (i>i recoflcillaiion 
Net Qoss) pmfi! lor th,q '%'.ar Ii; (21S) 95 143 217 
Net tfnance costs 87 110 111 -102 
Not taxatIOn on (17) 18 83 
Deprooatltln and amcrlli1..abor1 (mCiudirv;; feHings} 490 465 3\J(j 338 
. -..... ~, .. -.•. ----~----~-~----~~- ............. ~~~ ...... .. -.~~-"--"-~~" 
EBITDA" M 653 667 140 
Source: Sappi Annual Report 2005:64. 
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APPENDIX 5.8 WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE: FIVE YEAR OPERATING 
AND FINANCIAL SUMMARY 2004 
FIVE-YEAR OPERATING AND FINANCIAL SUMMARY 
-~--------,---
(kl That.~dsl Except Per Share Data and Percentages) 
SUMMARY OF OPERATlONS UI 
Revenue 
Cost oi products sold 
Selling and administrative expenses 
interest expense (net) 
Incon1e taxes 
Net earnings 
Net earnings as a percent of rew:nue 
Cash di~dends declared 
Per share of common stock:13 
Basic net earoingsG1 
Diluted net eamrngsGJ 
Realignment chargesfH 
Cash dividends declared 
Stockholders' eq!.l~ 
Shares used for computing earnings 
per share:tt11m) 
Basic 
Diluted 
fiNANCIAL POSITION AT VEAR-END 
Cash and cash equivalents 
Accounts recervable {net} 
1~lentories 
Total current assets 
Property., plant and equipment (net) 
Total assets 
Tota! current liabilities 
Sh()rt~teml borrowIngs 
long-term debt 
Stockholders' equity 
Working capital 
2004 
$991,909 
611,774 
2'74,125 
3,24S 
30,819 
6S,938 
6.6% 
$ 11,135 
S 1.15 
1.09 
.19 
6.80 
57,398 
60,474 
S 12.172-
151,174 
182,924 
430,865 
94.930 
639,571 
110,251 
43,904 
458,291 
320,604 
Notes to rIV0,,)'ear Operating and Financial Summary 
2003 2002 
$888,926 $827,106 
562,338 532,878 
246.652 217.154 
51474 6,466 
231262 23 f599 
51,716 47.912 
5.8% 5.8% 
S 8,588 S 7,192 
$ .88 S ]9 
,85 .77 
.15 .12 
6.48 5.61 
58.764 60,368 
GL081 62,333 
$ 55t356 $ 27,078 
146,,879 156,285 
164,904 168,998 
386.(336 364,643 
96,007 97,274 
593,762 531,994 
85;766 80,117 
59,923 72,915 
430~O94 369,097 
300,870 284A66 
20tH 2o.\):1 
$720,066 $701,291 
463,030 477,.318 
182,178 198,953 
6,742 9,909 
231307 4,325 
45,240 10,690 
6.3% 1.5% 
S 6,643 S 5,797 
$ .74 $ .17 
.71 .17 
.47 
.11 J)9 
5.65 5.14 
61.107 60,909 
631238 61,882 
S 35,820 S 8,434 
152,330 161,957 
177,041 1441192 
374,802 325,086 
98,994 102,665 
543,678 494,568 
74,521 54,004 
90 896 
90;848 92.194 
374,152 33],238 
300,281 211 ,082 
1. This smlf'mry sool.1ld be read in cofljll'tctim ~~fth the consoldatoo financial statements aoo the notes thereto. jj 
partictkr, see the discussions of the Fiscal 2000 $45,0 niNon realignment cilargeas discussed in the Companys 2000 
Form lCJ.K filed Ylfth ttle Securities ,arJd' Exchange Ccmmiss~n (SEC) and Note 11-&Jshess Acquisitions. 
2, en December 15~ 2004. the Company artlOUft;ed a three4or·two stockspft in the form of a stock div'kiend m shares of 
common stock otR:stancing at January 3, 2005 dstribute(J to shareholders on February 1. 2005. All share oodper s/we 
data has been retroactNety aqlJStea for the increased shares resultflg from this stock spit Treasury shares ~~re 
excluded from the stock split 
3, Basic earoogs per sl)are are based on the· v,eightoo average number of shares ri camnon stock outstana{ll dunlg the 
year after arjl.Jstment tor HCfnesied restr«:ted stock. Diklted eamingsper share assume tOO exercise of dluti\€ stock 
options and the ~sting ot aN outstaming restricted stock. 
4. Stockholders' equtyper share is based on sh~s outsttfldilg at year·e7d 
Source: Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2004: 30. 
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APPENDIX 5.9 WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE: FIVE YEAR OPERATION 
AND FINANCIAL SUMMARY 1997 
30 
Wolverine World Wide,lnc. 
(In 17lOlI.wmds, Except Per Sh(tl'(~Pe~a 1997 1996 [995 J994 1993 
Summary of Operations 
N .l sales 2nd othc op..;rat ing income $665,125 $511 ,029 54! 3.957 S3S7,534 $333.1 43 
Cost of products sold 46(},999 355,224 290.469 264.384 233, 115 
Selling and adUlinistrative expenses 137,157 107.492 85,993 93 .9l:C 80;354 
In.terest expense (net) 4.610 ].595 3.618 3,6"'9 4.211 
Income tax.ell 19~542 14,811 1(J.{)4 7 6 ,625 4,440 
N~t earnings 41,539 32.856 24,067 16,598 11,492 
P~rc 'Ilt of nel sale::; and 
otll<;;r opeFl.ting income 6 • .2'% 6.4% 5.U% 4.3% 3A ?Io 
Cash dividends dc:darcd $ 3,688 $ 2,974 S 2 ~ 47 $ 1.7 11 $ l.086 
Shares used fiJr I,;olnpu\ing 
earning per shureC::"": 
Basi 41,516 40,141 36.270 34,569 33.165 
Diluted 43,464 42,955 38,507 37.332 36,925 
Per share of 'o.mmon StOcK: 
·Nd earnings'!".!': 
Basic $ 1.00 S .31 .66 $ .·4(; $ .35 
Diluted .96 .76 .62 A5 .3J 
Cash :ividends,·\,(4) .Ot) .07 '{)6 .05 .03 
Stockholders ' equity (;' (~' 6.52 5.66 4.9J 356 3.13 
Financial I)osition at \earEnd 
Cash and. cash equivHkrrb $ 5,768 .$ 8 • .534 S 27,08 ) $ 2,949 3,730 
A.i;coums n:ceivable (net) 1 38,O()() i25,999 83,392 70,66CJ 62362 
Invcnlorie.· 143,834 117,427 S::U50 R1.637 70.55G 
T(.tal current assets 303,86J 264.628 214.875 171.141\ ! 9,5 12 
1(,1tal current .Ihibilitie:-: .:;4,895 69.810 37,647 43,117 3S,306 
Woridng capital 238.%6 ]94,818 ! 77.228 128,0~, 1 111 / 0,:. 
Property, plant an I eqlJipment (net) 90,33i 63,003 46.885 35~348 31,623 
lbl.a\ as 'e~ 449,i}63 36 1 ,S9~ 283,554 231.582 205. J 12 
SnorHerm borrowing:,; 3,251 1.026 2,3:'9 1,132 ['948 
LOIl~-Lenn debt 94,164 4 1,309 30.6n 43,786 49,645 
Steckhulders ' equity 282.430 239,292 204.2 14 131,343 112,146 
Not..:. w FiV(:-}~ar Op~ra!ing and Financial Summwy 
J. Tbi,::; summary should be read. in ,onjullction with the cmu;olidated financial statements and the notes thereto. 
2. Basic earnings per_ hare are based on the ·w jghted average Dumber of shares ofeormnon stock outstandin.g during the 
y~ar after adjustment for nonVc,Jcd comrnon stock . Diluted carnin"s per hare arc based on the weighted averoac IlUrnber 
of share" of comm(H] ·tock oulstandjug during the year and th(: assurned exercise of dilurive SH)ck option'. 
3. On April 17, 1997. JuJy 1 L 1 Q96. April 19, J 995 mul MardI 10, 1994, the Company announCI:~d threc-for ... twD stock $p.lit. 
on shales of common stock OIl 'tanding at May 2, 1997. July 2. ,. 199 I, May I, 1995 and March 21, 1994, respectively, 
All share and p..::r sham dam have been retroactively (tttiHstedlbl' tit.: increased ghar s resu lting from . lh~$0 stock splits. 
4, Cash divid0nds pGT share represent the mtes paid by the Company on the shar.;;:; outs tanding. 
5, Stockholders' ,;;qltity per share is based on sit~tre' outstanding at year end. 
Source: Wolverine Annual Report 1997:30. 
APPENDIX 5.10 WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE FINANCIAL 
HIGHLIGHTS 1994 - 1996 
Financial H 9 h I 9 h t s 
Opernting Resu.1ts 
N et sales and other operaring incornc 
Earning: rl:o.m contim ling operatiom. 
befo re income taxes 
[J}Com e ta,x.es 
Eamingsfrom continuing operations 
I'creent of net sales and other operadng :ncom.c 
Percent of average equity 
Per Share of Commou Stock 
Earnings from continuing operations 
I)ividends ded are-d 
Corporate Stat istics 
Shares used f(}f cmn puting earnings per .!:hare 
Number of !>tOckllo1ders of record 
Number of emplr ye·' 
1996 
$51 1,029 
$ 
·47,667 
l-1.,811 
32,856 
6A(J-b 
14.SlJ{-' 
L 15 
.to 
28,526.045 
1.961 
6.775 
$ 
1995 
~)4J J 4 
to,047 
24,067 
'), 3'Yc) 
16.2,0/1) 
.94 
,()~) 
~5 ,6 'i' 1 ,7{;:~ 
1,975 
5,:)86 
605 
1994 
$387,534 
25.223 
{),625 
16,)<)8 
1.;Y% 
15J~9< l 
,67 
.O? 
24,537.08t{ 
2,046 
5,206 
Ail;bJre {;xA p t'Y 1/)(1'" da::u hl(l;(' br(!l} rt!f"!M·(.-:'lj(~y 1!(!Jlijlrdfhl' 1.h iJUTC<.l U'l i Jhclt"t.'% ltJ'ttiriuJ!, fro,,/. ,lu Jhrr~fp.rAi.u:lI SJ.(lck Jt}iI':~ (j)JJlfilfJit'1!d ; , / rcu'h £~.r!he )':'IlJS 
prc.!t'lI fflfl a/;ow. 
2. 
Net Sa les 
Dolfars in Milfions 
.............. .... ....... .............................. ·"-"1500 
"-' .... - 400 
92 93 94 95 96 
Earn i n gs Frorn 
Conti nuing 
Operat ions 
Dofls!"s in Millions 
9293 94 95 96 
35 
Earnings Per Sh ar e 
From Gont inuinn 
Operations 
DoiiQrs 
.... .. ...... ............................................. ... ... .. 1.20 
92 93 94 95 96 
Source: Wolverine World Wide Annual Reports 1996:2. 
Revenues Per 
Employee 
DoN ... ~rs in 1J';O(JSfJll cis 
92 93 94 9596 
64 
48 
32 
16 
() 
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APPENDIX 5.11 WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE FIVE YEAR OPERATING 
AND FINANCIAL SUMMARY 1995-1999 
Wolverine World Wide, Inc. 
Five~Year Operating and Financial Summary (1) 
Summa ry (),fOpen ltion s 
N ,t sa les and the r opl."rati lig incm:ne 
Cost of products sold 
Sd il ng and (ldr l. irustrG1tiv(! e>..p 'nses 
interest expenS(~ (net) 
Earn ings bcfm:c interest, taxes, di:;pr(~('iat l(m, 
arnortizati{ nand restruchn:i:n!l 
d:1c rge (EBITDA) " 
l.ncome taxes 
Net earning::; 
Pi;?rCcnt of n e t sales .:md 
other opernting inconu: 
Cash d ividends declar d 
Sha.!"'s u" cd for cmnputins 
t::arnings p ~r "hafeY' m 
Bas ic 
Dilut d 
Per , hare of com m n stock: 
'et cam ings, as rcpofted:c.!) n , 
Bask 
Diluted 
Restn:rdnring charge 
Ca.~ih diyidends dedarcdi" (.; 
Stockholder:,,' equity ", ,~\ 
Finaildal Pos ition at Year End 
Cash and cush. equIva lent:-
Accoun ts receival 1 ~ ll1 I) 
Jnv~n.toti~'~; 
Totnl curn~n l ' assets 
Total ell rrent liabi liti . s 
\--Vorking capita] 
Property, plant and i!Cjuiplllent (net) 
Total a 'sels 
Short-term borrowin.gs 
Long- term debl 
St{)(kbold.:.- l's' e p lity 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Not,;;; to Pi 'c-Year Opaatirlg Il!ut Finandil! Summary 
1.999 
665,576 
4 57,001 
147,980 
1 (},346 
88,773 
17,166 
32,380 
4.9% 
4,944. 
40,303 
4l,4S(; 
.80 
.78 
(.23) 
.12 
7.48 
1,446 
170,732 
168,011 
349,301 
48,539 
300, 762 
116,.283 
$34,395 
'148 
139,201 
332,105 
1998 
,. 6(:9.329 S 
456,726 
J·.].3/103 
7,'279 
82,123 
2QJS7 
41,651 
6.:2% 
S 4,621 S 
41.,520 
42,952 
$ 1.00 $ 
.97 
.1.1 
6.85 
S 6,2()3 
1:2,110 
167,039 
340.978 
"1,268 
~ 9,710 
111,135 
521,A78 
6,546 
16J;650 
3CY),320 
J997 [996 19% 
665,125 (! '-11 ,029 . 412, ,,57 
-160,9., ':/ 355,224 290,469 
137,157 107A92 85,993 
4,610 J,395 3,678 
78,292 56..409 ·l3,557 
19,542 14,8"11 10,047 
41539 3 .... ,85 5 24,()67 
6.2';;, 6,4~~) 5.3'>;) 
3,688 '~f)74 2,347 
41,5J6 40,64'1 36,270 
43A(~ 42,9-5 3 ,507 
1.00 $ H :; ,66 
,96 .76 _,2 
(,05) 
.1')9 .07 .06 
6 '? SJj6 43] 
5,768 5 $,534 27,0 ~; 
138,O6 '~ 12: ,~99 K>,391 
143,34 11 7,.127 88350 
303J~61 2~4,628 21-;t.;875 
(4) N:5 ,~,):no 37,647 
238,966 194$ 18 177,228 
90,331 63,003 4ti)385 
449,663 36'. ,'98 283;"-
J ,251 1,026 2,339 
94,2.64 41,309 30,678 
2S2A30 239,292 ~O4,214 
1, This summar y should be read in conjunction with the consoli iated financi<:ll statements and the noh~s thereto, 
2, 'Basic eAming~: per shm:e an'" based on the w0igh ted ilvcrage Hl.tn1ber of s hares of c mmon stock outstand ing during 
the year a.f.te r. adju;,tment for llOllVeste 1 comm on stock.. Dilutcdeari1ings per share assum~ th~ l:xerdse C'f dilu tive 
s tock a ptions and the vc 'hng of all common s tock. 
;). On April 17, 1997, Ju ly 1'1, 19 6 and April 19, 1995, 11.10 Company arU101111ccJ thtee-for-hvo shxk spliL~ on shares of 
x Inmon stock oul ;;tanding at vfay 2, 19( 7, July 2.6, 1996 and h-'1ilY 1, 1995. re:pcc ti ve ly: II Shdrt.~ (lnd } . f share data 
have been fete actively adjl.l st ·,d for the increased shens r ulti I.g front these,tock sp l.its . 
4, ,ash d ividends per hare represent the rales paid by tht? COTnp any 1'1 the sharts ou t- tanding. 
f. Sto kholders' equ ity per ::.hare is 1: ased on ",hares outt>tandins <1 1: year end. 
32 www.wolverineworldwide.com 
Source: Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 1999:32, 
APPENDIX 5.12 WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE: FINANCIAL 
HIGHLIGHTS 2000-2002 
Financial Highlights 
OPERATiNG HIGHLIGHTS (in m;lflof).'!j 
Revenue 
Earnings befcre income taxes anel minority interest 
Income laxes 
{---Jet ear:1il19s 
IfJorking capital 
Ca~>rl providee! by operating actIVities 
Capital expendilures 
KSV RATIOS 
Gross margin percentages 
Selling and adrninistrath.le expenses 
as a percentage of revenue 
Effective income tax rale 
Net earnings as a pfncentagc of revenue 
Return on average equity 
Hetumon averago assets 
RcvBDue per employee {in thousandsy ' 
PER SHARE OF COMMON STOCK 
Diluted earnings 
CaS[l dividends declared 
CORPORATE STATISTiCS 
Shares used for computing diluted earnings 
per share (in thousands) 
Number of stockholders ofrecordi4 
Number oiemployees at yc!ar-end 
(1) Based on ti1e numblY of (1(7;oioyees ilt eaell a.opf;cabie fisCilI ye<1J -6o(i, 
(2) As of Ii-,., 81>plit:2D!e reocrd dme, 
M.ark ~t Information 
2002 
S82.7.~ 
717 
47,9 
2832 
f.'l8 ,3 
13 .. 9 
35.6°:~ 
26.3''c;'' 
32,9% 
5.8°'0 
12,6<\, 
8.6~" 
$18r.Ui 
0.13 
41,793 
1 ,721 
4,42€ 
2001 
$720.1 
6a.!) 
23,3 
45.2 
300.3 
53.9 
11.3 
35]%. 
25.3'%;0 
34.0% 
6.3"1" 
12.9% 
$t56.1 
$ 1.07 
0 ,16 
42,449 
1,81 1 
4.614 
607 
2000 
$701.3 
15,0 
4.3 
10.7 
271.1 
71 .0 
12,0 
2(L4°:Q 
28.8°/" 
1.6% 
3,2"/1> 
2.0% 
$143,0 
S 0.26 
0.14 
41 .795 
1,975 
4,903 
Wolverine Word Wide. inc. common stock is traded 01 . tile New York Stock Exchange and the Pacific Exchange under the 
symbol ''WV.fW.'' The foUowlng table shows the high and kN .. · sales prices on the New York Stock Exchange and dividends 
declared by calendar quarter ter 2002 and 2001 . The number oj stOCkholders of record on March 3, 20m was 1 :121. 
StocK Price 
~w~"~"", ·-"", ,,. .. ·,,··.,. ..... ~·· ,· 
First quarter 
Second quarter 
Third quarter 
Fourth quarter 
Hi9h 
$1823 
17.72 
17.2/ 
2002 
Cash Dividends Declared Pe l Share 200~~ 
Low 
$1400 
15.80 
1255 
1~3 ,42 
... ,. , ................ ~ .. . .... -.. . .... ....... , .... ... .. ... , ...... " ~ •.•. ...••. ,. ... . , .. . .......... .. ........ .. ,. ...... .... . , ........ " .. , .. ,',.. . .. ...... . ...... ,., ... .... ......... . .. 
First quarter 
Second quarter 
Third quarter 
Fourth quarter 
. 04~1 
.045 
04':': 
A quarterly dividend of S.055 per share was declared during the fi rst quarter ot lise I 2003. 
Source: Wolverine World Wide Annual Report 2002:2. 
$19.66 
18.49 
19.50 
16.98 
2001 
2001 
$.04 
.04 
,04 
.04 
Low 
$12.96 
13.30 
15,QO 
12.25 
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APPENDIX 5.13 WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE: STOCK 
PERFORMANCE 1999 
STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE GRAPH 
The following gmph compares the cumulativ(;; total stockholder return on Wolverine Common Stock to 
the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index. and an index of peer companies that produc',> non-athletic footwear~ 
assuming an inveshltent of $ t 00.00 at tile beginning of the period indicated. 'nle Standard & Poor's 500 Stock 
Index is a broad equity market index puhlished by Standard & Poor's. The index of peer companies wus 
constructed by the Company and consists of the compan:ies listed in the footnote to the graph. Inconstrncting 
the peer index, the .f(:tUrrt of each peer groupcompall)' was weighted according to its respective stock rnarket 
capitalization at he beginning .of each l')criod indicated, Cumuladve tot"al stockholder return is measured by 
dividing: (1) the sum of (a) thecum:ulative amount of dividend for the measurement periz)d RssHl'l1ing 
dividend reinvestment, and (b) the differe·nce between the share price at the end and the beginning of the 
measurement period; by (ii) the share price at the beginning .of the measurement period. 
400 
350 
300 
COMPARISON OF FIVE YEAR CUMULATIVE 
TOTAL STOCKHOLDER RETURN 
CO l 250 
a:: 
« 200 
...J 
..J 150 0 Q 
100 
50 
0 
1994 1.995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
-0- Wolverine -!::r S & P 500 -0- Peer Group 
(1) The index of peer companies cOllsists of J. Baker, Inc.; R.G. Barry Corporation; Brown Shoe Company. 
Inc.; Candie's, Inc.; Daniel Green Cornpany; Genesco Inc: Justin Indu"tries Inc. ; Kenneth Cole 
Productions, Inc.; Lacrosse Footwear, Inc.; .Penobscot Shoe Company; Rocky Shoes & Hoots, Inc.; The 
Stride Rite Corporation· The Tinlherland Cornpal1y;\\leUco Enterprises . Inc.: and \Veyco Group, Inc. 
(2) In J998, the index of peer companies also included Nine \\lest Grol.1p. Inc., ,;vhich was acquired in 1999 
by Jones Apparel Group . Inc., and is no longer qlloted for trading on an exchange or quotation system. 
For this reason Nine West Group. Inc.; has been omitted from the index of peer companies. In 1998, the 
index of pecrcompanies included Brown Group, Inc., which cbanged its ,name in 1999 to Brown Shoe 
Company, Inc. 
The donar values for total stockholder retUnl plotted in the graph above are shown in the table below: 
Fiscal S &P P·ee.r 
y_e,;..ar-End WOlverme 500 Group 
1994 $100.0 $100.0 $100.0 
1995 184.6 134.6 81." 
1996 256.0 169.2 104.6 
1997 300.7 225.6 {27 J~ 
1998 177.3 290.1 lOS. ~ 
1999 148.0 351.1 154..1 
Source: Wolverine World Wide: Notice of Annual General Meeting 2000:9. 
APPENDIX 7.1 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: BARLOWORLD 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1 Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2 Commit substantial resources to an area 
3 Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4 Corporate culture that demands high perform ance standards 
5 Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6 Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7 Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8 Use of international reach and size 
9 Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10 Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
a. 
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11 Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12 Commitment to long term paths or trajectories of development 
13 Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14 Seminars I conferences 
I I x l ~ l x l : l x l ~ l ~ 
15 Acquisitions 
16 Recruit outside talent 
17 Value chains 
18 Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19 Others: Performance management 
20 Others: Focus and scale 
_Total L Xi 
I 
I 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 28 
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APPENDIX 7.2 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: SABMILLER AFRICA AND ASIA 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1 Exposure to a demanding technical , operating or economic environment 
2 Commit substantial resources to an area 
3 Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4 Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5 Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6 Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7 Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8 Use of international reach and size 
9 Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10 Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11 Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12 Commitment to long term paths or trajectories of development 
13 Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14 Seminars I conferences 
15 Acquisitions 
16 Recruit outside talent 
17 Value chains 
18 Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19 Others : Performance management 
20 Others: Focus and scale 
Total ~:Xi 
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APPENDIX 7.3 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: SABMILLER EUROPE 
Times methods cited 
Method 
Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2 Commit substantial resources to an area 
3 Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4 Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5 Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6 Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7 Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8 Use of international reach and size 
9 Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10 Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11 Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12 Commitment to long term paths or trajectories of development 
13 Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14 Seminars I conferences 
15 Acquisitions 
16 Recruit outside talent 
17 Value chains 
18 Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19 Others: Performance management 
20 Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
'" Cl C C 0 
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'" 
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1 I, 1 I: 1 : 1 1 11 
1:1:1:lxlxl:lxl: 
x 1 
4 4 4 4 4 4 28 
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APPENDIX 7.4 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: SAPPI 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1 Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2 Commit substantial resources to an area 
3 Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4 Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5 Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6 Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7 Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8 Use of international reach and size 
g Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10 Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11 Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12 Commitment to long term paths or trajectories of development 
13 Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14 Seminars I conferences 
15 Acquisitions 
16 Recruit outside talent 
17 Value chains 
18 Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19 Others: Performance management 
20 Others: Focus and scale 
Total 2: Xi 
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APPENDIX 7.5 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1 Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2 Commit substantial resources to an area 
3 Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4 Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5 Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6 Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7 Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8 Use of international reach and size 
9 Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10 Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11 Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12 Commitment to long term paths or trajectories of development 
13 Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14 Seminars I conferences 
15 Acquisitions 
16 Recruit outside talent 
17 Value chains 
18 Others: Identify leadership competencies 
1 9 Others: Performance management 
20 Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
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APPENDIX 7.6 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY COMPOSITES 
Method Times Cited 
1. Exposure to demanding technical, operating, economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company·wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi·disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment, skills & knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and Scale 
Total ~Xi 
Number n 
Mean x 
BAR A&A EUR 
2 4 1 
1 1 
1 2 
7 2 7 
1 1 
2 2 
2 3 2 
1 3 1 
1 3 2 
1 2 
3 4 7 
2 1 
4 1 4 
1 
1 
1 
28 28 28 
13 13 10 
2.2 2.2 2.8 
, , , 
Note: Rank refers to Total or ~Xi column. Methods 18 to 20 not ranked because from Sappi alone. 
SAP WW LX; n x 
1 8 4 2.0 
2 6 3 2.0 
3 2 1.5 
3 19 4 4.8 
2 4 3 1.3 
2 6 3 2.0 
4 11 4 2.8 
1 6 4 1.5 
2 8 4 2.0 
3 2 1.5 
1 15 4 3.8 
1 4 3 1.3 
2 11 4 1.3 
2.8 
1 1 1.0 
1 1 1.0 
1 1 1.0 
1 1 1 1.0 
1 1 1 1.0 
1 1 1 1.0 
24 108 
14 50 
1.7 2.2 
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Rank 
5 
7 
11 
1 
9 
7 
3 
7 
5 
15 
2 
9 
3 
17 
14 
14 
14 
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APPENDIX 7.7 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: MARKETING 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark corporate competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
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Appendix 7.8 Development of Core Competencies: Outbound Logistics 
Method Times Cited 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activi ties that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
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APPENDIX 7.9 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: OPERATIONS 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
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APPENDIX 7.10 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: INBOUND LOGISTICS 
Method Times Cited 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company·wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
g. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
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APPENDIX 7.11 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Method Times Cited 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
Use of international reach and size 
Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11 . Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
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APPENDIX 7.12 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
Method Times Cited 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
Total LXi 
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APPENDIX 7.13 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Times methods cited 
Method 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
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APPENDIX 7.14 DEVELOPMENT OF CORE COMPETENCIES: INFRASTRUCTURE: GENERAL MANAGEMENT 
T imes methods cited 
Method 
1. Exposure to a demanding technical, operating or economic environment 
2. Commit substantial resources to an area 
3. Use of company-wide reward and incentive systems 
4. Corporate culture that demands high performance standards 
5. Internal analysis that identifies activities that should be developed 
6. Inclusion in planning process (objectives, goals etc) 
7. Formation of special multi-disciplinary teams 
8. Use of international reach and size 
9. Benchmark corporate competencies against competitors and other firms 
10. Regular review of existing and nascent core competencies 
11. Allocation of key managers and experts to areas 
12. Commitment to long-term paths or trajectories of development 
13. Investment in skills and knowledge, development of human resources 
14. Seminars/conferences 
15. Acquisitions 
16. Recruit outside talent 
17. Value chains 
18. Others: Identify leadership competencies 
19. Others: Performance management 
20. Others: Focus and scale 
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APPENDIX 7.15 
Beer Consumption by Country (2004) 
Rank 2004 2003 
Rank in Country Total Breakdown Year-on- Total Breakdown 
2003 consumption by year consumption by 
(1,000 kL) country increase (1,000 kL) country 
1 1 China 28,640 19.0% 14.6% 24,995 17.3% 
2 2 US 23,974 15.9% 0.9% 23,771 16.5% 
3 3 Germany 9,555 6.4% -1 .6% 9,711 6.7% 
4 4 Brazil 8,450 5.6% 2.8% 8,220 5.7% 
4 5 Russia 8,450 5.6% 11 .1% 7,606 5.3% 
6 6 Japan 6,549 4.4% 0.7% 6,500 4.5% 
7 7 UK 5,920 3.9% -1.8% 6,030 4.2% 
8 8 Mexico 5,435 3.6% 2.0% 5,328 3.7% 
9 9 Spain 3,376 2.2% 0.9% 3,345 2.3% 
10 10 Poland 2,670 1.8% -2.4% 2,735 1.9% 
11 11 South Africa 2,530 1.7% 3.3% 2,450 1.7% 
12 12 Canada 2,183 1.5% 0.8% 2,165 1.5% 
13 13 France 2,020 1.3% -4.6% 2,117 1.5% 
14 14 South Korea 1,897 1.3% 2.0% 1,860 1.3% 
15 15 Czech Republic 1,878 1.2% 2.1% 1,839 1.3% 
16 18 Ukraine 1,729 1.1% 3.9% 1,665 1.2% 
17 16 Italy 1,719 1.1% -1 .5% 1,745 1.2% 
18 17 Australia 1,678 1.1% -0.7% 1,689 1.2% 
19 19 Colombia 1,658 1.1% 2.0% 1,625 1.1% 
20 21 Thailand 1,595 1.1% 10.0% 1,450 1.0% 
21 20 Venezuela 1,525 1.0% 2.5% 1,488 1.0% 
22 25 Philippines 1,409 0.9% 15.6% 1,219 0.8% 
23 23 Romania 1,302 0.9% 1.5% 1,283 0.9% 
24 24 Argentine 1,281 0.9% 4.5% 1,225 0.8% 
25 22 Netherlands 1,269 0.8% -1 .8% 1,292 0.9% 
Note: Total consumption volume in Japan includes that of beer, happo-shu (low-malt beer) 
and new genre. 
Worldwide total consumption volume (estimate) : 
2004 2003 
150.392 million kL (up 4.2%) 144.296 million kL 
[Comments) 
• In 2004, annual consumption volume in the world recorded 19 years of consecutive 
growth. The growth rate against the previous year exceeded 4% for the first time since 
1987. The reasons to the expansion of the beer market are attributed to the global 
economic recovery and high temperature caused by record-breaking heat waves. 
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• The Chinese market, which has topped the list for 2 straight years, is growing at a more 
rapid pace than last year (up 6.4%), getting a lead of 4.67 million kL on the US. Its growth 
is attributed to a population increase and improved standard of living due to economic 
growth. The beer market in China is characterized by market growth centered on urban 
areas as well as aggressive market entries by foreign breweries. 
• Due to changes in economic policies and a ~rowing health consciousness since the late 
1990's, Russia jumped to 4th in 2004 from 9 in 1994, sharing its position with Brazil. 
• Of the southeast Asian markets, Thailand (up 10%) and the Philippines (up 15.6%) 
showed remarkable growth . 
• Japan remains in the same position on the list, but consumption increased (by 0.7%) for 
the first time since 2001 after a 2-year decline, which was attributed to the heat-wave and 
introduction of new genre. 
Acknowledgement: I learned of this source through Thompson, B. and Harrison, J. 
(2006). Multinational Assignment: SABMiller. Strategy 402. Grahamstown: 
Department of Management, Rhodes University. 
Source: Kirin (2004). 
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APPENDIX 7.16 FOREST INDUSTRY'S RELATED AND SUPPORTING 
INDUSTRIES 
Plantati.on 
Forests 
Suga't' cane '-
Ma:nufactur"inQ' 
Soiid WDod p.foc8;ssjng 
Mechanical pulping 
/ 
Chemical pulping 
Product:s/qrades Convert~rs Final uses 
Treated poles 
Sawn timbe 
Fibreboard 
( 
1'lJew5print 
. Magazine gmde 
! i Uncoated 
! ! Coated 
Telephone .. electriciTy 
& 'fencing poles 
- '---' __ .... (Pttckaqinq 
-. -,,"._--... 1. Buil~mg & construdion 
_-~ ... ~ ... -~. '.  l Furnrture /Publish~rs ~~.J'tl$~$; 
Newsptl1ef's 
zincs 
01 
Office 
Advert ising t11Luerials 
.I 
<' Tissue.,--+--l· 
Tissue. 
conlle 't€I'S 5.rm:itary products: 
Unerooar 
Pacer bggs 
'monuf , 
Corrugated boxe 
\ 1'. Sack Kraft 
I ;Prlflters 
I Cartonnoard .. -< 
\. lBox makers 
~ 
Pack~ing fo\" cen1ent" 
pota oes etc. 
Grocery bc.g,> 
Fresh produce p-ackoging 
Packaging for ~ ronspoM of goods 
Point of sale packaging 
// 
Source: South African Forestry (2004:7). 
APPE:\DI" 7.17 WORI.D'S TOP PULP, PAPER AND PAPER BOARD 
PRODUCERS Al\D CONSU\IERS 000 TONS 
Appendix 1 
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The World 's Top 30 Producers and Consumers - 2004 
Top 30 P<lpor & Paperboard producers 
, 
, 
Paper & paperbcaro 2004 % chango production 
, 
1. USA S3,401 4.{J 
2. China, Pac pie's Rap, 49.500 15,1 
:>. Japan :>0.889 2,{) 
~. Canada 20.461 2,5 
S. Germany 20.392 5,6 
6" Finland 14.ll3S 7.5 
7. Sweden 11 ,5139 4,8 
B, Kot9<3, R&p, 01 1O. f>11 3,6 
!}. France 10,249 3 , ~ 
10, Italy 9,665 1.8 
11. 8 razl! 8,422 0.4 
12.lndonasla 7.678 5,B 
13. Russia 6.789 6.5 
14. United Kingdom 6,240 0,2 
15, India 6,229 7.0 
16. Spain 5.527 1,6 
17, Aus-tria 4,852 5,3 
18, Taiwan 4.801 3,1 
19, Mexico 4.349 6.6 
20. Thalland 3,6(JD 10,4 
21. Nethertands- 3,459 3,5 
22, Australia 3,Hl4 3,4 
23, Poland 2,a:35 7;l 
24" South Africa 2.563 f) ,~ 
125, Norwav 2,294 4,9 
2s.Belglum 1,957 12,1 
27, SYli~erland 1,777 ·2,2 
128, Turk!lY 1,769 9,3 
129. PortuQal 1,666 9,5 
30, ArgentIna 1.507 8,1 
Sourco PJJperioop loc, 
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Top 30 Pulp prod ucers 
Pulp production 2004 %chnnge 
-1. USA 5-3,585 3,8 
2, Canada 26.40B 0 ,6 
-3. C~llna, People 's R£lp. 1.1,18(; 2.2 
~ Finland 12Jil!f ~5,6 ~vlldl,;n - 12,105 3,1 
S.Japan 10.7.20 1." 17, Brazil 9,728 6,0 
B. Russla 7,381 2 ,8 
9. IndoMsla. 5.209 0,3 
10. Chile 3.OWS 2(),fl 
11 . India 3.269 -2,8 
12. France 2.547 3,0 
13. NOlWlIY 2,528 5,S. 
1£.Germa f1y' 2.402 Soli· 
1·5. South Afr ica 2. 192 -5,4 
!6. Seain 1.898 5,5· 
17. ~orttJgal 1,950 0,8 
18. Austria 1,936 6.2· 
19. NllW 2oolaJ1d 1.596 12,5 
20. Australia 1,39B 11.4 
21. !loland I,Cl22 -0,3 
22. Thallan d 1,000 1.0 
~. Argentina !i42 2,6 
24. Czech Republic 735 2 .1 
25. Italy 687 6,;! 
26. Korell,. Rep. of 544 4.n 
27.Selglum - 531 8,1 
28. Slovak Republic 523 9.3 
129. Taiwan --a04 0,0 
30. Colombia 382 0.7 
-Top 30 Paper &. Paperboard consumers 
Paper & Paperboard 2004 ,,"change 
consumption 
1. USA 92.257 4,0 
2.. China, People's Rep. 54,392 13,2 
3. Japan 31.425 2,0 
4. Gennany 19,442 3,3 
5. United Kingdom 12.111B f.! 
6. Itaiy 11.334 0,7 
7. Franco 11 .079 2,3 
8. Korea, Rep. of 8.243 0,2 
9. BrlliZll 7.303 8.7 
10. Gan<lCi!i 7,;1$9 2,5 
11. Spain 7. 194 ·0.3 
12. htdi a 6,968 12,7 
13. Mexico 6. 137 4,5 
-14. Indo nesia 5,408 ~,8 
15. Taiwan 5.Hl7 2.e 
-16. RllsSia 4,9,,3 7,B 
17. Australla 4. 122 2.7 
18. Belgium 3,502 0.9 
19. Poland 3.3!H 8,6 
20. Nethenands 3,361 -6,3 
21. Turkey 3.329 15.0 
-22. M!llay$~ 2,546 7,5 
2:3. Sweden 2.276 ·0.3 
24. SO!Jlh Africa 2,147 12.6 
25. Aus.trla 2.006 3.1 
26. Argentina 1.956 12,9 
27. Swll%erland 1.664 3,0 
- -28. Iran 1.525 6,6 
29. Finland 1.489 -S.l 
- -
30. [}ef1mark j,395 9,7 
Soorce_ PaMrlOop Inc. 
Source: Intcmational Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers 
Unions (tCEM) (2005). 
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APPENDIX 7.18 QUESTIONS FOR SABMILLER 
Appendix: Questions Posed to SABMiIler 
I. What are SABMilier's core competencies? What does SABMilier perceive as 
their most important resources and capabilities that contribute towards 
forming these core competencies, which can be used to achieve a competitive 
advantage over rivals? 
Core competency Resources I Capabilities 
Brand-building and » Insight on consumer choice patterns 
portfolio shaping >- Robust and well-structured brand portfolio, across 
segments but skewed towards higher value brands 
with stronger equity and margins 
» Nimble and innovative marketing strategy, balancing 
volume impact with ROI considerations 
Sales and distribution ,. Quantity and quality of sales force and 
merchandising at retail point-of-sale 
;... Local market plans and analytical tools 
,- Productive relationships with distributors 
Costs and productivity » Strong operational efficiency and control model, 
cutting costs to reinvest in brands, assets, people 
:.- World class manufacturing, driving productivity and 
flexibility 
» Procurement based on detailed supplier cost 
structure insight 
Organization capability » Structured to match strategy 
;... Performance management, new talent recruitment 
,- A vigorous, fact-based and meritocratic corporate 
culture 
2. Does each brand have its own strategy in terms of cost vs. differentiation? Can 
we have an example of one such strategy (for instance for Castle)? 
Furthermore, who is SABMilier's main target customer, or is it different for 
each brand? 
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- Different for each brand. Target demographics by age, gender, income level, 
ethnicity, and ''personality '' are important inputs to our brand creation and 
management process. Castle Lager certainly has its own strategy - the brand 
imagery has certainly been rejuvenated on the basis of detailed consumer 
research, positioning, vis-ii-vis our other brands and carefid planning of the 
market strategy with an eye on both market goals and return on investment. 
3. What is your strategy in tenus of: 
a) International Strategy: 
There is an obvious need to strike a balance between the need for Global 
Integration of SABMilier as a whole, as well as the need for Local responsiveness 
to specific countries and their domestic situations. How does SABMilier ensure 
that both elements of corporate strategy are adequately addressed? 
By ensuring that local managing directors have sufficient autonomy to run 
their operations and respond to evolving market and competitive landscapes, 
whilst at the same time propagating global functional codes of best practice that 
are monitored and nurtured from the centre e.g. an SABMiller "Marketing Way " 
and "Communications Way". 
b) How do you perceive the relationship between international focus to change 
and develop as the beer market matures in the developing markets? Please 
make specific reference to your level of centralization and decentralization of 
decision making and strategy fonuulation, and what type of international 
organization structure SABMilier aspires to (multinational, International, or 
transnational)? 
We are currently a multinational, evolving toward a more international 
structure. We believe that an incremental shift in balance towards a cross-
border international focus is warranted by the consolidating global industry 
landscape. Global competitors (somewhat new to the sector) dictate 
coordinated international responses, leveraging the economies of scale of an 
international brand portfolio and standard marketing and pricing tools, whilst 
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we also aim to leverage cost synergies from our own cross-border production 
platforms and global procurement relationships with suppliers. 
c) Co-operative Strategy: 
How is the co-operative strategy for the ownership of breweries in developing 
markets like China, adding value to SABMiller as well as to the customer? 
What criteria and how were these partners chosen so as to ensure a strategic fi t 
with the core competencies which would provide synergized value? How are 
these relationships managed and controlled so as to minimize risk of a 
cooperative strategy (possibility of misrepresentation, failure to use 
complementary resources, holding of investment to a ransom, etc)? 
Our cooperative strategy in countries like China allow SABMiller to leverage 
its own operational competencies - sharpened by so much parallel experience 
around the world - as well as the local partner's local stature and 
relationship network. Such a local network is valuable vis-a-vis supplier 
relationships, local government and regulatory I agency relationships, local 
talent management, access to further local M &A opportunities, and in our 
case route to market and retailing synergies given our partner 's network of 
supermarkets. Our partners are selected on this basis - strength of their local 
business and relationship platform as well as harmony of future goals and 
aspirations for the business (reinvestment in growth, managing for 
shareholder value, ethics etc). We then manage our partner relationships on a 
two tier basis: integrated Boards of Directors (e.g. in Chain we also have the 
Chairmanship) and also local managerial representatives of SABMiller. 
Ultimately though, the shared aspirations and ethical values are crucial as 
well. 
Source: Questions by Goble, Muhlwa and Plaskitt, (2003: 16-18). Answers from 
Miller Salzman, SABMiller (2003). 
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Appendix 8.1 Transfer of Core Competencies: Barloworld 
, 
Seven Point Scale 
" 
== t ::J , 
> ~J ci " , 0 ~ ij::(j f- tiJ i 0 Ci ~ « --' . () o/S ~ ro ro ~ ro ro -rc .)= .)= .)= .!= .~ ~ I E E, E El LXi n x 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 7 7 6 4 5 7 5 41 7 5.9 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 49 7 7.0 
2. Post M&A integration teams 6 6 1 1 1 7 1 23 7 3.3 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 5 5 1 1 1 4 1 18 7 2.6 4. Short term secondments 5 4 1 1 1 5 1 18 7 2.6 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 5 6 2 2 2 4 4 25 7 3.6 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 6 7 6 6 7 7 7 46 7 6.6 
7. Seminars / conferences 2 4 1 3 5 3 2 20 7 2.9 
8. Visits 3 7 5 6 7 7 3 38 7 5.4 
9. Manuals and video material 6 5 1 1 1 5 1 20 7 2.9 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 5 7 7 7 7 7 2 42 7 6.0 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 
PI : 1 :1 : 1 ;1 ; 1-;1 44 1 71 6.3 20 7 2.9 
Total LXi 60 66 39 45 48 69 36 363 52.1 
Number n 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 12 
Mean X 5.0 5.5 3.3 3.8 4.0 5.8 3.0 4.3 4.3 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.2 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: SABMILLER AFRICA AND ASIA 
Seven Point Scale 
'" '" OJ OJ C 0 C OJ 0 0 ~ 0 ~ OJ <t c 
:0< ...J ~ 0 ::;: .<= 
ro :5 Ql ...J O/S 0:: " a. Ql ::;: 0 0 E ::;: I I- LXi n x 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 5 5 6 4 5 5 4 34 7 4.9 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 5 5 6 4 5 5 4 34 7 4.9 
2. Post M&A integration teams 2 4 6 4 2 3 4 25 7 3.6 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 4 3 4 1 1 1 14 6 2.3 
4. Short term secondments 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 1.0 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company 
7. Seminars / conferences 5 2 6 1 5 4 23 6 3.8 
8. Visits 6 6 7 4 7 6 36 6 6.0 
9. Manuals and video material 5 2 6 1 5 3 22 6 3.7 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 6 4 7 1 6 6 30 6 5.0 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi·disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership I J'I IF I I 51 41 22 1 5 1 4.4 
Total LXi 38 30 49 17 8 38 33 213 34.7 
Number n 9 9 9 8 3 9 9 56 9 
Mean X 4.2 3.3 5.4 2.1 2.7 4.2 3.7 3.8 3.9 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.3 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: SABMILLER EUROPE 
Seven Point Scale 
<I) >-
Ol C Ol 
c a a 
., Ol ~ 0 Q) a Ol 
-0:: c 
-'" -' OJ a ~ .r. ~ ::; -' 06 " ro a. 0:: Q) ~ 0 0 .!: ~ I f- LXi n x 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 4 5 6 3 5 2 3 28 7 4.0 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 5 4 5 2 7 3 2 28 7 4.0 
2. Post M&A integration teams 7 3 6 3 7 2 4 32 7 4.6 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 1 3 5 1 2 1 5 18 7 2.6 
4. Short term secondments 2 4 2 4 3 3 5 23 7 3.3 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 2 4 2 2 5 3 2 20 7 2.9 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 7 6 5 4 7 2 3 34 7 4.9 
7. Seminars / conferences 2 3 2 3 1 1 1 13 7 1.9 
8. Visits 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 15 7 2.1 
9. Manuals and video material 3 3 2 1 2 2 1 14 7 2.0 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 4 4 6 4 1 4 1 24 7 3.4 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 
I : I : I : I ~ I ~ I ; I : I 161 71 2.3 22 7 3.1 
Total LXi 41 45 45 33 41 26 28 259 37.1 
Number n 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 84 12 
Mean X 3.4 3.8 3.8 2.8 3.4 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.1 
-
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.4 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: SAPPI 
Seven Point Scale 
"' 
:>, 
CJ) CJ) c 0 c CJ) 0 0 t ~ f Qi 0 CJ) <{ c c 
-'" --' 
~ 0 ::;; .<: C1l • ro :; tI) --' <>IS 0:: () ~t C. tI) - . ::;; 0 0 E ::;; I f-- c·_u LXi n -x 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 4 5 6 5 4 6 30 6 5.0 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 2 5 5 4 1 7 24 6 4.0 
2. Post M&A integration teams 2 3 7 4 1 6 23 6 3.8 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 2 2 5 3 2 5 19 6 3.2 
4. Short term secondments 5 5 5 6 5 5 31 6 5.2 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 4 4 4 4 4 4 "---24 6 4.0 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions in wider company 6 5 5 6 5 5 32 6 5.3 
7. Seminars / conferences 5 4 - 4 3 4 20 5 4.0 
8. Visits 6 6 6 6 6 6 36 6 6.0 
9. Manuals and video material 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 6 3.0 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 4 4 4 4 4 4 24 6 4.0 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 6 3.0 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 4 6 - - 3 3 16 4 4.0 
13. Other: Multi -disciplinary/regional teams 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 6 7.0 
14. Other: Leadership 7 7 7 7 7 7 42 6 7.0 
Total LXi 60 64 61 61 54 69 369 63.5 
Number n 14 14 12 13 14 14 81 14 
Mean X 4.3 4.6 5.1 4.7 3.9 4.9 4.6 4.5 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.5 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE 
Seven Point Scale 
>- .ill 
'" 
"C C1l 
C> e C> e ~ a Q) e C> a 0 J'j . ~ ~l ~ a ~ C> <t: e -'" ...J ~ a ~ .c ~~ ~ ::; Q) ...J od U C1l Cl. 0:: ~ -:0 ~ 0 0 e ~ I ew LXi n x 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies 5 7 NA 5 4 4 5 30 6 5.0 
B. Effectiveness of methods used : 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 
2. Post M&A integration teams 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 
4. Short term secondments 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 
I : II ! I I IT-I: I : ' 23 4 5.8 17 3 5.7 17 3 5.7 6 1 6.0 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 
7. Seminars / conferences 
8. Visits 
9. Manuals and video material 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) I : 1 1 J 1 · 1 I ' 1 : 1 1 18 3 6.0 12 2 6.0 18 3 6.0 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 1'1 1'111 -1-411l 1 14 1 31 4.7 
Total LXi 34 37 4 9 30 11 125 45.5 
Number n 6 6 1 2 5 2 22 8 
Mean X 5.7 6.2 4.0 4.5 6.0 5.5 5.7 5.7 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
APPENDIX 8.6 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: COMPANY COMPOSITES (WEIGHTED) 
Seven Point Scale 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 
2. Post M&A integration teams 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 
4. Short term secondments 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 
7. Seminars I conferences 
8. Visits 
9. Manuals and video material 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and others 
13. Other; Multi·disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other; Leadership 
Tota l 
Number 
Mean 
DCi 
n 
x 
BAR A&A 
5.9 4.9 
49 34 
7 7 
23 25 
7 7 
18 14 
7 6 
18 Z 
7 7 
25 
7 
46 
7 
20 23 
7 6 
38 36 
7 6 
20 22 
7 6 
42 30 
7 6 
44 
7 
20 22 
7 5 
363 213 
84 56 
4.3 3.8 
EUR SAP WWW LXi 
4.0 5.0 5.0 24.8 
28 24 23 
7 6 4 158 
32 23 17 
7 6 3 120 
18 19 17 
7 6 3 86 
23 31 § 
7 6 1 85 
20 24 
7 6 69 
34 32 
7 6 112 
13 20 18 
7 5 3 94 
15 36 g 
7 6 2 137 
14 18 
7 6 74 
24 24 1§ 
7 6 3 138 
16 18 
7 6 78 
22 16 14 
7 4 3 94 
42 
6 42 
42 
6 42 
259 369 125 1329 
84 81 22 327 
3.1 4.6 5.7 4.1 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. Methods 13 and 14 not ranked because Sappi only. 
n x 
5 5.0 I :INKx I 
31 5.1 1 2 
30 4.0 4 5 
29 3.0 8 10 
28 3.0 9 10 
20 3.5 12 8 
20 5.6 5 1 
28 3.4 6 9 
28 4.9 3 3 
26 2.9 11 12 
29 4.8 2 4 
20 3.9 
26 3.6 ~ 6 7 
6 7.0 
6 7.0 
61.7 
14 
4.4 w 
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APPENDIX 8.7 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT RANKING METHODS 
Ranking Order 
METHOD NAME 
1 Appoint key people from within company to management positions 
8 Visits 
10 Inclusion in management process 
2 Post- M&A inteoration teams 
12 Benchmark against competitors and others 
6 Rotate managers and key people 
7 Seminar/Conferences 
11 Compensation incentives 
3 Experts deliver, install and return 
4 Short tenm secondments 
9 Manuals and video material 
5 Models or examples 
Method Order 
METHOD NAME 
1 Appoint kev people from within companv to management positions 
2 Post- M&A integration teams 
3 Experts deliver, install and return 
4 Short term secondments 
5 Models or examples 
6 Rotate manaqers and kev people 
7 Seminar/Conferences 
8 Visits 
9 Manuals and video material 
10 Inclusion in management process 
11 Compensation incentives 
12 Benchmark against competitors and others 
WEIGHTED WEIGHTED 
TOTAL MEAN TOTAL MEAN PERCENT 
1 2 1 2 1 
2 3 3 3 3 
3 4 2 4 2 
4 5 4 5 4 
5 7 6 7 6 
8 1 5 1 8 
6 8 6 9 5 
10 6 10 6 12 
9 11 8 11 7 
7 9 9 10 9 
10 12 11 12 10 
12 10 12 8 11 
WEIGHTED WEIGHTED 
TOTAL MEAN TOTAL MEAN PERCENT 
1 2 1 2 1 
4 5 4 5 4 
9 11 8 11 7 
7 9 9 10 9 
12 10 12 8 11 
8 1 5 1 8 
6 8 6 9 5 
2 3 3 3 3 
10 12 11 12 10 
3 4 2 4 2 
10 6 10 6 12 
5 7 6 7 6 
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Appendix 8.8 Transfer of Core Competencies: South African Companies 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 
BAR A&A EUR SAP 
5.9 4.9 4.0 5.0 1 ~:!8 1 n 41 ~o 1 Rank 1 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positio 7.0 4.9 4.0 4.0 19.9 4 5.0 1 
2. Post M&A integration teams 3.3 3.6 4.6 3.8 15.3 4 3.8 5 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 2.6 2.3 2.6 3.2 10.7 4 2.7 11 
4. Short term secondments 2.6 1.0 3.3 5.2 12.1 4 3.0 8 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 3.6 - 2.9 4.0 10.5 3 3.5 12 
- --
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 6.6 - 4.9 5.3 16.8 3 5.6 4 
7. Seminars / conferences 2.9 3.8 1.9 4.0 12.6 4 3.2 7 
8. Visits 5.4 6.0 2.1 6.0 19.5 4 4.9 2 
9. Manuals and video material 2.9 3.7 2.0 3.0 11 .6 4 2.9 9 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 6.0 5.0 3.4 4.0 18.4 3 4.6 3 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 6.3 - 2.3 3.0 11.6 3 3.9 9 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 2.9 4.4 3.1 4.0 14.4 4 3.6 6 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 7.0 7.0 1 7.0 
14. Other: Leadership 7.0 7.0 1 7.0 
Total LXi 
Number n 
Mean x 
52.1 34.7 37.1 63.5 
12 9 12 14 
4.3 3.9 3.1 4.5 1 18:~ I j lr I 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. Rank is based on Total column. Methods 13 and 14 not ranked because Sappi alone. 
640 
APPENDIX 8.9 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: MARKETING 
Seven Point Scale 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 
! BAR I A&A
5
! EU: ! SA: ! WWW
5
! LXi n x 
18 4 4.5 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 5 5 2 12 3 4.0 
2. Post M&A integration teams 2 7 2 5 16 4 4.0 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 4 1 2 5 12 4 3.0 
4. Short term secondments 1 2 5 8 3 2.7 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) - 2 4 ~ 2 c....l-O 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 7 6 13 2 6.5 
7. Seminars / conferences 5 2 5 7 19 4 4.8 
8. Visits 6 3 6 6 21 4 5.3 
9. Manuals and video material 5 3 3 11 3 3.7 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 6 4 4 6 20 4 5.0 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 1 1 ' 1 : 1 11 ,] 
4 2 2.0 
17 4 4.3 
7 1 7.0 
7 1 7.0 
Total LXi 38 41 55 39 173 62.3 
Number n 9 12 13 7 41 14 
Mean X 4.2 3.3 4.2 5.6 4.2 4.5 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.10 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: OUTBOUND LOGISTICS 
Seven Point Scale 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 
I BAR I A&\ I E51 SAP I www I L~~ I n2 1 '5 1 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 5 4 9 2 4.5 
2. Post M&A integration teams 4 3 7 2 3.5 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 3 3 6 2 3.0 
4. Short term secondments 1 4 5 2 2.5 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 4 4 1 4.0 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 
7. Seminars / conferences 
8. Visits 
9. Manuals and video material 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) I I ji ll g-J 6 1 6.0 5 2 2.5 9 2 4.5 5 2 2.5 8 2 4.0 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi·disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership I I 'I : I I ! I i I ~ I i~ 
Total LXi 
Number n 
Mean X I 1 33~ 1 3~~ 1 I 75 44.5 21 12 3.6 3.7 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.11 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: OPERATIONS 
Seven Point Scale 
A. Eslimated degree of success in transferring core competencies . 
BAR I A&A
6
1 EU: I SA: I WWw; j LXi n x 
24 4 6.0 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 6 5 5 7 23 4 5.8 
2. Post M&A integration teams 6 6 3 6 21 4 5.3 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 4 5 2 7 18 4 4.5 
4. Short term secondments 1 2 5 6 14 4 3.5 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 2 4 6 2 3.0 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 5 5 10 2 5.0 
7. Seminars / conferences 6 2 4 12 3 4.3 
8. Visits 7 3 6 16 3 5.3 
9. Manuals and video material 6 2 3 11 3 3.7 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 7 6 4 6 23 4 5.8 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership IE'I 111-'1 6 2 3.0 21 4 5.3 7 1 7.0 7 1 7.0 
Total LXi 49 45 64 37 195 68.5 
Number n 9 12 14 6 41 14 
Mean X 5.4 3.8 4.6 6.2 4.8 4.9 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.12 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: INBOUND LOGISTICS 
Seven Point Scale 
BAR 1 A&A4 1 EU: 1 SAP l www 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 1 LX; 1 n21 :51 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 4 2 6 2 3.0 
2. Post M&A integration teams 4 3 7 2 3.5 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 1 1 2 2 1.0 
4 . Short term secondments 1 4 5 2 2.5 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 2 
- - -----
2 1 2.0 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 4 4 1 4.0 
7. Seminars / conferences 1 3 4 2 2 
8. Visits 4 2 6 2 3.0 
9. Manuals and video material 1 1 2 2 1.0 
10.lnclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 1 4 5 2 2.5 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership [- I 1 ~ I 1 1 21 1 1 2.0 5 1 5.0 
Total LXi 
Number n 
Mean X 1 1 ~.~ 1 2~i 1 1 50 31 .5 20 12 2.5 2.6 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.13 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
Seven Point Scale BAR A&A EUR SAP WWW LXi n x 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 7 5 5 6 NA 23 4 5.8 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 7 5 7 5 24 4 6.0 
2. Post M&A integration teams 6 2 7 7 22 4 5.5 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 5 2 5 12 3 4.0 
4. Short term secondments 5 1 3 5 14 4 3.5 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 5 5 4 14 3 4.7 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 6 7 5 18 3 6.0 
7. Seminars / conferences 2 1 3 2 1.5 
8. Visits 3 1 6 10 3 3.3 
9. Manuals and video material 6 2 3 11 3 3.7 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 5 1 4 10 3 3.3 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 
[[-I :1 r 1 13 3 4.3 5 2 2.5 7 1 7.0 
7 1 7.0 
Total LXi 
Number n 
Mean X ~~ I JI }~I 5~~ I 170 62.3 39 14 4.4 4.5 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.14 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Seven Point Scale 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies . 
I BA~ I A&A5 1 EU: I SA: I WWW5 LXi n x 
24 5 4.8 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 7 5 3 4 4 23 5 4.6 
2. Post M&A integration teams 6 3 2 4 15 4 3.8 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 5 1 1 3 10 4 2.5 
4. Short term secondments 4 1 3 6 14 4 3.5 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 6 3 4 13 3 4.3 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 7 2 6 15 3 5.0 
7. Seminars / conferences 4 5 1 4 14 4 3.5 
8. Visits 7 7 1 6 21 4 5.3 
9. Manuals and video material 5 5 2 3 15 4 3.8 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 7 6 4 4 21 4 5.3 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies aga inst competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 
I ; I 51 ; I ; I I 
11 3 3.7 
9 3 3.0 
7 1 7.0 
7 1 7.0 
Total LXi 66 38 26 61 4 195 62.0 
Number n 12 9 12 13 1 47 14 
Mean X 5.5 4.2 2.2 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.4 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instance. 
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APPENDIX 8.15 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Seven Point Scale 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 
BAR I A&A41 EU~ I SA: I w WW:1 l:Xil n l x 
15 4 3.8 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 4 2 1 7 3 2.3 
2. Post M&A integration teams 4 4 1 9 3 3.0 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 1 5 2 8 3 2.7 
4. Short term secondments 1 5 5 11 3.7 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 2 4 6 2 3.0 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 3 5 8 2 4.0 
7. Sem inars / conferences 4 1 3 5 13 4 3.3 
8. Visits 6 2 6 14 3 4.7 
9. Manuals and video material 3 1 3 7 3 2.3 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 6 1 4 11 3 3.7 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 
In I f ~ 111 41 4 2 2.0 12 4 3.0 7 1 7.0 
7 1 7.0 
Total l:Xi 
Number n 
Mean X [ 33: I 22: I 35:1 --:: I 124 51 .7 37 14 3.4 3.7 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.16 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: INFRASTRUCTURE: GENERAL MANAGEMENT 
Q. 
Seven Point Scale 
E <fJ 
<fJ C Q) C 
C 0 115 <fJ 0 C 0 Q) S· ~ "" . E ~ ~ "C . ~ 
'"" 
> 0 
:J. Q) 
ro (5 " 
Q. 
" 
~ Q; ~ cc 
f-W Q) ~ IE <fJ ro:: > x 0 >- Q. ~ -
--,0:: w we 0 is (f) oc ale! LXi n -x 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. 6 4 5 7 5 6 5 4 42 8 5.3 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 54 8 6.8 
2. Post M&A integration teams 1 1 1 7 1 6 - 6 23 7 3.3 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 1 1 1 4 1 5 5 - 18 7 2.6 
4. Short term secondments 1 1 1 5 1 5 - - 14 6 2.3 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) 2 2 2 4 4 4 - - 18 6 3.0 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions 6 6 7 7 7 5 - - 38 6 6.3 
7. Seminars / conferences 1 3 5 3 2 4 - 6 24 7 3.4 
8. Visits 5 6 7 7 3 6 - 6 40 7 5.7 
9. Manuals and video material 1 1 1 5 1 3 - - 12 6 2.0 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) 7 7 7 7 2 4 - 6 40 7 5.7 
11. Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams 
14. Other: Leadership 1 rl ;1 rl 11 :Il 34 6 5.7 18 6 3.0 7 1 7.0 7 1 7.0 
Total LXi 39 45 48 69 36 69 11 30 347 63.8 
Number n 12 12 12 12 12 14 2 5 81 14 
Mean X 3.3 3.8 4.0 5.8 3.0 4.9 5.5 6.0 4.3 4.6 
Note: Figures are rounded in certain instances. 
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APPENDIX 8.17 TRANSFER OF CORE COMPETENCIES: VALUE CHAIN (WEIGHTED) 
,., 
Seven Point Scale 
0> "0 
'" 
0> 
C C ~ c "0:3 0 :;; ~ g (5 
" ~~ c:-=- c (!) ~ !'! "'" ~ ::;; .c J! 0'-.. -0> 
" 
.cO> oc u 
" 0 g cO " ::;; 0-, - -' ::;; I t- .f; LXi n X 
A. Estimated degree of success in transferring core competencies. ~ 1Q ~ 12 .. ~ 1Q ~ 4 2 4 2 4 5 4 8 163 33 4.9 
B. Effectiveness of methods used: 4.5 5.0 6.0 3.5 5.8 4.8 3.8 5.3 38.7 8 4.8 
1. Appoint key people from within company to management positions 12 ~ .. § ~ .. I ~ 3 2 4 • 4 5 3 8 
158 31 5.1 
2. Post M&A integration teams 1Q I <1 I .. 1Q ~ .. 4 2 4 2 4 4 3 7 120 30 4.0 
3. Experts deliver, install and return 12 § ~ • 12 1Q ~ ~ 4 2 4 2 3 4 3 7 86 29 3.0 
4. Short-term secondments ~ 0 11 0 11 11 11 11 3 2 4 2 4 4 3 6 85 28 3.0 
5. Models or examples (other acquisitions or investments) • 1 "- • 11 J.:l § 1Q 2 1 2 1 3 3 2 8 69 20 3.5 
6. Rotate managers and key people from new acquisitions J.:l § 1Q 1 ~ 1Q § ;Ja 2 1 2 1 3 3 2 6 112 20 5.6 
7. Seminars / conferences .!Jl 0 12 1 ~ 11 J.:l ~ 4 2 3 2 2 4 4 7 94 28 3.4 
8. Visits <1 ~ 1Q § 1Q <1 11 19. 4 2 3 2 3 4 3 7 137 28 4.9 
9. Manuals and video material 11 0 11 • 11 1Q Z 12 3 2 3 2 3 4 3 6 74 26 2.9 
10. Inclusion in management process (priority objectives etc) <Q ~ .. 0 1Q <1 11 19. 4 2 4 2 3 4 3 7 138 29 4.8 
11 . Compensation incentives based on achievement of transfer 1 1 • • J.:l 11 1 ;l1 2 1 2 1 3 3 2 6 78 20 3.9 
12. Benchmark core competencies against competitors and other firms 11 Z <1 0 0 ~ 12 1Q 4 2 4 1 2 3 4 6 94 26 3.6 
13. Other: Multi-disciplinary/regional teams Z Z 7 Z Z Z 1 1 1 1 1 1 42 6 7.0 
14. Other: Leadership Z Z Z Z I Z 1 1 1 1 1 1 42 6 7.0 
Total LXi 173 75 195 50 170 195 124 347 1,329 61.7 
Number n 41 21 41 20 39 47 37 81 327 14 
Mean X 4.2 3.6 4.8 2.5 4.4 4.1 3.4 4.3 4.1 4.4 
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APPENDIX 11.1 
POST THESIS EVENTS AND INFORMATION 
Chapter 3. South Africa 
2.3 Political 
On 20 September 2006, a case against former deputy president Jacob luma was 
thrown out of court. State prosecutors, who had been hoping to show that luma took 
bribes from a French arms firm, were unable to complete the indictment. luma was 
cleared of raped charges earlier in the year, after an HIV -positive woman claimed that 
he had assaulted her. (Economist 2006b). 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, delivering the Steve Biko memorial at the University of 
Cape Town on 26 September 2006, warned that South Africa is in danger oflosing its 
moral direction. He said it had failed to sustain the idealism that ended apartheid and 
warned of growing ethnic divisions. The retired Anglican Archbishop opposes ex-
vice president luma becoming president due to his "moral failings". Tutu did state 
that the country had achieved a remarkable degree of stability in 12 years of 
democracy despite problems of poverty, aids, corruption and crime (BBC News 
2006). 
2.11 International Business 
The Old Mutual, which is listed in both Johannesburg and London, acquired Scandia 
in Sweden in 2006. The enlarged group will be similar in size to Prudential of the UK 
and Aegon of Holland. South Africa will still account for 49 percent of the total value 
of Old Mutual ' s business. It will be equal with the UK in terms of the value of new 
business as each will 23 percent, with the US at 19 percent, Sweden 15 percent and 
the rest of the world (primarily Continental Europe outside Sweden) 20 percent 
(Cranston 2006). 
6S0 
MTN, South African company acquired Investcom for R33.S billion. The deal made 
MTN, which is lead by CEO Phuthuma Nhleko, the market leader in the cellular 
business in the Middle East and Africa, with networks in 21 countries and serving 
almost 30 million subscribers (McLeod 2006). McNulty (S May 2006) sees the 
acquisition as reflecting an impressively ambitious global strategy. MTN says it is in 
line with its vision to be the leading provider of telecoms emerging market. 
South Africa's Netcare became one of the world's biggest private health care 
organizations after beating three international companies to win control of Britain's 
General Healthcare Group (GHG) in a R23. 7 billion deal. The bid beat direct 
competition from three international private equity rivals - KKR, Cinven and 
Blackstone - for the 49 hospital chain (Philip 2006). 
Economist (2006a:S9) carried an article "South African business: going global". The 
article mentions how quickly South African Breweries moved to establish a global 
strategic position. It also states: "South Africa is now one of the top investors in sub-
Saharan Africa, and has helped to spur economic development. New mines mean 
more exports and foreign exchange. Millions of Africans have access to phones, 
often for the first time." 
The Swiss mining group Xstrata's acquisition of Canadian miner Falconbridge lifted 
its market capitalization to more than US$SO billion compared to Anglo American's 
$69 billion. The Chief Executive of Xstrata is Mick Davis from South Africa who 
was previously Head of Finance at Billiton and Escom (2006b). 
Chapter 5. Corporations Studied 
S.4 SABMiller 
SABMiller revenue increased by 19 percent to $IS,307 million for the financial year 
to March 2006. Adjusted EPS improved by 11 percent. (SABMiller Annual Report 
2006) The total shareholder return since listing in London in 1999 amounted to 21S 
percent compared to the 20 percent achieved by FTSE 100 index. 
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The company communicated four strategic priorities: 
• Creating a balanced and attractive global spread of businesses 
• Developing strong, relevant brand portfolios in the local market 
• Constantly raising the performance oflocal businesses 
• Leveraging our global scale 
"Where something is done well within the group, we ensure that all our 
businesses learn and apply the lessons. This way, each operation benefits to 
the fullest extent from the skills, resources and experience of SABMiller as a 
whole. (Annual Report 2006:3) 
5.5 .s.rumi 
Chief Executive Jonathon Leslie resigned in March 2006. Van As will act as CEO 
until a successor to Leslie is appointed. McNulty (2006a) comments that it appears 
Sappi ' s decision to look outside the paper industry for a successor to Van As failed. 
McNulty (2006c) lists Sappi's travails. These include problems with management 
succession planning, a strong rand, spiraling input costs, operational issues at some 
mills, logistical difficulties in the US, continuing operating losses, tough market 
conditions (particularly in Europe) and rising debt. He believes the poor result should 
be blamed on bad markets and management (and the board). He also notes taht 
chairman and acting CEO Eugene van As is at the centre of Sappi' s battle to turn its 
fortunes around and that a recovery in market conditions is the key factor to the 
turnaround. 
5.6 Wolverine World Wide 
Wolverine World Wide revenue increased to $1061 million for the financial year to 
December 2005. The return on equity improved from 15.1 percent to 16.2 percent. 
EPS increased from $1.09 to $1.27. This is the fifth consecutive year of double-digit 
EPS increases. 
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The five year Cumulative Shareholder Return beat both the S & P 600 Footwear 
Index and the S & P Small Capital 600 Index. See Appendix 11.3. 
The company announced a plan to drive itself to a new stage of strategic development 
- evolving Wolverine from a leading multi-branded footwear global business into a 
leading multi-branded global footwear, apparel and accessories company (Annual 
Report 2005). 
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APPENDIX 11.2 
SABMILLER CUMULATIVE TSR PERFORMANCE 2001-2006 
1~TIR __ ~ ", "I 
- ,. . .. z 
~'-------------------------------------
10 
t.Mrch OI 
-~....:;..- . 
--
The above graph compares the company's TSR of the period from I April 2001 to 31 
March 2006 with the FTSE 100 Total Return Index over the same period, 
The total return to shareholders since the UK listing in 1999 is 215% compared with 
20% for FTSE 100 as a whole (as measured 31 March 2006), 
Source: SABMiller Annual Report 2006:5 and 2006:52, 
• 
APPENDIX 11.3 
WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE CUMULATIVE TOTAL STOCK 
HOLDER RETURN 2000-2005 
Wolverine's Stock Price Performance 
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The following graph compares the cumulative total stockholder relurn on Wolverine common stock to the Standard & 
Poor's Smull Cup 600 jndex and the Standard & Poor's 600 Footwear Index, assuming an investment of $100.00 at 
lhc beginning of the period indicated. Wolverine is part of the Standard & Poor's Smull Cap 600 Index and the 
Standard & Poor's 600 Footwear Index. In addition to Wo1verine, the Standard & Poor's 600 Footwear Index 
currently consists of Brown Shoe Company, Inc., K-Swiss Inc. (Class A), and The Stride Rite Corporation. These 
indices are weighted based on the market capilalizution of the companies included in each index. 
Cumulative total stockholder return is measured by dividing: (i) the sum of the cumulative amount of dividends for 
the measurement period, assuming dividend reinvestment, and the difference between the share price at the end and 
the beginning of the measurement period; by {ii) the share price at the beginning of the measurement period. 
Five Year Cumulative Tota! Retum Summary 
300 
250 
m 200 
a:: 
<'l'.: 150 
..J 
..J 
.f>-0 100 Q ......... . ..... .....,. 
--" -)E....... .--
50 
0 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
-0-- Wolverine --fr-- S&P Small Cap 600 Index 
... *.... S&P 600 Footwear Index 
The dollar values for total stockholder return plotted in the graph arc shown in the table below: 
S&P S'&:P 600 
Itiscai Small Cap Footwear 
Year-End Wolverine 600 Index Index 
2000 8100.00 SlOO.OO $100.00 
2001 8100.94 $107.43 $ 75.44 
2002 $103.23 $ 90.83 S 91.63 
2003 $140.79 $126.44 $151.81 
2004 $215.30 $154.82 $173.92 
2005 $233.56 S166.71 $205.06 
Source: Wolverine World Wide: Notice of Annual General Meeting 2006:13. 
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APPENDIX 11.4 
LEADING SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES 2006 
. SA GIANTS' 
Reobo! by Tl.I'nDVCr Talal Dssels b'" Equity funds Ntt profit FinanriaJ _.. , Company Rm Rm ""Rm RM Rm ylllJ' end 
BHP 8i!lrtol! Pi: •••. 198570,5 274261 ,7 217 641,9 11\ W5,4 40140,9 J\IIl 200S 
BHP BilktoR Pk •••• • 157 841,4 208600,0 206954,1 1110 937,9 22558,6 lUll 2004 
AneJo Ame.ritcn PIt •• . • HI 647,7 281971,6 353645,3 143103,4 16136,4 De< 2004 
Anglo AmeriUlO PI( • .. 124246,7 277 160,0 219833,6 137140,0 12560,0 ik< 2003 
- - --.----.--.-.----
SABMiller PI! •• " 80130,4 52261,1 181220) 6019,7 7658,4 Mor 2005 
SABMllif'l' PIe •••••• .. , 71 936,7 47 449,4 107909,6 183,5 6050,6 Mot 2004 
-.. ---
Sonlom .............. 70731,0 225 817,0 39742,0 25 724,0 7 799,0 Dec 2004 
SC;n1om •••••••••••••• 48 883,0 193944.0 335'8,3 18830,0 3263,0 Dt( 2003 
-----
Sasol ....... ,. ..... 69239,0 81571,0 158 715,7 4l486,O 1254',0 lUll WDS 
50101. ...... .. 60 m,o 71 589,0 98030.6 3746t O 7116,0 Joo 2{lO4 
The Bllhesl Group . • .. 62811,8 18 071,7 36750.' -4 11 t.J 1 992,2 Joo 200S 
The Bldusl GfGllp . • •• ••. 51 262,2 15 82~,7 22 527,7 3811,2 1 6408 JUll 2004 
O~ MuruoJ PI, .. .. ..... 53271 ,7 703 880,4 117 641 ,6 23891 ,3 8369,6 0.2004 
Ok! Mulual Pk .• .• .•• , 54 488,1 667750.0 60666,9 16964,3 6 964,3 De( 2003 
._----- --_._---_.-._---.. 
- ----
Standard Bonk Group , •.• 45819,0 628528,0 114899,2 4321 4,0 8326,0 De< 20114 
Stondard Bonk Group 45337,0 538996,0 85039,8 28 706.0 6959,0 Dot 2003 
relearn ..•.••.•... 43117,0 56 538 0 87m,4 22250,0 7 ~3~0 Mill" 2005 
1.0..." .... 
.. -
40795,0 51684,0 59853,1 21287,0 6336,0 Moe 200; 
10 Imperlol HOOlJngs •• • . . • 42 546,0 27 868,0 35545,2 8515,0 I '41,0 J~n 200S 
12 Imperiol Haldlng! •••• 35 278,0 22465,0 21415,0 8236,0 1 639,0 Jun 2004 
-- - - - - ------
11 FirstRol1!l •••••••••••• 40 306,0 460595,0 11 2 300,6 29265,0 9208,0 11m 2005 
14 FirSlRand ••••••••• _ •••• 34918,0 424263,0 72 999,4 24 218,0 5857,0 Jun W04 
12 8arloworld .... 3! 401,0 2508(0 3023.1,7 8823,0 1 958,0 50p 2005 
10 RorIo"A'orld • ••• 36673,0 24757,0 22729,6 8905.(i 1788,0 lop 200' 
13 Abso (jfollll ...• 351102,0 348328,0 77 355,2 2'113,0 6215,0 Mar ro05 
I 
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APPENDIX 11.4 
LEADING SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANIES 2006 (continued) 
SA GIANTS (ont 
Rallhd by TuraoVlf Torol IIsset!> 
-" 
Eqllity f.ch Nt t prdir r. ndol 
lumover {4II1p. y Roo Rm <ap R. Rm Rm y.or fftd 
11 ~~a GI\IlIjl •.•. 35611 ,0 306 81~0 493')1,2 10023,6 4784,0 Mol 2004 
14 5uppi . .. . -, . J1961.8 35853,S 21 999,4 13 662,4 -159,2 S6p 2005 
15 SDPP' . .... 30503,2 39031,3 18265,1 15714.2 335,5 ~p 2001 
15 Pit:k 'n Puy Sl",1!S . 31885,0 5460,0 14681,2 4,3 564,0 Ftb 2005 
16 PKk 'n ~DY St~re! 29216,1 \ 161,1 10962,3 106,1 49 1,9 feb 2004 
16 Hedlxlflk .. 30661,0 321624,0 57912,6 134&3,0 3617,0 0.. 2004 
13 H,"""f .. - .. 35062,0 304349,0 29666,0 6191 ,0 1709,0 Il« 2003 
17 Richemonl Seruml&<. .loG . 19175,8 7991 9,' 152 631,8 65 096,8 7451,6 Mar 2005 
IB rimamon! ~e[urillf'S AC . , 26162,8 71534,9 101 B4~2 54 3'B,B 2240,3 "'" 2004 
------
IB Shopnle Holdillfll. 29812,9 8 121.,5 12 22B,3 1610,1 583,2 Jun 200~ 
17 Sh!Jjlnlc Hi".Idlflgi 26141,1 770~' 1521,2 1831 ,3 491.1 Jun 2004 
19 MTII brD\IJI . 28994,0 26820,0 102345,0 12 96 '~0 6 500,0 Mar 2005 
20 l.I.TH Groop 23 B71 ,O 201·14,D 73149,9 8079.0 4387,0 MOl 2004 
10 Ma;snulfl HoidlllQ! 26561,4 6910,4 11 66~ , 9 25.9 625,9 Ju ~ !005 
21 M!lS'iII1(lr1 Holdings . 23781.1 6~4.2 8366,0 1026,5 678,7 JIM 2004 
11 AiI!Ilo AmeriOIll Pialmum Corp 23308,4 36 3033 122283,3 21 140,6 45lD,9 Orc 1005 
21 Anglo AmencD!l P!chnum (orp 19624,8 32777,1 50875,0 18730,7 3487,9 DN: 20(}..\ 
-- ---- -- - - -
22 Mlllul SUd ~ 23 053,0 13851,0 28216,1 17 H4.G 5085,0 Oe( 200~ 
23 Mmul SiGel SA 18 &38.0 185Jh,O 28301,3 B741 ,O 2518,0 D£t 2003 
13 1.Jb~f1y Groop 20554,0 109 316,1) 24 740) 8431.0 3573,0 Del: 20il4 
14 liberty Group 18111.8 96281,9 17931 ,5 8421.7 2682,8 Un 2003 
14 Steinhoff htlono:r110nol HoIdlllps 191144 10146,9 25190,1 4559,6 1 .59,8 Jun 1005 
39 SI~lIIhoff InI~mG1IQOQllloldln!JS 10572,1 1289&4 15091,5 57&33 13114.3 !un 2004 
21 Dmtll5lOn DlIto HDId •.•.• 17374,9 910S,5 7906,0 1143,0 138,8 Scp 2005 
Source: Financial Mail Top Companies 2006b:29-30, 
